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Abstract 
The problem of the ‘mountain man’, the caricature of self-sufficiency and 
individualism, is not a new one for autonomy theorists. It seems plausible that 
there is genuine value in self-direction according to one’s deeply-held principles. 
If autonomy involves something like this, then anyone concerned with autonomy 
as a social rather than individualistic phenomenon must explain what (if anything) 
the mountain man gets wrong when he denies that his autonomy admits of being 
placed under obligations to others. In particular, the mountain man challenges 
autonomy-minded social anarchists: if his denial of legitimate non-voluntary 
obligations is correct, then it is not just the state we should reject, but any 
organising body with coercive powers. This may be consistent with individualist 
anarchism or right-libertarianism, but it sits ill with the social anarchist intuition 
that we can have genuine political obligations (albeit not to the state). 
My thesis addresses this problem in three stages. First, I argue for a functional 
analysis of authority and autonomy: the concepts are not pre-existing 
“immovable objects”, but rather are defined by the role that they are intended 
to play in our discourse. I suggest that we need a concept of political or 
institutional authority in order to resolve co-ordination problems and pursue 
collaborative social goods, and a concept of autonomy to explain when and why 
self-direction is valuable. 
Second, I defend a social-relational conception of autonomy. The autonomous 
agent is powerful and authoritative, where this power and authority is in large 
part constituted, rather than merely affected, by the social structures and 
relations that we stand in. We are powerful and authoritative (and thus 
autonomous), I argue, when we stand in relations of non-domination: we are not 
vulnerable to arbitrary interference in our lives, and this non-vulnerability is 
defended in virtue of recognition respect for us as agents. There are two 
important implications of this account: that autonomy comes with a built-in 
equality condition whereby everybody’s autonomy is threatened if anybody’s is, 
and that there is no principled distinction to be drawn between ‘personal’ and 
‘political’ autonomy. 
In the last three chapters, I suggest an autonomy-justified conception of 
authority. I argue for autonomy as the crucial collaborative good which 
authoritative institutions help us to pursue, and suggest that such institutions 
may legitimately claim authority if they act or effect actions in ways which are 
likely to promote or defend autonomy-constituting relations, and act or effect 
actions in ways consistent with maximal equal autonomy. Finally, I return to the 
anarchist argument, showing that while my accounts of autonomy and authority 
give us a plausible picture of how autonomy is compatible with genuinely 
authoritative institutions, this picture still has no room for the state.  
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1 
Autonomy and Authority: The Problem of the Mountain Man 
Introduction 
In this thesis, I argue for a social-relational account of autonomy and a 
conception of authority – the autonomy-justified conception – on which authority 
is defined functionally according to the goal of maximal equal autonomy in that 
social-relational sense. The motivating force for the argument comes from two 
familiar intuitions: that there is great value to the autonomous life, and that 
living such a life need not imply an anti-social or profoundly individualistic 
existence. The former is perhaps more often endorsed than the latter, but that 
we can be autonomous while (or through) living a life richly laden with 
obligations to others is implicitly suggested by anybody who holds that friendship, 
family and community can be important parts of an autonomous life.1 
These intuitions are challenged by what I call the mountain man problem, the 
hypothetical (and, in fact, actual) interlocutor who asserts that his autonomy is 
simply inconsistent with any political authority or obligation. Although a general 
problem for political authority, the mountain man is a particular challenge to 
democratic authority justified through autonomy, and to the view that although 
states must fail to respect autonomy, not all political authority is inconsistent 
with autonomy.  
This challenge dates at least as far back as RP Wolff, although there are parallel 
arguments to be found in, for example, Marx’s attack on proto-anarchists and 
anarchists and, from the other end of the spectrum, in Stirner’s thorough-going 
egoism.2 The central claim of my thesis is that although we ought to buy at least 
part of Wolff’s conclusion – autonomy really is inconsistent with the state – being 
able to consistently reject state authority without falling into an implausibly 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Friedman (2003), Oshana (2006), and Meyers (2005). 
2 See Wolff (1998), Stirner (2009), and Marx (2008). More recently, see Miller (1984) for a useful 
critical overview of the individualist versus communist discourse. 
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individualistic account of autonomy requires that we re-assess our conceptions 
of both autonomy and authority. In other words, autonomy-minded anarchists 
should reject state authority but not political authority, because political 
authority is a requirement for the kind of social and egalitarian autonomy 
(rather than autonomy as unrestricted choosing) which anarchists aim at.3 
There is a great deal of preparatory work to be done first, however. Two 
questions arise immediately. What is it for autonomy and authority to be in 
tension in the first place? What are the concepts being used here such that they 
seem incompatible? In this chapter, I suggest a plausible initial picture of 
autonomy and authority, and show how the problems raised by the mountain 
man are not easily solved by democratic procedures. 
Although, obviously, there will be detailed examination of both notions later in 
the thesis, it will be helpful to make sure that we’re all on more or less the 
same page from the start. 
Autonomy is, in its etymologically strictest and least interesting (for our 
purposes) form, self-legislation.4 We are autonomous just insofar as what we do 
follows from what we want to do (or think we ought to do, think would best fit 
with our goals, and so on – I leave this very vague for now). The autonomous 
agent isn’t a wanton choice-making machine, nor are they the psychological 
puppets of someone else; rather, their actions are determined by some 
reasonably consistent and consistently endorsed set of principles which the 
agent holds. Thus, I autonomously eat a cheese sandwich if I decide that eating 
the sandwich is the best way for me to pursue my goal of having lunch, I eat less 
autonomously if I am only eating the sandwich because my mother has pressured 
me into it; and if I have some unusual dairy addiction or have been hypnotised 
into believing that I like cheese, my sandwich-eating is not autonomous at all. 
Such a bare-bones picture leaves much to be explained – for a start, we might 
                                                          
3 Throughout this thesis, I use “anarchist/anarchists” to refer exclusively to the communist 
anarchist position unless specifically noted otherwise – whether or not Stirner’s individualism, 
for example, has any conceptual or historical claim on the word, it is not one of the family of 
political theories being picked out when I refer to anarchist thought. 
4 See Christman (1988) for a useful survey of various conceptions of autonomy. 
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want to ask questions about how and why I come to believe that eating the 
sandwich best serves my lunch-based principles – but it does, I believe, capture 
the central intuition that most of us have about autonomy: it involves directing 
our lives as best we can to fit with our preferences and our beliefs about what is 
valuable. Minimally, then, autonomy requires that we be powerful and 
authoritative over our lives; powerful so that we can actually exercise our self-
direction, and authoritative because this direction is specifically ours to 
decide.56 
Authority, on the other hand, can be thought of as the right to legislate (broadly 
understood) for others: I am authoritative over you, or over something, insofar 
as I can demand that you do or refrain from doing something and have this 
demand take on a moral nature.7 Although the idea of a morally required 
obedience does not translate well across all senses of authority it is clearly 
relevant in terms of political authority, or the ability of some institution to 
legitimately command obedience of some group or groups of people.8 In 
particular, political authority seems to have some requirement that an 
institutional ability to command be connected with features of the institution 
itself. For example, the putative political authority of the British government is 
taken to be correlated with its following certain democratic procedures, being 
constituted in such-and-such a way, so that it may not demand obedience 
without satisfying the correlative requirements (and/or that it only has authority 
in a realm delineated by these requirements). 
This first pass at autonomy and authority gives us the following very bare-bones 
definitions. Autonomy is self-direction according to one’s goals and values; the 
autonomous agent’s life is more or less under her control. Authority is the ability 
                                                          
5 I return to these requirements, and examine what they entail, in Chapter 4. 
6 Although each of them gives a different conception of autonomy, this very broad and rough 
intuition is shared by Christman (1989), Colburn (2010), Friedman (2003), Oshana (2006) and 
Raz (1986) among others. Even those who – as I do, following Oshana – argue that autonomy is 
largely a matter of external circumstances more complicated than simply the satisfaction of 
authentic desires are clearly concerned with what it is to be self-directing in the appropriate 
way, rather than denying that self-direction is an appropriate component of autonomy. 
7 See, for example, Carr (1983), Raz (1979) and Wolff (op. cit.). 
8  Whereas we ‘obey’ an epistemic authority by believing them or perhaps by adopting the 
recommended course of action, and any moral imperative is often indirect if it is present at 
all. 
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to command others, backed with moral force – when we are given an 
authoritative order, we ought to obey.  
So far, so (relatively) uncontroversial. Although not all political theorists attach 
as much importance to autonomy as I do, it is a very common value in, at least, 
Western liberal thought. Authority is even more widely accepted as a concept 
which must figure in any account of political institutions – arguably, the notion 
of authority is the most crucial conceptual component of the state, often used 
as a distinguishing factor between government and a friendly society (or 
government and any other band of thugs). Clearly, then, any account of political 
institutions – at least, any autonomy-minded account – must find a principled 
way of incorporating both of these concepts. We want, in short, some way to 
reconcile the importance of autonomous self-direction with the value of 
collective and authoritative decision-making: some account which vindicates the 
intuition that autonomy is valuable, and explains why the value of autonomy 
(correctly understood) does not entail rejecting any and everything which would 
restrict our range of choices. 
It is here that the mountain man emerges from his bunker, and his challenge is 
far more serious than our intuitions might suggest. 
 
1. The Mountain Man 
The mountain man archetype is known by many names, but whether we call him 
a survivalist, a militiaman, or a mountain man, his essential details remain the 
same. From Thoreau’s Walden (1995) to the story of Christopher McCandless told 
by Into the Wild (1996), key themes recur time and again: independence, self-
reliance, a rejection or standing outside of society. The mountain man is 
beholden to nobody and nobody is beholden to him. You may do just as you wish 
outside his patch of land, for that is your business, but you may not interfere 
with what he does on that land, nor may you make any demands of him. He 
would no doubt come to the aid of a hiker who fell and broke their leg on the 
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passing track – but, crucially, he would not be obliged to do any more than the 
bare dictates of morality demand, and any attempt to coerce him into 
compliance would mark an unjustifiable infringement of his freedom. 
So much the worse for mountain man, we might think. His life is not one to 
aspire to, and his picture of freedom an unappealing portrait of rampant 
individualism with strong overtones of parody masculinism. I tend to agree.9 The 
problem for the autonomy theorist is this: 
If autonomy consists in self-direction, then we cannot disagree with the 
mountain man’s assertion that being forced to (for example) contribute to a 
Hiker Rescue Fund constitutes a restriction of his autonomy. We may – and 
perhaps should – press upon him the importance of solidarity, empathy, altruism 
and so forth, but insofar as we respect autonomy, we must accede to his 
demands to be left alone.  
The problem extends further. We have so far only considered a sort of paradigm 
example, a specific problem whereby it looks like I can give no autonomy-
minded reason for the mountain man to change his stance.10 But exactly the 
same difficulty strikes when we try to make the case for any autonomous agent 
being coerced into doing anything that does not figure in their plans for self-
direction. If we can’t make mountain man help the hiker, it’s not obvious why 
we can make Mrs Brown next door stop plastering her house with racist posters, 
or what gives us the right to demand that healthcare providers be forced to 
provide healthcare regardless of their religious opposition to particular people 
accessing those services.  
In short, it begins to look as if the problem is not one of autonomy and rugged 
individualists, but one of autonomy and authority: if autonomy is (roughly) self-
direction and authority is (roughly) the right to over-ride that self-direction, 
                                                          
9 Although it does seem fair to observe that anyone who has not, on occasion, felt the urge to 
take to the backwoods and ward off governance with a shotgun must be a citizen of some 
undiscovered Utopia. 
10 To be clear: we might still have other reasons, doubtless moral ones, to offer the mountain 
man. The problem is specifically that an attempt to generate obligations on the basis of 
autonomy seems to fail, and so I’ve focussed on that to the exclusion of other possibilities. 
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then one of the two has to go. We either drop authority and let countless petty 
fiefdoms spring up – the “thousand stinkworts blooming” approach – or we 
expropriate mountain man’s Appalachian hideaway and let the autonomy 
theorists go hang.  
It is worth being clear about the implications of these approaches. If there is no 
such thing as a social or political institution with the right to make demands on 
us, then unless and until humans become near-angels motivated by altruism and 
benevolence the anarchist society does not look appealing, for the anarchist 
‘society’ at best looks like a collection of family units or micro-states 
maintaining an uneasy peace. Kropotkin (1972) famously thought that in the 
absence of exploitation and competition we would be so motivated; but, 
although there is much about his account that is plausible, the claim that 
humans are by default moral and considerate agents is surely too contentious to 
rest a revolution on. 
Equally, if we really are concerned with self-direction then it won’t do to 
dismiss the anarchist rejection of state authority as callow or narrowly 
individualist: there should be a damn good reason to prevent someone from 
living as they would like, and it is fairly obvious that the justifications we are 
given for the authority of actual states are not sufficient to provide such a 
reason. Even when the justifications are not actively misleading or misconceived, 
they go unmet: we don’t consent to state authority, the state does not make 
most people better citizens, and state governments don’t effectively represent 
their constituents. So the anarchist may with understandable derision ask what 
reasons apart from fear or narrow self-interest we have to obey the state. 
The rest of this chapter is concerned with one type of response to this problem 
of autonomy and authority: various attempts to resolve it through the authority 
of democracy. I argue that none of the autonomy-minded justifications for 
democratic authority work given the prevalent conceptions of autonomy, and 
that if these arguments were the only resources available then the problem 
really would be impossible to overcome. 
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2. Autonomy and Democracy 
I think, and shall argue, that the mountain man problem above gives us a strong 
motivation to be sceptical about one or other of the concepts of autonomy and 
authority outlined earlier, and that the criticisms which have been made of 
these concepts, although ultimately defeasible, deserve our attention. However, 
it would perhaps be dialectically unhelpful to move straight from problem cases 
to entertaining the thought that these problem cases are fatal without first 
entertaining relevant attempts to solve the problem. In particular, one family of 
arguments within political philosophy seems apt for just such a task: the group 
of arguments which purport to show that concern for autonomy ultimately 
justifies political obligation within democracies. That is, arguments from 
autonomy to democratic authority, if they are successful, will be able to 
reconcile autonomy with authority by showing that the latter is necessary or 
valuable for the former. Since this is one of the key goals of my project, it would 
be remiss not to sketch such arguments and show how I think they fail. 
In the context of self-direction specifically within society, we might say that 
autonomy consists in shaping and bringing about the collective principles, rules 
and institutions of our community. When we take part in such procedures, we 
are after all making decisions about the course of our (though also others’) lives: 
not always immediate and direct “what shall I have for lunch?” decisions, but 
nonetheless decisions which will, even if indirectly, shape how my life goes. 
When I decide which of three jobs to pursue, my decision reflects my values and 
beliefs, at least if I am autonomous, and there are obvious parallels between 
this and a political decision about, say, public funding for jobs training.  
One particularly striking parallel is that the smaller our role in making or relative 
power to influence these decisions is, the less autonomous we are; just as my 
decision about whether or not to eat a cheese sandwich seems to become less 
and less autonomous (as my values play an increasingly small role in it) when it 
is the result of misinformation, threats, brainwashing or the like. Conversely, we 
are on the whole more autonomous the more integrated we are into the 
decision-making process – the subject of a tyrant is less autonomous than the 
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citizen of a democracy in virtue of having less power to take part in collective 
decisions.  
A further, perhaps obvious, point to note is that autonomy in this sense is taken 
to be valuable. There are difficult questions to answer about the extent to which 
completely unmoralised autonomy is inherently valuable, but it seems 
reasonable to say that at least ceteris paribus, infringing or restricting 
someone’s autonomy is bad. If we think that there is value in a self-directed life, 
then it follows that we have a reason, albeit a defeasible reason, to object to 
that self-direction being compromised. Part of why we regard the tyrant as a 
malevolent entity, after all, is precisely because they unfairly impinge upon the 
autonomy of those they rule. Notably, we tend to think that citizens under a 
dictatorship which allowed ‘personal’ rights such as freedom of expression or 
movement, but denied ‘political’ or ‘civil’ rights like voting and the right to 
association, would still be severely lacking in autonomy; not, or not solely, as 
part of a collective agent which can have or lack autonomy, but on the 
individual scale.11 If I can have no say over some range of decisions which affect 
me (among others), then it seems plausible to say that I am less self-directed 
and by hypothesis less autonomous. 
This is the point at which democratic solutions to the problem can be introduced. 
Democracy, for a concept which is so widely treated, remains surprisingly woolly. 
This fuzziness has a major effect on the plausibility of its various justifications – 
it would, for example, be significantly more difficult to run an autonomy-based 
justification for liberal representative democracy than it would to run a 
welfarist argument in support of the same.12 Similarly, the difficulties posed by 
unanimous democratic systems are of an entirely different nature to those posed 
by majoritarian democracies, since questions of consent which afflict the latter 
do not trouble the former. For the purposes of this chapter, ‘democracy’ is thus 
taken to refer to a direct majoritarian system unless specified otherwise; that is, 
                                                          
11 I return to this example in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
12 Such an argument would still be reliant on controversial epistemic and empirical claims, but 
would be much less conceptually tangled: all the welfarist has to show is that our well-being 
is, even if only just barely, better served by liberal democracy than by (say) direct democracy 
or a benevolent dictatorship. See Schofield (2006) and Mill (1974) for more on the 
Benthamite/Millian utilitarian justifications for democracy. 
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when I speak of democracy I am speaking of a decision-making procedure 
whereby every eligible citizen may vote on any and every proposal, and a simple 
majority is enough to pass the proposal. 
In the contemporary literature at least, the demands of autonomy are 
consistently cited as motivation for democracy and for the concurrent 
democratic authority. Liberal-democratic systems are purported either to evince 
respect for autonomy by their very nature, or – more modestly – to be the “least-
worst” form of coercive government in terms of trading off some autonomy in 
order to more firmly secure the remainder (and any other goods which might be 
in play).13 To use a familiar example, democracy is taken by those in the 
Rawlsian tradition to be the form of government which would be chosen by any 
rational agent standing behind the notorious veil of ignorance: in a democracy 
we have the best overall chance of our autonomy being on the whole respected 
or promoted.14 If we care about autonomy, then something like rational 
compulsion demands that we accept the authority of democratic institutions in 
at least some contexts.  
Traditional arguments from autonomy to democracy can be split into two groups. 
The first take there to be one or more features of democracy which, as a matter 
of conceptual necessity, pay heed to or promote our autonomy. On these views, 
there is something about the democratic process which is inseparable from 
valuing self-direction; a feature, or features, of democracy explicable or 
valuable only by reference to the importance of the autonomous life. If such 
arguments can be made to work, there is shared conceptual ground between 
autonomy and democracy and the problem of the mountain man should at least 
be soluble. The problem, of course, is that if the arguments fail, then the 
autonomy theorist cannot consistently require democratic authority. If the 
arguments show further that democracy and autonomy have mutually-exclusive 
essential requirements, then not only should autonomy theorists steer clear of 
                                                          
13 Recent arguments from autonomy to (some form of) democracy, or autonomy-minded 
justifications for democracy, can be found in Gould (1988), especially chapters 6 and 8, and 
Cooke (2000). 
14 This is a slightly crude characterisation of the Rawlsian attitude to democracy, which itself 
develops across Rawls’ work, but it is fair to say that democracy fits into the broader 
Rawlsian picture as something that is instrumentally important for the goals of pursuing 
conceptions of the good and developing our moral sense: see, for example, Rawls (1996).  
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democracy, but the democrat cannot justify their system of organisation by any 
reference to autonomy.  
The second group of arguments claim more modestly that democratic decision-
making procedures are, in some or most situations, more likely to have a 
positive effect on autonomy than other processes. That may be because 
democracy is necessarily conceptually friendly to autonomy, in which case the 
second group of arguments would be entailed or implied by the first, or simply 
because it really is the worst form of government for autonomous agents apart 
from all the others. While the success of the contingent justifications would give 
us at least some reason to acquiesce to democratic authority (albeit a somewhat 
self-interested seeming reason), their failure seems not only to make autonomy 
incompatible with autonomy, but also to make this justificatory tactic 
inconsistent with the previous paragraph’s. It is after all difficult to imagine how 
a system which was necessarily autonomy-friendly could consistently fail to 
respect, promote or instantiate autonomy better than any alternatives. By 
analogy, imagine two putative reasons to buy a coffee machine: one is that this 
particular machine has a feature or features which result in excellent coffee, 
and the other is that it will probably produce better coffee than I can currently 
make. If it does not in fact produce excellent coffee, then it might still deliver a 
better cup than I have now; but if it persistently and systematically outputs 
flavourless brownish water which is less enjoyable than my current drink, then 
we can be fairly certain that it lacks one or more features relevant to making 
excellent coffee. 
In other words, the first group of arguments’ failure does not entail the second 
group being unsuccessful – if we can find no necessary links there may still be 
contingent or pragmatic reasons for the autonomy-minded to be democrats – but 
a failure to find any pragmatic reasons rebounds “backwards” along the 
argument and means that there can be no possibility of a conceptual necessity. 
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2.1. Justifying Democracy with Autonomy – Necessary Justifications 
Probably the boldest link drawn between the concepts of autonomy and 
democracy is Rousseau’s.15 In the state he proposes, voting in a particular way 
and under particular conditions is constitutive of a valuable freedom which 
simply does not exist in pre-political society or when we are cut off from 
others.16 On an account of this sort, democracy does not just instantiate 
autonomy. Rather, partaking in it constitutes autonomy in a way that partaking 
in other decision-making procedures doesn’t: we collectively decide upon the 
principles and policies which obtain in our society, and in so doing we realise a 
particular kind of agency, namely the agency of autonomous moral actors.17 If 
these principles are not the kinds of directives that we can legitimately demand 
compliance with, they are empty statements of desire or intent rather than any 
kind of effective self-determination; consequently a need for autonomy within 
society brings with it an obligation to obey certain kinds of collective decisions.  
Although he speaks of freedom rather than autonomy, and is in any case positing 
a kind of freedom of the ‘real’ or rational self which would sit ill with modern 
accounts of personal-political autonomy, Rousseau’s account gives us a useful 
paradigm of the first conceptual justification for democracy from autonomy. 
Hereafter I refer to it as the “constitution” justification: the democratic process 
is a process of self-direction both within the community, and as part of it – 
which is to say, we can play a role in the direction of the community itself. Just 
as being able to choose between jobs or houses allows an agent to pursue their 
goals and their self-conception (that is, the “kind of person” they want to be, or 
the values and traits they regard as important to their identity), so being able to 
effect change with regards to the society they live in allows this self-direction to 
extend beyond a notional private realm. The constitution justification, further, 
appears to give us another reason to reject the mountain man as the correct 
                                                          
15 E.g. Rousseau (1968), Book 1 Ch. 8. 
16 Space precludes a full rehearsal of the preconditions Rousseau suggests, but it is worth 
mentioning the most important: that everyone votes with the general good, as opposed to the 
particular good of some interest group, or simple self-interest, in mind. There is an 
interesting consequence of this which overlaps with some of the problems raised later: if we 
do not vote for the general good, we are not engaged in the kind of activity that democracy 
should aim at, and thus the justification for democracy fails at the conceptual level. See 
Rousseau, Book 2 Ch. 3. 
17 Ibid. 
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picture of the autonomous agent: there are some kinds of autonomy which we 
just can’t have without being embedded or engaged with society, and autonomy 
within society requires, as sketched above, obedience to political authority. 
The second conceptually-necessary justification is connected to but distinct 
from the constitution justification. That claim posits that to live in a democratic 
society is part of what it means to be fully or maximally autonomous, while this 
second approach makes the more modest claim that democracy is necessarily 
respectful of autonomy or of the values which we take to ground the value of 
autonomy (and as such, is hereafter referred to as the “respect” justification).  
One way to think of this is that democracy need not instantiate self-direction in 
order to respect it. Take the example the citizen of a democracy who leads a 
relatively autonomous life insofar as they have their own identity, sets of values 
and so on, but plays no overt political role in their community. They are not 
politically active, do not vote, perhaps they even make the occasional assertion 
that they “don’t do politics”. Assuming the paradoxical benign dictator who 
rules in an enlightened and far-sighted way to further the interests of their 
subjects, such an ‘apolitical’ agent would plausibly be just as self-directed in 
the dictatorship as they would in a democratic system. But should they have 
some epiphanic experience and attempt to become politically active, they would 
very quickly be confronted with the limits of their self-direction. 
While the democracy may not have given the agent any means of self-direction 
they made use of, it did respect that self-direction and afforded it the 
appropriate opportunities. Indeed, part of what it is to be a democracy simply is 
to afford value to self-direction.18 The autocracy, however many kinds of self-
direction it may tolerate, has no basic commitment to the principles which 
motivate our valuing of such self-direction. Thus, one could argue that valuing 
autonomy justifies democratic decision-making on the basis that only 
democracies are necessarily respectful of autonomy by dint of their motivating 
values. 
                                                          
18 Albeit perhaps indirectly or instrumentally – a utilitarian democrat might simply hold self-
direction to be good because it tends to produce the most utility or satisfy the most 
preferences. Nevertheless, they are still plausibly committed to valuing self-direction. 
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There is a third option for autonomy-minded necessary justifications of 
democracy; it is perhaps controversial, but, I think, interesting enough to 
warrant consideration. The proposal is that if we are to value autonomy inter-
subjectively rather than merely egoistically valuing our own autonomy, we must 
value it fairly: I cannot, on the basis of a moral requirement for agential respect, 
demand that my self-direction or self-conception take priority over anyone 
else’s (certainly not without some strong independent argument).19 Thus, if we 
find ourselves in a situation where self-directions clash, we must have some 
appropriate method for resolving this conflict which pays due heed to both (or 
all) parties’ autonomy – and democracy, offering as it does the same input to all 
relevant agents, seems like a strong candidate.20   
This should not and cannot be taken to mean that the condition requires 
everyone to be getting their own way all the time (or no-one to get their own 
way any of the time, although that if anything seems less likely than its 
opposite), but rather that each person’s need or desire for self-direction should, 
ceteris paribus, be taken equally seriously. When it comes to voting, social or 
economic disadvantage should not negatively affect the likelihood of achieving 
one’s preferred result, precisely because of the normative if not practical 
irrelevance of wealth or personal power to the value of being able to self-
direct.21 That is to say, although economic status might well bear on how much 
self-directing one is able to do – if I can’t afford to go swimming every day, my 
chances of becoming an Olympic swimmer are pretty low – there is no reason to 
think that it should bear on how valuable that self-direction is, either 
subjectively or objectively. Prioritising the self-direction of the rich cannot be 
justified by arguing that rich folks’ self-direction is more valuable than everyone 
                                                          
19 In fact, it strikes me that purely egoistic self-direction is more properly thought of as 
autarchy than autonomy – Raz (1986, pp379-382 and 417-419) seems to argue something 
similar - but the distinction is not crucial for present purposes. More importantly, the 
independent support for prioritising one self-conception over another cannot be found in 
some inequality of rational capacities – as has been plausibly argued, once an agent gets 
beyond a basic level of competence, we do not assign them gradated levels of agential 
respect (and shouldn’t attempt to try). This argument is made in Carter (2011, pp538-571), 
and I argue for the equal autonomy requirement elsewhere in the thesis.  
20 Harrison (1993) suggests that the autonomy justification for democracy works something like 
this. 
21 This condition in turn suggests that there must be fairly stringent equality outside the ballot 
box, an implication I return to later in the thesis and which is also discussed by, for example, 
Dworkin (2002, pp194-198)). 
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else’s. The same is true for the other dimensions of advantage or disadvantage 
which affect the opportunities one may in fact have to be self-directing, and yet 
still don’t alter one’s basic status with regards to that value. 
This thought owes much to Christiano’s argument for democracy from equality, 
but it is not quite the same.22 Christiano claims that equality is valuable and 
democracy is thus valuable insofar as it equalises political resources; although 
this claim strikes me as fairly plausible on its own merits, my argument is that 
respect for autonomy incorporates an equality condition whereby respect for any 
agent qua agent requires similar respect for all agents qua agents.23 Democracy, 
then, is justifiable in part because it satisfies this condition.24 
I have given three potential conceptual justifications for democracy from 
considerations of autonomy: the constitutive claim that democracy instantiates 
autonomy through expanding the realm of self-direction, the respect claim that 
it evinces respect for autonomy by virtue of its motivating values, and the 
equality claim that autonomy within society requires some kind of equality 
between agents and their competing claims which democracy is structurally 
suited to provide. If these justifications go through, we have a set of reasons 
which amount to showing that being motivated by a commitment to autonomy 
requires that we have and use a notion of political authority. Albeit for 
somewhat different conceptual reasons, all three conceptual claims give a 
version of the argument that there is some necessary connection between 
autonomy and authority. The extent to which any of these claims can be 
defended is examined in Section 3; for now, I turn to laying out the contingent 
autonomy-based justifications for democracy. 
                                                          
22 Christiano (1993). 
23 By analogy: if I find some trait or skill – say, the ability to balance a spoon on one’s nose – 
admirable, then I must offer equal admiration to every agent insofar as they are equally able 
to a spoon on their nose. While I may overall have variable levels of admiration for people 
who have the same skill at spoon-balancing – perhaps because person A entertains orphans 
with their spoon, but person B (somehow) uses it to steal from pensioners – I cannot argue 
that person B’s ability is any less admirable than person A’s, and if there were to be some 
social benefit due to all and only people who did unusual things with cutlery, A and B should 
be equally likely to receive this benefit. 
24 There are also some similarities between my version of the equality condition and Singer’s 
argument from compromise – see Singer (1973), especially pp30-37. Unlike Singer, though, my 
concern is not whether fair compromise increases utility, but with whether it respects the 
normative basis of autonomy. 
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2.2 Justifying Democracy with Autonomy – Contingent Justifications 
Compared to the necessity justifications above, the two contingent reasons I 
now turn to to support the claim that autonomy justifies democracy are 
relatively straightforward. They share a normative basis of respect for (or 
promotion of) self-direction with the preceding accounts, which is to say that 
our viewing them as justification for democracy is dependent upon viewing the 
maximisation of self-direction as, at least prima facie, a good thing. The first of 
these contingent arguments is what we might call the “maximisation” model, 
whereby democracy’s appeal depends upon a particular means-end calculation 
with regards to our goals. The second approach suggests that democracy allows 
us to develop valuable skills of self-direction which would either be less 
developed, or entirely undeveloped, in non-democratic (or non-social) 
circumstances. 
The maximisation justification, that democracies are or are likely to be the best 
way to maximise our autonomy given particular conditions, can be thought of as 
pseudo-Hobbesian insofar as it seems to arise from precisely the same kind of 
thinking which characterises non-state societies as nasty and brutish.25 Given 
absolute power to effect our wishes, as a Dr Manhattan type, we would have no 
need to fear or even pay heed to others in our society – our self-direction could 
not be influenced or limited by potential malefactors.26 If we were these 
eminently autarchic agents, democracy would serve no purpose and indeed 
might even prove to be a limitation on our self-direction. The flipside of this, of 
course, is that we have no reason to believe that we are (or, speaking in the 
hypothetical, will be) these kinds of agents. Moreover, if we were to exist within 
the same community as such an agent, or within the same community as a 
powerful group of like-minded agents, then at the very least our self-direction 
would be under threat. Absent our being nigh-omnipotent, a Hobbesian “warre” 
where might makes right would thus be contra-indicated by a desire for robust 
self-direction.  
                                                          
25 Hobbes (1651). 
26 Dr Manhattan, a figure in Alan Moore’s Watchmen graphic novel, is (or was) a scientist who 
through the usual comic-book convention of outstanding foolishness and curiously beneficial 
irradiation becomes an immortal, indestructible energy being with the ability to manipulate 
matter at the sub-atomic level.  
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Take this toy example: I have a burning passion for eating as much cake as 
possible, and am faced with two possible ways to get it. One option is to remain 
in a Hobbesian state of nature where I could obtain as much cake as possible by 
force or manipulation, but would be vulnerable to others trying the same tactic 
on me. The other possibility is that I agree to abide by a system of rules which, 
while it would prevent me from taking certain paths to cake (I could not murder, 
extort, etc.) would also prevent others from murdering me in their pursuit of a 
Victoria sponge. 
Weighing these options up, it would take a fairly serious fascination with 
confectionery to decide that the possibility of increased cake outweighs the risk 
of death. The sensible thing to do, then, is to buy into some set of rulers so that 
having the best chance of achieving our goals for the smallest chance of being 
oppressed (or murdered, enslaved, and so on) is not dependent upon our being a 
superhuman or demigod.  
This is where democracy is brought into the picture. If I vote for some relevant 
proposal and it wins, I have effected self-direction without having to climb over 
bodies to do it; if, on the other hand, the vote is lost, then while my desire has 
been frustrated I am not (or at least, am unlikely to be) in any imminent danger 
of death or imprisonment because of my pursuit of this desire. For example: in a 
vote over whether to spend public money on this or that proposal, the worst 
probable outcome is that your proposal loses. Your desires go unsatisfied, and 
perhaps your self-direction (even self-conception) is negatively affected – not a 
great outcome, but nevertheless better than the posited outcomes of trying and 
failing to secure your aims through sheer force of will or arms.27 
In essence, then, the maximisation argument holds that autonomy contingently 
justifies democratic authority in virtue of democracy having the smallest spread 
to cover – we accept the occasional frustration of our wishes in exchange for the 
guarantee that the most serious threats to our autonomy are socially off-limits.  
                                                          
27 A similar calculation is implied by the methodology of Rawls’ Original Position: were we to 
stand behind the infamous veil of ignorance, knowing nothing about what our position in 
society would be, it would be irrational to choose a “success/death” world over a 
“success/frustration” world. See Rawls (1999). 
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The second, “enhancement” approach takes a different stance regarding how we 
should see society. Where the spectre of Hobbes warned us that the community 
is a constant threat to our autonomy, this account suggests instead that in a 
democracy we can develop new kinds of self-direction as well as polishing up 
those powers we already have.28 
On such a view, undemocratic organisations are problematic not merely because 
they do, or may, abrogate our autonomy, but because they undermine or fail to 
fully utilise the capacities which (in part or in whole, depending upon the view 
one takes) constitute this autonomy.29 Even if we were to occupy some 
benevolent dictatorship similar to the one considered in the preceding sub-
section, where all the self-directing that we as-it-happened wanted to do was 
permitted, we would be cut off from other opportunities to develop as self-
directing agents: taking part in organising our community, coming to value new 
experiences and types of relations and so on.30 
To illustrate the point, imagine that you and nine others are trapped on a 
remote island, under the rule of an unseen overlord. Through various methods of 
eavesdropping and surveillance, this power has a fairly accurate grasp of each 
person’s desires, and for any one person their desires are satisfied more often 
than not. As it so happens, neither you nor the rest of the group are 
tremendously bothered about the relative lack of self-direction; you may even 
prefer the gilded cage of the island, without this preference being in any way 
disqualified on grounds of oppressive socialisation or adaptive formation.31 
Plausibly, your life in this example is perfectly pleasant: it is of course a very 
precarious and (we are likely to think) submissive kind of pleasant, but these are 
somewhat separate criticisms. The enhancement justification can say, simply, 
                                                          
28 E.g. Mill (1974), Arendt, (1970), Gutmann (1995). 
29 Wolff (op. cit.) takes this to be part of the Kantian argument against state authority. 
30 For the moment, I remain neutral on whether these new relations constitute greater 
autonomy, or are merely conducive to it: the distinction is not particularly important for the 
purpose of outlining the enhancement view. 
31 The question of what exactly makes a preference adaptive is a live one, and cannot be done 
justice as a side-issue here. However, if we use something like Jon Elster’s 1989 account of an 
adaptive preference as one which has been brought about by particular restrictions and would 
not survive the lifting of those restrictions, then we can see that the folk on the island could 
perfectly easily prefer life on the island to a more self-directed but arduous existence – it 
may be a foolish or even a craven preference, but it need not be an adaptive one.  
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that even if no other problems applied, this case would be less than ideal 
because having (for example) a conflict over jam resolved by fiat from above, 
even if the resolution is satisfactory, is just not as valuable as having the group 
work out some decision-making method or principle which achieves the same 
result. In a similar vein, we tend to think that children coming to think of 
sharing as a good (or just, or fair) thing through discussion with and paying heed 
to their peers is a better process than having this sharing imposed by force of 
parental power.  
It might be thought, as Elster objects in his critique of Mill, that such arguments 
“put the cart before the horse” in terms of democracy’s function and value: 
they could be seen to suggest that democracy is valuable because it allows us to 
expand our capacities of reason, tolerance and the like, when surely it is 
precisely because we possess such capacities that democracy is to be valued.32  
It is worth making clear, therefore, that the enhancement account as I have 
construed it is not intended to suggest that the only justification for democracy 
is this nurturing of autonomy-relevant capacities. Patently, we do not partake in 
democracy just for the love of the game; we might appreciate the experiences, 
skills and so on that we develop in pursuing political activity – and if the activity 
comes to naught, we might even decide that these were in the end the most 
valuable results – but it is a mistake to regard political participation as a sort of 
glorified public school debate where the outcome is ultimately less important 
than how clever one can look along the way. 
The enhancement justification, more modestly and plausibly, says that we value 
democracy not just because it allows us to self-direct, but also because the kind 
of self-direction it instantiates and encourages is more extensive and involves a 
greater number of valuable skills/capacities than the sort of self-direction 
typically found in oppressive societies. A different analogy should highlight the 
point here. Just as we may think there are reasons to obey epistemic authorities 
in order to sharpen our faculties of learning and analysis, the kinds of decision-
making procedures undertaken and enforced by political authorities in 
democracies can help to improve our capacity for (or enjoyment of) autonomy. 
                                                          
32 Elster (1989), pp138-39. 
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Close of Section 2 
I have argued in this section that there are two broad categories of justificatory 
arguments for democracy: the conceptual arguments which claim that 
democracy is (perhaps uniquely) respectful or constitutive of autonomy, and the 
contingent justifications to the effect that autonomy is most likely to be best 
served by democracy. It may seem that I have crowbarred a gap between them 
where none ought to exist: we are more likely to achieve our goals in a 
democracy, one might think, if or because there is something about the 
democratic process which inherently tends to respect and/or promote autonomy 
as opposed to other collective decision-making procedures. The point of this 
separation is not to suggest that each of these justifications is entirely 
conceptually independent of the others, but rather to make it easier to examine 
clearly the problems which arise for the various accounts, and to see how and 
why they may conflict with each other in attempting to provide autonomy-
minded justifications for authority. 
In the next section I address this task. 
 
3. The Problems of Democracy 
Having offered five justificatory routes from autonomy to democracy in the 
preceding section, I now propose three examples which each appear to block 
some of these justifications: the familiar cases of frustrated self-direction, 
malevolent self-direction and persistent minorities. Taken in toto, they pose a 
serious collective challenge to any attempt to justify democracy through 
autonomy, and thus also to reconciling autonomy and authority. 
3.1. Problems of Democracy: Frustrated Self-Direction 
The most obvious and familiar instance of democracy and autonomy seemingly 
coming apart is a case which occurs daily in actuality, that of the lost vote. 
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To give a mundane example, say that I and four friends have decided to go for a 
drink, and are in the process of settling on a pub. Being a man of limited wealth 
and taste, I suggest the Dive Bar, a cheap and cheerful booze-shed, while my 
fine wine-loving friends prefer the Bourgeois Conceit. Neither group is prepared 
to back down on their selection – but neither are we prepared to manipulate, 
bully or coerce the other into attending our preferred choice (after all, we are 
supposedly friends). Fortunately, we’re a far-sighted and fair-minded bunch and 
have prepared for this contingency, unanimously settling on a rule that any 
irreconcilable intra-group dispute is to be resolved by means of a simple 
majority vote. Naturally, their four votes outweigh my one, and so, to my 
presumed disgust, we set course for the Bourgeois Conceit. 
The first justificatory victim of this example is the constitutive claim. If 
democracy is valuable or worthwhile because it extends the realm in which we 
can self-direct, then why should we value it when it fails to extend, or even 
restricts, this realm?33 Admittedly in the pub example, the realm is fairly limited 
to start with and the restriction fairly minor, but it still seems that where I 
choose to drink is something that forms a (very small) part of my self-conception 
and self-direction – and in any case, scaling up the example from pub to (say) 
use of community resources brings the problem into much starker relief. It 
seems, then, odd to make the argument that democracy instantiates autonomy 
as a matter of conceptual necessity when we have what look like clear cases of 
democracy abnegating autonomy. 
The obvious response here is to suggest that the voting process is itself 
something I value, and that although one instance of self-direction has been 
closed off, another equally or more valuable kind/instance has been instantiated. 
The strongest counter-argument of this type would be something akin to 
Rousseau’s idea that the general will of the electorate cannot, given certain 
                                                          
33 Again, the question of political obligation heaves into view. We might think that the problem 
for autonomy isn’t so much that I don’t get to go to my preferred pub, but that it would be 
(by hypothesis) wrong of me to repudiate the process and decision which brought this about. 
Nevertheless, it still seems that even if I am not morally bound by the decision there is an 
element of frustrated self-direction – I did, after all, want to go to my preferred pub with my 
friends, and regardless of whether it would be immoral for me not to go to their preferred 
pub, my original goal goes unfulfilled. 
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preconditions, err.34 If the general will (of my group of friends) is for the 
Bourgeois Conceit, then I am simply mistaken in thinking that I wanted to go to 
the Dive Bar and none of my real or rational goals have been frustrated.35  
This is not a tack that the defender of democracy is likely to find palatable. The 
notion of being mistaken about my own goals (or the interests of my ‘real self’) 
such that my autonomy might best be served by dancing to someone else’s tune 
calls up the spectre of Berlin’s (1969) caricature of positive liberty, whereby 
more or less any interference with my self-direction can be justified in service of 
some higher rational self. The assertion that my opposition to going to the 
Bourgeois Conceit was merely the result of confusion about what I really want is 
problematic on two counts. Apart from the potential for oppression so stridently 
noted by Berlin, such a claim sits ill with underlying notions that the ability to 
pursue what we want, or even just what we think we want, is a valuable 
component of autonomy. If democracy is valuable because it allows us to self-
direct across a wider scope, and this self-direction is – at least on the face of it – 
a valuable component of autonomy, we cannot then argue that the democratic 
process is to be valued because it can over-ride ‘mistaken’ self-direction.  
If, after all, I’m supposed to prefer democracy (in part) because it allows me to 
achieve various goals and as such it instantiates my autonomy, then it is 
incoherent to respond to the frustration of these goals by claiming that 
democracy has instantiated my autonomy through not only blocking my 
preferences, but by showing that I didn’t want to achieve these goals (or that I 
didn’t even have the preferences) in the first place. As I argue later, democratic 
frustration of desires need not be hostile to autonomy. But the claim that 
democratic frustration of desires means we actually didn’t have such desires to 
begin with is again to put democracy and autonomy in the wrong order. It’s in 
part because we are assumed to be generally right about our own desires that 
democracy is floated as an autonomy-preserving decision-making process, and 
the Rousseau-type response gets this backwards. 
                                                          
34 Rousseau (op. cit.). 
35 It must be presumed for this case that we are voting for where we want the group to go, 
rather than necessarily where we want to go, or else the whole thing is a measure of 
particular wills and not – at least according to Rousseau – serving the proper function of 
freedom (that is, autonomy) or democracy in any case. 
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A more plausible iteration of this argument would suggest that although I did 
indeed want the group to go to the Dive Bar, and that this goal has been blocked, 
my autonomy has not overall been reduced because there are other preferences 
which have been satisfied. The most promising candidate is some first or second-
order attitude towards the process by which some (perhaps not all) of my goals, 
such as settling on a pub to go to with friends, are achieved. I might directly 
desire that we vote on it because I know this to be the procedure which will 
result in a choice without everyone falling out, or more likely have a higher-
order wish that questions of collective direction or resource distribution be 
settled in a particular way.36 Thus, despite being lumbered with one disfavoured 
outcome, I also have one or more favoured outcomes, and the autonomy loss is 
averted. 
In the pub example, this counter-argument looks fairly strong. Presumably I do 
want my friends and I to be able to make collective decisions in a reasonably 
calm and fair way, and would prefer losing a vote and having to drink in a wine 
bar to coercing, tricking etc. my friends into drinking in a cheap pub. 
Unfortunately, there are multiple cases where it just seems wrong to say that 
we have these kinds of procedural preferences, and even more where it is 
patently inappropriate to suggest that our thwarted desires are outweighed by 
satisfying any procedural preferences we do have. 
Imagine some distant possible world where subjects of the British state can vote 
on legislation and, for example, I vote against the renewal of the Trident 
nuclear weapons system. Assuming that I am not voting wantonly, mistakenly, 
and so forth, it seems most plausible to say that I simply don’t give a damn how 
fair the process is: the thing that I desire, and the only thing that I desire, is the 
removal of nuclear weapons from their base at Faslane. Certainly, a successful 
vote against the renewal may be preferable for me – it renders unnecessary 
irksome actions like protest, direct action, risking arrest and so forth. But losing 
the vote does not mean that I will regard the renewal of Trident as “balanced 
out” in terms of desire-satisfaction (and as such in terms of its effect on my 
autonomy) by the purported fairness of the procedure which led to it. Here, 
                                                          
36 The notion of ‘procedural’ preferences as a solution to voting problems is proposed and 
discussed at some length in Hansson (1996). 
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then, it seems that the procedural preference argument will support the claim 
that democratic processes actually form part of our leading autonomous lives iff 
we are imagined to have these procedural preferences with regards to every 
matter which is voted on – and we simply do not. 
The problem also afflicts the respect justification to some extent. Holding that 
democracy is uniquely respectful of autonomy is in slight tension with the 
examples above. There is something particularly disingenuous in maintaining 
that you have nothing but respect for someone’s self-direction whilst 
simultaneously frustrating it (as when states and their media assert undying 
respect and admiration for political protest in the abstract at the same time as 
they victimise and demonise actual protesters). There is however a defensive 
argument to be made that insofar as they offer equal formal input for each 
agent’s self-direction, democracies do fulfil this condition. It can’t, after all, be 
the case that respect for someone’s decisions or their decision-making ability 
requires that we agree with all of them or work to bring them all about. It would 
not seem strange, for example, for me to say that I respect my friend’s decision 
to study law in the hope of doing human rights work, and also to say that I think 
his decision is mistaken on several grounds and that I will not work to help him 
attain this goal.37  
The respect justification is thus not as immediately vulnerable to frustrated self-
direction as the instantiation justification, although there is a particular kind of 
frustration we will arrive at in Section 3.3 which does look to close off respect 
for autonomy as a plausible motivation for democracy. 
Neither contingent justification suffers too badly from single instances of 
frustrated self-direction: it may well still be the case that I am all-things-
considered more likely to get what I want for the least cost. Indeed, assuming 
that I vote, lose, and suffer no bad consequences related to the way I voted 
rather than the fact I lost, the pseudo-Hobbesian can still assert that this is 
preferable to the alternative. And as per the Millian argument, I could plausibly 
                                                          
37 Indeed, it would seem stranger if I were to devote myself to ensuring that his goals came to 
pass, at least presuming that we did not have the kind of intimate relationship that causes 
folk to be deeply invested in the personal success of the other(s). 
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acquire or enhance some valuable skill during the decision-making process. As 
I’ll now argue, however, both the maximisation and enhancement justifications 
have more worrisome challengers in store. 
3.2. Problems of Democracy: Malevolent Self-Direction 
Where the previous case suggested that not getting what we want is inconsistent 
with using autonomy to justify democracy, the following example shows that 
under at least some conditions, democracy is inconsistent with somebody or 
some group getting exactly what they want. 
Suppose that, as before, I and my friends are deliberating on how to pass the 
evening. No longer merely content to foist overpriced drinks upon me, the 
majority have now decided that only imprisoning me in stocks and throwing fruit 
at me will satisfy their curiously medieval desires. From my perspective, the 
process has thrown up the problem referred to above – if there are any situations 
with agents we can point to and say with confidence “they’re not self-directed”, 
being pelted with rotten tomatoes on the whim of another has got to be pushing 
for a podium spot – but there are further important questions to be asked about 
the extent to which my friends’ actions cohere with the justifications given in 
Section 2. 
That democracy respects self-direction is not just supposed to be a subjectively 
valuable thing, after all. While we do have good reason to value it because self-
direction is (or is likely to be) valuable to us, justifying democracy is surely not 
simply a matter of asserting “well, I like it”. The justification has to work for all 
relevantly similar agents in order to serve as a motivation for equal political 
organisation, and in the stocks case this doesn’t happen.38 If democracy can 
respect self-direction only insofar as we are members of a politically or socially 
privileged group, there is little justificatory distance between it and oligarchy or 
populist autocracy (which raises obvious questions about purportedly democratic 
modern states), and membership of the voting majority looks very like political 
                                                          
38 A ‘relevantly similar agent’ can be cashed out fairly loosely at this point as simply referring to 
someone who is receptive to autonomy justifications (and so not, for example, concerned 
only with serving the will of a deity or furthering their own interests), although obviously this 
would need more sharpening before it could do any practical work. 
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privilege in this case. In other words, it seems that cases of majority-mandated 
immorality are permissible under democracy, and this fails the “respect for 
autonomy” condition for the minority. This again suggests that there is no 
necessary link between autonomy and democracy. 
If this is so, then the idea of autonomy requiring democratic authority is 
vulnerable on two fronts. Either it’s simply wrong that autonomy can be 
reconciled with authority through democracy, or autonomy only requires us to 
acknowledge the authority of commands that are in accordance with our 
wishes.39 This latter option is, fairly obviously, a cigarette paper away from 
being the mountain man’s position, but the former alternative is really no better. 
Both are useless if we are trying to reconcile autonomy and political obligation. 
The response might be made that respect for autonomy requires a kind of 
institutional distance that is inconsistent with inspecting every act before 
approving it. It is unfortunate (we might concede) that the occasional malign or 
misconceived exercise in self-direction slips through, but if the alternative is 
overweening social and legal scrutiny, surely the first option displays greater 
respect.40  
Although this counter-argument has some intuitive appeal, it rests on a 
mischaracterisation. We are talking about collective self-direction in the form of 
laws or institutional rules, and surely these are precisely the kinds of things that 
we can, and should, give careful thought to. To give an analogy, it is absurd to 
expect folk to submit to (purportedly) random stop-searches just on the basis 
that they might, perhaps, have done something wrong or be about to do 
something wrong; there is no need for citizens to justify themselves against 
purely speculative charges of immoral behaviour. Conversely, it is not absurd at 
all to consider all possible reasons to implement or repeal a law requiring 
submission to these searches. It is the character of the proposal, not any agents, 
which is at issue.  
                                                          
39 Or perhaps just one, very wide front: autonomy can only be consistent with authority through 
decisions that accord with our preferences, so democratic authority has no particular 
autonomy legitimation and (insofar as no other institution can claim legitimate authority 
either) the mountain man is correct. 
40 Carter’s (op. cit.) notion of ‘opacity respect’ suggests something like this, for example. 
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Thus, the objection should be read not as claiming that there is something 
conceptually wrong with a law which may permit malevolent acts (for example, 
allowing people to drive once they reach a certain age allows them much greater 
legally-protected freedom of movement and potentially a greater area to 
commit crimes across), but rather that there are some proposals or kinds of 
proposals that just are malevolent towards some group or groups. At the 
absolute best, such proposals seem to be respecting one group’s autonomy 
(namely those who voted for it) while ignoring the autonomy of those on the 
receiving end of it. If all the respect justification amounts to is that democracy 
sometimes respects the autonomy of some people then it is not much of a 
justification at all. 
We might wonder also if there is not something suspicious about the 
enforcement of oppression (or in the stocks case, merely immorality) being 
legitimated as part of the exercise of self-direction – something which would 
cause the constitutive justification to fail into the bargain. Admittedly, this 
objection is predicated on a moralised notion of autonomy and would thus face 
criticism from those who agree with Dworkin that the “autonomous person may 
be a saint or a sinner” (1989, p62). As it happens, I am far from convinced (as I 
argue in later chapters) by the content-neutral accounts of autonomy which are 
generally the basis of such criticisms. More importantly for the moment, 
however, the problem I now raise is not that these kinds of actions are 
necessarily ruled out of the realm of autonomy, but that they run afoul of the 
equality condition referred to in Section 2.1. That is, in order to justify 
democracy through respect for autonomy, it must systemically show this respect 
equally according to relevant similarities. In cases where immoral or oppressive 
proposals are mandated by the majority, this problem takes the same form as 
the respect problem given above, but there is an added dimension to it. 
Regardless of whether or not one’s own autonomy is compatible with immoral or 
oppressive behaviour, it is uncontroversial that there are some acts and 
attitudes or kinds of acts and attitudes which necessarily fail to respect others’ 
autonomy: bigots cannot respect the autonomy of their targets of hatred, 
misogynists cannot respect the autonomy of women, and so on. There are, 
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therefore, some kinds of political proposals which are similarly inconsistent with 
respect for others’ autonomy. If these proposals are passed, then patently the 
group or groups malignly affected by the measures have not had their autonomy 
treated equally with others. By definition, a policy which fails to respect a 
group’s autonomy cannot be treating them equally with groups whose autonomy 
is respected by the policy. So, malevolent self-direction defeats the equality as 
well as the respect conceptual justifications.41  
Curiously, given that frustrated self-direction does not pose a particular problem 
for contingent justifications, malevolent self-direction seems – as I’ll now 
explain – to cut off both the maximisation and the enhancement routes.  
If democracy only protects me from the baying mob so long as I am part of it (or 
have a bigger baying mob of my own) then, again, it looks much as if it is simply 
ballot-papering over the brute exercise of power. To draw out the point, 
imagine that I am faced with two possible scenarios, in both of which I occupy 
an unpopular minority of one. In the first case, the majority group decides to 
burn down my house, with any discussion or decision-making procedure which 
does occur confined to within the majority group. In the second case, the 
majority put the house-burning proposal to a vote I may take part in. About the 
best that can be said of the second case is that there is an extra step between 
the proposal and its enactment. I may have had some purely formal opportunity 
to try and prevent it that was not present in the first case, but the mere fact 
that democratic decision-making procedures are in place has done nothing to 
increase my autonomy, or even give it more stable protection than would be the 
case in a non-democratic society. Someone might object here that I’m applying 
a more demanding standard than I’ve been using in the frustrated self-direction 
case.42 If occasional frustrations of self-direction aren’t enough to defeat the 
maximisation justification, why should occasional instances of malevolent self-
direction do so? The reason is this: as discussed in the previous section, all 
                                                          
41 In fact, at this point the best bet for upholding the equality condition looks to be accepting a 
moralised account of autonomy and arguing from there that neither proponents nor victims of 
the proposal are autonomous. Even here, though, there is an obvious gap between someone 
who is not autonomous in the sense that fulfilling their goals would be inconsistent with 
maximal equal autonomy, and someone who is not autonomous because they are on the 
receiving end of oppression. 
42 My thanks to Robert Cowan for highlighting several argumentative gaps in this section. 
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democracy needs to do to claim maximisation as an autonomy-minded 
justification is to show that democracy is better for autonomy than a Hobbesian 
state of nature (or an autocracy, etc). Plausibly, it does this even when our self-
direction is frustrated – it’s better to vote and then be frustrated than to be 
frustrated and then dead. But if we’re talking about something like the arson 
case, there just isn’t a meaningful distinction between my house being burned 
down by a democratically-endorsed public servant, a Hobbesian mob of amateur 
pyromaniacs, or an autocrat’s paramilitaries. It’s also not necessary for this to 
be, as it were, the ‘standard’ in a democracy. Although it’s clear that this kind 
of case does in fact occur pretty frequently (as in, for example, the recent 
French bans on certain kinds of religious dress), there’s a deeper problem. In 
particular, responding to malevolent self-direction cases by denying that they’re 
the norm suggests that in fact, two justificatory strategies are covertly being 
appealed to: either authority is justified iff it actually does maximise our self-
direction – in which case democratic endorsement is irrelevant and we have no 
reason to abide by democratic decisions which fail to maximise that self-
direction – or democracy’s justification is not actually to do with maximisation, 
but some other value like formal equality in decision-making.  
If, conversely, I can get what I want in a democracy just by dint of membership 
of a powerful group – to reverse the example, if it is now me deciding whether I 
should burn someone’s house down – then the various laudable traits which 
democratic decision-making is supposed to encourage have no role to play, and 
the enhancement justification is left to flap in the wind. Perhaps, in the 
discussion around the proposal, I will be struck by a particularly forceful 
argument and come to realise that my arsonist ways are wrong, developing a 
new facet of my moral character which comes to expand my autonomy. But this 
could equally occur if I was part of a torch-wielding mob being given an 
impromptu dressing-down by an onlooker. Unless the enhancement claim can 
produce some independent argument that democracies necessarily encourage 
more thoughtful (and hence, mysteriously, more autonomous) citizens than the 
alternative, the apparent endorsement of malevolent self-direction is a blow 
against this approach to justifying democracy.  
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3.3. Problems of Democracy: Persistent Minorities 
The final problem I consider is that of persistent minorities, where there is some 
particular group (understood de dicto) that is bound to lose any vote, either with 
regards to some particular matter or, worse, any vote at all. Take, for example, 
a culturally-homogeneous immigrant group within some society where the 
dominant social mores demand short hair, as opposed to the group’s preference 
(whether social, religious, or practical) for long hair. Imagine, further, that the 
short hair norm is enforced by law – it is illegal to have hair beyond a certain 
length – but that as a direct democracy, all laws can be challenged and voted on. 
Even if the group manage to challenge the law, they will be bound to lose. The 
fact that their group is far smaller than the opposing group means that there is 
absolutely no prospect of the law being overturned through the democratic 
process. Worse, we can stipulate without implausibility that it is not the case 
that the group is in the minority just because their preferences differ (as it 
happens) from the majority – while it is true that they are in a minority 
preference-wise, this is not the whole story. They are essentially excluded from 
collective self-direction by dint of their status as an immigrant minority; the law 
regarding hair length functions to coercively assimilate minority groups, and 
their purely formal access to democratic decision-making does nothing to change 
this.  
The difficulties posed by the case of persistent minorities overlap to some 
extent with the problems raised by frustrated self-direction. The problems are 
not, however, co-extensive.  
Firstly, the respect justification is inconsistent with persistent minority status. If 
democracy fails to respect my autonomy on those occasions when I am in the 
minority, this failure is presumably worsened by systemic inability to correct it. 
To put it another way, if the possibility of being in the minority once blocks the 
conceptual respect approach, then the certainty of being in the minority on 
every occasion must also do so. 
More damagingly, persistent minorities also pose problems for the equality 
condition. While the respect angle at least has the possibility of arguing that 
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affording everyone the same initial input takes equal heed of the normative 
basis of valuing autonomy (albeit this argument is fairly weak), it is impossible to 
justify democracy via equality if simple membership of a particular group is a 
guaranteed actual or potential block to self-direction.  
To clarify the distinction between this and the frustrated self-direction problem, 
consider the analogy of a football league. In one case, the league is set up so 
that each team is allocated the same amount of money for transfers, youth 
development and so forth each season. While, obviously, not every team can win 
every game, and there may be periods where one or two teams are dominant 
(where some particularly good group of players breaks into the first team at the 
same time, or the like), there is no structural barrier to any given team winning 
any given game – it is, as it were, a level playing field. Similarly, a single 
instance of frustrated self-direction only poses a problem for the equality 
condition if we assume that equal autonomy consists in everyone self-directing 
exactly as they would wish all the time. As I have argued, there is no reason to 
believe that the condition includes this fairly implausible requirement. 
Persistent minorities, however, seem more like smaller clubs in contemporary 
Scottish and English leagues. Formally, there is no reason why they should not 
win any given game, but the structure of professional football makes it – barring 
deeply bizarre circumstances – impossible that they will win against more than a 
handful of teams.43 Just by dint of not having a legacy of success, or a billionaire 
backer, or a whole variety of other things which should not be relevant to a 
contest of skill (or teamwork, or diving), some groups are ruled out. Similarly, 
just by dint of some socio-economic or cultural identifier, persistent minorities 
are structurally excluded from democracy. This is surely incompatible with the 
equality condition: respect for people as agents should be equal (both equally 
merited and equally afforded) across all agents, and membership of a persistent 
minority makes no odds as to whether or not one is an agent. 
                                                          
43 Since I first wrote this, it’s been somewhat overtaken by events, specifically the English 
Premier League being won by rank outsiders Leicester City – but the mere fact of this being 
such a surprise suggests that the analogy still holds up fairly well. 
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Drawing out the point further: the point of the equality condition is, like the 
presumed point of league divisions and indeed the rules of the game itself, not 
to ensure that everybody wins all the time, but that everyone has a fair chance 
of winning, or that every team’s participation grants them an equal right to 
compete for the win. In football, the motivation for this is taken to be 
something like the idea that no team has a right to win just because of who they 
are – if, to slip into managerial jargon, the other team wants it more, they 
should win even if they are playing the Grand Champions of the World. League 
divisions are supposed to go some way towards ensuring that in any given match, 
the winner will be determined only by those factors relevant to competitive 
sport (whatever they may be). Similarly, then, the presumed autonomy 
motivation for democracy must say that every agent defaults to having a chance 
to win; that is, every agent must have the same respect shown to their 
proposal.44 In the case of persistent minorities, however, the agents are always 
playing against the slope, not because they keep losing the toss, but because 
they had no meaningful chance to win it.  
Finally and fairly obviously, the problem of persistent minorities blocks off the 
maximisation justification (at least from an autonomy standpoint – it may still be 
better in terms of, e.g., personal safety, although history suggests otherwise). 
After all, we cannot cogently claim that democracy gives an agent the best 
chance of pursuing their goals if it is structurally impossible for them to 
effectively pursue those goals. Again, this is distinct from instances of frustrated 
self-direction insofar as occasional frustrations needn’t act as a defeater for the 
maximisation justification, whereas persistent frustration (as happens here) is 
just inconsistent with deploying the maximisation approach. If we want to say to 
someone that they should accept democratic authority because such a system 
maximises their chances of getting what they want, we’d better be right – and in 
the case of persistent minorities, we’re clearly not. It also raises a side-problem 
for the enhancement justification: namely, whether it’s even sensible to think of 
participation as developing valuable traits when this participation has no 
effective political upshot. To re-mark the Elsterian line, it seems very strange to 
                                                          
44 Or, to use Singer’s tongue-in-cheek but fairly accurate description of the model, we want “a 
fair distribution of unfairness” (op. cit., p53). 
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assert that a persistent minority’s autonomy is well served just because voting 
gives them new opportunities to have a good hard think about the issues. 
Close of Section 3 
The problems of frustrated self-direction, malevolent self-direction and 
persistent minorities, taken together, look to close off every potential 
justification suggested in Section 2. Frustrated self-direction poses an obvious 
challenge for the constitutive justification and a somewhat lesser one to the 
respect argument. Malevolent self-direction certainly undermines the respect, 
equality, maximisation and enhancement justifications and has potential to 
block the constitutive justification; and the problem of persistent minorities 
applies to every justification, encompassing many of the problems of frustrated 
self-direction while extending them in the case of the equality, maximisation 
and enhancement justifications. 
Furthermore, none of the counter-arguments attempted so far have gained much 
purchase. The likeliest-looking option, regarding the satisfaction of procedural 
preferences as a way to counter-balance any autonomy loss that accompanies 
the frustration of first-order preferences, is in essence reliant on unsound 
empirical claims.   
Each of these problems presents a slightly different version of the same basic 
challenge, which was to make autonomy and authority consistent through the 
operation of democratic decision-making procedures. If there is no conceptual 
connection between autonomy and democratic authority, then there is no reason 
to think that concern for autonomy rationally compels us to make us of some 
idea of authority. If functioning democracies are not in fact the most 
contingently likely societies to support or protect autonomy, then there is no 
pragmatic reason for autonomy to motivate us towards democratic authority. In 
short, it seems as if the mountain man poses a far more serious problem than it 
may initially seem. Without being able to prove him wrong with democracy, then 
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his claim that autonomy and authority are irreconcilable will have to be 
accepted.45 
 
4. Where Next? 
The apparent failure of democratic authority to incorporate concern for 
autonomy (still understood broadly as a self-directed life) leaves two obvious 
routes open. We might decide that the concept of autonomy is no great loss, and 
dispense with it; or, alternatively, reject authority as the misguided or 
misdirected value. There are compelling prima facie cases for both courses of 
action, as I outline in the next chapter. However, there is also a third possibility, 
that of harmonising autonomy and authority through revisiting the respective 
conceptions. This is the line that I will ultimately defend. In particular, as I will 
argue, the apparent impasse here can be resolved if we proceed via functional 
rather than conceptual analysis: that is, if we drop the idea that there are 
antecedent and uncontroversial concepts of autonomy and authority, and 
instead take these concepts to be most usefully delimited by reference to what 
purpose they’re supposed to play in our political discourse.  
Given that the strongest challenges to autonomy and authority are, I claim, 
criticisms of particular conceptions rather than of the concepts themselves (or 
the values these concepts invoke), we should therefore be motivated to perform 
this functional analysis rather than ejecting the baby with the bathwater. 
                                                          
45 One response that I have not considered here is that autonomy may be consistent with some 
non-democratic authority. I assume that it’s fairly obvious why the autonomy justifications 
already given do not militate towards such a response, and will not expound much further; 
there may be, although I think it’s unlikely, some reasonably plausible conception of 
autonomy which can be made consistent with a particular kind of technocracy or benevolent 
dictatorship, but that conception would surely have more in common with moral than with 
personal-political autonomy. 
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2. 
Conceptual and Methodological Challenges 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the caricature of the mountain man – the rugged 
individualist who rejects all institutional authority on the basis of personal 
autonomy – and the problems that frustrated self-direction, malevolent self-
direction and persistent minorities pose to giving an autonomy-minded 
justification for his political obligation.  
The problem, to restate it, is this: if we value autonomy as self-direction, it is 
difficult to give a reason why we should expect somebody to accept institutional 
obligation to do anything inconsistent with their self-direction. On the other 
hand, if one of the justifications for political authority that we give is its 
promoting or instantiating autonomy then it seems that no authority may claim 
obligations which are inconsistent with autonomy as self-direction. 
I will eventually show that the conflict can be resolved. Before that task can be 
undertaken, though, there’s some groundwork to do. First, I must defend against 
criticisms that (one or both of) the concepts are not worth rescuing. Second, I 
need to explain the methodology by which plausible conceptions of autonomy 
and authority can be made to cohere. In other words, the point of this chapter is 
to show that we can (and should) revise rather than reject our notions of 
autonomy and authority, and that a functional analysis gives us the best tools to 
do this. 
The first section lays out some reasons to think that authority as a concept is not 
worth the hassle of keeping, before arguing that the hassle is greatly reduced if 
we think of the concept as being shaped by the role we want it to play rather 
than being an immovable object against which we bash conceptually irresistible 
forces. Much of the philosophical literature on authority (Wolff 1998, Simmons 
1979, Carr 1983) has presumed a concept of authority which captures our pre-
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theoretic intuitions and which has clear necessity and sufficiency conditions: I 
argue that we are better served by constructing a concept according to the 
philosophical or practical function the concept is supposed to perform. 
The second section repeats much the same process for autonomy. Here, however, 
the criticisms are more numerous and the functional analysis less drawn-out, 
since the concept and value of autonomy have been challenged in somewhat 
more depth than that of (institutional) authority. I consider the arguments that 
autonomy as the concept has been traditionally understood is disvaluable or 
impractical, and show that the conceptual requirements of being powerful and 
authoritative over one’s life capture the purpose of autonomy in our discourse 
and are neither objectionable nor implausible. In essence, I argue, we need a 
concept of autonomy that captures and explains the value of self-direction as 
reflecting the value of agency. In particular, the functional analysis of autonomy 
suggests that the concept must illustrate the notion that being able to creatively 
work over our surroundings and pursue our aims in accordance with our 
principles is a basic value for agents, and hence requires that autonomous agents 
be powerful and authoritative.  
I conclude the chapter in Section 3 by heading off a potential distraction. I show 
that the concept of moral autonomy cannot play the required role: moral 
autonomy ultimately requires something like the ability to make suitably 
responsible moral decisions, and hence can be claimed without being powerful 
and authoritative over the direction of one’s life. 
 
1. Authority: Criticisms and Two Analyses 
1.1 Against All Authority? 
Given the ultimately anarchist conclusions of my thesis, it seems as well to 
entertain the case for a total rejection of institutional authority as early as 
possible. If we value self-direction, the thought goes, then we have no reason to 
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buy into a concept which tells us that our self-direction can be over-ridden even 
if we’re not doing anything independently morally objectionable. If part of the 
concept’s baggage includes making it morally objectionable not to do what an 
institution tells us, then so much the worse for political authority. 
This is roughly the line that R.P. Wolff famously adopted with In Defense of 
Anarchism, and it is not as absurd as it may at first appear. When Wolff argues 
that “there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a command” (1998, p15) for 
autonomous agents, he is not advocating a kind of nihilist or subjectivist free-
for-all, nor a Stirnerian egoism where only doing exactly as you wish can be 
properly called autonomy.1 In fact, Wolff’s view of autonomy is a rigorously 
moralised one; we are autonomous insofar as we act according to rationally 
universalisable principles of action (in other words, insofar as we’re Kantians). 
Political obligation would, by virtue of obedience to alien causes, involve the 
commissioning of heteronomous maxims, so our moral duties as autonomous 
agents demand that we reject any and all authority which is not moral authority.  
It is true that Wolff’s argument is somewhat vitiated by an apparent conflation 
between moral and personal-political autonomy, but as that is something I 
return to in the final section it can be put aside for now. The key claim can 
plausibly survive being disengaged from its Kantian anchor, and the key claim is 
that political obligation ends up being, in more or fewer words, a variation on 
“do x because I said so!”. This seems like a poor candidate for authority of any 
sort, since political authorities should give us moral reasons for, rather than 
simply demanding or compelling, action. If there were only prudential reasons to 
obey a political authority, then it would be odd to say that we had any 
obligation to follow their directives (although it might be prudent to do so). On 
the other hand, if political authority and political obligation boil down to being 
required to do what somebody else tells you to without any regard for your own 
reasons, it is difficult to see what autonomy-minded motivation there could be 
for accepting them. On this view, therefore, commands of the sort given us by 
putative political authorities are the kinds of command that the autonomous 
                                                          
1 See Stirner (2009), p153. 
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agent, and the agent who values autonomy, have no reason to treat as 
authoritative (although they may still be compelling). 
There is a notable conceptual gap here. It is only if political authority and 
political obligation are divorced from good reasons for action that they can’t 
give us legitimate commands – so what reasons are there for thinking that this 
conditional obtains? Again, I will pass fairly briefly over the detail of Wolff’s 
argument against democratic authority: in essence, and fairly similarly to some 
of the problems posed for democracy in the last chapter, Wolff claims that there 
is no appropriate connection between the commands of actually-existing states 
and rationally or morally forceful commands.  
If we lived in a sort of quasi-Rousseauian state where we could plausibly be said 
to self-legislate, or if we had agreed beforehand to adopt such-and-such a 
decision-making procedure, then the connection would be there – the 
autonomous agent abides by their own principles, and sticks to promises and 
agreements – and it may be permissible for us to be coerced into fulfilling these 
obligations; which are, in the final analysis, self-imposed. Wolff’s comment to 
this effect, that external compulsion under such conditions would introduce us 
to our “better self in the form of the state” (ibid, p23) is therefore consistent 
with his earlier denial of commands, for in demanding and even compelling 
obedience the state (or other political authorities) which operated like this 
would be not so much commanding us as refusing to deviate from our own 
commands.  
The Odysseus example, though fairly shopworn at this point, is a useful 
illustration. When Odysseus requests of his crew that they tie him to the mast, 
he is making a commitment roughly analogous to our endorsing some policy or 
procedure; when they subsequently refuse to untie him despite his apparent 
change of heart, they are not commanding him to remain tied to the mast, but 
carrying out his own self-regarding commands. Odysseus would still, for Wolff, 
be autonomous despite this coercion because it is coercion that he has himself 
endorsed (and even required).  
38 
 
But actual states do not function like this: if we were to reverse the analogy and 
try to make Odysseus’ story parallel political obligation in (say) the UK, we 
would probably end up with something like the following. Odysseus wakes up on 
a ship, with no notion of how he got there, and is told that he must either do 
what the crew tells him or be thrown overboard. Feeling that his odds are better 
on-board the ship than off it, he agrees to this ultimatum; when they pass the 
Sirens, he is tied to the mast and, again, the crew refuse to untie him. The 
Sirens’ potential for interfering with preference formation put to one side, it 
should be obvious that in this case Odysseus’ reduced freedom of action is an 
infringement of his autonomy – not because he can’t get away from the mast, 
but because there is no point in this sequence of events where he can self-
legislate; there is no sense in which his being tied to the mast, or even on board, 
is a state of affairs that follows from his autonomous agency.2 
This, I believe, captures the key conceptual claim in Wolff’s argument against 
the political authority of actual states (the arguments that he makes in support 
of the claim having been discussed in somewhat more detail in the previous 
chapter), but it still doesn’t quite get us to the thorough-going absolutist 
position I suggested at the start of this section. There are after all other forms 
of social organisation than liberal democracy, and at least some of Wolff’s 
supporting arguments (such as his criticism of the idea that a ‘representative’ 
can ever actually represent their constituents) are closely tied to specific kinds 
of putatively democratic institutions. Further, he often seems to endorse some 
form of direct democracy; this suggests that something exactly like the promise-
keeping obligations referred to above may provide a workable – though very 
stringent – account of political authority whereby an institution may coerce us to 
comply with laws or policies that we have directly voted on, at least if we have 
(presumably explicitly) consented to abide by the result of the vote. 
                                                          
2 I leave aside the faintly facetious objection that he could have self-legislated by jumping 
overboard. Kant might, if we could paint the action as martyrdom rather than suicide, 
suggest that Odysseus should indeed have taken death before imprisonment; but given that 
the context of our discussion is one of what legitimates external coercion or institutional 
authority, we should go along with Hume’s famous criticism (1748) of the legitimacy of our 
obligation in such circumstances. It seems misguided as well as incorrect to assert that you 
can produce political obligation through the barrel of a gun (or perhaps off the end of a 
plank). 
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There are three problems with this. First and least important (at least for our 
purposes) is that Wolff appears to be committed to denying that promise-
keeping obligations are autonomous – from what he says during In Defense of 
Anarchism, doing something “because you promised!” is just as heteronomous as 
“because I said so!”.3  
The second and third worries, however, point towards why Wolff may in fact be 
committed to a more anti-authoritarian position than he believes. If we ought to 
obey institutions just in virtue of having said that we would, it’s not obvious why 
these institutions have to be democratic in form. Perhaps their being democratic 
is something which leads us to agree in the first place, but obligation based on 
original consent gives no reason to think that we have stronger obligations to 
democracies than to any other promise-bearer. This seems, at the least, odd: 
even if there would be other reasons against obeying a fascist government which 
decisively over-ride our putative obligation, we surely want to deny that we 
have any prima facie reason to obey fascist institutions, let alone one which is 
on a conceptual par with reasons to obey laws in a democracy.  
The second worry, then, is that Wolff seems committed to saying that if there 
can be any political obligation, it is grounded in whatever moral requirements 
are taken on by agreeing to bear that obligation, and in nothing else. In short, 
some kind of consent or contract theory is the only way to reconcile autonomy 
and authority – but in addition to the issues contract theories face with regards 
to when consent is genuine, whether the contract should be actual or 
hypothetical, etc., the problem arises that such theories give political 
authorities no particular institutional requirements or bounds. That is to say, if I 
consent to obey an unjust authority, then unless it acts in such a way as to 
breach whatever terms the consent has been given under, my obligation still 
stands however unjust the institution is.4 Even if we were to accept such a view 
                                                          
3 “It can be replied that my obligation rests upon my promise to obey, and that may in fact be 
true. But insofar as a promise of that sort is the sole ground of my duty to obey, I can no 
longer be said to be autonomous”. Wolff (op. cit., p29). 
4 There may still be countervailing reasons to disobey (“on the one hand I ought to keep my 
promises, but on the other hand I ought not to support injustice”, and so on), but this is a 
somewhat different thing from the obligation itself being sensitive to institutional features. 
Again, such sensitivity could be built into the terms that we consent to – this seems to be 
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of authority, we would be left with the problem that this cannot be consistent 
with authority’s being justified by autonomy. Odysseus consenting to his 
temporary imprisonment is one thing; but, as the tweaked example suggests, 
you cannot persistently frustrate someone’s self-direction and demand their 
compliance by reference to the value of that same self-direction. 
The third worry is related to this – and is, in fact, something that Wolff noted in 
his preface to the 1998 edition of In Defense (p. viii). There, he writes with 
some chagrin of having received congratulatory letters from various militia 
groups and survivalists after the publication of the first edition; these actual 
mountain men heartily endorsed what they saw as an obvious paean to 
individualism and rejection of public authority. It is odd that Wolff seems so 
puzzled as to how they could have gained this impression, for – some concluding 
remarks in the book about the value of solidarity and the need for a co-
ordinating authority for our political autonomy (which concept he leaves fairly 
vague) aside – the conclusion that most obviously follows from the majority of In 
Defense’s argumentation is that we have not only a valuable interest in, but a 
moral duty to maintain, an absolute right to reject any imperative which we 
have not endorsed through rational reflection.5 This simply rules out the 
possibility of anyone having legitimate authority over me without my explicit 
consent, and gives the mountain man all the theoretical ammunition that he 
needs to defend himself against the legitimacy of political obligation. If 
authority truly is the right to command and be obeyed, and the autonomous 
agent recognises no commands, then how can the two be reconciled? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
largely what hypothetical contractarianism (e.g. Rawls 1971) aims to do – but it is important 
to note that there is no need for it to be; what matters is consent, and the features of the 
institution and the obligation are only important insofar as they affect whether we would or 
should (rationally, self-interestedly, etc.) agree to the political obligation ‘contract’. 
5 For the sake of clarity and fairness, it should be emphasised again that Wolff does not think 
we’re forbidden from treating others as reliable moral guides, nor that others may not 
legitimately compel us to perform our moral duties (or compel us to refrain from breaching 
them). In both cases, though, the judgement of the others is a kind of shortcut or backup to 
our own moral sense – we may take “don’t do that!” as a good reason not to do something 
because we think the speaker is morally reliable, but strictly speaking we act heteronomously 
if we refrain from acting just because they told us to rather than because we take their 
command as a good prima facie signifier of the action’s wrongness. 
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1.2 Two Analyses of Political Authority: Conceptual Analysis 
So far, the tale seems pretty bleak: authority as we have depicted it thus far 
just doesn’t look like it can make demands of autonomous agents (at least, 
without compromising their autonomy). However, this is where the 
methodological turn becomes relevant.  
In searching for a plausible account of political authority, there are two broad 
approaches we may take. One starts by taking for granted some pre-theoretic 
intuitions, tries to find necessary and sufficient conditions which capture those 
intuitions, and then turns to the political context to see how we might apply the 
concept. I call this the conceptual analysis or concept-prior approach. By 
contrast, the other – hereafter referred to as the functional analysis – starts with 
the political context, by considering what practical political role is played by a 
particular concept. It then generates necessary and sufficient conditions by 
reflecting on what has to be present for that role successfully to be played. The 
contrast between the two approaches can be captured by thinking about the 
difference between two questions:  “Authority looks thus-and-so; how do we 
justify it in a political context?” and “What could we not achieve without a 
concept of political authority? How would the concept have to look in order to 
achieve these goals?”. In this section, I provide a brief explanation of the 
problems of the first, concept-prior approach, by way of motivating a shift 
towards the second. 
It is first necessary to explain why the approach holds its attraction. Generally, 
we have strong intuitions about what a political authority is, and what is or is 
not authoritative. For example, that authority must include an ability to issue 
commands rather than advice; and that these commands must give compelling 
reasons to action that are not simply prudential. “Do x or I will hit you” might 
give you a compelling reason to act, but we would want to avoid saying that it 
was an authoritative command. Rather, the reason has to be something like the 
avoidance of immoral behaviour – if I give you an authoritative command and you 
disobey, you have done something foolish, wrong, or both. 
42 
 
An account of authority which takes there to be a pre-existing concept with 
clear necessity and sufficiency conditions – the conceptual analysis approach – 
makes intelligible our feelings that “don’t kick that baby” is authoritative where 
“give me your lunch money” is not. When we distinguish between the two 
imperatives, the concept-prior approach explains, the second demand – for our 
lunch money – fails to meet the necessary and sufficient conditions (whatever 
they might in fact be) for being authoritative.  
This approach can be illuminated with a parallel from epistemology.6 We might 
approach the concept of knowledge by taking as a starting point our intuitions 
that knowers ought to be right, and ought to be right reliably rather than simply 
by chance. Thus, something like the justified true belief account effectively 
gives us necessity and sufficiency conditions for a concept’s capturing our 
intuitions – “knowledge is this kind of thing [a correct belief about the world not 
arrived at by chance]; how do we go about justifying our claims to having it?”. 
Notice that many of the historically noteworthy or dominant accounts of 
political authority are perfectly coherent when we take a concept-prior 
approach to authority. Hobbes clearly thinks that any rational agent has 
compelling reasons to accept any sufficiently powerful warlord. Rousseau 
famously argues that our rational self legitimates the operation of political 
authorities. Rawls tries to split the difference with a sort of “what any rational 
person would accept is permissible if actual agents mostly accept it” account, 
and so on.7  
All of these accounts can be interpreted as adopting the view that authority is x, 
and the task is for us to work out how x can be suitably harmonised with other 
values y, z, etc.8 (By contrast, consider the functional analyst’s formulation: 
                                                          
6 See Craig (1999) for his thesis about what we would lack in an epistemological ‘state of 
nature’, where we had no concept of knowledge. 
7 To return to epistemology, the parallels would be different accounts of what it is for a belief 
to be justified – they offer distinctive answers about what the necessity and sufficiency 
conditions are, but share the same presumption that anything which does in fact meet the 
correct conditions is what we mean by knowledge. 
8 For example: Hobbes (1651) can be interpreted as making that case that authority is the right 
to command & be obeyed, and what gives an agent this right is a combination of power and 
rational self-interest on the part of others. Similarly, we can read Rousseau (1968) as using 
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“We have a practical project which makes x intelligible; is that project 
compatible with a separate project which makes y important to us?”). 
And this, at first pass, is fairly compelling. We do seem to have some notion of 
authority to hand when we consider the command cases above, and it is from 
there fairly natural to conclude that the problem must be that the second 
demand fails some conceptual criteria for authority.  
However, it is notoriously difficult to combine the pre-existing intuition of 
authority as “the right to command and, correlatively, the right to be obeyed” 
(Wolff, 1998) with a workable account of institutional obligation. For it seems 
that here there are only two ways something can be authoritative: either there 
are objectively compelling reasons already, or I have generated a reason (by, for 
example, consenting to the authority). But neither of these ways will work for 
political institutions, at least straightforwardly.  
What these ‘objectively compelling’ reasons may look like is a difficult although 
perhaps not insurmountable problem. Raz (1986) and Darwall (2009) give two 
very different accounts of how we can be authoritatively bound by others even 
in virtue of reasons we may reject, for example, but in both cases overcoming 
the problem requires making the authority more or less straightforwardly moral. 
In other words, the authority of institutions comes ultimately from moral 
judgements; I ought or ought not to do something an institution tells me (not) to 
for precisely the same reasons as I would have if some morally correct passer-by 
gave me the imperative. This seems to leave the institution more or less out of 
the picture; its being formed for such-and-such a purpose, or having these 
particular features and lacking those others, is essentially irrelevant to its being 
authoritative. It seems fairly plausible, for example, that anybody who asserts 
we should not torture animals or infants is correct and in this sense authoritative 
– we ought to do what they say. But this directive could be issued by anyone or 
any institution without it becoming any less (or more) authoritative; whether it’s 
your granny, Holyrood or FIFA doing the directing makes absolutely no difference 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the same concept of authority but justifying it differently – through the operation of the 
General Will and the rational self, and so on. 
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to our being obliged to obey. Clearly it cannot be the case that FIFA or your 
granny are political authorities, but if all that legitimises authority is the 
content of the directive, we have no way of individuating Holyrood as a 
(putative) political authority. So although providing objectively compelling 
reasons certainly have a role to play in an institution’s being authoritative, it 
cannot be solely that. 
Balancing political authority on explicit consent, on the other hand, leads us 
very quickly to problems of total voluntarism. If I should do x because I have 
consented to an institution governing me in the matter of x-ing, then it is not a 
straightforward moral claim – there is, by hypothesis, nothing independently 
wrong about (not) x-ing – but we famously do not consent to most of the claims 
and restrictions on us. Here, the institution in question gets the right to 
command (and be obeyed) only if I agree to be commanded; and this seems 
neither intuitively plausible nor practically workable.  
To recap: the concept-prior account of political authority is appealing insofar as 
it matches with our intuitions about authority in other areas. In particular, it 
explains the parallels between political and moral obligations insofar as we tend 
to think that (for example) paying tax is, like giving a dehydrated person water, 
something we must do regardless of our feelings about it. It explains it, I suggest, 
by dint of eliding moral and political authority; transplanting moral authority, 
where the hard necessity and sufficiency conditions really do seem to simply be 
met by the correlative rights Wolff suggests, into an institutional framework. 
If we take the concept of authority to come first, and require that political 
institutions meet the necessity and sufficiency conditions to claim authority, 
then we have an immovable conceptual object poised to resist any and all force 
we apply to it. Although the conceptual analysis approach allows us to interpret 
arguments about political authority, it does so in such a fashion as to limit the 
tools at our disposal – and, in doing so, makes the interpretation we get seem 
more inevitable than is in fact the case.   
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To give an example: presuming that political authority is a concept with these 
fixed conditions, which we then try and make fit with other values, will make it 
seem as if there is no way to reconcile authority and autonomy. If “the right to 
command, and be obeyed” is a fixed point, then it is difficult not to conclude 
that we have to sacrifice some measure of autonomy in order to accommodate 
the inescapable needs of authority; but, I suggest, the needs are only 
inescapable because we have taken authority to come first. 
1.3. Two Analyses of Political Authority: Functional Analysis 
Compared to the conceptual or concept-prior analysis, the functional analysis 
runs the state of nature experiments backwards. Rather than querying how we 
would justify such-and-such account of authority in some variant of the state of 
nature, the functional approach asks the question “what functions might we 
need a concept of authority for in the state of nature?”.9 The answer to this, and 
whatever the reasons we give for it looking this way, tells us a great deal about 
what it means for these institutions to be authoritative – and in turn, gives us 
criteria to assess the authority claims of particular institutions or systems. 
It is worth noting in passing that functional analysis need not rule out any 
substantive proposal just because it is presented as a concept-prior account. 
Changing the second-order theory is not necessarily an endorsement or rejection 
of any first-order theory. Hauling out the epistemological analogy one final time, 
if we take the functional approach that we would lack the means to identify 
reliable testimony/testifiers absent a concept of knowledge, it might well be the 
case that justified, true beliefs are required to give reliable testimony. Similarly, 
perhaps a functional analysis of authority will reveal that Hobbes had it right all 
along. Importantly, though, he would be right in virtue of the values and ends 
we could not achieve without authority, rather than because he had given the 
correct necessity and sufficiency conditions for a pre-existing concept.  
                                                          
9 In addition to Craig’s “practical explication” approach to epistemology (op. cit.), an 
argument in favour of adopting the functional analysis in political philosophy can be found in 
Lane (1999). 
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An interlocutor could object that, at the very least, Hobbes and Rousseau do ask 
the question of what purpose authority serves: we have reason to obey the 
sovereign because we need to solve co-operation problems and brute force is the 
best way to do that, or we must obey the general will because so acting is 
constitutive of moral freedom; the shape of the authority is, in short, 
determined by what we want it to do.  
This, however, is not quite right. The ways in which authority is justified are 
determined by which values the authors aim at, yes, but the concept of 
authority, rather than its justification, is taken for granted. That is, while 
Hobbes bangs the rational self-interest drum and Rousseau looks to moral liberty 
as giving us reasons to collectively self-legislate, they both presume the concept 
they are trying to justify – there must, they assume, be something out there 
which has a straightforward right to command (and demand obedience) from us, 
so the question is working out how we get there.10 
Approaching the concept through functional analysis, with functional desiderata 
preceding and shaping rather than following from the account of authority, 
places vital questions front and centre.  
An admittedly simplified example should illustrate the point. If we want 
authority to be simply “ability to command” – something like Weber’s (2004) 
notion of sovereignty as a successful claim to be the sole executor of legitimate 
violence – then there is no need for it to satisfy any requirements of justice, 
procedural consistency, and so forth. The effective warlord is authoritative 
according to this standard.  
Conversely, if authority is supposed to carry some normative rather than merely 
prudential or instrumental weight (in other words, not just the ability but the 
right to command), then there will be extra conceptual requirements; the 
authority must be capable of more than brute coercion if the function it serves 
extends beyond the crude Weberian idea given previously.  
                                                          
10 See Hobbes (op. cit.) and Rousseau (op. cit.)  
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In the binary above, the obvious point on which to push the second account’s 
proponent is why we want authority to have this normative capacity, especially 
since it makes it much harder to come up with a consistent and practicable 
concept.11  
There is a proliferation of ways in which we could answer the question, of course, 
but they are not important here. The point is that we encounter the question 
now, right at the start of our attempt to produce the concept. Instead of 
presuming that “right to command others” must be a coherent part of any 
notion of authority, and then running up against – for example – apparent 
problems of voluntarism, we drag the conflict into the open early on. This 
arguably complicates rather than simplifies matters, insofar as we cannot take a 
pre-existing mould of authority and see what fits neatly within it. It is surely, 
though, a better method than using the wrong mould; by inquiring why we want 
an account of authority, we have to be clear about what values will be served by 
such an account, and how. 
The process thus articulates and distinguishes several important questions which 
might otherwise remain implicit within the discussion; further, it goes at least 
some way to providing answers to those questions. 
If, for example, we want a concept of authority in order to serve the end of a 
patterned resource distribution, then there will be some potential features 
already ruled out. It seems unlikely, for example, that a concept which included 
or allowed for arbitrary changes on the part of the authority would be best for 
this role, since there are presumably fairly few patterns of distribution that are 
most effectively served by a whimsical and inconstant distributor.12 
                                                          
11 It is worth noting that at this point, conceptual analysis hits a brick wall: it, unlike the 
functional analysis account, cannot take the metaphorical step back and ponder which 
concept of political authority we should adopt (or which serves our desired function) to 
answer the question. 
12 Interestingly, though, it’s not immediately obvious that transparency (which is often taken to 
be a desirable quality) need play a major or even minor part in a concept of authority 
required for the “administration of things, rather than the ruling of people”, although one 
could certainly make a case for it. If we want authority to serve a more ‘positive’ role, in the 
sense of enabling or creating goods (rather than simply shuffling them about or making them 
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There are two values, or types of value, that seem best served by functional 
analysis. On the one hand, we have the methodological advantages: as applied 
here, functional analysis is explicitly a tool to reconcile autonomy and authority. 
As such, it is purpose-built to defeat the problem of the mountain man, whereas 
the concept-prior approach must simply shrug and tell us to embrace or ignore 
him.13 Relatedly, functional analysis does not make unattractive theories or 
dilemmas seem inescapable – the reason that concept-prior accounts of 
authority give us a binary choice with regards to the mountain man is because of 
their own presuppositions rather than because they have captured some 
unavoidable truth about the world. 
But this alone may not be enough to motivate functional rather than conceptual 
analysis. Apart from the aforementioned fact that functional analysis often 
seems to result in far more complex explanations, which on the face of it must 
count against the theory, the value of practical explication is that it most closely 
approximates something like materialism (in the Marxist sense) about political 
philosophy. The proper aim of political philosophy is, surely, to think seriously 
about what humans (and other social agents) need and ought to have, and – 
inconveniently – these needs as well as the methods by which they can be 
fulfilled tend to change temporally and geographically, politically and 
economically. 
We should therefore consider what purpose authority is supposed to serve before 
deciding on its features, rather than importing pre-theoretic intuitions and 
trying to justify them; and we should be aware that our being able to make 
                                                                                                                                                                                
easier to get at), such as being a facilitator and marker of community decisions, then a 
stronger transparency requirement looks probable. 
13 To clarify, I don’t take the functional analysis to be a way of mollifying the mountain man. It’s 
not supposed to convince him that’s he’s wrong about what we have to believe about 
authority if we value autonomy (though it might do so), but to show that his presuppositions 
aren’t inescapable: we can, contra the mountain man’s claims, perfectly coherently value 
autonomy and authority, so long as we’re clear about what roles they’re serving. If the 
mountain man accuses me of shifting the goalposts (as Cowan has suggested he might), it will 
be a charge I’m happy to accept – since part of the point of the functional analysis is to show 
that we can and perhaps should shift the goalposts, depending on the kind of game we want 
to play.  
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sense of particular accounts of authority via conceptual analysis does not in fact 
mean that authority is an uncontroversial descriptive concept.14  
To return to the intuitive characterisation of authority as providing compelling 
reasons to act given at the start of this section: the functional analysis need not, 
and probably won’t, reject this desideratum for political authority. What it does 
suggest is that the nature of those reasons is far more dependent on substantive 
arguments about value – procedural consistency versus material impact, co-
operation versus competition, and so on – than we might anticipate. In short, the 
purpose of the functional analysis is to put the values or goals we want authority 
to serve first, and to construct the concept with those values in mind, rather 
than take the concept to be set and then try to make its justification line up 
with our values. If it turns out that, in fact, there really is no way to make a 
plausible concept of authority which can serve those values (whatever they are) 
then the mountain man will be vindicated. For now, I merely offer the 
methodological and practical reasons to adopt a functional analysis, returning to 
the question of what role we actually want authority to play in Chapter 5.  
 
2. Autonomy: Criticisms and another Functional Analysis 
One possible response to the problem of the mountain man, and particularly to 
the problems of justifying democracy through autonomy, is to accept that 
autonomy is not the only value. Where autonomy and authority clash, autonomy 
may come off worse, but in the process equality (for example) may be increased. 
The pluralist about value can thus adopt a fairly modest strategy of concession. I 
do not address this strategy for two reasons. First, and for reasons that will be 
laid out in more detail over the course of the thesis, it does not seem to me to 
involve the correct conception of autonomy. Second, it is not a defence against 
the stronger – and, I think, more interesting – version of the autonomy criticism. 
                                                          
14 Here I am to some extent standing alongside Finlayson’s criticism of the notions of 
reasonableness and neutrality in political philosophy, where she argues that “politically 
neutral ‘common sense’” usually turns out to be both politically controversial and inherently 
reactionary. See Finlayson (2015, p55). 
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That is, the weaker form of the criticism says merely that autonomy is not the 
only value, but the stronger variants argue that it is actively disvaluable – we 
should not be concerned with clashes between autonomy and authority because 
we should not be concerned with autonomy in the first place. 
I leave aside the group of criticisms focussed on the purported non-existence or 
inaccessibility of the self, and also ignore the objection that self-determination 
is impossible because causal determinism is true (that is, we cannot be 
autonomous if this is understood as having some measure of control over our 
actions, since our actions are entirely dependent upon long causal chains 
stretching back to the Big Bang). Instead, I consider two arguments to the effect 
that deploying the concept of autonomy is harmful in theory or in practice.15  
2.1 Autonomy is Conceptually Unappealing 
The first criticism, that autonomy is actively disvaluable at a conceptual level, 
has been levelled by a number of critics, both communitarian and feminist. I 
address the feminist charges only, as the communitarian critique is more closely 
bound up with ideas of self that lie outwith this chapter’s purview. The meat of 
this charge is summarised by the worry that the ideal of autonomy  
nurtures a stark individualism fueled by the silent assumption that 
autonomous man is free to sidestep the constraints of materiality and the 
power of social-political structures in his projects of radical self-making.16 
The pursuit of autonomy is thus cast as an attempt to cut oneself off from 
personal relations and responsibilities; to be autonomous is indeed to be the 
autarchic mountain man – and this is precisely why we should abandon the 
notion. We can cash this thought out in two ways. The first is that, as an 
androcentric ideal, autonomy should not and cannot be esteemed as a 
purportedly universal value. The related second conclusion is that pursuing such 
an ideal is anti-feminist (and/or, given the traditionally Western and Anglophone 
emphasis on this area of philosophy, colonialist or imperialist) and thus actively 
                                                          
15 Both these sets of criticisms (along with the critiques that I do consider) are given a more 
detailed airing and then rejected in, among others, Ch. 2 of Friedman (2003). 
16 Code (2000, p183). 
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harmful to any oppressed or victimised group. To draw a parallel from elsewhere 
in political philosophy, we might object to the notion of negative liberty by 
arguing that freedom from is, or has been, primarily the concern of the 
privileged and/or wealthy precisely because the primary concern of capital 
accumulators and dominators is removing limitations on their exercise of power. 
To presume the importance of unfettered choosing over safety, health and so on 
is simply to apply an inappropriate standard, and one that – deliberately or not – 
excludes those whose main concerns are not the absence of external legal 
restraints, but the presence or otherwise of basic social and economic provisions. 
It is unarguably the case that a significant proportion of theorists concerned with 
self-direction have expounded precisely the kind of hyper-individualistic account 
that Code charges them with.17 When Wolff says that the “primary obligation of 
man [italics mine] is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled” (op. cit., p18), he very 
obviously has in mind the sort of self-sufficient rational chooser that stalks the 
halls of political philosophy. The idiosyncratic notion of autonomy at play in (for 
example) reducing welfare spending in order to make folk self-sufficient equally 
clearly draws on the caricature of the autonomous agent as unhindered by ties 
of dependence or mutual support.18 Further, given the close historical 
association between gender roles and particular values – the view (most 
commonly found in the columns of the right-wing Daily Mail) for example, that 
autonomy-as-self-sufficiency is a valuable trait for male-identified agents but 
positively poisonous for female-identified agents – then, if this is indeed what is 
meant by autonomy, we should join its critics in repudiating it as a useful 
normative concept. 
I argue, following Friedman et al, that the concept of autonomy need not carry 
any such baggage, and that it would be a mistake to conflate the concept with 
some of its particularly noxious conceptions. All that we have said of autonomy 
thus far is that it requires power and authority over oneself.19 These features are 
                                                          
17 See, for example, Frankfurt (1971), Nozick (1974), Rand (1982) and Stirner (op. cit.). As 
suggested above, Wolff (op. cit.) probably falls into this category too, albeit reluctantly. 
18 That, at least, is the most charitable interpretation one can give. 
19 Not political authority over oneself, however that would work, but in the sense that we are 
competent reasoners, and our wanting to do something is taken as a strong though prima 
facie reason for us to do it. I discuss this in much more detail later, but for more on autonomy 
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in no way necessarily linked to ideals of being an unfettered chooser. To give an 
example, someone with a family could be autonomous despite (or, as I argue 
later, because of) the various responsibilities placed upon them by these 
relations, and without at any point having consciously decided to undertake 
these responsibilities. Their power over themselves, without getting too deeply 
into competing conceptions at this early stage, does not require that they be 
free to pick any option at any time. Similarly, they meet the authority condition 
so long as their status as an agent is taken to demand recognition, rather than 
only if it’s the case that their word is (metaphorically) law and cannot be 
gainsaid. 
 Still, the autonomy sceptic might yet be uneasy. However one dresses up these 
ideas, they are still, overtly, concerned with exercising (perhaps imposing) our 
wills. Is it not merely pushing the question back a stage to assert that whatever 
autonomy consists in, it must give us power? By analogy: say that I am trying to 
convince someone to buy a car, because of the increased ease of movement this 
gives them. If they are apathetic or hostile to this, perhaps (to try and keep the 
parallels fairly close) because the purported “joy of the open road” is a 
paradigm of individualistic self-sufficiency, then it serves no purpose for me to 
point out the multifarious different ways in which increased freedom of 
movement can be applied. If the open road’s joy is no object of value, then 
offering up ways in which it can be accessed by a wider group or engaged in new 
ways is just re-arranging deckchairs on the Titanic. 
One strategy that would be open to me, however, is to argue that the joy of the 
open road is not the real value at all – it may be widely taken to be so, and this 
widely-accepted notion could well be oppressive, but the actual value of car 
ownership is something entirely different. Perhaps the value lies in the fact that 
I can now meet with friends more easily and often, or that new job opportunities 
have opened up, or – bleakly – that I have some avenue of escape. 
How can this strategy be applied to power and authority? Doing so fully requires 
laying out a conception of autonomy, but some progress can be made at the bare 
                                                                                                                                                                                
as power and authority over one’s life, see Oshana (2006). 
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concept stage. Clearly, power over one’s life can be interpreted in a hyper-
individualistic way: as being the sole director of one’s actions with no regard for 
responsibilities or relations. Cast in such a light, autonomy is simply a fantasy, if 
an unhealthy one – no-one can avoid the “constraints of materiality” or the 
inconvenient fact of social norms. But need it be interpreted this way? Surely not: 
demanding the power to self-direct is simply to demand freedom from 
domination, and this is something that coheres well with feminist attitudes 
towards employment and reproductive autonomy (to give but two examples). 
Dependence on another, to take the opposite tack, is not necessarily a reduction 
of power to self-direct unless that dependence has some oppressive aspect. 
Being dependent on a friend for emotional support, or on a carer for some 
physical tasks, does not render an agent non-autonomous unless, say, that friend 
uses this relation to malignly interfere with the way my life goes (imagine a case 
where they use emotional blackmail to prevent me from a taking a job or 
maintaining a relationship with someone else). 
Similarly, holding that we must be authoritative over our own lives is not 
equivalent to holding that no one may challenge our behaviour, or that we 
cannot be beholden to others.  If, for example, I have decided that I want to go 
to the pub tonight, but someone reminds me that I already promised to dogsit 
for a friend, then my being under obligation doesn’t undercut the authority of 
my previous plan: the objection is not “you aren’t an appropriate source of 
values regarding your life”, but “you have already decided that dogsitting is in 
some way a valuable activity (and made a commitment based on that which it 
would be immoral to abandon)”. While my freedom of action is plausibly being 
restricted, the restriction is vastly different from that put in place by oppression.  
By way of example: in the UK, heterosexual cisgendered men face no 
establishment pressure or questioning over their sexual preferences or identity 
(beyond perhaps the lingering Victoriana of ‘settling down’, marrying and 
starting a family being regarded as the default). They are held to be entitled to 
their attractions, and it would be widely regarded as absurd to inquire as to why 
they feel this way. There are of course occasions where their behaviour can be 
challenged, and being authoritative over their attractions manifestly does not 
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equate to a right to have them requited, but, crucially, that they have these 
attractions is taken as prima facie reason enough for them to be treated with 
(some fairly minimal level of) respect. They are, in this sense, authoritative over 
their sexuality.  
Conversely, and to take a recent case, the homophobic and transphobic Section 
28 which used to operate in British schools stood as a direct challenge to the 
authority of LGBTQ agents over their sexual identities. The (barely) implicit 
assumption about agents being made by such legislation must be something like: 
that they have these attractions or this identity is reason enough to prevent 
them, with the coercive force of the state, from being acknowledged in 
education as living a life as valuable and ‘normal’ (or, indeed, abnormal) as any 
other’s. This was not primarily restriction of action – it certainly indirectly 
results in restrictions of action through maintaining the heteronormative 
structure it was designed to defend, that said – but an obvious refusal to grant 
the agent status as a source of values; their having particular desires or 
identities was not accepted as reason to treat these desires and identities with 
respect, despite there being no normatively important difference.20  
While dogsitting can represent a restriction of action and yet have no effect on 
my authoritative status, thereby showing that authority does not require 
unhindered and unchallengable choosing, the Section 28 example highlights that 
it is not possible for us to be authoritative over ourselves without our desires and 
identities being presumed to have normative force. To put it another way, the 
authority in question does not require that we may brush off any and all 
demands for justification; it does require that those demands be addressed to us, 
as agents and independent sources of value, in the first place. 
I believe this goes some way towards dealing with the criticism that the concept 
of autonomy is unduly individualistic and it is therefore a mistake to pursue it. 
Indeed, I would argue that something very like the power and authority 
conditions are implicit in feminist accounts of what is necessary for living free of 
                                                          
20 This does not, of course, imply that there are no differences in the way that people of 
different identities experience their lives – simply that there is no defensible normative basis 
for acceptance of one set of consensual relations and hostility towards another where the 
only distinction is the sex/gender of the partner(s). 
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oppression.21 The other criticism remains, however – the objection that while 
the concept might not be harmful, its pursuit is in practice either a distraction 
from more pressing matters, or apt to worsen the situation of those who pursue 
it (and/or people close to those who pursue it). 
2.2 Autonomy is Disvaluable in Practice 
This criticism harks back to the point made earlier about the wielding of self-
sufficiency, “pulling oneself up by the bootstraps” and the like in the service of 
public spending cuts: whether or not autonomy requires that we all do the dance 
of the mountain man, it seems at least to allow it. Given this, and given the pre-
existing political and social structures which tend to conflate autonomy with 
autarchy and/or self-mastery, the critic might object that however conceptually 
innocent it is, the practical upshot of asserting autonomy as a primary value will 
be malignant.  
Return to the car example mentioned previously. I could make a convincing 
argument to the effect that there were various genuine values to possessing a 
car – that the concept of having a car is not, in fact, a necessarily harmful one, 
and even a worthwhile one – and still be blocked off by objections that for 
various socio-economic reasons (pollution, the relative cost of owning and 
running a car, etc.), car ownership is not a practically worthwhile goal. Or, to 
use a political example which is closer to the bone, we might think that there 
are good philosophical reasons to adopt unanimous direct democracy but 
pursuing it would be impractical, or there are more pressing issues to organise 
around, and so on. 
The objection has three strands:  
1. Autonomy is conceptually and practically valuable, but given prevailing 
social and material conditions, there are more important tasks to be addressed. 
2. Autonomy may be conceptually valuable, but its pursuit under current 
social and material conditions is likely to harm the autonomy seeker.  
                                                          
21 See Friedman (op. cit.), Oshana (op. cit.) and Stoljar (2000). 
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3. As 2, but its pursuit is likely to harm those close to the autonomy 
seeker.22  
Taking the strands in order, 1 can be partly answered with the stereotypically 
philosophical “yes, but on the other hand...”. To argue that, for example, 
personal-political autonomy must take precedence over survival, or survival at 
above a bare subsistence level, would be to ignore the basis of autonomy – we 
cannot respect agents as sources of value and simultaneously hold that they may 
not prioritise their survival over theoretical commitments.23 But on the other 
hand, whether autonomy is a value prior to (say) personal security, or even a 
value that includes it, will depend on the particular conception of autonomy 
that we use. Similarly, a suitably social account of autonomy will place great 
emphasis on addressing conditions of oppression and exploitation rather than 
advancing the individual through or around such barriers – that is, the pursuit of 
autonomy (properly conceived) will be, at least in many if not most cases, 
concerned with socio-economic liberation before it is concerned with maximising 
the freedom of action of one person, or of arbitrating between the competing 
ends of already-fairly-autonomous agents. The response, then, is a dual one of 
conceding that autonomy may not be the sole or the primary value, but also that 
a suitable account of autonomy might very well turn out to include many of its 
purported competitor values. 
The second part of the objection, that pursuing autonomy may be harmful to the 
would-be autonomous agent, admits of a parallel response regarding the 
distinction between the standard or popular concept of autonomy (as something 
akin to self-sufficiency or self-mastery) and the reconceptualised idea of 
autonomy as power and authority. Just as the notion of empowerment is 
multiply traduced and used to justify everything from privatising medical care to 
cutting disability benefit, but remains a genuinely worthwhile principled and 
pragmatic goal if properly constructed, so autonomy is only likely to be harmful 
                                                          
22 The important distinction between “autonomy may be bad because harmful to the seeker” 
and “autonomy may be bad because harmful to those around the seeker” is drawn in, e.g., 
Friedman (op. cit., pp41-43). 
23 Although this is to some extent dependent on what precisely those commitments are – 
perhaps I may prioritise survival over a commitment freedom of expression, but not over a 
commitment to treat others as ends in themselves.  
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if mistakenly conceived. If someone pursues self-sufficiency, with the attendant 
cutting off of important social relations, or self-mastery, with the accompanying 
denial of social and material conditions’ effect on identity, then it does seem 
likely that they have been harmed. Nevertheless, as has been argued before and 
will be argued again in this chapter, self-sufficiency and self-mastery are not 
autonomy. To put the response in the simplest terms: the potential harm of 
pursuing a misconceived idea of autonomy does not mean that autonomy is itself 
potentially harmful. 
Finally, there is the claim that pursuing autonomy may have deleterious effects 
on those close to the autonomy seeker.24 The objection can in some cases be 
rebutted by a version of the same response as above, but this rejoinder will not 
work universally. While autonomy need not invariably involve the abandoning of 
pre-existing relations, there seem to be no principled reasons to suggest that it 
cannot, and in some circumstances, such as those where the relations are 
exploitative, then we might well return to the view that autonomy endorses 
removing oneself from them. Take the case of someone who decides that their 
self-conception is inconsistent with living in a densely-populated city, and what 
they really want to do is to go and live in the woods somewhere. They need not 
be swinging for Walden (particularly if they have no aunts to bring them food 
every weekend); they can quite coherently value the friends and experiences 
they have accumulated in the city, but simply feel that, for whatever reason, 
they would feel “more themselves” and/or more in control of their lives in a 
rural area.  
So far, their attitude seems perfectly consistent with autonomy conceived as 
power and authority, but it is clearly plausible – indeed, likely – that others will 
be negatively affected by this decision. Friends will miss them, flatmates will 
need to engage in various tedious administrative tasks; depending on their job, 
                                                          
24 I have chosen not to focus on starker cases of self-direction leading to the harming of others 
on the basis that such actions are independently ruled out by moral concerns – no-one, save 
perhaps Stirner, would defend the idea that autonomy can countenance a right to unprovoked 
murder, given that (even if such acts were internally consistent with maximal equal 
autonomy, something I dispute) this would very obviously be immoral for more reasons than 
that it ignores the autonomy of the victim. Less parodical cases of this type, it seems to me, 
do a better job both of bringing out the critic’s legitimate worries about fetishising the 
individual, and defending autonomy against such worries. 
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the move may even have a damaging impact on those they work with (perhaps 
they are a doctor who subverts or refuses to comply with unjust disability 
assessment schemes, and their replacement will be a running-dog motivated by 
the profitable prospect of declaring as many people fit for work as possible). It 
appears, then, that at least the charge that autonomy causes or may cause 
harms to others will stick – and if we are engaged in defending a concept which 
benefits the individual but harms others, are we not veering dangerously close to 
precisely the kind of right-libertarian land of take-what-you-want that I have 
been at pains to reject thus far?25  
There is certainly something intuitively unappealing about the thought that 
supporting one person’s self-direction may be to deny another some non-trivial 
benefit – but this is an intuition of a kind with hesitating to publicly condemn an 
incompetent doctor because they seem pleasant. It may not be nice to do so, 
but then – as TV Tropes would have it – good is not nice, and people blamelessly 
hurt each other all the time. If one person in a relationship comes to realise that 
they are no longer happy to be with the other(s), then revealing this information, 
and ending the relationship, is highly likely to be incredibly hurtful no matter 
how gentle the let-down is. We cannot, however, seriously entertain the idea 
that the relationship-ender has done something wrong here – as Friedman says, 
“a person has no general responsibility simply to remain in just any social 
relationships in which she finds herself.”26 We obviously bear some basic 
responsibilities towards each other which limit (to some extent) how and when 
we may break off certain relationships; I cannot abruptly decide that I don’t 
want to see my partner any more if we’re alone in the wilderness and I have the 
only map, for example. Here, though, I am under general moral obligations – the 
problem is not that my partner will or may experience distress at the news I 
don’t want to be with her, but that I will have essentially left her to die of 
exposure. Again, the issue is not specifically that my pursuit of autonomy has 
harmed another, but that I have broken a (particularly strong) moral obligation. 
                                                          
25 “Eve: All this riot and uproar, V... is this Anarchy? Is this the land of do-as-you-please?  
 V: No. This is only the land of take-what-you-want.” 
See Moore/Lloyd (1982). 
26 Friedman, op. cit., p42. See also Humphries (forthcoming). 
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It is not my being powerful and authoritative which has caused harm to another: 
it is my using this power inappropriately.27 
 But failing to maximise somebody’s happiness is not the same thing as failing an 
obligation (unless one is an act utilitarian, of course). I am not failing my 
obligations or duties of care to a competent adult by deciding that I need a 
better social life, or to return to university or the like, even if we very unsafely 
assume that the other person will have a marginally less satisfactory life as a 
result. Similarly, if I know that a friend would be pleased to see me today, but it 
is vital that I get some research done – or even if I have a strong desire to take 
the day off to eat soup – then presuming that I have not already promised them I 
would visit them, going to work (or eating soup) doesn’t constitute my wronging 
that friend. To respect another as a source of values is not to regard those values 
as always taking priority over one’s own; it is simply to acknowledge that they 
are values, and to give them appropriate consideration. Absent some previous 
obligation to the contrary, we can blamelessly make people unhappy, and the 
possibility that the autonomy seeker will harm others around them is one that 
must be accepted. To argue the contrary is, essentially, to argue that we cannot 
change the relations we stand in without the explicit permission of all other 
parties, a deeply reactionary stance. It is also a stance that is plainly 
inconsistent with the value of self-direction understood as being powerful and 
authoritative over our lives. 
It is worth making one final point on this matter. To say that we are blameless 
“absent obligation” is not to suggest that only explicit, contractarian-type 
agreements (between rational individuals, presumably) can put us under 
obligation. Equally, the question of whose value should take priority is difficult 
to give an abstract, principled answer to, but there are paradigm cases showing 
that it is certainly possible (and sometimes fairly easy) for us to weigh up these 
values. If, in the example above, I know that my friend is lonely and depressed, 
then staying at home to eat soup will be blameworthy irrespective of any claims 
that “I never said I’d go and see him”, and of the fact that I genuinely enjoy 
soup. Recognising them as a source of values does involve recognising that (on 
                                                          
27 With great power comes great etc. 
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this occasion) their wishes are more important than my own, and insofar as our 
relationship constitutes an endorsed part of our identities, this obligation has no 
malign effect on our autonomy – indeed, it is actively beneficial to it.28 As such, 
it misses the point to say that autonomy is an overly-individualistic or oppressive 
concept because it may sanction courses of action, such as the ending of 
particular relations, which bring harm to others. For one thing, autonomy (as I 
conceive it) is perfectly happy for a deeply socially-embedded agent to be 
autonomous not despite, but because of their network of obligations; for 
another, if we are not prepared to sanction the occasional harm to others, we 
are plunging head-first into exactly the kind of dominating, harmful-norm 
perpetuating ideology that autonomy’s feminist critics would reject.29  
2.3 Recap and Another Functional Analysis 
This subsection has addressed the objections that the concept of autonomy may 
be inherently harmful, and that its pursuit may be harmful in effect. The first 
objection, I argue, mischaracterises autonomy as being necessarily the ideal of 
the hyper-individualised, self-mastering rational agent who is beholden to 
nothing and no-one. While this is unarguably a fairly accurate picture of a 
number of conceptions of autonomy, it is not a required feature of the concept 
itself. All that is conceptually necessary for autonomy is power over one’s life 
and authority (weakly construed for the moment as an agent who is self-
respecting and regards their self-direction as generally reflecting their values) 
over it, and neither of these conditions is inextricable from oppressive 
conceptions of autonomy. 
The second objection amounts to three slightly different criticisms: first, that 
autonomy is valuable but only one value among others; second, that pursuing 
autonomy is liable to harm the pursuer; and finally, that someone seeking to 
increase their autonomy is liable to harm others around them.  
                                                          
28 Of course, whether or not they are depressed, then I may equally go and see them 
(‘sacrificing’ my research or soup in the process) without any autonomy loss – again, the 
relationship makes up a valuable part of my self-conception. The point is simply to show that 
moral obligations can play important roles in autonomous lives. 
29 For a parallel and relevant criticism, see, e.g., Bartky’s (1990) objection that an ethic of care 
looks dangerously like a re-affirmation of traditional ‘good woman’ roles. See also Kaplan 
(1994). 
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In response to the first criticism, I suggest that while autonomy may turn out to 
be a far wider-ranging value than previously thought, there is nothing in the 
‘thinner’ version to suggest that we must at all times prioritise autonomy over 
survival, or other basic goods. The second prong admits of a mischaracterisation 
defence similar to the one given in the previous paragraph: it seems entirely 
plausible that people could bring suffering and/or harm on themselves through 
pursuit of purported ideals of autonomy, like self-sufficiency or disassociation 
from involuntary relations, but all this tells us is that the concept of autonomy 
has been bastardised into something like autarchy or free choosing – not that 
autonomy, correctly conceived, need be harmful to its seeker. 
Finally, the thought that the pursuit of autonomy may be harmful to others 
needs a more complex response. Autonomy does not licence immoral behaviour. 
Even if it were the case that my autonomy would be increased or improved by 
setting fire to a noisy neighbour’s flat, I may not do so on pain of (apart from 
anything else) failing to accord them the same status as a source of values that I 
claim for myself. Autonomy may still licence behaviour that causes others upset, 
distress, or even harm. But the alternative suggestion, that we must remain in 
any relationships which would distress others if ended, is clearly an indefensible 
position and one distinctly at odds with the historical and political-philosophical 
commitments of feminism. Just as an autonomous agent may nevertheless be 
deeply unhappy, making someone else unhappy is not, in itself, a violation of 
their autonomy. 
I have, hopefully, defended against claims that autonomy is necessarily 
disvaluable or harmful. Before concluding the chapter it is worth drawing out 
the positive case for valuing it, through a functional argument which has been 
immanent in responding to the foregoing criticisms.  
The case is this. The concept of autonomy, of being powerful and authoritative 
over our lives, is valuable because it allows us to describe and explain the 
importance of self-direction. We do not, after all, desire to simply be ‘wanton’ 
choosers settling on options more or less at random. The idea of autonomy as 
being in some sense authoritative over the decisions that we make illuminates 
the notion that self-direction is valuable because it reflects (or instantiates, or 
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whatever we wish to use at this early stage) something valuable about human 
agency, and agency requires more than random selection. This, of course, invites 
the question of why agency is valuable at all. One option would be to claim that 
its value is a primitive, akin to the way that utilitarians sometimes talk about 
the value of pleasure. I’m somewhat sympathetic to this, but my view is closer 
to Marx’s notion (2010, pp86-92) of “species-being” (although, to be clear, I do 
not adopt the idea wholesale). This is in part the idea that humans’ unique or 
essential property is that we consciously and creatively shape the world around 
us in accordance with our values and desires. Agency is thus valuable because 
and when it allows us to engage in this creative activity; as a useful corollary, 
this also explains why autonomy as being powerful and authoritative captures 
the value of agency where random selection does not – mere ‘plumping’ does not 
evince the idea of conscious creation that Marx appeals to.30  
Similarly, autonomy must involve some exercise of power if it is to be able to 
explain what is gained by successful self-direction, and lost through such 
direction being frustrated. If we imagine the second, kidnapped Odysseus, it is 
his loss of power which accounts for our feeling that he is not self-directed: 
whatever he has reflected upon, decided upon, and so forth, that decision is not 
mirrored or even acknowledged in his actions (or lack thereof). Autonomy need 
not, as I’ve argued above, be an explanatory factor for the value of unrestricted 
power or complete self-sufficiency – apart from anything else we have autarchy 
to hand if we want to make those kinds of arguments – but it doesn’t seem 
consistent with autonomy’s role that an agent could be completely unable to 
self-direct and yet be autonomous. 
The functional analysis of autonomy, then, suggests that power and authority are 
required features of a concept which seeks to explain or make intelligible the 
practice and value of self-direction. It is not required by this concept that we be 
unrestricted choosers nor rugged individualists – in fact, as I argue in Chapters 3 
and 4, the most plausible conception of autonomy is one which takes very 
seriously our social embeddedness. In the next section, I perform the necessary 
groundwork to argue for such a conception by showing that the concept of 
                                                          
30 Someone might then inquire why creatively working over our material conditions is valuable. 
This, I suspect, is the point at which I give up and claim that the value is a primitive. 
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autonomy which plays the functional role required will not simply be given to us 
by adopting moral autonomy. 
 
3. Acting Responsibly and Acting Autonomously  
Given the importance I have placed on the concept of autonomy as something 
which helps to explain the value of “living one’s own life” or acting in 
accordance with deeply-held principles, it is worth taking some time to head off 
the reasonable thought that I might simply be talking about moral autonomy: 
that the concept which best explains why we want autonomous agents to be 
powerful and authoritative is the same concept which explains the importance 
of making moral decisions in the right way. In other words, there is a potential 
misunderstanding here that I wish to avoid, namely that valuing autonomy 
because we value agency suggests that I should give an account of moral 
autonomy. This section is devoted to avoiding that misunderstanding by showing 
that although the concept of moral autonomy does call on the value of agency, 
it does so in a way which is importantly different from the way that personal (or, 
foreshadowing Chapter 3, personal-political) autonomy does.  
I argue that moral and personal-political autonomy are distinct concepts playing 
different roles in our philosophical discourse, and that moral autonomy requires 
(morally) responsible reasoning where personal-political autonomy has no such 
requirement. Finally, I provide several arguments to the effect that an agent can 
be morally responsible without being powerful and authoritative over their lives 
(in the ways necessary to explain the value of self-direction), and vice-versa. 
To begin with a straightforward pair of definitional claims: 
Moral autonomy is concerned with what we owe to others, and only weakly 
sensitive to our desires. We are compelled on pain of conceptual confusion 
towards adopting certain attitudes (taking certain actions, living a certain way) 
just by dint of the capacities we must use to consider them. 
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Personal-political autonomy is concerned with what others owe to us, and is 
strongly (although not indefeasibly) sensitive to our desires. Certain of our 
normative attitudes may be inconsistent with our own desires, but this is owing 
to the practical contradictions implied by the two sets of beliefs rather than any 
conceptual incoherence.31 
Since moral and personal-political autonomy aim at different goods, we have 
different failure conditions for them. It is unlikely that moral autonomy can 
perform the functional role specified in the previous section. To support the 
stronger claim that the two are conceptually independent, I must show not only 
that there are conceptual differences and different failure conditions – for as I 
have conceded, there are also conceptual similarities and shared failure 
conditions – but that we can have one entirely without the other. 
One noteworthy feature shared by all non-Kantian accounts of autonomy is that 
two agents can make morally autonomous decisions regarding the same question 
and come up with different, even mutually exclusive answers without either 
being wrong or heteronomous: autonomy is not necessarily a matter of coming 
up with the right answer de re, but of taking the right approach to the question. 
While there might be cases where restrictions of rationality, forward planning 
and so on mean that in practice there is only one right answer, these will be 
exceptions rather than the rule. Thus, Annie autonomously decides that x-ing is 
wrong, while Brendan equally autonomously settles on the position that x-ing is 
permissible; this may be due to differing higher-order ethical commitments, 
views of moral psychology, or simple probabilistic judgements (to give three out 
of a much wider set of possible commitments) and, so long as none of these 
other commitments themselves fail whatever restrictions are taken to be in play, 
                                                          
31 I argue later that it is possible for an agent to be conceptually confused about whether such-
and-such a course of life can be defended as autonomous, but as suggested on the previous 
page, we can assume for now that there is no reason internal to such a conception of 
autonomy that anyone should need to defend their self-direction in terms of autonomy – 
someone who self-consciously commits to an elitist or egoist view can (and probably will) fail 
to be autonomous, on my view, but this is because of what autonomy actually requires, rather 
than because they are committed to courses of action which are inconsistent with some idea 
of autonomy that we have stipulated they are somehow also committed to. See Chapters 3 
and 4. 
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Annie and Brendan’s disagreement suggests no failures of moral autonomy on 
either of their parts. 
Further, we can judge not just idiosyncratically, but wrongly, and still be 
autonomous. Imagine that Brendan’s probabilistic assessment is simply incorrect, 
and correcting this assessment would cause his view of x-ing to align with 
Annie’s. So long as, again, his mistake is not the result of slapdash 
(arbitrary/culpably ignorant/etc.) reasoning, Brendan’s decision is still 
autonomous; and this does seem to accord with our intuition that one cannot 
require near-omniscience in order to be autonomous.32 
It also, however, begins to make moral autonomy accord closely with another 
normatively weighty notion, that of responsible moral action. In fact, it seems 
that the morally autonomous agent must also be the morally responsible agent; 
that, in Oshana’s words, “autonomous agency seems to be both sufficient and 
necessary for responsible agency”(2002, p262).33  It is to this claim that I now 
turn.  
In the next subsection, I argue that being a morally responsible reasoner is a 
necessity condition for being morally autonomous, and in the following 
subsection provide several cases where meeting this requirement of moral 
autonomy (that is, responsible reasoning) is independent of meeting those of 
personal-political autonomy. 
3.1 Moral Autonomy and Responsible Reasoning 
The first thing to do here is to be clear about what we mean by moral 
responsibility. An obvious interpretation is something like “causal responsibility 
for a morally-loaded action” or “appropriate blameworthiness for some action” – 
I am morally responsible for causing a cat suffering because it was I who 
deliberately kicked it and thereby created its suffering, and so on. This is not, 
                                                          
32 See, for example, Levy (2009). 
33 To be clear, Oshana denies that these necessity and sufficiency conditions obtain: but she 
denies the necessary linkage between personal-political autonomy and responsibility, rather 
than moral autonomy and responsibility (and indeed I make the same denial). 
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however, the sense in which it is used here: rather, what I mean by 
responsibility is the act (or state, etc.) of acting or judging in a responsible 
fashion. Responsibility (for the purposes of this discussion) should thus be 
thought of as denoting a particular quality or virtue of an agent instead of 
suggesting a particular causal link – we are after the agent who is responsible in 
the way that a pipe-smoking boat captain is supposed to be responsible, rather 
than the way that the accused is supposed to be responsible.34 As such, I will 
refer to responsible action or responsible reasoning, rather than to moral 
responsibility. 
We can thus largely leave to one side tricky questions about folks’ metaphysical 
ability to do other than they did. The crucial conceptual features here are not 
(or not solely) whether it was possible for me to act differently, but whether the 
act I did perform (judgement I made, etc.) meets certain internal and external 
criteria regarding the thought process that led to it. To act responsibly is to take 
certain relevant reasons as motivating and to act according to some appropriate 
set of principles (and to be be willing and able to reflect critically on these 
principles), just as the concept of moral autonomy is concerned with the 
formation and adoption of specific (albeit specified at a second or higher order) 
principles or reasons for action. Below, I suggest some non-exclusive contenders 
for what may be required to set and meet such principles for responsible action; 
that these requirements will apply equally well to extensions of the concept of 
moral autonomy elucidated in the previous section is not coincidental. 
Speaking very broadly, the first requirement of morally responsible action is a 
particular form of self-consciousness. In order to act responsibly, we should be 
aware that our (apparent) agency imposes requirements on us, and also aware of 
the rough limits of these requirements. For example, I act responsibly if I realise 
that my being able to seriously injure or kill someone with a car means I must 
                                                          
34 Again there is likely to be some overlap – if someone is literally incapable of being responsible 
in the former sense, we would be unlikely to suggest that they are appropriate subjects of 
blame or reprimand (although they could obviously still be strictly causally responsible for 
something). Conversely, failure to reason responsibly before action, absent excuse, is one 
good reason to hold the agent blameworthy for the moral disvalue of the result. Further and 
more detailed discussion of responsible action, and of moral responsibility as holding 
responsible can be found in, among others, Fischer & Ravizza, (1991, 1998); Levy (2009), 
Oshana (1997), and Steadman (2012). 
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think carefully about where and how I drive, but it would be at least prima facie 
strange for me to worry about whether the state of pedestrian crossings in 
Bristol means I should not drive to Edinburgh, and absent other factors no-one 
would be inclined to think that my worrying so indicated a particularly virtuous 
level of responsible reasoning.35 
Of course, in just the same way that one can act or reason wrongly but 
autonomously, we can act or reason wrongly but responsibly. Taking the driving 
case above, imagine that I have no good (internal) reasons to thoroughly check 
my car’s brake lines, with the result that halfway down the M8 I cause a pile-up 
through being unable to stop in time. If we stipulate that the responsible driver 
can never be the cause of an accident, then I will be judged irresponsible, but 
again very few people would argue that we ought to exhaustively check our cars 
before setting off in order to be responsible. It seems, again, as if the fact that I 
performed all the checks I took myself to be obliged to perform, and was non-
culpably ignorant that there were other checks I should have performed, means I 
have acted in a morally responsible manner (and, curiously, might mean that I 
am not morally responsible in the other, apt-for-blame, sense). 
Further, and again with near-perfect isomorphism to thinking autonomously, we 
can think responsibly about the car safety question and come up with different 
answers: Anne argues that all things considered, there will be more harm than 
good as a result of mandatory rigorous pre-drive testing, while Brendan makes 
the case that tougher restrictions on private motor vehicles might be no bad 
thing. Neither of their claims need be made in bad faith, or on arbitrary grounds, 
and so on, and so we have the third parallel between autonomy and 
responsibility: the possibility of blameless disagreement.36 
                                                          
35 If I just considered the possibility and dismissed it (rather than being swayed by it, or it not 
coming to mind at all), an observer might perhaps be happier to say that I was being 
exceeding responsible, but even then the verdict seems fairly arguable.  
36 It also seems possible at first glance that we could reason both responsibly and immorally 
(Anne earnestly believes that increased traffic accidents will toughen up humanity, for 
example); whether immoral action requires some failure of responsible reasoning is, again, an 
interesting tangent but not one explored here. 
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There is one final link to be drawn between the morally autonomous agent and 
the agent who acts responsibly: their actions (judgements) cannot be the result 
of irresistible coercion. If someone holds a gun to my head and demands that I 
drive an unsafe vehicle to Edinburgh, then I could plausibly judge one way and 
act another, in that I could judge responsibly that it would be best if I didn’t, 
and yet be compelled through fear to act against that judgement.37 This is not 
the result of slapdash, arbitrary or culpably ignorant reasoning – even if I decide 
that actually it would be best to drive to Edinburgh, I have not decided to re-
evaluate my views on public safety just for the hell of it, but am being forced 
under obviously sub-optimal conditions to evaluate various likely outcomes for 
my own safety and for public safety if I accept/refuse. Consequently, it would 
be very odd to lay the blame for the resultant accident on my irresponsibility, 
and indeed relatively implausible even to suggest that I had acted irresponsibly. 
As yet, there is no reason to take this argument as anything more than a 
motivation to think that our ordinary talk of responsibility carries a number of 
fairly distinctive senses, one of which seems to be best captured by “morally 
autonomous”. In the next subsection, I make the further claim that this view of 
moral autonomy as requiring responsible reasoning and action – which is, I have 
suggested, the correct one – comes entirely apart from personal-political 
autonomy. There are sufficient conceptual differences and counter-examples for 
an agent to be morally autonomous without being personally-politically 
autonomous, and vice-versa. This being so, we have no reason to think that the 
functional analysis of autonomy as being powerful and authoritative over our 
lives will persuade us to adopt moral autonomy. 
3.2 The (Non-)Kantian Gulag and the Two Types of Autonomy 
In Virtue & Taste (1991), Flint Schier posed a thought-experiment he dubbed 
‘The Kantian Gulag’ as part of an argument that autonomy was not simply 
equivalent to freedom. As part of the experiment, we are to imagine a good 
                                                          
37 There is something appealing about the thought that any moral judgement is in some sense 
prima facie until we’re confronted with the reality of it, but we surely don’t want to take on 
the theoretical burden of claiming that it’s impossible to make an autonomous moral 
evaluation without being so confronted. 
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Kantian who has been – for whatever reason – incarcerated in a prison camp. 
There are various crises or moral problems we can imagine this agent dealing 
with according to the Categorical Imperative; they refuse to give up fellow 
prisoners for torture, do not allow themselves to become ruled by motives of 
vengeance, and so on. Is this agent autonomous in the Kantian sense, and can we 
imagine such a situation without conceptual confusion? Schier affirms both, and 
then asks whether we would say that the agent was free because autonomous – 
to which the answer, as he very plausibly claims, is “no”. 
Returning to Schier’s example, consider the morally autonomous agent not in 
strictly Kantian terms, but with moral autonomy conceived of as requiring 
responsible reasoning. Can this agent – at least potentially – meet the 
requirements given above? Surely so: they can recognise their continued agency, 
apply non-arbitrary rules and principles, and so on. Depending on other ethical 
commitments, we might say that actions like informing on one’s fellow prisoners 
are immoral and irresponsible, immoral but responsible, wrong but all things 
considered excusable, or any of a multitude of other verdicts. The key thing is 
that it is certainly conceptually, and evidently historically, possible for persons 
to maintain a high level of moral autonomy even under conditions of extreme 
duress. 
But precisely those conditions that make moral autonomy impressive make 
personal-political autonomy impossible – just as, in the original example, we 
would say that the agent was autonomous but not free, here we should say that 
they were morally autonomous but not personally-politically autonomous. An 
agent’s considering the morally relevant features of an offered choice between 
snitching and starvation, rather than unthinkingly grasping at survival, satisfies 
in heroic fashion the requirements for responsible, and as such autonomous, 
moral evaluation. An agent being in a position where they are forced to choose 
between their moral integrity (or self-conception) and survival fails in 
calamitous fashion the basic external requirements for being powerful and 
authoritative over one’s life. 
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To reiterate, the distinction is not that entirely different sets of psychological 
capacities or capabilities are used in the exercise of the two types of autonomy. 
The point is rather that the concepts are deployed in different situations, or 
have different goals. Personal-political autonomy is not impossible in a prison 
camp because there is some singular and very particular ability to decide on life 
goals which is only active when we are at liberty, but because the possibility of 
achieving those goals is dependent upon our being at liberty. 
The wrong, furthermore, of forcing a prisoner to snitch or be starved is of a 
somewhat different one from the wrong of imprisoning them (or even ‘just’) 
starving them, with no bargain offered). Depending upon how far coercion 
excuses the prisoner, the wrong partly inheres in making them complicit or 
straightforwardly using them in some further immorality. In other words, if the 
prisoner experiences a failure of moral autonomy the disvalue lies in the fact 
that they have thus acted wrongly or immorally, not (from the perspective of 
assessing their moral status, rather than that of the captor) that they have 
themselves been wronged. With failures of personal-political autonomy, the 
wrong is the very direct harm to the agent, not that the agent is thus dragged 
into the commission of immorality themselves. 
We can sketch many further examples where an agent can act morally 
autonomously without being personally-politically autonomous: disaster 
situations or conditions of extended chronic shortage, for example, have 
conceptual space for agents who are rigorously fair, non-arbitrary, reflective etc. 
in their moral judgements but cannot so much as decide whether to fish from 
one creek or the other.38 
Approaching the question from the other angle and asking whether an agent can 
be personally-politically autonomous whilst being morally heteronomous gives 
another affirmative answer. Take a “Ripley case”, involving someone who is 
pathologically incapable of seeing others as making moral demands on them.39 
                                                          
38 To give one concrete example, there is no reason to think that someone caught up in the civil 
war in Syria suddenly becomes incapable of responsible reasoning, but they might very well 
have almost no room for self-direction. 
39 Here, ‘Ripley’ refers to the villain protagonist of Patricia Highsmith’s books, rather than 
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Will they make non-arbitrary moral judgements about, for example, distribution 
of resources, or acknowledge the possibility of strong countervailing claims? No – 
indeed, Ripley cannot do so. But will they make and carry out courses of action 
according to some deeply-held principle or self-conception (even a bad or 
harmful one)? There seems absolutely no conceptual reason that they should not, 
and fairly good observational evidence to suggest that people in fact do lead 
morally heteronomous – albeit generally not to Ripley’s level – but personally-
politically autonomous lives.40 
Without yet delving too deeply into episodic/programmatic and local/global 
distinctions at this stage, it is also worth remarking that the asymmetry between 
moral and personal-political autonomy is mirrored at both levels – the examples 
so far have all been writ large and concerned with what we might paint as 
autonomous lives, but I can have a local failure of moral autonomy, such as 
making a decision about how to interact with someone based solely on my dislike 
of them, without any restrictions on my self-direction. Similarly, there is no 
reason to think that I must reason less fairly or rigorously because I have been 
temporarily prevented from going to my favoured pub. Just as in the wider-
ranging cases, one is a (minor) breach of my obligations to others, and the 
second is a (brief) restriction of my own valued self-direction. 
There is one move remaining to someone who wishes to claim that moral and 
personal-political autonomy serve or are served by the same function.41 It will 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Sigourney Weaver’s tough-as-nails space trucker. For further discussion of Ripley-type cases, 
see Oshana (2006), pp165-170. 
40 Again foreshadowing a forthcoming argument, I would note that many of these people might 
live fairly personally-politically autonomous lives in spite of themselves – someone may think 
that “just being born doesn’t mean you’re owed anything” and be autonomous, but this is in 
part thanks to precisely the type of social structures they explicitly claim to reject. 
41 There is also a Kantian move, which I have not considered more fully owing to constraints of 
space and because it is somewhat orthogonal to my task here, but which can be summarised 
as follows. It is not, in fact, possible to act responsibly (and thus meet the necessity condition 
for moral autonomy, as I claim) and wrongly, the Kantian says, because acting according to 
the right kinds of reasons, i.e. autonomously in the Kantian sense, always entails that one is 
acting correctly. My response, similarly summarised, is that I can remain silent on what 
precisely it is to make responsible moral decisions. If the Kantian asserts that anyone who is 
really deliberating suitably hard and following the correct decision-making procedure will act 
correctly, my claims here can accommodate that perfectly well, because all I have suggested 
is that responsible decision-making is equivalent to moral autonomy – I have not made any 
strong claims about what is required for morally responsible decision-making. For the 
Kantian, in other words, responsible moral reasoning cannot result in morally wrong action. 
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say something like this: someone who is incapable of or prevented from being 
apt for one kind of autonomy will necessarily be inapt for the other as well. 
Contra my claims about prisoners, an agent who is forced to make a choice 
between their moral integrity and their survival can be neither morally nor 
personally-politically autonomous, and the same conditions are doing the 
malevolent work in both instances. 
The plausibility of this objection depends on its strength. If we think it 
sociologically very unlikely that an agent with extremely limited power and 
authority over their lives will be morally autonomous, then it seems fairly 
reasonable (although by no means infallible), but this is no challenge to my 
theory. It is difficult to think of a form of coercion or manipulation which is on 
the one hand potent enough to undercut an agent’s reflective capacities, but on 
the other has no practical impact on their self-direction. We should not be 
surprised that many circumstances which are hostile to one form of autonomy 
are also hostile to the other.  
If, though, the claim is interpreted as saying that someone who fails to meet any 
of the preconditions of one kind of autonomy must also fail to meet any of the 
other, then it is nearly trivial. We have already seen that many of the same 
capacities (reflection, some measure of self-control, instrumental reasoning etc.) 
are required for someone to be capable of either form of autonomy. To argue 
from this that moral and personal-political autonomy are irreducibly equivalent 
is akin to saying that football and rounders are conceptually inseparable because 
they are both impossible to play without physical extension: it is true but 
uninteresting on a coarse-grained account (which misses everything that 
matters), and it is false on an account fine-grained enough to capture the 
relevant distinctions. 
This being so, it is implausible to claim that the idea of autonomy as being 
powerful and authoritative over one’s life is equivalent to the concept given us 
by moral autonomy. To be morally autonomous you must indeed have some kind 
                                                                                                                                                                                
But this is solely as a result of their particular theory of responsible reasoning, and so my 
claim that moral autonomy requires responsible moral reasoning is true after all. 
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of power and authority – the power to decide for yourself, and the moral 
authority attached to responsible reasoning – but moral autonomy requires far 
less control over the direction of your life, and far less external recognition of 
your actions as authoritative, than does personal autonomy as we have 
understood the concept so far. As such, the functional analysis of personal 
autonomy will neither require that agents act morally responsibly, nor that 
morally autonomous agents be powerful and authoritative over their lives – 
whatever the constituents of personal autonomy turn out to be, they will not be 
the same as those of moral autonomy. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have made three moves. First, I argued that we should 
approach the concept of political authority via a functional rather than 
conceptual analysis: what it is for some institution to be authoritative is 
dependent upon what that institution’s purpose or role is, and so the authority 
of political institutions is greatly determined by substantive rather than 
procedural matters. A right-libertarian and a social democrat, for example, will 
have different roles for political institutions and hence different success criteria 
for when those institutions may legitimately claim authority. 
I then made a parallel argument for the concept of personal autonomy. We want 
such a concept to be able to account for the value we place on self-direction, 
and to account for those features of a life which seem important for such self-
direction. The concept which does this, I suggest, is one of the autonomous 
agent as being powerful and authoritative over the course of their lives: able, 
within limits, to choose how her life goes according to what she values, and have 
that decision respected and (at least prima facie) enabled in virtue of her being 
a legitimate source of values. This concept captures many of our intuitions about 
autonomy, without being vulnerable to the kinds of objections that plague many 
particular conceptions of autonomy. 
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Finally, I sought to head off the idea that moral autonomy could serve the 
function of accounting for self-direction in the way set out above. To be morally 
autonomous is, I argued, essentially to be a responsible moral reasoner, and 
there is nothing about that status which requires the kind of wide-ranging power 
and authority necessary to be plausibly described as deciding how one’s life goes. 
We can therefore safely leave conceptions of moral autonomy aside when we 
seek a plausible account of autonomy as power and authority. 
In the next chapter, I turn to constructing a conception of personal or personal-
political autonomy which holds that being powerful and authoritative over one’s 
life is a matter of standing in particular social relations. 
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3. 
The Structure of Autonomy 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have argued that the concept of autonomy is not in 
principle objectionably individualistic, and that a properly-conceived account 
will show autonomy to be consistent with a thorough-going commitment to social 
values. The next step, obviously, is to provide such an account. 
Examining the structure of personal-political autonomy entails two tasks: 
identifying the components or features relevant to being autonomous, and 
identifying how they interact.1 The most minimal accounts obviously have an 
easier time of this. For instance, Frankfurt’s (1971) structuralism has essentially 
two components, lower and higher-order desires, which interact fairly 
straightforwardly. If our higher-order desires endorse our lower-order desires, 
we are autonomous. Frankfurtian structuralism is a paradigm example of what I 
call “internalist” accounts of autonomy: those features relevant to our 
autonomous status are all internal to our psychology.  
In contemporary debates, it is more usual to adopt some flavour of 
“externalism” about autonomy, i.e. to argue that at least one of the 
determinants of our autonomy is external to our psychological states. Procedural 
accounts are externalist in this way: we must consider the procedures through 
which first-order desires were formed, and the factors which affected our 
decision-making and psychology, as well as our own higher-order attitudes to the 
desires (and how those attitudes were formed). Desire-satisfaction theories are 
on the face of it the simplest form of externalism: the crudest possible 
conception would have it that the more of your desires are satisfied, the more 
autonomous you are. More plausible versions, though, are like structuralist or 
procedural accounts with an extra condition bolted on: now we have desires; our 
higher-order attitudes towards those desires; how the desires and our attitudes 
towards them come to be formed; and lastly, whether the ‘correct’ desires, 
                                                          
1 Hereafter, “autonomy” should be taken to refer only to personal-political autonomy unless 
specifically stated otherwise. 
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those formed under conditions of procedural independence are being fulfilled. 
While each of these accounts pinpoints, to a greater or lesser degree, something 
important about autonomy, I claim that each fails to capture at least one feature 
which is necessary for the concept of autonomy to do the normative work we 
want it to. The functional analysis in the previous chapter suggests that in order 
for autonomy to account for the value we place on self-direction and those 
features of life which are important for self-direction, we ought to think of the 
autonomous agent as being powerful and authoritative over her life. Here, I 
make the further argument that no internalist or desire-satisfaction externalist 
conceptions give us the proper criteria for being powerful and authoritative, and 
so we must adopt a still more stringently externalist view. 
On my view, autonomy has internal preconditions but actually being autonomous 
is a matter of external, non-psychological features of our lives. Most distinctively, 
I claim that autonomy is constituted largely by our standing in particular social 
relations. In many cases, these relations seem to be entirely external to and 
independent of any desires we have: we can be autonomous and unhappy with 
our decisions, or autonomous “in spite of ourselves”, so long as we stand in 
relations which constitute our being powerful and authoritative over our lives. 
Complexity is not necessarily a virtue, of course, but it seems to me to be the 
only way to satisfactorily account for the internal preconditions and external 
conditions for one’s being powerful and authoritative over one’s life – i.e. being 
autonomous – which I’ve so far endorsed. As such, the complex nature of the 
theory is a necessary consequence of its attempt to elucidate a key value of our 
generally pretty fiddly lives. 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to work out what the key structural features of 
autonomy are and how they fit together. I show how the relational account 
fulfils the requirements laid down for autonomy: an agent is autonomous insofar 
as she is powerful and authoritative over her life, and this status is constituted 
by her satisfying certain psychological preconditions and standing in certain 
relations. The most pressing task is therefore to explain how (and why) the 
relational account best meets the power and authority criteria of autonomy.  
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In order to accomplish this, we must first be clear about our reasons for thinking 
that the criteria for autonomy are power and authority; and, keeping in mind 
the worries raised in the second chapter, show that being powerful and 
authoritative is not a chimerical or individualist value. 
 
1. The Concept of Autonomy 
Assessing the plausibility of a particular conception of autonomy, of course, first 
requires that we know what the concept is supposed to do – you can hardly 
decide whether or not to buy a particular car without having a reasonably good 
idea of what function a car is supposed to serve. Similarly, if you know what a 
car does, but are unable to explain why that should be important to you, it 
would seem odd to assert that you should buy this, that, or any car. The aims of 
this section are thus to lay out a fairly uncontroversial sketch of the concept of 
autonomy, suggesting that at the broadest level autonomy consists in having 
power and authority over oneself, and to give some more detailed justifications 
for the presumption that autonomy is a valuable thing (a presumption which, as 
the criticisms raised in Chapter 2 show, is by no means self-evidently true) by 
analysing the concept in functional terms. 
It is worth re-emphasising the methodological approach adopted in Chapter 2 
before continuing. Autonomy clearly serves a normative purpose – we refer to it 
in discussions of redistribution, political power and medical ethics among many 
others – and so we must be clear about what that purpose is, and ensure that the 
concept and conception we offer is fit for purpose. Taking the approach that 
such-and-such a conception provides plausible necessity and sufficiency 
conditions for our pre-theoretic intuitions about autonomy, that the conception 
would allow (say) voluntary slavery, and that therefore one can be an 
autonomous slave, is to misapprehend the role that the concept of autonomy is 
supposed to play. Instead, we should assess accounts of autonomy by examining 
how well they perform the desired function of explaining and illuminating the 
value and practice of self-direction. I take my task here to be the elucidation of 
a concept of autonomy that best serves the end of valuing agency, rather than 
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strict analysis of a pre-existing concept in an attempt to discover its necessary 
and sufficient conditions. 
What Does Autonomy Require? 
To begin by outlining again the concept of autonomy: something shared across 
almost every contemporary or near-contemporary account is the idea that self-
determination is key.2 Self-determination (or self-direction) can remain fairly 
broadly defined for the moment, taken to mean something like the ability to 
exercise some non-trivial level of control over our lives, being able to make 
“choices and [take] actions that effectively accord with deeper wants and 
desires”.3 One familiar set of contrast cases which can illustrate the concept, as 
well as distinguish it from theoretical neighbours, is Pettit’s (1996) case of the 
citizen and the slave. By considering the contrasting situations of the agents, we 
can identify the differences which seem to make one autonomous and the other 
not (or less) autonomous, and then move to explain those differences. 
One concept which is often conflated with autonomy is that of autarchy, simple 
unrestricted choice – I am autarchic insofar as I choose what I want and do what 
I want (the negatively free agent is paradigmatically autarchic).4 It will be 
immediately obvious that neither the slave nor the citizen is autarchic, and so 
we have another reason to think that free choice, at least, cannot be all there is 
to autonomy. Quite how important autarchy is must remain a question to be 
dealt with later; for now, we can say that the slave or serf is considerably less 
autonomous than the citizen with rights of self-expression, freedom of 
movement and so on. 
 Insofar as the slave’s life is directed in the interests and at the will of others, 
they are non-autonomous. The citizen – whilst by no means to be necessarily 
regarded as ‘fully’ autonomous, as will become clear – has considerably more 
room to make her life go the way she sees fit; within certain not-inconsiderable 
bounds, she sets and pursues goals according to her own principles.  
                                                          
2 See, for example, Colburn (2010); Dworkin (1988); Friedman (2003); Meyers (1989); Oshana 
(2006); Raz (1986). 
3 Friedman (2003), p28. 
4 See Benn (1976) and Colburn (op. cit.) for more on the distinction between autarchy and 
autonomy. 
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What, then, are the differences that explain their contrasting states? Obviously 
the slave’s enslavement is crucial to their lack of autonomy, but to explain that 
a slave is not autonomous because they are a slave is (perhaps not quite) to 
argue in a circle. To put it another way – what features does the citizen possess 
that the slave does not? 
It cannot be what we might think of as basic capacities which are required to be 
capable of self-direction in the first place, such as a reasonably coherent 
psychological identity, some amount of linguistic ability, instrumental rationality 
or the like. There is, obviously, no necessary difference between the slave and 
the citizen in this respect: both of them could be equally well (or badly) 
equipped for autonomy without being equally autonomous.  
The differences instead lie in the extent to which they can actually use these 
capacities, and the extent to which this usage follows from or is consistent with 
the agent’s demand for recognition.  
The first difference is comparatively straightforward, and can be seen in the 
example above: A and B both have identical capacities, however these are 
understood for autonomy, but A has the freedom to employ those capacities 
whereas B does not. A is therefore more autonomous.  
It is worth taking a moment here to set up the second difference, that of 
recognition respect.5 This demand for recognition is not something like a 
demand for the attribution of professional excellence or interpersonal 
importance, although these might fall under it. Rather, it is a more basic 
recognition of oneself or another as an agent. When we recognise others as 
agents, we recognise – or presume – their possession of normatively-important 
capacities like a sense of self and some measure of instrumental reasoning. 
Arguments about what, precisely, are the conditions for agenthood can be laid 
aside. Whatever we think makes an agent an agent, we think it possessed by 
those we recognise in this relevant way, and there is one consequence of 
recognition which is important to my argument. 
                                                          
5 Darwall (2006) expands on the normative role of recognition respect, and is the primary 
influence on the (much-simplified) account of recognition presented here and in later 
chapters. 
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When we recognise somebody as an agent, we grant their wishes prima facie 
authority; my being an agent means that there is no general requirement for me 
to explain or justify my actions unless certain other conditions (such as my 
actions impinging on others, to give one example) apply. “Because I want to” is, 
ceteris paribus, all the motivation anyone can feel entitled to get out of me, 
and all the justification I need to perform the action.6 
This ceteris paribus is, nonetheless, doing a job of work here – or else my 
account would simply collapse into autarchy-as-autonomy. If I want to go round 
setting fire to orphanages, then all else is not equal – my shrug of “I just wanted 
to” does not defeat moral arguments against immolating children. Note, though, 
that we still have to have a non-arbitrary reason to rule out “because I wanted 
to”. The presumption is that we may decide how best to direct our lives; when 
we are permitted or supported in a particular action in virtue of it being what 
we want to do, we are recognised as agents and we are authoritative over our 
lives. We might be forbidden from doing some things without this indicating a 
lack of recognition respect, but there must be good reasons for this interference. 
To recap, and return to the contrast case of the citizen and the slave: the 
citizen is able to self-direct in a non-trivial manner, and her self-direction is 
regarded as at least prima facie valuable just in virtue of her valuing of it. The 
slave or serf, conversely, has very limited self-direction, perhaps none at all that 
isn’t trivial, and their wanting to do something is not acknowledged as a reason 
for them to do it. The key distinctions between the cases, I will show, are 
distinctions of power and authority. The autonomous agent is powerful and 
authoritative with regards to the direction of their life, while the heteronomous 
agent is not (this is a scalar rather than binary distinction – we are more and less 
powerful and authoritative, not “godlike” and “totally powerless”). 
                                                          
6 It’s worth being crystal clear that this isn’t intended to suggest that being an agent entails 
that we can never be legitimately asked for, nor required to give, more justification than this: 
if, for example, I try and evade childcare duties by shrugging and saying “I didn’t want to”, 
this response will be rightly regarded as unsatisfactory. Rather, the claim that we’re not in 
general required to give more justification than this is supposed to capture the thought that 
being an agent entails that unless I’d breach some obligation, or fail to fulfil some duty, or my 
behaviour is out of character (and so on), merely wanting to do something is a good enough 
justification for us to do it. 
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 While the citizen can make at least some use of these basic capacities or 
preconditions – she can decide that a day off at the end of the week is worth 
working late on Monday and Tuesday – the slave has a far more limited arena to 
exercise self-direction, not to mention a more restricted number of options even 
within that arena. They are, to reverse Raz’s aphorism, free to decide whether 
to cut down trees in this field or the next, but not free to give up being a 
lumberjack. In short, the citizen has considerably more power over their life 
than the slave does. The autonomous agent must, then, both have the ability 
and the regular opportunity to self-direct; “power” here should be understood as 
something exercised instead of a mere possession of the appropriate mental and 
physical powers, whatever they might be, for the exercise of autonomy.7  
A similar point can be made regarding the authority of the agent. For the 
moment, this authority should be thought of simply as a kind of normative 
recognition as described above; a status such that having a particular desire is 
regarded, simply because of one’s being an agent, as a prima facie fairly strong 
reason for one to fulfil it (just as being recognised as an ‘authority’ on geese 
means that your saying something about geese’s behaviour gives others prima 
facie reasons to believe it). This prima facie reason is obviously defeasible: if I 
am blind drunk or suffering some other serious impediment to (say) my 
instrumental rationality, then the prima facie reason given by my agency does 
not end up being a good reason all things considered. But I take it that this is 
part of why it’s only a prima facie reason in the first place, albeit a weighty one: 
we take agents’ desiring to do something as being on the face of it a good 
motivation for them to do it (and perhaps for us to assist), because we presume 
their rational and epistemic competence. But if it then transpires that the agent 
is somehow incompetent, the motivation ceases to be a good one. If our avian 
authority asserts “geese display such-and-such behaviour”, we believe them in 
the normal run of things – their assertion is a good prima facie reason to think 
that geese do indeed behave like this – but if they then assert something like 
                                                          
7 The autonomous agent could still very well decide that (originally non-voluntary) social 
commitments are a valuable part of their identity, and need not be constantly engaged in 
self-examination or grand projects. To say that self-direction must be exercised is simply to 
say that an agent cannot have their life and values wholly set by another and be counted as 
autonomous, no matter how much “potential” for autonomy they have. A potential chicken is 
still just an egg, after all. 
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“geese are small rodents which enjoy peanut butter”, that prima facie reason is 
defeated. 
To return to the citizen and slave case with respect to authority: the slave may 
have some discretion regarding certain tasks or some parts of their life, but this 
limited power to self-direct is not based on the same foundations of recognition 
as that of the citizen’s power. To a greater or lesser extent, the power to self-
direct is regarded as default for a citizen – assuming that some course of action 
is not ruled out by morality, then the citizen should regard herself as being 
entitled to pursue it just because she wants to, or because it leads to some 
other outcome she values, etc. In short, the citizen’s power over her life is 
matched by authority in a way that the slave’s is not; when the slave is left to 
choose whether to repair this end or that end of their exploiter’s wall, the 
choice does not follow from recognition of their status as an agent capable of 
making normative claims. They express no self-conception in the choosing, and 
they are not offered the choice in virtue of their agency.  
Consider: we do not allow Roombas free roam because we think that they are 
independent sources of value; we leave them to potter about because it is of no 
particular importance to us which corner of the carpet it cleans first. Similarly, 
the slave’s being left to choose between ends of the wall does not constitute 
their being granted room for self-direction on the basis of recognition of their 
authority over their life (indeed, such a bequest would seem conceptually at 
odds with slave-holding in the first place), but a mere absence of active 
interference. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that an enslaved agent ceases to be, or to see 
themselves, as a source of value, nor that they are prevented from all self-
direction which they hold to be important. Rather, there is a sharp disconnect 
between what they can do, and what they can do on the basis simply of being an 
agent. Where the citizen’s authority is at least theoretically the default position, 
the slave defaults to having no authority – their realm of self-direction is set 
according to the wishes or values of another. 
The authority criterion given above shares a certain amount of conceptual 
overlap with ideas that self-respect is necessary for autonomy – one cannot, the 
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argument runs, be an autonomous agent without believing that the goals one has 
are valuable, or that one is capable of setting and following through on goals.8 
Given this overlap, the differences are worth drawing out by way of explaining 
why authority here is not simply reducible to self-respect. 
Since it seems possible that an agent could engage in meaningful self-direction 
without realising it (perhaps they believe themselves to merely be acting out 
preset patterns), or without believing themselves worthy of it, we have a good 
indication that power on its own is not sufficient for autonomy. What seems to 
be missing from the deterministic and self-abnegating agents is the kind of self-
respect that allows one to hold that “because I want to” is a good (though not 
indefeasible) reason to carry out an action. However, the weak authority 
requirement is not simply a self-respect criterion. As aforementioned, an 
enslaved agent could well and correctly view themselves as an independent 
source of values – but still, their justification or reasoning for performing many 
or most actions is not going to revolve around this view.9 That is to say, someone 
could easily hold that they deserve to act from their own values, and also 
recognise that many or most of their actions are not of this kind.  
In summary, the weak authority condition (hereafter WAC) is composed of two 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient sub-conditions: the agent must have 
some minimum level of self-respect for themselves as an agent, and the actions 
they take must, in general, be explicable or defensible just by reference to 
recognition of this agency. Taken together, satisfying these conditions 
constitutes being weakly authoritative over one’s life. 
I have argued so far that the concept of autonomy requires power and authority 
over our lives, such that we can (to an extent that falls short of total self-
sufficiency or implausible freedom from social conditions) manage the direction 
of our lives in accordance with our principles or values. Such a concept is not 
inherently harmful, and nor is the pursuit of it unduly likely to bring harm to the 
agent or to others around them (although it may, and may do so in a morally-
                                                          
8 See, for example, Hill (1991). 
9 I call it a “weak” authority requirement because it does not, as yet, require that anyone else 
acknowledge the authority of the agent. I return to this limitation in the ‘Relational 
Autonomy’ part of Section 3. 
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blameless fashion). So, we at least seem to have defeated one of the challenges 
to autonomy raised in Chapter 2. 
This nevertheless leaves a great deal of work. Even if it is not necessarily the 
case that power and authority are conceptually or practically harmful, we have 
already seen that it can still be the case that particular conceptions of them are. 
If it turns out that in fact, the only consistent conception of autonomy involves 
(say) power as unrestricted choice, then the previously raised objections that 
autonomy is an overly individualistic or androcentric value would be difficult to 
refute. The task for the remainder of this chapter, then, is to show that 
autonomy properly conceived is consistent and not vulnerable to such criticisms.  
After criticising several relatively popular conceptions of autonomy – the 
internalist, structuralist view most often associated with Frankfurt, an account 
of autonomy as procedural independence, and what I snappily title the 
procedural independence desire-satisfaction view – I make the case for my own 
account, a relational conception which owes much to Marina Oshana. On this 
conception, autonomy is constituted, rather than merely causally affected, by 
our social relations: it is not that I become less autonomous in virtue of my 
social status causing some desire to be frustrated, for example, but because I 
stand in relations which constitute my being (again, more or less) powerless to 
direct my life. 
This account, I argue, best meets the power and authority conditions which are 
required to explain autonomy’s role and value. There are internal psychological 
preconditions that we must satisfy in order to engage in the relevant kind of 
self-direction, and external, social relations which determine the extent to 
which we actually engage in such self-direction. To be powerful is to be able to 
pursue (morally unobjectionable) goals, to be authoritative is to have a 
normative status as a proper source of value for those goals; and the relations 
we stand in are constitutive of being either. 
It is primarily the relational aspect which gives my account a reply to worries 
about ethical and structural individualism; to value autonomy consistently on the 
relational account, one must value the autonomy of others, and such an equality 
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militates both conceptually and in terms of practical organisation against a 
world organised for the purposes of reclusive mountain men. 
 
2. Internalist Accounts 
In this section, I rehearse and criticise two accounts that can be broadly 
classified as internalist – that is to say, they cast autonomy entirely or primarily 
as a matter of our psychologies or mental states lining up in the correct fashion. 
Only structuralism can strictly be painted as a purely internalist account; 
procedural independence takes some heed of external factors. I categorise 
proceduralism as an internalist view because external factors are of secondary 
importance to the proceduralist thesis – so long as no-one is malignly interfering, 
the key concern is whether we meet the various conditions of competence (such 
as instrumental reasoning and so on), and these preconditions relate to our 
psychologies, not our surroundings.10 
To take the accounts in order, I now turn to structuralism. 
 
2.1 Structuralism 
Structuralism’s great virtue is the straightforwardness of its conditions. It is 
entirely conceptually possible for any given agent on Earth at this moment to be 
autonomous if we adopt, for example, Frankfurt’s view: autonomy consists in 
having first-order desires which are identified with or endorsed at a second-
order level, and being motivated to act by these desires.11 If I desire (to do) 
something (“I want to eat that cake!”), then I have a first-order desire; if I have 
a desire for or positive attitude towards that first-order desire, I have a second-
order desire endorsing it. 
                                                          
10 This is probably a somewhat contentious categorisation, but ultimately whether or not one 
agrees with my taxonomy of proceduralism is a side-issue to the point at hand – I would be 
happy enough calling it semi-internalist, or pseudo externalist, or the like. 
11 One version of this view – although he does not refer to it as an account of autonomy - is 
given by Frankfurt’s 1971 paper ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’. See also 
Dworkin (1976); Dworkin’s version is often referred to as the identification or split-level view, 
but for simplicity’s sake (and because there is more overlap than not) I refer to them 
interchangeably as structuralism. 
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If, for instance, I have some set of (first-order) desires A1...Z1, all of which are 
endorsed by the second-order set A2...Z2, then on the structuralist account, I am 
autonomous regardless of what kind of desire A1 (or A2) may be, and autonomous 
regardless of whether I will ever fulfil this desire.12 I may, then, have a desire to 
go and enjoy the countryside, and after checking this desire against the various 
higher-order desires I have, I find that I can endorse it – that is, I’m not riddled 
with guilt over wasting valuable research time, nor secretly convinced that 
hillwalking is a bourgeois conceit. I identify myself “decisively [italics 
Frankfurt’s] with one of [my] first-order desires”, such that I am happy to be 
moved by it, and so the structuralist will claim that I am autonomous.13 
Something important about autonomy is obviously captured by this kind of 
account. Without returning to the outdated notion of autonomy as being the 
self-mastery of the rugged individualist, we can still hold that someone who is 
consistently acting on desires they regret or repudiate (or, conversely, 
consistently fails to be motivated by desires/attitudes they regard as important 
or praiseworthy) is alienated from themselves in such a way as to render them 
non-autonomous. They may still have power over their life, since power over 
one’s desires is a very different thing from power over one’s actions: I can on 
the whole stop myself from eating cake much more easily than I can stop myself 
from desiring cake. However, they plausibly fail the weak authority condition by 
dint of their actions not reflecting their deep values and commitments. One of 
the platitudes of autonomy, after all, is that it is valuable – or, at least, we 
value it – because leading a life “of one’s own” is valuable, and we can hardly be 
                                                          
12 The 1:1 relation between first and second-order desires here is assumed purely for 
simplicity’s sake, and should not be taken to imply that structuralist accounts are committed 
to a requirement that every first-order desire must have a second-order desire devoted solely 
to endorsing it in order for the agent to be autonomous. Such an account would, it seems to 
me, require an implausible level of self-consciousness about everyday actions and modes of 
life or else label such habits heteronomous: introspection reveals that, despite a marked 
preference for some kinds of soft drink over another, I have no discernible second-order 
desires whatsoever about which colour of fizz I ought to drink. Certainly, there is no decisive 
identification; but does this make me less authoritative or powerful over my life? I cannot see 
how, unless, again, to be powerful and authoritative (i.e. autonomous) is simply to be some 
kind of ultimately autarchic, rigorously self-creating Great Will – and this is a conception of 
autonomy that has already been rejected. Bratman’s more recent claim that “autonomy is 
realised by the functioning of reasoning-guiding policies that are higher-order” (2003, p171) 
evades the particular worry of unduly rigorous self-consciousness which I have rehearsed 
here, but as a structuralist theory is still vulnerable to the Seamus-type problem cases I set 
up in this chapter. 
13 Frankfurt (ibid), p16. 
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leading a life of our own if all of the desires which partly define us are desires 
that we would not, or would rather not, recognise as ours. In short, something 
like a more relaxed version Frankfurt’s freedom of the will looks as if it is 
probably necessary for authenticity – and, to a lesser extent, the authority 
condition of autonomy.14 As I now argue, however, it is not sufficient for 
autonomy. 
2.2 Seamus, Sinead and the Problems with Structuralism 
Just as it would be odd to think of the autonomous agent as one with no 
reflective capacity or control, it would be very unusual to say that so long as I 
was at peace with my desire to stand atop a hill, whether or not I can actually 
do so is irrelevant to my autonomy. Consider a close possible world where my 
equivalent, Seamus, has the same deep desire to roam o’er hill and glen, but 
unlike me, is being held prisoner for an indefinite period. How, we might think, 
can it possibly be the case that I and my counterfactual compatriot are equally 
autonomous despite my being free to fulfil the desire, and his being imprisoned 
and unable to fulfil it? Here, Seamus patently has very little power over his life, 
and while there are doubtless significant ways he can act from his own values 
(refusing to speak to screws, hunger striking, or whatever), the vast majority of 
his self-direction will be of the “walking in this corner of the prison yard rather 
than that one” sort, and as such not explicable by reference to his commitments 
or values.  
To cast Seamus as autonomous when we have defined autonomy as being 
powerful and authoritative thus seems inappropriate. The freedom to walk in 
one direction instead of another counts for little if we are only picking between 
the directions by virtue of being imprisoned, after all. Since this worry afflicts 
other internalist accounts that can evade the structuralist-specific issue below, I 
temporarily set it to one side. 
A further and familiar problem awaits structuralism. In the case above, it seems 
that Seamus is not autonomous – but it does at least seem that insofar as his 
                                                          
14 Although the extent to which our desires must be authentic in order to be properly counted as 
part of our identity is very much up for debate – for present purposes, I assume that some 
measure of authenticity is necessary, but make no claims regarding how much or how 
precisely the authenticity of a desire is to be specified. 
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desires are “in order”, he is more autonomous than he otherwise would be. The 
problem, in other words, has been that the states identified by structuralism are 
insufficient for autonomy, not that they are inconsistent with it. As has been 
famously demonstrated, however, inconsistency does arise in at least some 
cases.15 Imagine Sinead, a woman similar to Woolf’s “angel in the house” – 
conforming to 1950s gender roles, subservient to her husband in the economic 
and domestic, and perhaps sexual, domains; and furthermore, happy with such a 
life. Sinead values the role of home-maker, and actively disvalues things like 
economic independence or a career; and her higher-order reflections on these 
attitudes lead her to endorse them. She identifies decisively with her lower-
order desires and attitudes, and on the structuralist account she is thus 
autonomous.16  
There is an obvious criticism to be made here regarding the possibility of 
autonomy being determined by factors outside the agent’s psychology, but as it 
leads into procedural independence (and, ultimately, thorough-going 
externalism), it makes sense to first examine the type of objection to 
structuralism raised by Hill (1973) and Westlund (2003). Each has its own 
emphasis, but the overall outline of the objections is roughly the same. Imagine 
as before an “angel in the house”, but now add that for whatever particular 
reason, she has begun to chafe against her disempowerment. She grows to 
loathe doing dishes, preparing dinner, cleaning the house, and so on – but on 
reflection, she repudiates these desires. Despite loathing the daily prospect of 
getting out of bed early to make breakfast, she believes that she should not 
loathe it; what she desires is to want to discharge these various burdens. She has 
become, at least by structuralist lights, non-autonomous. 
The problem arises here: according to the structuralist schema, Sinead will 
become autonomous by effectively curbing those desires which she rejects on 
reflection – in other words, those desires to smash the plates rather than clean 
them, and so on. It is only when she accepts her domination, in short, that she 
will be autonomous, and this is the second damning criticism against 
                                                          
15 Particularly in Friedman (1986).  
16 I borrow the particular title and set-up for this example from Oshana (op. cit., pp58-60) 
although (obviously) indirectly from Woolf (1966).  
89 
 
structuralism: it not only strongly appears to sanction oppressive norms so long 
as they are identified with, but when these norms are resisted, then rather than 
supporting self-determination (something that even other unsatisfactory 
conceptions of autonomy do, albeit perhaps in unhelpful or merely formal ways), 
it actively urges the suppression of desires to resist, for the sake of autonomy.  
One cannot be said to be authoritative if the first-order desires one has are 
repudiated for no other reason than that they conflict with higher-order desires 
which themselves disbar meaningful self-determination. If I have some high-level 
commitment to subservience, and find myself riddled with first-order desires 
towards rebellion, it is entirely ass-backwards to say that my autonomy, my 
ability to self-direct, is best served by quashing these selfsame urges to self-
direct. As Friedman says with regards to an agent playing the angel in the house 
role: “Her frustration, grief, and depression, and the motivations to change her 
life which spring from these sources, may be her only reliable guides”.17 
There is, unsurprisingly, more than one interpretation of what has gone wrong in 
cases such as these. Friedman casts the problem as one of psychological or 
reflective misfires caused by oppressive socialisation, while (for example) 
Oshana plausibly argues that whether or not the agent’s reflective capacities 
have been harmed, she is still not autonomous.18 This distinction will become 
more relevant in the next section, but for the moment, I remain silent on the 
matter. The important claim at this point is just that it cannot be the case that 
having all your psychological ducks lined up in a row is enough to make you 
autonomous. 
Despite the force of the claim that we must have (at least some) ownership of 
our desires and goals – we cannot be metaphorical automata furrowing someone 
else’s groove, nor alienated from ourselves to the point of psychological fracture 
– the implausibility of freedom of the will as a sufficient condition for personal-
political autonomy suggests that external factors must play a significant role in 
                                                          
17 Friedman (1986), p31. Interestingly, Friedman doesn’t initially seem to hold the angel in the 
house objection as doing much work in criticising structuralism; the majority of her paper is 
focussed instead on pressing home a charge of infinite regress. 
18 Oshana (2006), pp59-60. 
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determining our autonomous status. Autonomy is not simply a matter of well-
ordered desires: its structure extends beyond the self. 
2.3 Procedural Independence 
Worries of the kind laid out above have caused theorists such as Christman 
(1991, 1993), Gerald Dworkin (1988) and Meyers (1989) to pay greater heed to 
the status and history of the agent, whilst still putting the locus of autonomy 
firmly within their psychology.19 The obvious weakness, they would argue, is that 
autonomy conceived as bringing first-order desires in line with higher-order 
desires, or of having authentic first-order desires, must also presume that these 
higher-order desires are themselves authentic – and in the Sinead case, it seems 
overwhelmingly likely that the relevant higher-order attitudes are the result of 
endemic social pressures which are hostile not only to her self-determination, 
but also to the critical analysis of these social pressures. The procedures by 
which her desires have been formed are themselves moulded and infiltrated by 
factors inconsistent with her “deciding for herself”, and hence she is not 
procedurally independent. 
That is to say, Sinead’s social/material conditions push her towards a particular 
role and set of attitudes, and that role and/or those attitudes themselves, as 
well as the social and material conditions which they are a product of, militate 
against critical reflection. To use a familiar phrase, Sinead has internalised 
exactly those norms which oppress her. 
It is thus fairly easy to see why higher-order repudiation or endorsement of first-
order attitudes fails to act as a suitable criterion for autonomy. It is as if, being 
effectively convinced that punching oneself in the face is good for one’s health, 
I regard my own disinclination to do it as signifying a failure to be sufficiently 
concerned with my physical well-being. The problem is not that my health is an 
inappropriate thing to be concerned about, but that there are certain epistemic 
preconditions I have to satisfy in order to effectively be concerned with well-
                                                          
19 Although generally the agent’s history is important only insofar as it has epistemic effects: 
they are “historical” accounts of autonomy in the sense that one’s history may determine 
one’s current autonomy. 
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being, or for my concern to be directed in the right kind of way to achieve its 
goal. 
The Dworkinian model of procedural independence does fairly little to extend 
the scope of autonomy. Rather than higher-order identification with desires, he 
suggests that what is necessary is instead that the agent be able to reflect on 
their desires and change them in light of these high-level attitudes.20 This 
capability need not be of the wearingly self-conscious kind of reflection typically 
engaged in by philosophers; someone can equally as well display procedural 
independence by deciding to give up smoking because of a higher-order desire 
for children, or not attending works events they find objectionable, as by sitting 
in their armchair until they have concluded that publishing in some journal really 
does cohere with their theoretical political commitments. Indeed, they can be 
procedurally independent without engaging in any behaviour or attitude 
modification at all, so long as it would be possible for them to engage in such 
modification if they wanted to. 
The history of the agent now becomes important. If they have been socialised in 
such a fashion as to harm their ability to critically reflect – if, for example, they 
have been taught since a young age that critical thought is a mark of disrespect 
or truculence or the like – then their higher-order identification with their first-
order desires cannot be taken as signifying autonomy.  
To illustrate the point, imagine someone who is misinformed that some 
particular brand of fizzy juice contains dangerous levels of carcinogens. Further, 
they are tricked into thinking that the company which makes the purportedly 
offending drink are engaged in some spectacular guerrilla PR. As far as the agent 
knows, they have paid off everyone from high-profile scientists to newspaper 
editors to folk on the metaphorical Clapham omnibus to claim that the drink 
isn’t dangerous at all, but instead a delicious low-calorie refreshment. In such a 
case, the agent will have a desire not to consume the drink, and indeed will 
have a higher-order identification with this attitude of distaste, but it would 
seem misguided to say that they are (with respect to this matter) acting 
                                                          
20 “Autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect upon their first-
order preferences, desires, wishes and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to 
change these in light of higher-order preferences and values” (1988, p20). 
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autonomously. After all, not only do they have a mistaken idea about the object 
of this attitude, but there is no way – at least, as the thought-experiment has 
been specified – for them to correct this mistake. Any evidence which would 
enable them to reflect accurately on whether or not drinking this particular fizzy 
juice is the sort of thing they want to be doing is, by virtue of the failure of 
procedural independence, going to be disbarred from their consideration. 
By contrast, if they are in full awareness of the facts about the drink, and come 
to some eventual decision about the attitudes they hold towards it – that is, “I 
desire/do not desire it” and “I identify/do not identify with this desire” – then, 
the proceduralist will say, they are autonomous. Their desires and attitudes are 
either in some sense “their own” or at the very least attitudes they are happy to 
take ownership of, and we have no reason to think that they are taking 
ownership under conditions of psychological or epistemic pressure. As we might 
think of it, they’re not buying any attitudinal pigs in pokes.   
Proceduralism thus purports to satisfy the twin requirements of autonomy in the 
following ways:  
1. Power: The procedurally independent agent has power over their life insofar 
as they act on desires/attitudes which they either have endorsed, or could 
endorse, after critical reflection. If I am pursuing goals that I don’t want to, or 
wouldn’t want to if given appropriate information about them, then I am still 
self-directing in the minimal, “this tree rather than that tree” sense. But there 
is none of the kind of self-direction which we generally take to characterise an 
autonomous life, where attitudes and the objects of those attitudes are 
reflective of an agent’s deeply-held commitments and values. Attitudes formed 
or endorsed after critical reflection under conditions of procedural 
independence, conversely, can be considered as contributing to or constituting 
the agent’s ability to shape their life in the way they would like (or in a way 
consistent with their commitments). 
2. Authority: An agent who satisfies the conditions of procedural independence 
is authoritative in the sense that there is no reason to think their desires fail to 
properly or appropriately express their commitments. Imagine that you have 
some desire for entertainment, and decide to watch a film. You are a fan of 
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comedy, and your trusted friend recommends that you see Shaun of the Dead. 
Here, unlike in the energy drink case, your decision-making process has not been 
manipulated – your friend honestly opines that it’s a good film they think you 
would enjoy, and that is the extent of their input – and, in the limited matter of 
whether or not to watch that film, you are authoritative. There is no reason to 
think that a decision to watch it conflicts or is in any way inconsistent with your 
other beliefs, desires and so on; when you claim that “On the basis of being a 
comedy fan I want to watch Shaun of the Dead” there is no epistemic disconnect 
in the way that there would be if we had been misinformed such that we instead 
claimed “on the basis of being a comedy fan I want to watch Wuthering Heights”. 
Analogously, when a procedurally-independent agent says “On the basis of some 
principle or desire, I want to x”, we can understand her x-ing by reference to 
what she desires or values, and what kind of thing x is. If she had no self-respect, 
it would seem at least odd for her to say “I wish to x, and that wish seems like a 
good enough reason to x”, and if she had been manipulated, misinformed, or 
just forced into x-ing, we would not be able to make the connection between 
her wishes and her action – it would be akin to trying to work out why a comedy 
fan had rented Wuthering Heights.21 
Sinead-type cases of internalised oppression, then, can be appropriately 
explained by procedural independence theories of autonomy. Sinead’s second-
order identification with her desires to cook, clean and so on do not make her 
autonomous because the identification is itself the result of malevolent attitude-
forming procedures; her preferences are, to use the jargon, adaptively formed.22 
2.4 Seamus (though not Sinead) and the Problems with Procedural Independence 
Although procedural independence gives a good explanation of the Sinead case, 
the account is still problematic. Recall that Seamus, the subject of our other 
thought experiment, has deep desires to go hillwalking and – we can now make 
                                                          
21 This is obviously a somewhat naive picture, since we would in reality likely conclude that 
there must be some motivation or influence we’re not privy to, but the point remains – her 
actions simply would not be explicable by reference to her agency or self-conception, and if 
that was all an observer had access to, then it doesn’t seem unreasonable to suggest that 
they would be stumped. 
22 Elster (1982, 1997) gives a helpful overview of adaptive preference formation as well as the 
problems it raises for autonomy theorists. 
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explicit – these desires have been formed under conditions of procedural 
independence. He identifies with them not because he has been brainwashed or 
manipulated into identification but because he honestly (and correctly) believes 
that hillwalking forms or expresses some important aspect of his self-direction. 
Structuralists and procedural independence theorists will both agree that 
Seamus is autonomous – and will both run into the obvious objection that 
imprisonment and autonomy do not seem like natural playmates. 
Take the authority condition first. Seamus is clearly still authoritative in the 
same sense that a comedy fan is authoritative in their choice of film; that is, 
epistemically and with regard to his desires, Seamus is the authority. The screws 
could not claim that they knew better than Seamus what he felt about 
hillwalking. But this is not the whole of the authority condition: his being 
epistemically reliable about his desires is not taken as having any import to the 
way he is treated.  
That is to say, while desires based on mistaken premises might be regarded as 
undermining the authority of the agent, acknowledging that the agent knows 
what they’re talking about is not the same as acknowledging that they should be 
allowed to match deed to word.23 To restate the point: that an agent’s desires 
are held to be (more or less) authentic does not equate to that agent being 
authoritative with regards to them. Seamus knows that he wants to go 
hillwalking, but also knows that this desire has no impact on the course of his 
life – he cannot regard his day-to-day self-direction as meaningfully following 
from his own values, and cannot thus meet the authority condition of autonomy. 
The problem with satisfying the power criterion should be fairly obvious and 
does not need much elaboration. Although Seamus is able to engage in some 
limited episodic self-direction – he can walk to this corner of the exercise yard 
rather than that, sit at this table rather than that – he clearly is not able to 
shape the general direction of his life according to his principles. Whatever goals 
and plans he has for his life, their fulfilment lies well beyond his grasp for, at 
                                                          
23 In many if not most cases, of course, the difficulty in mapping out how desires have come to 
be formed means that we should presume epistemic authority rather than require provenance 
for it. Oshana (2006, pp38-39) makes a similar point.  
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the very least, the duration of his imprisonment, and he cannot be said to satisfy 
the criterion of power to self-direct.24  
In short, and entirely unsurprisingly, Seamus the political prisoner is not 
autonomous – and that procedural independence would deem him so militates 
against adopting that conception of autonomy. 
 
3. Externalist Accounts 
The common theme running through most of the criticisms of structuralist and 
procedural independence accounts is that, by dint of being entirely or primarily 
focussed on the psychology of the agent – the “inner citadel”, in Berlin’s (1969) 
phrasing – rather than their political and material conditions, they ignore obvious 
external hindrances to self-direction. Still, the idea that some psychological 
conditions are necessary for autonomy is a fairly reasonable one. 
The obvious move, then, is not to entirely abandon psychological competence or 
independence conditions, but to seek out other conditions which relate to this 
external aspect of autonomy. In this section, I consider two such externalist 
conceptions: procedurally-independent desire satisfaction, which evades many 
of the problems of internalist accounts but ultimately retreats to what amounts 
to an inner citadel, and relational (or social-relational) autonomy. This latter, I 
suggest, is the most promising attempt to satisfy the power and authority 
conditions for autonomy, although there are several worries it must first dispose 
of. 
3.1 Procedurally-Independent Desire Satisfaction 
Recall that the most serious objection to procedural independence seemed to be 
that it gave the wrong result in cases where an agent’s psychology wasn’t 
hindered, but their ability to follow through on their desires was. The most 
straightforward route out of the problem is thus to take the claim “the 
                                                          
24 The distinction between the two types of self-direction here – sitting in this corner rather 
than that as opposed to deciding to take up hill-walking at the weekends – maps onto the 
distinction between episodic and programmatic autonomy, which will be discussed in more 
detail later in the chapter. 
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autonomous agent reflectively endorses their desires” and append the extra 
condition “...and is capable of fulfilling these desires”.25 There is now a non-
arbitrary and intuitively plausible distinction between mine and Seamus’ 
autonomous status, namely that his goals are consistently frustrated. We have 
equally authentic desires, and the capacity to reflect on and change these 
desires and our attitudes towards them; but insofar as I can achieve mine and 
Seamus cannot, I have greater autonomy. 
Drawing the example more broadly, imagine a world where, in addition to 
endorsing (or being inclined to endorse, or being at ease with) all of my desires, 
they are all fulfilled. Not only am I at liberty to climb any hill I wish, but I can 
travel there on free public transport, will receive good medical care if I fall off 
said hill and break my head, and so on. On this picture, I am not only deciding 
what kind of life I want to live, I am actually getting to live it – setting my goals 
and achieving them. If one of structuralism’s problems is that simply knowing 
what you want to do isn’t enough, then assuming that the desires haven’t been 
formed by oppressive socialisation or the like, it looks as if someone who knows 
what they want to do and actually does it must be autonomous. 
It should be fairly obvious how the procedurally-independent desire-satisfaction 
(PIDS) account purports to satisfy the conditions of autonomy.  
1. Authority. I am authoritative with regards to my self-direction insofar as I 
“decide for myself what is valuable” (Colburn 2010, p19), where this decision is 
not the result of malevolent or subversive influence. 
2. Power. I am powerful insofar as I “live my life in accordance with that 
decision” (ibid); and I am autonomous insofar as I am authoritative and 
powerful.26 
                                                          
25 I have not included a ‘pure’ desire-satisfaction account, where one is autonomous just insofar 
as one’s desires are satisfied, for two reasons. The first is that (so far as I know) no-one has 
seriously proposed such an account. This is likely thanks to the second reason: such an 
account would imply that people acting under addiction or psychological compulsion, or with 
clearly adaptively formed preferences, would all be autonomous if they got what they 
desired. Such a theory on its face fails to capture either the power or the authority 
requirements given at the start of this paper, and so is of no interest to me. 
26 Colburn does not refer to his account as procedurally-independent desire-satisfaction 
(understandably), but I am confident that the name does no violence to his theory. Raz (1986) 
also holds a view not dissimilar to this, although his account is much friendlier to 
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Such a theory gives us a fairly straightforward account of what it is to be 
powerful and authoritative, and in addition seems to capture a great deal of 
what we mean when we talk of the nature and value of autonomy. 
But just as we can critique structuralist accounts for allowing the “wrong kind” 
of desire harmonisation, such as when Friedman’s angel of the house suppresses 
her first-order desire to smash the dinner plates, desire-satisfaction or freedom 
of action accounts seem vulnerable to counting any kind of life as autonomously 
lived so long as the agent truly (madly, deeply) desires to so live it. While it is 
certainly difficult to construct a scenario whereby an agent could genuinely 
desire their own enslavement without there being oppressive socialisation or 
adaptive preference formation at work, it does not seem conceptually 
impossible that such a scenario could come about.27 
Not all autonomy theorists see this as a problem, of course: if it is in fact the 
case that someone has come to this desire free of influences which would render 
it inauthentic (implausible as that may be), such theorists would argue, then not 
only is fulfilling this desire compatible with their autonomy, it would be a 
limitation of their autonomy to deny them fulfilment. It seems, in fact, that 
there is no necessary reason why we might not be obliged to help the would-be 
voluntary slave to find a master.28 
With this in mind, it is helpful to consider why our intuitions (may) rebel against 
the notion that the voluntary slave is autonomous, not least because what seems 
to me to be the critical factor – the inability of the agent to thereafter fulfil any 
desires other than the ones which happen to coincide with the slaveholder’s 
wishes – suggests the third, social-relational, component required for a useful 
conception of autonomy.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
perfectionism. 
27 Although probably very unlikely sociologically, and I would be perfectly happy with a 
successful argument that ‘voluntary’ slavery is in fact an incoherent idea. 
28 Colburn has indicated in discussion that he might be committed to this view, for example 
(though he asserts that there will almost invariably be good reasons not to find a master for 
the would-be slave). His 2011 paper ‘Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences’ also coheres with 
the view: so long as the desire for enslavement was the result of conscious character 
formation rather than covert influences upon our preferences, the voluntary slave is 
autonomous. 
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Imagine the agent who somehow comes to authentically desire their own 
enslavement, and imagine that this desire is satisfied. At some point afterwards, 
they realise just how limited their life now is; they lose the desire to be 
commanded by another, and develop a desire to be free – a desire which is 
inescapably frustrated by their enslaved status. The desire-satisfaction theorist, 
of course, can merely shrug and observe that they are not now autonomous, 
because they have authentic desires which cannot be fulfilled; but when they 
were content with their lot, when the life of the slave was one they desired, 
they were autonomous.  
But there is a basic implausibility in this defence. By retreating to a 
fundamentally internalist standpoint – that is, committing itself to the claim that 
our autonomous status can change without any external change – it suggests that 
the slave becomes non-autonomous at precisely the point where they desire to 
be free, rather than at the point where their freedom is restricted.29 In turn, 
this suggests that the best way to guarantee our autonomy is simply to aim low: 
the more easily-satisfied our desires, the more autonomous we are likely to be.  
The obvious response, and one that we have already seen usefully deployed 
elsewhere, would be for the PIDS defender to show that “aiming low” would 
ultimately be a form of adaptive preference formation (and as such, something 
we already have the conceptual resources to explain without harm to the 
theory). This, however, will not work here: any such attempt is bound to define 
adaptive preference formation either so broadly as to include almost any desire, 
or so narrowly as to rule out paradigm cases of heteronomy.  
If, for example, the defender of desire-satisfaction moves to suggest that aiming 
low would be an adaptively-formed preference because it would not survive the 
removal of the limitation (namely that thorough-going deep desires are likely to 
be frustrated), then we must ask why my preference for being fairly mobile is 
                                                          
29 It also suggests a bizarrely dynamic flip-flopping account of autonomy: depending upon how 
my desires interact, I can be autonomous one day, non-autonomous the next, and then return 
to being autonomous the day after that, without there being any change in my physical 
circumstances or social standing (this observation is also made in Dworkin (1988), p16). This 
thought also serves as one motivation for the episodic/programmatic division to be examined 
later. 
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not adaptively formed.30 After all, plausibly at least, I would be entirely 
indifferent to the difficulty of getting to a location by foot if I was not limited by 
gravity, inertia and the like. Given the ability to move from place to place by 
whatever means I liked, it strikes me that I might well opt for flight, or perhaps 
teleportation – but this cannot mean that my admittedly weak desire to be 
reasonably physically fit is adaptively-formed. If, in other words, the limitation 
of my being a (gravity-bound) human was removed, then perhaps my desire for 
fitness would vanish too. But this on its own seems an absurd reason to claim 
that my sporadic efforts at exercise are the result of an adaptively-formed 
preference. 
There may of course be other reasons to desire fitness, but crucially there need 
not be – it seems entirely reasonable that someone could wish to be fit (rather 
than healthy) purely in order to move about more easily. If the brute fact that 
we are earthbound is not enough to render fitness desires adaptive, then how 
can the equally brute fact that many complicated or long-term desires are likely 
to be frustrated or at least difficult to fulfil mean that a higher-order preference 
for more easily-satisfied desires must be adaptively formed?31 
If, conversely, we restrict the definition so that fitness desires are not counted 
as adaptive by dint of our physical constitution or limitation, then it is difficult 
to see how the desire for easily-fulfilled desires is adaptive. If we remove or at 
least loosen the restrictions on desire-fulfilment in our hypothetical world – so 
that all desires which do not contradict physical laws can be satisfied relatively 
easily – then while it might be a bit odd to desire easily-fulfilled preferences 
(odd because in this context the desire specifies nothing), it certainly isn’t 
obviously incoherent. 
In fact, given the new stipulations, the specificity of the organising desire makes 
it look very like a curiously self-effacing but perfectly conceivable desire that “I 
will desire only those things which are possible” – just as I might, if forced to 
                                                          
30 This account of adaptive preference formation is suggested by, e.g.,  Dimock (1997). 
31 Come to that, such a picture of adaptive formation seems to suggest that if we have exclusive 
desires and a desire that they weren’t exclusive (“I want to go to place x at time t”, “I want 
to go to place Y at time t”, and “I want it to be possible to go to both x and Y at time t”, for 
example), the third must be adaptively formed because it wouldn’t survive the removal of 
the law of non-contradiction. This seems odd. 
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seriously consider long-standing frivolous desires (for a starship, say) in the real 
world, conclude that there is no point in desiring what I literally cannot have.32 
Indeed, perhaps the desire only seems curious in the context of our hypothetical 
world of maximal desire-satisfaction, because it seems psychologically odd to 
wish only for what you can get when you can get more or less anything.  
That is to say: if all desires that can be fulfilled in the hypothetical world are 
fairly easily-fulfilled, and this means a preference for easily-fulfilled desires just 
equates to a desire not to have impossible desires, then it seems entirely 
possible and indeed sensible for this preference to withstand the removal of 
limitations which brought it about (namely that some desires are far more likely 
to be frustrated than others). As such, it need not be adaptively formed, and the 
“aiming low” criticism cannot be defused by reference to the formation of the 
desire.  
The objection will be raised here that there is a key difference between my 
desire for a starship and someone else’s equally difficult to fulfil desire for (say) 
control over the direction of their life, namely that my desire is frustrated by 
factors which cannot be defeated through correcting injustice – given the various 
historical, technological and medical conditions which actually obtain, it is 
simply not going to happen.  
The agent’s desire for self-direction, however, is not like this – given the various 
historical, social and economic conditions which actually obtain, it is still 
possible (not to mention morally obligatory) for their desire to be fulfilled.33 To 
suggest that my science-fiction desires and their desires to be free are equally 
fantastical seems not only mistaken, then, but deeply objectionable. The 
comparison may be thought to invite or imply the conclusion that we are equally 
                                                          
32 Although the limitation is contingent and it makes sense to speak of me desiring a starship 
insofar as this desire incorporates the desire for other requirements which would make the 
desire possible, I could not seriously desire it in the same way that I could desire a cheese 
sandwich, a beer, or a trip to Dublin – given contemporary levels of technology and the 
average human lifespan, then barring a technological singularity (by definition impossible to 
predict), it is simply impossible that my desire for a starship will be fulfilled. 
33 This is not to suggest that the only important difference between the desires is one of 
feasibility; obviously a deep desire for self-direction is far wider-ranging and has more 
normative weight than a vague wish that reality was more like Star Trek, but these 
differences are not yet relevant. 
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as culpable in our own frustrated desires as those who frustrate them; “well, if 
you will go around wanting to be free...”. 
But this is precisely the problem that the comparison is intended to highlight. 
Clearly it is vastly more unfair and unjust that the agent is oppressed than that I 
have no starship, but merely casting it in terms of frustrated desires fails to fully 
capture how the loss of autonomy occurs. While it is the case that the structural 
barriers to my starship are of a generally different kind than the structural 
barriers to the agent’s freedom, they are still structural; the agent may be (and 
usually is, at least individually) just as powerless to change the political 
structure which oppresses them as I am to change the technological structures 
which so consistently fail to crack faster-than-light travel.  
This being so, and given what was said about adaptive preferences earlier, the 
desire-satisfaction theorist seems committed to arguing that I am rendered less 
autonomous by my lack of starship, and that the other agent would be 
autonomous if it wasn’t for the unfortunate fact of their desires. The first of 
these claims seems suspicious at best (although much of this suspicion is 
probably sociological rather than philosophical, a point which will become more 
important later); the second, outright oppressive. 
It is worth re-stating that the requirement for non-adaptively formed 
preferences probably catches most if not all actual (or closest-possible-world) 
cases where folk come to drop desires for freedom, self-determination and the 
like. My suggestion is not that, for example, a desire-satisfaction theorist holding 
this condition is always unable to explain why the angel of the house is not 
autonomous, but rather that there are tweaks – and not absurd, fantastical 
tweaks, either – to such cases which will block these kind of explanations; and 
that this in turn suggests that the mechanism which affects autonomy is not 
authenticity of desires but some other external operator.  
So far, neither internalist accounts nor theories concerned with the fulfilment of 
authentic desires have given a satisfying account of autonomy’s structure. 
Desire-satisfaction accounts either deny the loss of autonomy (if the prisoner is 
voluntarily incarcerated, for example) and thereby fail to meet the power 
criterion, or are committed to suggesting that it is contingent on the agent’s 
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desires. The foregoing argument has shown that the latter option is unworkable, 
leading as it does to the counter-intuitive conclusion that the best way to 
increase autonomy is to desire as little as possible.  
Procedurally-independent desire-satisfaction accounts, the most plausible form 
of desire-satisfaction theories so far, seem at first to meet the power and 
authority conditions. Indeed, in some sense they do meet them: we’re 
authoritative over our desires and have the power to pursue them. In fulfilling 
the conditions however, the PIDS account reveals that we’re still not being 
external enough about them. It seems to me, for example, that Colburn is 
committed to the flip-flopping autonomy (where I could cycle rapidly between 
autonomy and heteronomy without any change in my external circumstances or 
social positioning) which Dworkin and I have criticised as implausible, as well as 
to the autonomy of the voluntary slave.34 The weak authority condition I 
mentioned earlier should be replaced with a stronger one: it is not enough to be 
authoritative over one’s desires. Similarly, the conception of being powerful 
over one’s life needs sharpening, for worries about domination lurk just off-
stage. Being able to pursue one’s desires does not seem to meet the power 
criterion for autonomy if, as in Pettit’s (1996) famous example, we are only able 
to pursue our desires in virtue of somebody else’s refraining from interference 
with our lives. 
In directly addressing the first prong of the desire-satisfaction response, the 
claim that a voluntary slave who remains happy with their lot is autonomous, I 
also set out the third option for giving an account of autonomy’s constitution: 
the relational (or, following Oshana, social-relational) theory of autonomy. 
Latterly, I examine the domination worry in more detail, arguing that the 
relational account can explain precisely why, 1) the weak authority condition is 
                                                          
34 It has been objected that there is, in fact, an external change here: namely, that your desires 
are no longer being satisfied (we might cast this as something like a “desire-frustration 
relation” obtaining where no such relation obtained before). I’m not wholly convinced that 
this is a meaningful external change, but I can accommodate the charge by instead arguing 
that the external change (if there is one) is entirely dependent on the psychological change, 
and can happen without any other external changes in terms of how powerful and 
authoritative we are. The social relations that we stand in remain the same, and we have just 
as much power over the direction of our lives as we did before; all that’s changed is that now 
we’re not happy about it.  
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insufficient, and 2) The satisfaction of procedurally independently formed 
desires is consistent with being dominated (and thus non-autonomous). 
3.2 Relational autonomy 
The most plausible components of the previous accounts both suggest that at the 
very least, we need power over ourselves and the direction of our lives in order 
to be autonomous. Although the power does not need to be the improbable total 
self-mastery of the Randian hero, it does need to extend far enough that we can 
recognise and reject inauthentic desires or oppressive socialisation, and that we 
can both pursue and change authentic desires. Unless we have a fairly explicit 
desire to be regarded as an independent source of values then the loss of power 
cannot inhere in the frustration of desires as such.35 To return again to the 
voluntary slave example, they are not empowered by the satisfaction of their 
slavery desire, nor would they be disempowered by its frustration. If the desires 
play any role here, it is only insofar as their fulfilment or frustration affects our 
social relations. This is a reversal of the more usual (particularly in proceduralist 
accounts) claim that our relations with others only impact our autonomy insofar 
as they adversely affect our ability to form authentic desires or to carry these 
desires out. In the rest of the chapter, I show that taking social relations 
seriously as constituents of autonomy is implied by the particular failures of non-
relational accounts, and make the positive case for the relational view. 
To re-state the social-relational claim more positively: our relations are 
important not only because they can causally influence our autonomy (as in 
when some set of relations allows me to or prevents me from fulfilling a desire), 
but because they partly constitute our autonomy: a large chunk of what it is to 
be autonomous is to stand in particular relations or kinds of relations. The 
voluntary slave is thus non-autonomous because, regardless of how heartily they 
endorse the values which control and shape their lives, their endorsement is not 
the deciding factor in what values play this role. The relations that the slave 
stands in are those of domination and subordination to others, and it is purely 
contingent that their values and the values of their dominator are congruent; or, 
                                                          
35 We might, of course, have such a desire, but equally well we may not – indeed, we might be 
motivated (perhaps out of a belief that the ultimate source of value is god, for example) to 
reject such a desire even if we did have it. 
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to borrow Oshana’s neat precis, the direction of the voluntary slave’s life 
“coincides with what she desires, but is not dependent on what she decides” 
(2006, p61).  
The relational interpretation of the voluntary slave case avoids the flip-flopping 
of autonomy which bedevils desire-satisfaction accounts. If the agent endorses 
the enslavement one day and repudiates it the next, their happiness will clearly 
be affected, but without a concomitant change in the relations they stand in, 
their autonomous status remains unchanged. The relational conception also 
offers us a simple explanation of why they lack power and thus autonomy: the 
voluntary slave may very well be living her life in accordance with her decisions 
about what is valuable, but she lives so only on the whim of the slave-owner, for 
the relations that she stands in are not those which grant her robust powers to 
choose – and change – the direction of her life. Similarly, the powers that she 
does have are vulnerable to being altered or suppressed should the dominators 
so wish it. 
Imagine that the reasons such an agent has to opt for enslavement are based in 
some religious concerns; “only religious authorities of such-and-such a 
composition are proper judges of how to direct a person’s life, because what is 
valuable in life is service to god(s) and these authorities are best placed to know 
the will of god(s)”. This reason lasts right up until the authorities in question 
undergo some dogmatic schism which results in the slave being controlled by a 
group she strongly disagrees with; she can no longer be said to be living her life 
in accordance with what is valuable to her, but her actual powers have changed 
not at all.  
Perhaps, though, this case trades too strongly on our sociological suspicion about 
whether the agent here is really procedurally-independent, or whether such a 
course of action is rational according to the standards and norms that govern 
self-direction. Here is a different example. The agent now regards survival, 
rather than religious service, as the primary or sole object of value: she will 
favour all and only actions which give her the best chance of seeing the next 
sunrise.36 This surely cannot be irrational, particularly (though not only) if we 
                                                          
36 Clearly, the agent is a thorough-going Hobbesian. 
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specify that disaster conditions obtain. To this end, she submits to enslavement 
along the same lines as the other cases we have posited; and again, she seems to 
be autonomous on the PIDS account until the slave-owners begin to act in ways 
contrary to her survival. But, again, she is no less powerful than she was before 
the slave-owners began to interfere; the problem is not that somebody has 
interfered with her self-direction, but that she is entirely powerless to stop 
them.  
In contrast, an agent who does stand in relations that make her powerful and 
authoritative is not prone to arbitrary interference in her life; should she, for 
example, come to believe in a different religion or interpretation of her religion 
then there is nothing which can force her to continue a life of service to the 
rejected church. Indeed, if she stands in the relevant relations, then only her 
faith or belief can compel her to continue a life of religious service in the first 
place. 
The shape of the forthcoming argument regarding relational standing and power 
over one’s life should now be clear to anyone familiar with Philip Pettit’s work 
on republican freedom, but for clarity and comprehensiveness’ sake it is worth 
rehearsing Pettit’s own argument about domination and power before turning it 
to my purposes. 
3.3 Domination, Power, and Why the Weak Authority Condition is Too Weak 
Pettit (1996, 1997) presents the hypothetical case of a slave who has a good 
working knowledge of the psychological quirks and tics of the slaveholder, such 
that they can (with a fairly high degree of success) effectively pursue their own 
desires and evade much or all attempted interference with their lives. To give a 
concrete example: they know that the slaveholder is very fond of port and 
cheese on a Friday afternoon, and that if they’re given it in sufficient quantities, 
they will pass the rest of the day in satiated quietude. Thus, if the slave can 
contrive to make sure that the slaveholder is stuffed with food and drink, they 
have most of Friday to themselves – there will be, albeit temporarily, no 
interference with their lives.  
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As Pettit remarks, it would seem very odd to claim that freedom from 
interference made the slave meaningfully free. As it happens, they won’t be 
interfered with, true, but if the slaveholder changes his habits then the slave’s 
relative Friday freedom is lost and they have no recourse against it. What is 
necessary for freedom, Pettit argues (1997, pp64-68), is that we are free from 
domination: nobody should be in a position such that they can arbitrarily 
interfere with our lives without our having any recourse against them. In the 
example above, the slave has no recourse against the slaveholder’s suddenly 
deciding to interfere with their Friday activities. To borrow Oshana’s phrasing 
again, their lives have (in this respect) coincided with their desires, but have not 
been dependent on their desires (op. cit., p61). Rather, they have been 
dependent on the whims of the slaveholder, and so when the whims of the 
slaveholder stop coinciding with the slaves’ self-direction, the slaves can no 
longer self-direct. 
It is easy enough to draw the parallels between freedom in Pettit’s account and 
autonomy here: we are autonomous insofar as we are powerful and authoritative, 
and neither power nor authority are consistent with being dominated in Pettit’s 
sense. To stand in autonomy-constitutive relations of power and authority is to 
stand in relations which are hostile to arbitrary interference with one’s life. 
What, though, is unique or important about the relational view here? Why can’t 
the PIDS theorist, for example, steal the relational account’s thunder by 
embracing non-domination as being required for procedurally-independent 
desire-satisfaction? 
Let’s take power first. Can the slave satisfy desires that she has formed under 
conditions of procedural independence? It seems obvious that she can, 
dependent on what those desires are. Even if her desires are not of the self-
effacing kind that ought to make us worry about the independence of their 
formation, she can clearly fulfil at least some of them if, like Pettit’s agent, she 
is subject to a slaveholder with no interest in frustrating those desires. But this 
surely does not motivate us to say that she would be autonomous, and for 
precisely the same reasons that Pettit’s slave is not free. Note that if the 
slaveholder’s whims change, such that the enslaved agent can no longer pursue 
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those desires, there has been no relational change – she still stands in dominated 
relations whether or not there is active interference. Consistency demands that 
either she is autonomous in both cases or in neither, and surely nobody would 
assert the autonomy of somebody whose desires were consistently frustrated by 
the arbitrary whims of another. If it is not the as-it-happens frustration of the 
desires, but the structural inability of the agent to pursue any desires that don’t 
line up with the slaveholder’s, then what makes them non-autonomous is their 
social-relational standing. To put it as plainly as possible: if we agree that 
domination is incompatible with power over one’s life, then (since desire-
satisfaction is obviously compatible with domination) we cannot think that 
power over one’s life consists simply in satisfying desires.  
What about authority? Recall that I have already made vaguely foreboding noises 
about the ability of the Weak Authority Condition (roughly, “I have some 
minimum level of self-respect, and regard many or most of my actions as being 
explicable by this respect for my agency”) to do the job required. One obvious 
problem for the WAC would be radical misunderstandings of one’s own actions or 
psychology. Imagine a Manchurian Candidate, where the brainwashed agent 
believes that assassinating the President is explained by her desire to kill the 
President and her belief that she is an appropriate source of values. She’s just 
wrong; the desire has been implanted in her in such a fashion that she thinks it’s 
explicable by reference to her values, but of course this belief is itself the result 
of psychological manipulation. 
Now, adaptive preference formation concerns will obviously disbar this as an 
example of autonomy – and rightly so – but exactly the same kind of problem 
applies when the agent is wrong not about why she acts, but about how others 
understand her actions. Take the following example: an enslaved agent is told to 
instruct the slaveholder’s children in some or other subject. As it happens, this 
is something that she would want to do anyway, and if she was asked why she 
set up a lesson in such-and-such manner, or chose this or that subject, her reply 
would involve her own values. But so far as anybody else is concerned, her 
actions are explicable just by reference to the demands of the slaveholder; and, 
importantly, if there is a clash between her and the slaveholder on some 
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pedagogical point, any claim on her part that involved her own values would be 
regarded as irrelevant.  
Another, perhaps less contrived, example may illustrate the point further. Take 
a citizen who wants to be a teacher (for reasons of their own), and who is 
supported in this goal. They have – by hypothesis – the power to direct their life; 
they certainly seem to have a minimal level of self-respect and the belief that 
becoming a teacher is explicable by reference to these values. But now add that 
they are supported in this goal only because, and only insofar as, they will aid 
the state in some aim or goal which has nothing to do with their own values. 
Perhaps, for example, their support is dependent upon keeping their teaching 
within certain ideological boundaries, or upon churning out so many officer 
cadets per year. Again we see that although the agent regards their being a 
teacher as being explicable by reference to their principles, such an explanation 
would gain no traction in a dispute with the governing body. That is to say, 
where they see the question “why did you teach this class in such-and-such a 
manner?” as being at least partly answered by “my belief that this manner of 
teaching furthers a deeply-held principle of mine”, their interlocutor will not. If 
their teaching career is solely dependent upon their efficient replication of some 
government ideology, it seems obvious that they are not being supported in 
virtue of their agency; there is no externally recognised connection between 
their values and their actions. 
The lay of the land is as follows. If we think that autonomy is valuable because, 
ultimately, agency is valuable (and agency is valuable because it allows us to 
engage in conscious and creative manipulation of our environment in accordance 
with our principles and goals), then it seems very odd to say that autonomy can 
consist in a life where the prime explanatory factor is some other body or 
institution’s goals. Something crucial about authority is missed by such a life; 
just as the canny slave’s desire-satisfaction might be consistent with domination 
rather than indicating freedom, somebody’s being allowed to perform or 
supported in performing some act (or series of acts, etc.) is not in itself enough 
to show that the support has anything to do with respect for them as an agent. 
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To this end, I suggest that the WAC must be replaced with the imaginatively-
titled Strong Authority Condition: in order for an agent to be authoritative over 
their life, they must, 1) Have some minimum level of self-respect, 2) Regard 
many or most of their actions as being explicable by reference to their goals or 
values, 3) Be generally regarded by others as an appropriate source of values. 
This third sub-condition, as is immediately obvious, is not something that can be 
conceptualised in terms of satisfied desires, but rather consists in having a 
certain social recognition or status – in other words, standing in particular social 
relations. The question of what kind of relations these might be is a substantive 
one, and as such best left till the next chapter; but formulating the Strong 
Authority Condition (called SAC from here on out) in this way explains exactly 
what’s gone wrong in the “enslaved teacher” and “government puppet teacher” 
cases. Although they see their self-direction as being explicable by reference to 
their goals, nobody else does; and it cannot be the case that we recognise an 
agent as an appropriate source of values – that is, recognise them as 
authoritative – if we do not think that their actions should be construed in terms 
of their desires and values.   
My account, in summary, gives the following criteria for being powerful and 
authoritative over one’s life: 
1. Power. We are powerful over our lives if we stand in sets of social relations 
such that we can effectively pursue our goals – although these relations must be 
consistent with maximal equal autonomy; standing in relations of “being a tyrant” 
is, for reasons which will become apparent next chapter, inconsistent with 
autonomy. 
2. Authority. We are authoritative over our lives if we satisfy the strong 
authority criterion: we have a minimal level of self-respect, regard many or 
most of our actions as being explicable mainly by reference to our goals and 
values, and are generally regarded as an appropriate source of values. This third 
sub-condition is external and relational, while the first two are primarily or 
entirely psychological. 
This account explains why Sinead is not autonomous: she is relatively powerless 
in addition to not being regarded as an appropriate source of values. It captures 
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Seamus’ heteronomy by noting both his inability to self-direct, and the obvious 
refusal of others to acknowledge his authority over his life. Finally, my account 
is in a position to show why domination is inconsistent with autonomy in a 
fashion that, I have argued, PIDS is conceptually incapable of doing. 
There is, however, a significant ditch left to jump. Specifically, the account as I 
have set it up seems prone to skipping over self-direction entirely; so long as 
there’s nothing unjust at work, it appears, whether or not I actually can pursue 
(or am pursuing) my values is somewhat orthogonal to the question of whether 
I’m autonomous. 
3.4 Worries About Voluntary Slavery and “Blamelessly” Frustrated Self-Direction 
There are two kinds of self-direction worry for the relational account addressed 
in this subsection. The first is the familiar problem of whether the voluntary 
slave is autonomous, and the second concerns self-direction frustrated without 
any apparent injustice. Both of these worries are related – in both cases we are 
confronted with an individual who is apparently autonomous and yet cannot self-
direct in some or all realms – but they are distinct. The case of the voluntary 
slave illuminates important distinctions between autonomous actions and an 
autonomous life, while the problem of frustrated self-direction without injustice 
stresses the relational account’s focus on social and political structures rather 
than desire satisfaction. In both cases, I argue that the relational view gives the 
right answer: the voluntary slave is not autonomous because the relations they 
stand in do not constitute their being powerful and authoritative, while the 
agent whose self-direction is (blamelessly) frustrated still stands in relations of 
power and authority over the course of their life. 
To take them in order, recall the hypothetical example of the voluntary slave: 
an agent who has some (unspecified, but let us presume authentic) desire which 
requires them to give up control over their life to some other(s), and who 
successfully pursues this desire. On the view I’ve suggested, they cannot be 
autonomous as slaves – their realm of self-direction is delimited by another and 
they seem to be fairly comprehensively dominated – but then this is exactly how 
they want their life to go; their status as a slave is one that they genuinely 
endorse. 
111 
 
Now, I am not interested in here defending the claim that they are non-
autonomous (the previous subsection should anyway make it clear why I take the 
claim to be true), but a case wherein a previously-autonomous individual 
satisfies an authentic desire and thus becomes heteronomous does invite the 
question of how we should think of the act which leads to abrogated autonomy. 
When an agent enters into voluntary slavery, do they autonomously commit 
themselves to heteronomy, or does the nature of the act somehow render its 
performance heteronomous?  
The latter option seems blocked for relational theorists, given that carrying out 
the act under the stated conditions requires that the agent stand in relations of 
autonomy – if they weren’t able to self-direct, they wouldn’t be able to direct 
themselves into slavery. And given the external emphasis of relational accounts, 
an attempt to disbar the agent or the act from autonomy because of (non-
adaptive) desires they have would surely be inconsistent. That is to say: claiming 
that the agent will not be autonomous when they are a slave, because they lack 
the relational standing crucial to effective self-direction, means that we cannot 
simultaneously argue that they are non-autonomous when they do stand in such 
relations but wish not to. 
This, then, appears to leave open only the path of arguing that the agent is 
indeed autonomous at the point where they volunteer for slavery, in which case 
we might well be tempted to ask again what the relational view is bringing to 
the table. If the account says that the agent is autonomous because being a 
slave meets their deep values, then it just looks like desire-satisfaction with 
some added bells and whistles. If, on the other hand, the agent is not 
autonomous because they’re performing the wrong kind of self-direction, then 
the objection will be that we’re being arbitrary about when the power and 
authority to self-direct constitutes autonomy. 
In responding to this objection, the distinction between autonomous choices and 
autonomous lives, or between ‘episodic’ and ‘programmatic’ autonomy, 
becomes crucial.37 Episodic autonomy is most easily thought of as being 
                                                          
37 I use Meyers’ (1989) “episodic/programmatic” nomenclature for this distinction rather than 
“local/global”, but I think the terms are equivalent. Similarly, both Raz’s notion of pervasive 
autonomy, and his claim that “the autonomous person chooses his own profession or trade. He 
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instantiated by decisions about what kind of fizzy juice to buy, or which route 
home to take; if the shop is out of Irn-Bru, or if roadworks block my preferred 
path, some desire of mine has been frustrated. However, it is not at all clear 
that my social relations have changed. I still stand in the kind of relations that 
allow me to choose x or y drink or path, but on this particular occasion x (or y) 
are not options on the table. It is also notable that an agent could be 
episodically autonomous under conditions of extreme oppression – think of a 
Guantanamo Bay detainee who chooses to walk around the exercise yard 
clockwise rather than anti-clockwise, or a person of colour in 1950s England 
deciding between two kinds of beer. We would patently resist attempts to 
suggest that these agents stand in the kind of relations which characterise the 
maximally autonomous person – you cannot pursue life to the fullest in an 
internment camp, nor while at constant risk of systemic, verbal and physical 
abuse – but there is obviously a sense in which they are in control of how their 
life goes, albeit a limited sense. Here, then, we can speak of the agent as 
episodically autonomous but programmatically non (or minimally) autonomous: 
free to choose this direction rather than that, or this pub over that one, but not 
free to be safe in either case without conforming to norms that are hostile to 
their having maximal equal autonomy.38 
This is, admittedly, a somewhat simplified picture. There can be instances of 
episodic autonomy that have profound effects on the direction of our lives: 
whether I decide to go to one job interview or another, for example. Here, the 
exercise of my episodic autonomy has obvious and far-reaching consequences for 
my programmatic autonomy; nonetheless, it still seems to be the case that 
programmatic autonomy is more than a mere “adding up” of instances of 
episodic autonomy. Although episodic autonomy can be important for our 
programmatic autonomy, it will not always be so. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
may be denied the chance to cut down trees in the next field without any diminution to his 
[pervasive] autonomy” cohere neatly with the view of programmatic autonomy I put forward. 
See Chapters 4 and 6, in addition to Meyers (op. cit.), Oshana (op. cit.), and Raz (1986, 
p409). 
38 I explore the question of why interfering with an agent’s self-direction (even if that direction 
would express their deeply-held principles) is not simply equivalent to limiting their 
autonomy in the next chapter. 
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As the foregoing paragraphs suggest, programmatic autonomy (by partial 
contrast) involves standing in the relations necessary to pursue those desires and 
goals which are central to our self-conception. To restrict programmatic 
autonomy is to non-trivially interfere with the direction of someone’s life and, 
indeed, with the constitution of their social self – denying an agent freedom of 
self-expression is in some sense to try and change who that agent is.39  
This accounts for the intuition that to claim I am non-autonomous because I am 
not the captain of the Enterprise-E is frivolous. Unlike the slave, I have 
substantial power to direct my own life and pursue or change desires central to 
my self-conception – where I do not (for example, with regards to where I live 
and travel, the relevant relations I stand in are fairly limiting, albeit far less so 
in comparison to many others), it seems entirely correct to say that I am 
consequently lacking in autonomy.40 Thus, fairly straightforwardly, the voluntary 
slave is (or may be) autonomous when she decides she wants to be a slave, and 
is not autonomous when she stands in enslaving relations; and the change is 
explained very simply by reference to her actual power and authority rather 
than how she feels about her power and authority. 
Still, something about the problem of my thwarted desire to go star trekking 
does stick, and deserves attention at the structural rather than substantive level: 
the worry about blamelessly frustrated self-direction. We can think of this as a 
kind of mirror of the voluntary slave example. Instead of worrying that we might 
get a false negative by claiming heteronomy of an agent’s authentic self-
direction, the problem here is one of a potential false positive, where we 
ascribe autonomy to somebody whose self-direction appears crucially limited 
                                                          
39 I am inclined to think that there’s an asymmetry here with episodic autonomy: episodic 
autonomy can be (though it often isn’t) vital to programmatic autonomy and “leading a life of 
one’s own”, while restricting the exercise of programmatic autonomy will invariably interfere 
with one’s power to lead such a life. This isn’t to say that the programmatically autonomous 
agent must be a go-getting individual – she may perfectly well lead a “timid, limited, and 
mundane” life, to borrow a characterisation from Oshana – but simply that restricting 
programmatic autonomy involves a change of relations which is not mirrored in any particular 
instance of limited episodic autonomy (unless that episodic autonomy is limited as a result of 
limited programmatic autonomy). If I am persistently unable to choose my preferred brand of 
fizzy juice, I still seem to be in control of my life; if I am persistently unable to choose which 
job to do, I am so much the less powerful over the direction of that life (even if I don’t, as it 
happens, care).  
40 Again, the “Douglass Objection” that the overcoming of obstacles might itself be thought to 
make one more autonomous will be addressed in the following chapter. 
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despite the absence of any malevolent interference – hence, “blamelessly” 
frustrated self-direction. 
A familiar example might help to illustrate the point. Imagine again that I wish 
to be a teacher, that this role plays a significant part in my self-conception; and, 
further, that so wishing is taken as being reason enough for me to be supported 
through training, accommodation, grants and the like – in short, that I stand in 
all the appropriate relations to have power and authority over my life. Now, 
imagine that my self-direction is frustrated; not by sudden collapses in 
instrumental reasoning, or through malign interference, but because I’m just not 
very good. Perhaps it turns out that standing in front of a class makes me panic, 
or that I take student feedback personally, or whatever the case may be. In any 
event, it is clear to all concerned that my teaching career is a non-starter: I will 
not achieve that goal. 
It certainly doesn’t seem that I have failed to meet any of the (plausible) 
internalist criteria: I am pursuing authentic desires, and no-one has hindered my 
ability to self-reflect. Similarly, the relations I stand in are largely the same as if 
I were a “natural” – my assessor is supportive, I have not faced unjust barriers, 
and I do not risk poverty or death in the event of failure. But still and all, there 
is something exceedingly odd about the thought that I might be autonomous and 
at the same time be unable to fulfil my self-conception.  
I have placed the worry here, rather than as a substantive challenge in the next 
chapter, because it suggests at first glance that my account of autonomy as 
power and authority relationally conceived is missing some key structural 
feature. If this agent really is both powerful and authoritative, the critic will 
suggest, then either my conception of power and authority is incomplete or 
incorrect, or there is some third facet to autonomy. Just as Seamus and Sinead’s 
cases act as defeaters to previously discussed theories, the thought here is that 
an inability to account for the failed teacher is enough to suggest that the 
relational approach misses something absolutely key to autonomy. In other 
words, Sinead defeats structuralism; Seamus highlights the inadequacy of 
procedural independence; the voluntary slave hamstrings PIDS; I must therefore 
explain why the failed teacher does not sink my relational account. Showing that 
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my argument gets it right in this case serves that purpose, while showing how it 
gets it right (hopefully) illuminates the argument further. 
In pursuing these tasks, it will be helpful to recall why we are concerned with 
autonomy in the first place. We value self-direction because of the value of 
agency – we should seek to support others in their self-direction in virtue of 
having prima facie reasons to think that people self-directing is a good thing. 
The best conceptual method of evincing and respecting the value of self-
direction, I have argued, is to think of the autonomous agent as one who 
relationally situated such that they are powerful and authoritative over their life.  
This claim certainly seems in tension with arguing that the unsuccessful teacher 
is autonomous but it is not clear that this tension is anything but superficial (or 
perhaps another result of the autarchy/autonomy conflation). Consider that, in 
the failed teacher case, my wanting to be a teacher was taken as reason enough 
for me to train as a teacher, and that there were – by stipulation – no oppressive 
relations which prevented me from pursuing that plan of life. In other words, I 
was able to pursue something I valued deeply, because I valued it deeply; this 
sounds very like the kind of thing that an autonomous agent does. Again, Raz’s 
remark that the autonomous lumberjack might not be free to work in this field 
rather than that is pertinent here. We cannot require that the autonomous agent 
is one who is successful in all she pursues. People fail to achieve their goals for 
numerous reasons, and some of those reasons seem to be inextricably woven 
into the tapestry (or trodden into the manky rug) of human life. 
If a five-footer fails to achieve their goal of becoming a world-famous 
basketballer, we can commiserate with them and share their disappointment, 
but we do not think that they have thereby become less able to pursue values in 
general, or that they have been unjustly prevented from pursuing those values. 
There is, in short, a distinction that must be drawn between “rotten luck” and 
“rotten society”, and having rotten luck is not in general enough to mean that 
one is non-autonomous. The worry that this is a change in autonomy without an 
external change – a possibility I have previously rejected – can be addressed in 
one of two ways. Either the relations I stand in have changed from, say, “would-
be teacher” to “not a teacher” (think of a teaching student as opposed to a 
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retired teacher, or indeed an apiarist or shopkeeper) or the relations haven’t 
changed but neither has my autonomous status. That is, if I really stood in “not 
a teacher” relations all along, unbeknownst to me, then my self-direction would 
always have been frustrated. Whether or not I am autonomous in that regard, I 
am no more or less so than I was a year ago. 
Does this mean that we should accept the apparent oddity of an account which 
gives us, in the failed teacher, an autonomous yet persistently frustrated agent? 
I believe so – the pain is not so very great as to make the bullet-biting more 
difficult than is usual in philosophy. Autonomy as we have conceived of it is 
primarily a social matter: a question of how we ought to organise society given 
our purported respect for the value of agency. There is nothing that society can, 
or perhaps ought, to do about my being a hopeless teacher or too short to play 
basketball – except to ensure that I have opportunities to pursue other values, or 
those same values in other ways.41  
Although I am increasingly convinced that something like this is the right 
response, its counter-intuitiveness notwithstanding, there is another response 
which grants the agent’s heteronomy while still supporting the claim that such 
agents are not a problem for my theory. 
The first move would be to admit the conceptual possibility of the failed 
teacher, but deny that the case is sociologically probable. The agent could, after 
all, work in other educational roles or find other ways to self-direct according to 
the deeply-held values which motivated her to pursue teaching in the first place. 
Recall again Raz’s analogy of the lumberjack, whose autonomy is a matter of 
being able to lumberjack rather than cut down a particular tree. Imagine that 
they pursue the profession because they value being outdoors, doing physically 
                                                          
41 One might be tempted to take this case as supporting the idea that responsibility is the key to 
autonomy – again, see Colburn (op. cit.), but the notion can be crudely summarised with the 
claim that we’re autonomous insofar as we can appropriately be described as the author of 
our actions (even if those actions are, say, an unsuccessful pursuit of some goal). This is not 
the place for a full rebuttal, but given the obvious relevance to the problem of frustrated 
self-direction it is worth saying something. Briefly, it seems to me that one’s standing in 
relations which constitute power and authority over one’s life is likely to make one 
responsible for (or constitute one’s being responsible for) that life – the responsibility is a 
feature of, not a prerequisite for, autonomy. The relational account can thus encompass at 
least some responsibility accounts, whilst explaining that what makes the failed teacher 
autonomous is her relational standing rather than her responsibility for the unsuccessful 
attempt. 
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taxing work, and so on. If it turns out that they (for example) have a mortal 
phobia of the sound of falling trees, or an allergy to sap, and as such cannot be a 
lumberjack, then they are still not prevented from doing a job that will allow 
them to be outdoors, etc.  
This may appear to be defining the problem out of existence by way of ever 
more abstract conceptions of what it is to pursue one’s values, but that is not 
the intent. Instead, observe that it would seem very odd for somebody’s 
continuing to have as a central part of their self-conception something that they 
know they cannot do. In certain cases, where this inability is the result of 
structural malevolence, it would be significantly less odd - “I should be a 
teacher, and I would be if it wasn’t for the institutional racism” is a complaint 
with a genuine force that “I should be a teacher, and I would be if I wasn’t crap 
at it” patently lacks.42  
All of this suggests a distinction between self-direction frustrated by malign 
influence and self-direction frustrated by ‘faultless facts’ about the world (I’m 
too short to be a basketball player, too shy to be a teacher, too pre-Singularity to 
fly a starship) which is relevant here. It is one that can be tentatively identified 
through considering how we would respond to “I would be an x if it wasn’t for y” 
type statements – if y is some faultless fact then ultimately we have a kind of 
rationality failure with regards to the agent’s self-direction. Either the failed 
teacher is not a worry for my account because folk don’t, as it happens, tend to 
centre their self-conceptions around values or occupations made impossible by 
faultless facts; or it is not a worry because such an agent’s continuing to do so 
would make them heteronomous (or less autonomous) by dint of a problem with 
their instrumental rationality. It would be, on some level, their failing to be 
authoritative over the direction of their lives, analogously to how my authority 
over what film I want to watch would be undermined if I selected Wuthering 
Heights on the basis of an affinity for comedy. 
One obvious objection is that we are highly likely to have disputes over whether 
something is a faultless fact or not – so be it. There would certainly have to be 
                                                          
42 Similarly, “I should be a starship captain, and I would be if it wasn’t for our technological 
level and certain universal constants” is obviously not a complaint we should take seriously. 
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some criteria to that effect, but that is a substantive task for elsewhere. I can, 
however, offer a tentative sketch of what these criteria might be. If the feature 
or fact which prevents us from pursuing some goal does not involve arbitrary 
interference (or standing in relations which make us vulnerable to such 
interference), then it is likely to be what I’ve called a faultless fact.43 To give a 
pair of contrast cases, my being unable to be a starship captain does not entail 
that I stand in dominating relations – it is, as suggested, entirely consistent with 
my being powerful and authoritative over the direction of my life – but 
someone’s being prevented from pursuing a teaching career because of racist 
biases or hiring practices is (one instance of) what it is to stand in dominating 
relations. Explaining why I can’t command the Enterprise involves no reference 
to unjust and arbitrary relations of power; explaining why the discriminated-
against agent can’t be a teacher does. 
With these criteria in hand, denying that in general there can ever be times 
when an autonomous agent might be frustrated or unfulfilled would be – to 
emphasise the point – to give an account of autonomy as autarchy, and hence 
cease to address the functional role of autonomy as a concept explaining the 
value and practice of self-direction. We want, to restate the goal, a story of why 
and when self-direction is valuable; merely asserting the primacy of autarchy 
does not tell that story. 
I have suggested, in response to the worry that my account still seems to suffer 
from autonomy being blocked or limited by purely internalist factors, two 
possible options. 
We might, first, concede that since autonomy as a concept is concerned with 
human activities rather than the activities of perfectly rational and near-
omnipotent agents, the autonomous agent can still find her self-conception 
butting up against an unfortunately but blamelessly unsympathetic world. The 
failed teacher is only heteronomous if she finds herself disempowered or treated 
with less agential respect as a result of her failure; it is not inconsistent with 
autonomy to be unhappy and at a loss with what to do with one’s life. 
                                                          
43 This standard for distinguishing between merely unfortunate faultless facts and instances of 
injustice was suggested by Marina Oshana. 
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Alternatively, we could say that the failed teacher is heteronomous, but is 
heteronomous for the same kinds of internalist reasons that we have already 
baked into the account. If I were to suffer a brain haemorrhage and fall into a 
coma, my desires would be frustrated without external interference, but this 
seems unproblematic. 
Both of these responses follow similar lines, but can be thought of as offering 
two variations on why the failed teacher is not a problem for the relational 
account of autonomy: either they are not heteronomous, or their heteronomy is 
not an instance or result of the sort of thing that should worry the relational 
theorist. 
 
Conclusion 
If, as I have previously argued, the autonomous agent should be thought of as 
one who is powerful and authoritative over the direction of her life, then 
internalist accounts – theories which locate autonomy in the relationship 
between psychological states – plainly will not do the job. Seamus the prisoner 
can identify with his desire to go hill-walking as hard as he likes, but this will not 
make him autonomous until that desire gives him a normative claim (in other 
words, until he is authoritative) and until he actually has the power to do so.  
Some measure of higher-order identification seems necessary for authenticity, 
although the Sinead case shows that this identification must itself meet an 
external condition (that of procedural or historical independence), but 
autonomy as a concept that illuminates the value of self-direction is clearly not 
served by accounts which limit themselves entirely or primarily to psychological 
orderliness. 
Procedurally-independent desire-satisfaction can adequately explain both the 
Seamus and Sinead cases: Sinead is not autonomous because she is not 
procedurally independent, and Seamus is not autonomous because his desires 
are unsatisfied. Although an improvement over internalist accounts, PIDS fails to 
properly heed the power requirements of autonomy: we can become less 
autonomous, without in any way becoming less able to direct our lives, just in 
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virtue of new desires. Further, PIDS allows for the autonomy of clearly 
dominated individuals: in addition to failing the power requirement, this also 
makes the agent’s authority impossible, for how could an authoritative agent be 
denied even prima facie status as an independent source of values? 
Only the relational account gets the right answer in all these cases. If we value 
autonomy because we value agency and self-direction, then power must be 
understood not as the mere absence of interference, or ability to evade it in 
pursuit of goals, but rather as being situated within relations and material 
conditions which tend towards maximising any agent’s ability to self-direct 
according to their values. Similarly, authority cannot simply be the belief that 
one’s actions are explicable by reference to one’s values; being recognised as an 
independent source of values is a necessary criterion for being autonomous 
within society. 
I have argued that, counter-intuitive as it may at first seem, a certain amount of 
frustrated self-direction is perfectly acceptable for this account: structuring 
society to give everybody the best possible chance at autonomy cannot require 
making sure that everybody gets what they want (even if what they want is 
entirely unobjectionable) all the time. If we are concerned with autonomy, our 
first worry should be oppression, not hard luck; and the relational account takes 
these worries on board in a way that none of its competitors do. 
To be autonomous, then, is to be powerful and authoritative, where the external 
criteria for power and authority are constituted relationally; in the next chapter, 
I address the substantive task of laying out and defending the key relational 
constituents. 
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4. 
Autonomous Relations, the Personal and the Political 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters I have argued that personal-political autonomy is not 
best understood as self-mastery or unrestricted choosing. Instead, we should 
conceive of it as constituted to a large degree by external factors: the social and 
political relations we stand in. Only by understanding it in this way can we 
defend it against charges of hyper-individualism and make sense of paradigm 
problem cases for autonomy theorists. 
The structure of autonomy, as I defended it in the previous chapter, can be 
depicted as something like this: 
 
As the diagram above illustrates, to be autonomous is to be powerful and 
authoritative over one’s life. There are certain preconditions of psychological 
competency - a sense of self, instrumental rationality and so on – required for 
power and authority, but the status of actually being powerful and authoritative 
122 
 
(in other words, autonomous) is constituted by standing in relations of non-
domination whilst possessing these competencies. When we are non-dominated, 
we are not vulnerable to arbitrary interference in our lives, and this protection 
against arbitrary interference is based on our being recognised as agents. The 
autonomous agent, then, satisfies the psychological preconditions and stands in 
social relations of non-vulnerability and recognition respect. 
In this chapter, there are two main goals. The first is to put some flesh on these 
structural bones by considering types of relations which constitute autonomy and, 
conversely, relations which are autonomy-hostile no matter how fervently and 
authentically the agent desires them. I will focus on those relations which are 
non-dominating (as noted in the diagram above) and show how they are required 
for autonomy-constitutive relations. 
Providing a substantive picture of relational autonomy serves several purposes. 
As a simple matter of persuasiveness, it clearly serves my case to be able to 
point to specific relations and explain how they are constitutive of autonomous 
status (or more-autonomous status, or maximally-autonomous status, etc.), and 
allows practical problem cases to be directly addressed. From a broader 
theoretical standpoint, offering these concrete relations will also feed into my 
eventual argument that no state institution can produce stable relations of the 
correct sort, because of the dominating nature of such institutions.  
The second task for this chapter follows from the picture of relational autonomy 
so presented, and is similarly relevant to my later claims about authority. I 
argue that the account of autonomy-constituting relations we end up with 
suggests that there is no principled distinction between personal (or private) and 
political (or public) relations: the common view that there are distinct 
categories of ‘personal’ and ‘political’ autonomy is therefore a misconception.1 
There are certainly kinds of relations which are inappropriate subjects of the 
                                                          
1 Otsuka (2001), for example, speaks of friendship and romantic relationships as giving rise to 
“the sorts of injustice which...are rightfully regarded as irrelevant, or only very indirectly 
relevant, to political philosophy”. Raz, despite rather unhelpfully claiming that “it would be 
tedious to engage in lengthy argument over what action is political” (1986, p3), clearly thinks 
that there is some distinction between personal and political – otherwise it would be rather 
odd to engage in the effort to find a political morality. This thought is supported by his talk of 
personal and (distinctly) political freedom; see Raz (ibid), particularly pp3-4 and 394-95. 
Similarly, Tomasi (2004) distinguishes between ethical and political liberalism at least partly 
on the basis that the latter does not concern itself with “personal moral value”.  
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kinds of general debate or coercion associated with political decisions, but this 
is because of the effect that such debate would have on agent autonomy, rather 
than owing to any necessarily and distinctively ‘apolitical’ feature.2 Rejecting 
the division between personal and political, one of the sacred tenets of 
liberalism, gets us closer to being able to specify the kinds of conditions that 
must be met in order for rough personal-political equality to obtain – a necessary 
precondition for any kind of institutional obligation, as I shall argue. We will be 
able to show that our ‘personal’ autonomy is intimately bound up with our 
‘political’ autonomy, and that merely formal equality at the ballot box is not 
and cannot be enough to legitimate a putatively authoritative institution if 
material inequalities persist. 
The principle that the personal is political (and vice-versa) also allows us to 
ward off objections that autonomy-based justifications for institutional 
obligation must be uselessly limited in scope and/or at risk of perpetuating 
existent social domination; so that, say, the anarchist account of something like 
participatory democracy fails to consider the effect of informal power 
hierarchies. If, as I suggest, the only cogent use of ‘personal’ and ‘political’ is as 
loose descriptors of the extent to which we will sanction public oversight of 
certain matters, then there is no occasion when we can simply ignore 
considerations of (for example) inequality or regard them as external to the 
matter of obligation.  
In short, arguing that the personal is still political is to argue that there is no 
magical protected realm where we may necessarily disregard the political 
context of our personal lives. Politics and political engagement are, necessarily, 
woven into every facet of our lives rather than being preserve of some specially-
selected elite, and it makes as little sense to speak of personal autonomy 
without political power and authority as it does to imagine that the brainwashed 
or entirely subservient agent makes authentic political decisions. As such, a 
plausible picture of ‘personal’ autonomy is also a plausible picture of ‘political’ 
                                                          
2 To give a brief example, it is generally accepted that there is some more-or-less stringent 
limit to which we may interfere with parent-child relations (largely, as I shall argue, because 
to ignore this limit is to ignore much of why we may value parenting to begin with). 
Nevertheless, child-rearing clearly is a topic of political debate and public input; the question 
of how I may raise “my” child is one that Jane Doe of Anywheresville can legitimately opine 
on and make normative claims about. 
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autonomy. 
 
1. Substantiating Substantive Independence: What Kind of Relations 
Constitute Autonomy? 
In the previous chapter, I made the case that only a thorough-going externalist 
account of autonomy, one which sees the autonomous agent as one who fulfils 
certain psychological preconditions and stands in appropriate relations, can 
evade the show-stopping objections levelled against alternative accounts. In 
particular, I claimed that cases like the voluntary slave are archetypal examples 
of relational autonomy’s advantage over its competitors insofar as they show 
that some kinds of external factors – in particular, some kinds of social relations 
– are necessarily inconsistent with an agent’s being powerful and authoritative 
over their lives. 
The task now, then, is to explain in more detail what relations are constitutive 
of or hostile to autonomy, and on what grounds.3 After identifying two properties 
which non-dominating relations must have, and showing how these properties 
allow non-dominating relations to make us powerful and authoritative, I provide 
examples of particular autonomy-constitutive and autonomy-hostile relations. 
The examples should not be taken as exhaustive, nor as a full account of the 
relations which fall out of a conceptual analysis of relationally-conceived 
autonomy. Rather, I offer them as paradigm cases, and to suggest the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a relation’s meeting the requirements given for 
autonomy. That is to say, the examples are illustrative of what it is for a relation 
or set of relations to partly constitute our having power and authority over our 
lives. 
It seems appropriate to repeat that the account I offer is similar and heavily 
indebted to that put forward by Oshana (2006); I rehearse it here both to 
provide a clear statement of my position and to draw out the distinctions 
between mine and Oshana’s versions of the theory. A point worth re-emphasising 
                                                          
3 I use “autonomy-hostile” rather than the probably more accurate, but rather odd-sounding, 
“heteronomy-constitutive”. 
125 
 
is that the following features are features of the relations themselves; it is not 
the case that standing in (say) a relation of mutual support causes non-
domination, but that it constitutes it – part of what it is to be free of 
domination, or what it is to be free of some particular form of domination, is to 
stand in such-and-such a mutually-supportive relation. 
After laying out the general idea behind non-domination in more detail, I give 
two properties that non-dominating relations must have: non-vulnerability and 
recognition respect. Although the two properties are not simply equivalent to 
power and authority, I suggest that there is a fairly strong correlation: non-
vulnerability is the main player in power over one’s life, while recognition 
respect is key to authority. 
1.1. Non-domination: A First Pass.  
I have borrowed Pettit’s term non-domination in order to highlight that our 
being powerful over our lives does not require us to be “masters of the universe” 
in order to be autonomous: if it were simply the case that autonomy was a 
function of being the most powerful and being regarded as the most powerful, 
then feudal lords or monarchs would be the archetypal autonomous agents.4  
While Pettit’s idea of non-domination as a (structural rather than merely 
coincidental) freedom from arbitrary interference with one’s life greatly informs 
the conception I put forward here, there are several relevant differences.5 A 
closely-regulated structure of interference with one’s life, according to well-
known rules grounded in theoretically-consistent bases, may prove hostile to 
one’s autonomy, but it is clearly not arbitrary.6  
                                                          
4 The question of whether a feudal lord is more autonomous than, say, a contemporary working 
or middle-class white Scottish male is I think an open one at this stage: intuitively, the lord 
has significantly more power and authority in certain realms (as it were), but fails to stand in 
some significant relations – such as access to reliable healthcare – which more often obtain 
for the latter. We might thus say that the lord is more autarchic, rather than more 
autonomous. I return to this discussion in ‘Non-domination (2)’ later in the chapter. 
5 For a fuller picture of his account of non-domination, see Pettit (1996). The difference 
between structural and coincidental freedom from unjust interference will be discussed 
further later in this chapter, but Pettit’s example of the slave who is a good judge of the 
slaveholder’s whims (and thus avoids some of the slaveholder’s worst excesses) is a useful 
illustration of why structural freedom is required. See pp22-24 of Pettit (ibid). 
6 Unless, perhaps, we mean arbitrary in the sense used when describing some action or theory 
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On my view, an agent is non-dominated if she stands in relations such that she 
can “determine how she shall live in a context of at least minimal social and 
psychological security”.7 That is, she cannot be constantly looking over her 
shoulder for death squads or roving bandits (or forced into banditry herself), nor 
can she be under overwhelming pressure to live in a particular fashion lest she 
be ostracised, suffer material harms, and so on. The connection between power, 
authority and non-domination can be characterised at this stage in the following 
way: 
1. Power. Without what I term social security (here referring to the existence of 
accessible systems of universal public welfare, education and so on) my power to 
achieve many goals is drastically reduced if not simply removed. It will certainly, 
for example, be considerably more difficult to reliably feed myself in the 
absence of social co-ordination; and it is hard to see how I could be a teacher, 
writer, or publican at all in a Hobbesian omnipresent state of war. 
There are certainly differences between these cases, in the sense that there is a 
difference between lacking the power to fulfil a role because the role does not 
exist and lacking the power because you cannot (for whatever reason) access 
that role; it may also be that some powers are necessarily social in a way that 
others are not. I probably could, assuming that I was a competent survivalist, 
retain the power to feed myself on a desert island, but it just seems incoherent 
to say that I could be a teacher in such a scenario – who, after all, would I teach?  
It does not seem to me, though, that these differences are relevant to the 
matter at hand except insofar as we should note the importance of the social to 
the purportedly personal. It makes no sense to think of autonomy in the 
outdated terms of self-mastery and non-interference when many of our powers 
                                                                                                                                                                                
as making morally arbitrary distinctions, where the arbitrariness is more akin to fixing on 
morally irrelevant factors than “just plumping” – if non-domination as freedom from arbitrary 
interference is understood as freedom from morally arbitrary interference, there may be less 
of a division between mine and Pettit’s accounts. To the best of my understanding, however, 
Pettit holds the view that arbitrariness is something like interference which fails to meet 
certain democratic criteria; these two claims are not obviously incompatible, but they are 
obviously not equivalent (on p56 of Pettit (1997), he defends the claim that arbitrariness is 
something to do with whether or not an act of interference tracks “the welfare and world-
view of the public”, but has since sharpened this to include the tracking being done through 
suitably-formed institutions). See, e.g., Pettit (1997, 1999). 
7 Oshana, op. cit., p86. 
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are conceptually dependent upon society, but powers can come in different 
forms. Sometimes our power to do something is entirely dependent upon there 
being a social role or function for that thing, as with teaching, and that 
sometimes there is a socially-independent role which society can help or hinder 
us in performing, as with feeding ourselves. That there are these different types 
of power does not, however, make any difference to the claim that being socially 
secure partly constitutes our having power over our lives. 
In terms of psychological security, we can add in the associated worries and 
stresses of life in a Mad Max-type world. Plausibly, however, the psychological 
factors are not generally so crucial for power as they are for authority – at least 
in terms of non-domination. Consider: if for some reason I am psychologically 
incapable of forward planning or instrumental reasoning, then my capacity for 
autonomy suffers and it seems odd to speak of dominating relations as 
undermining my power to direct. On the other hand – and to restate a point from 
the last chapter – we can easily imagine an instrumentally-reasoning, forward-
planning agent who nonetheless regards his actions as not following from his 
self-conception or deeply-held principles. That is, the agent would (may) still 
have power, but seems to lack authority, under conditions of psychological 
insecurity. 
2. Authority. There is probably some sense in which social security is required 
for a person to have authority over her life, as I shall suggest shortly, but we can 
fairly easily imagine a situation in which some group is blamelessly deprived of 
basic requirements for welfare (shipwrecks, natural disasters, and so on), and so 
it would be too strong to suggest that any and all cases where there is a lack of 
social security entail that agents are not held to be authoritative. Psychological 
security should be understood as being generally able to plan and carry out 
courses of action on the basis that they cohere with one’s goals, without fearing 
physical or emotional reprisal.  
Note that this does not require that all our plans be successful, nor even lacking 
in risk; I fairly patently risk reprisal if I plan to assault the next group of 
strangers to pass by my office, and this does not make me less autonomous. The 
requirement is instead that we are regarded (and regard ourselves) as 
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inappropriate subjects of arbitrary coercion – there should be no standing reason 
to believe that acting on my wishes is likely to result in others harming me.8 The 
reasoning behind this is fairly straightforward: to regard someone as 
authoritative over their lives is to regard them as an appropriate source of 
values, and regarding someone as an appropriate source of values is (generally) 
inconsistent with systematically preventing them from following these values. 
The idea behind non-domination as a constituent of autonomy, then, is that the 
power and authority requirements are met by those relations which obtain 
between agents/groups of agents and institutions, or agents/groups and other 
agents/groups (rather than, for example, between the agent’s psychological 
history and reflective capacities).9  
There are important worries that might well arise at this point regarding the 
potentially lopsided nature of non-domination. One can, we might think, be non-
dominated by living within a suitably utopian, equal society, but surely one can 
also be secure against domination simply by being the meanest bastard in the 
playground. Defending an autonomy that lets in ‘non-domination’ of this kind is 
inimical to my project. If non-domination only requires that no agent is in a 
position to interfere with one’s life, then whether the interference is arbitrary is 
of no import – and so it looks as if we’re back to talking about non-domination as 
a feature of autarchy, not autonomy. If, on the other hand, non-domination is 
concerned with, specifically, arbitrary interference, then it will have to be 
based on something other than brute power. Here’s why: the account of 
autonomy that I argue for includes (as will be shown) something like an internal 
equality condition. In order for us to stand in relations of maximal autonomy, 
those relations must guarantee every other relevantly similar agent the same 
power and authority with regards to own their self-direction. If an agent’s non-
vulnerability to arbitrary interference is a result of their simply being more 
                                                          
8 And, of course, the opposite belief – that harm will likely result from attempts to self-
determine – is partly constitutive of psychological insecurity (here meant in my limited sense, 
rather than the widely-used sense of someone who is ‘sensitive’ with regards to some trait or 
other). 
9 I refer to “groups of agents” here not in order to begin a discussion of group rights, but to 
acknowledge that there seem to be times I stand in certain relations only insofar as I am (de 
dicto) a member of some group – considered as the individual James Humphries, for example, 
I am less likely than many to be assaulted by the police, but as “domestic extremist #32 in 
George Square” the likelihood is much greater. 
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powerful than others, then this equality condition is not met (as should be 
obvious from the fact that such an agent is in the position of being able to 
arbitrarily interfere with others’ lives). I address the concerns about non-
domination and inequality in much more detail later, but before doing so it will 
be worthwhile to expand on some instances of non-dominating relations.  
I will therefore now turn to a category of relations which are apt for both 
domination and non-domination, elaborating on the relevant differences along 
the way: labour relations. 
As our particular instance of labour relations, take the relations which obtain 
between an agent and their working institution.10 That is to say, the bundle of 
relations which obtain between an agent, Amy, her fellow workers, and any 
other agents who may be in a position to direct or impact upon Amy’s activities 
with regards to her job.  
Amy stands in dominating labour relations if, among other things, she is liable to 
arbitrary or unjust dismissal or punishment; if, for example, she can lose a job 
as a teacher because the head of school takes a sudden dislike to her.11 Similarly, 
if she risks dismissal (or punishment, or ostracism, etc.) for refusal to take part 
in unannounced extra duties, whether or not she does so refuse, she is 
dominated. The normal way of thinking about having powers to exercise self-
direction is that we have the power to x when we can also decide not to x: for 
example, my being able to throw and catch a ball would not generally be 
thought of as a normatively important power – or its exercise an important part 
of my self-direction or conception – if I exercise it only when someone holds a 
gun to my head and tells me to do so or die.12 For just the same reasons that a 
right to work must entail a right not to work, and a right to live correspond with 
                                                          
10 I avoid the putatively more straightforward “agent and their employer” for reasons which will 
shortly become obvious if they are not already. 
11 Bearing in mind my earlier remarks about arbitrariness, it is worth clarifying what I mean by 
morally arbitrary here. It could be the case that instead of risking losing her job if the head 
“just happens” to take a dislike to her, she risks losing her job on the basis of some long-held 
religious bias of the head’s – here there seems to be less of the “on a whim” aspect of the 
first case, but Amy is patently still being dominated. 
12 It would perhaps be possible for someone who held a stringently (and highly implausible) 
Hobbesian view whereby we are free to do anything we’re not physically prevented from 
doing to suggest that my ball-throwing is indeed an exercise in normatively-important powers; 
this is not the place for that discussion, but suffice is to say that I find the claim unattractive. 
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a right to die, we must say that an agent’s power over their life is marked not 
just by what they may choose to do, but what they may choose not to do. My 
standing in relations that allow me to teach cannot make me autonomous if 
those same relations prevent me from doing anything but teaching (or unjustly 
sanction me for not doing so). More broadly, labour relations that coercively tie 
one to a particular job or life on pain of unacceptable harm or difficulty do not 
only make one’s undertaking of that job heteronomous, but interfere with other 
powers over one’s life that are equally required for maximal autonomy.13 
With respect to the second requirement for autonomy, Amy cannot be said to be 
authoritative over her work if her ability to do it – or, rather, the recognition of 
her ability to do it – is dependent upon irrelevant factors. For her to be 
authoritative with regards to teaching, it is not necessary that “if she says she 
can do it, she can”. We should instead cast the authority condition as being 
satisfied in the following way. Amy is authoritative over her desire to be a 
teacher; this authority requires that she be granted the appropriate 
opportunities and support. If, for whatever reason, she cannot meet the 
generally-accepted criteria for successful teachership, then refusal to employ 
her will not amount to refusing to regard her as authoritative over her life. What 
is required for her to be authoritative is that her desire to be a teacher, when 
accompanied by her qualifications to do so, is an institutionally and inter-
subjectively respected and supported reason for her to be a teacher. To 
summarise the point: if someone can x and wants to x, they are authoritative 
over their working life insofar as their desire and ability to x is regarded as a 
good reason for them to x (if they can x but do not wish to, they are 
authoritative insofar as they need not x).  
Dominating labour relations, then, undercut or at the least make unstable an 
agent’s power over her working life, while they fail to acknowledge that agent’s 
                                                          
13 This is not to say that a dangerous job need make one heteronomous: while it might be the 
case that economic coercion makes (say) crews of crab boats undertake significant risks of 
death on pain of poverty, it doesn’t seem true that folk will never authentically take 
dangerous jobs, nor that the labour relations one would then stand in need be dominating or 
fail to display recognition respect. Rather, the heteronomy consists in standing in relations 
such that one is coerced into doing a dangerous job or that one is coerced into doing an 
alienating, tedious, etc. (but not dangerous) job, through the threat of harm, poverty or 
similar. See also Chapter 12 of Cohen (1989). 
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authority. But what of non-dominating relations? 
Amy stands in non-dominating relations if there is nobody with the power to 
morally arbitrarily or unjustly dismiss her from teaching or sanction her; that is, 
so long as her power to continue her employment is not dependent upon the 
whims or brute influence of others. This can be cashed out in ways roughly 
analogous to the standard negative/positive liberty distinction. Most obviously, 
Amy is non-dominated when it is structurally difficult for, say, her employer to 
directly exercise arbitrary power, but she is also non-dominated if there are 
labour and welfare laws which mean that quitting or being fired from a job need 
not be a threat to her well-being. To use the usual slogans, Amy is here free to 
challenge or change her employer in addition to being free from arbitrary 
institutional interference; the non-domination consists in her being able to cease 
a job she dislikes, as well as her being protected against being treated certain 
ways within that job. 
This refers back to my earlier point about coercive labour relations tying one to 
a job on threat of harm, poverty etc.: even employment which does not directly 
inflict arbitrary interference can damage our power and authority over our lives 
if we have to hold that job – however much we despise it – or be unable to pay 
bills, risk eviction, and so on. An agent cannot be said to be maximally powerful 
over their life if sheer self-preservation demands engaging in alienating work, 
and similarly, it is inconsistent with their being authoritative that their only 
protection against such a situation is brute luck (of having one or more socio-
economic privileges or managing to find a job they do enjoy, for example) rather 
than social or institutional support.14 
A couple of fairly minor observations should be made before concluding this 
section. Although I have generally cast conflicts in terms of employee versus 
employer, it is entirely possible that one agent (or group) could dominate 
another within the workplace but without any formal or institutional power to 
do so. Coercing or manipulating a colleague into doing more than their fair share 
                                                          
14 This is the point I anticipated several pages ago: social security is required for authority in 
the sense that an agent can rightly regard themselves as authoritative, but still fail to be 
authoritative, if their relations are inconsistent with being treated as an independent source 
of values (i.e. If they are at risk of harm should they give up a disvalued job). 
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of work, or bullying them (from any number of motivations from personal dislike 
to oppressive norms) such that they want to quit, are two examples where 
bosses are at most indirectly involved, but labour domination still occurs. Again, 
the fundamental problem is the structure of labour relations that allows this to 
happen. Just as a punitive contract is no less dominating if one happens to have 
an easygoing immediate superior, the fact that one’s colleagues are not 
reactionary throwbacks does not make being powerless against them if they 
were any less problematic for autonomy. 
In terms of non-dominating relations, meanwhile, I have suggested that trade 
unions are part of securing non-domination. This should not however be taken as 
an argument that membership of a (reformist) trade union is enough to attain 
this security within a hierarchical and capitalist society. Apart from anything 
else, contemporary reformist unions rely on the means of production being held 
in private hands in order to maintain their own position; a re-ordering of 
structures which makes (for example) legal recognition of strikes irrelevant puts 
thousands of bureaucrats out of a job. There are none-too-subtle implications 
for the shape of an autonomy-maximising society here, but for the moment I 
simply make the point that, conceptually hostile to maximal autonomy though 
reformist unions are, they – in many cases at least – still make their members 
more powerful over their own lives by acting as a partial counterbalance to the 
dominating force of employers. 
To conclude, then: in this section, I have argued that relations which constitute 
autonomy must be non-dominating, and given a sketch of what such relations 
might look like. Non-dominating relations make the agent powerful and 
authoritative over her life, for example by defending her against the whims of a 
more economically powerful agent or institution. But unanswered questions 
remain. I have not provided an account of what makes these relations non-
dominating (or to put it another way, I haven’t picked out the conceptual 
features of a “defended against economic exploitation” relation which are 
necessarily shared by other non-dominating relations), nor given any indication 
as to how we are non-dominated by a secure working environment but not (for 
example) by being a powerful feudal lord. In the following sections, I explain the 
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two properties which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a 
relation or set of relations to be non-dominating and thus partly constitutive of 
personal-political autonomy: non-vulnerability and recognition respect. 
1.2. Non-domination (1) – Non-vulnerability.  
In the examples above, one noticeable difference between Amy’s circumstances 
under domination and non-domination is the extent to which she is vulnerable to 
others: whether or not the head of school is in fact fickle or prejudiced – or 
whether this fickleness or prejudice will as it happens affect Amy – she stands in 
relations such that she is structurally exposed to the possibility of arbitrary and 
unjust harm, interference with her self-direction, and so on. Being autonomous 
cannot be a matter of happenstance or good fortune; the autonomous agent 
must have a more secure ground for their self-direction than the contingent fact 
that no-one happens to feel like oppressing them just at the moment.15  
When she is not dominated, however, this vulnerability is not present. There 
certainly still seems to be the possibility that someone will attempt to harm her 
or unjustly interfere with her self-direction, but she can strike back, so to speak 
– she stands in relations such that an unjust attack on her power and authority 
over herself can be defended against. Take a case where Amy is a trade union 
member, and will not have to rely solely on her own determination (or wealth) in 
an employment dispute. There is obviously still the possibility – indeed, the 
overwhelming probability – that her employer will attempt to coerce her in some 
or other fashion, but insofar as it is more difficult for them to do so, Amy is less 
vulnerable, and thus less dominated.16 
Non-vulnerability satisfies the power requirement of autonomy in just the same 
way that someone would have greater power to build a house if they could do so 
without fear of attack than if they had to attempt the construction under a 
                                                          
15 As Oshana (2006, pp83-84) says, “we cannot claim that a person is self-governing if her 
efforts to determine how she will live would have been thwarted had she tried to act 
differently with respect to activities relevant to the direction of her life”. 
16 Equally, of course, if it is well-established within Amy’s community that exploitative 
employment practices will not be tolerated, and will be met with general retribution, the 
effect seems to be the same or greater. This point will assume much greater significance in 
the final part of the chapter. 
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constant hail of bottles, or if they had many people to help them (and reduce 
the risk of, say, their being fatally injured during the process) as opposed to 
trying to do it on their own. It is, as the fact of the matter has shown, possible 
for people to pursue their authentically-preferred career under conditions of 
domination, but exactly insofar as they have to overcome arbitrary and unjust 
challenges to their power, they are less autonomous. 
This leads to an objection that on my view, folk like Malcolm X, Mary Barbour 
and Frederick Douglass – indeed, all those who stand by their principles in the 
face of coercion – are less autonomous in virtue of being oppressed.17 Three non-
exclusive responses are possible. We might, first, accept that this seems 
counter-intuitive but assert that it’s nonetheless true: risking death for one’s 
principles is courageous, admirable (at least in this case) and so on, but it is not 
obvious that this makes one better able to control one’s life. Second, we could 
respond that insofar as they do fight off this coercion in order to lead a life more 
consistent with their self-conception, they are more autonomous (they have lost 
some powers but gained others which are more vital to them). This is somewhat 
ad hoc – although not obviously wrong, since the claim isn’t that fighting 
oppression makes you less powerful, but rather that having to do so means that 
you’ve started from a less powerful position. Like the first response, though, 
such a reply might fail to capture the force of the objection, which I take to be 
that an agent who sticks to their guns is in some meaningful sense more in 
control of their life than the agent in a gilded cage. The final response is to re-
emphasise the division between moral and personal-political autonomy described 
in Chapter 2. The inhabitants of Schier’s “Kantian Gulag” might, in fact, be able 
to stick to all their moral principles, act only on suitable reasons, etc., but does 
the agent who refuses to nark have more power over their lives than the stoolie? 
Surely not – the stoolie, after all, had just as much metaphysical freedom to 
assent or dissent, and need not necessarily be irrational or psychologically 
                                                          
17 The objection was first raised to me by Chris Reid during a seminar at the University of 
Glasgow, and variations of it can also be found in, among others, Meyers (2000) and Sperry 
(2013), though it is not entirely clear to me whether Meyers is rejecting substantive accounts 
on this basis, or making the related but distinct claim that agents under oppression are 
better-placed to assess their own autonomous status than others are to assess it. For further 
criticisms of (specifically) constitutively relational autonomy on this basis, see Christman 
(2009), Meyers (2008) and Noggle (2011); for a more detailed response, see Oshana (2014). 
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fractured. 
Unless we are to understand personal-political autonomy as being self-mastery 
or total integrity – and that, essentially, is what this claim suggests; only the 
moral hero, spitting defiance at the firing squad, is truly autonomous – then 
sticking to your guns does not constitute being powerful over the direction of 
your life. While there might well be ways to cast the revolutionary’s fight as 
ultimately leading to or instantiating some kinds of personal-political autonomy, 
it is misguided to suggest that the revolutionary is more autonomous in virtue of 
having less power over their lives.  
In any case, non-vulnerability is important for power not just in preventing 
oppression or domination by others, but in establishing or maintaining the kind 
of social structures that allow people to perform fundamentally co-operative 
tasks, or indeed to co-operate in the first place. Take the Mad Max world 
mentioned earlier. Whether or not we are unfortunate enough to encounter the 
Great Humungous (the primary antagonist of the second film), we are in some 
sense vulnerable just to the vagaries of the world itself – I might be able to 
teach only when there are no lethal dust storms, or have my power to be a road 
warrior curtailed by an acute shortage of V8 Interceptors. While there are no 
agents engaged in oppression, I nevertheless lack powers crucial to my ability to 
self-direct. Vulnerability can, then, be the result of structural human action, or 
it might result from disaster conditions. This suggests, intuitively correctly, that 
an agent is less autonomous (because more vulnerable, and thus less powerful) 
in times of chronic scarcity.18  
Of course, the possibility of disaster is ever-present – particularly given the 
omnipresence of dangerous ideologues with nuclear weapons – so it cannot be 
the case that we are non-vulnerable iff there is a cast-iron guarantee that there 
will be enough food on the table, warm enough clothes on our back, etc. for the 
rest of our lives (or that will be no asteroid strikes, nuclear disasters, and so 
forth). As a fairly rough-and-ready criterion, then, we are non-vulnerable iff we 
                                                          
18 Of course – as in Mad Max, or with contemporary climate change – these disaster conditions 
might themselves be human-caused. This probably has a different moral upshot with regards 
to responsibility and restitution, but from the agent’s point of view the effects on autonomy 
are (likely to be) much the same. 
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stand in relations that defend us against arbitrary and unjust harm or 
interference and no conditions of disaster/chronic scarcity obtain or are 
imminently likely to obtain.19 
There is a more pressing objection to field, however. The thought that we might 
have our self-direction seriously interfered with by the theoretical possibility of 
an asteroid strike or nanomachine is so far-fetched that it may justifiably be 
regarded as fundamentally unimportant for practical purposes, but there is one 
very obvious set of relations in which we seem not just to be vulnerable, but for 
the vulnerability to be both necessary for the relations and a necessary part of 
what makes them valuable; namely, intimate personal relationships.20 Since this 
challenge is one which cuts right to the heart of my overall concern with 
autonomy and society, it is worth discussing it in some detail.21 
The objection would take something like the following form: I have claimed that 
we are vulnerable insofar as our self-direction is prone or susceptible to unjust 
or arbitrary interference – paradigmatically, if we would (for example) have to 
give up a valuable activity or suffer serious emotional or physical harm at the 
hands of another. But this seems to be precisely the kind of problem that affects 
intimately-related agents with divergent or conflicting values; if I am faced with 
the prospect of passing up valued employment because the alternative is the 
breakdown of an intimate relationship, then it looks very like I must choose 
between self-direction and serious emotional harm. As such, my power is 
compromised; presuming that there is no emotional blackmail going on – that is, 
I would suffer the harm just as an inevitable result of the relationship ending, 
rather than because my partner(s) would deliberately inflict suffering on me in 
retribution – then it doesn’t seem correct to say my authority is undermined, but 
the net result still appears to be that I am less autonomous.  
                                                          
19 As an interesting if bleak aside, this implies that whether one believes humanity as a whole to 
be vulnerable is largely dependent on how just how close one takes Earth’s environmental 
(and/or capitalism’s economic and social) collapse to be. 
20 I do not distinguish here between intimate friendship relations, romantic, parental, etc.; 
there are obviously different types of behaviour that constitute these relations, but the 
essential vulnerability, what we might unscientifically call the potential for heartbreak or 
betrayal, is the same across all of them. 
21 I focus on the broader question of domination and intimacy in Humphries (forthcoming), 
where much of this material is developed further. 
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This presents a direct and troubling challenge to my attempt to provide a 
thoroughly social account of autonomy: if we are vulnerable, thus less powerful 
and less autonomous, just in virtue of being in intimate relationships, then other 
people are a clear threat to autonomy even in run-of-the-mill, non-disaster 
circumstances, and the kinds of substantive relations that constitute autonomy 
must turn out to be those which allow no unasked-for limitations of our choice. 
But this is more or less just autarchy: an individualist, almost Randian and 
assuredly anti-social view of autonomy as being compromised by the presence of 
or attachment to others. In other words, we end up right back at the mountain 
man’s door. What is required is a way to show either that vulnerability of this 
sort is relevantly different to, say, the vulnerability to being bullied at work, or 
that it is not in fact vulnerability at all.  
First, it is important not to confuse our vulnerability to emotional pain with 
what I have defined as vulnerability. I am, in the ordinary language sense, 
vulnerable to a swift stab in the eye, but this doesn’t mean that I am vulnerable 
in any autonomy-relevant way. Similarly, we ought not to allow the usual 
connotations of ‘vulnerable’ with regards to emotion to colour our view here: 
anyone in a committed relationship, plausibly, is more vulnerable to heartbreak 
than anyone who is not, but this should not simply be taken as equivalent to 
their lacking non-vulnerability in my sense. 
We cannot require that deep or committed relationships be ever-lasting; it can’t 
just be the possibility that they end which has the effect (or appears to have the 
effect) of making us problematically vulnerable. Rather, it seems to be in the 
yoking of our well-being to that of another. The self-direction threatening 
vulnerability that I spoke of earlier must, it would appear, lie in the fact we 
might be at risk of fairly serious psychological damage if we self-direct in certain 
ways, and – unlike in the case of workplace vulnerability – there is no institution 
or procedure to watch over such relationships; I cannot launch an emotional 
tribunal for unfair dismissal. 
Here, it will be helpful to consider a point made by Jay Wallace in his paper on 
obligations of intimate relationships: there are always normative considerations 
which will result in agents’ being “not completely free to chart their course 
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through life on their own terms” (2012, p189). That is to say, there is invariably 
the potential for there to be moral or pragmatic reasons not to pursue some 
course of action we might deeply desire to pursue – but this is not in itself a 
limitation on our autonomy. My being (morally and perhaps legally) bound not to 
kick older folk in the kneecaps does not represent an arbitrary or unjust 
interference with self-direction, so in order for a relationship’s generating 
obligations upon me to make me vulnerable in my sense, the obligations must be 
unjust or arbitrary – and with this thought in hand, the anti-Randian path opens 
up. 
Take the plausible thought that there are going to be some obligations which are 
constitutive of a loving relationship – for example, the obligation to provide 
support and comfort when the significant other(s) are unhappy.22 If this is 
correct (and I assume that it is from here on out), and if it is the case that 
forming loving relationships is at least one type of relation that can be 
constitutive of autonomy, then we must conclude that these kinds of obligations 
are, perhaps indirectly, themselves autonomy-constitutive. This surely isn’t a 
wild claim: I have new obligations as a postgraduate that I didn’t have as an 
undergraduate, but – at least insofar as these obligations are a required part of 
“postgraduate-dom” and continued study is part of my valued self-direction – 
these obligations make up part of my (incompletely) autonomous life. This claim 
seems fairly innocuous to me.  
Note, here, that there’s at least some potential for psychological (rather than 
material) vulnerability; I would, presumably, be deeply unhappy to fail my PhD. 
But without the possibility of failure, the success would be meaningless, and we 
can stipulate that this failure is not the result of unjust or arbitrary interference 
in my life, so it now looks as if the possibility for emotional damage is one which 
is, at least in my case, a required part of the relation. It would be sad, 
unpleasant, sub-optimal etc. for me to fail, but not unjust or arbitrary, so the 
necessary risk of pain is not vulnerability in the relevant sense. If I have to 
choose between, say, giving up a valued job offer or giving up a valued 
                                                          
22 I can, I think, remain neutral on whether this obligation is a derivative or, as Wallace would 
have it, non-derivative and sui generis duty of love – whatever its ultimate ground, we can 
surely agree that being bound by a duty of comfort is just part of what it is to love someone. 
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relationship, either option is going to cause me pain, but then that’s surely true 
by virtue of my valuing them – an exclusive choice between two valued options 
must involve some regret, it seems to me – and it is absurd to think that the 
autonomous agent is by definition able to obtain everything they value. A painful 
choice may be the result of autonomy-hostile coercion, but it may also be a 
blameless result of our having relatively complicated and sometimes self-
contradictory sets of desires, and in the latter case the appropriate response is 
somewhere between sympathy and a shrugged “so it goes”.23  
The story so far, then, is that neither the generation of obligations by nor the 
possibility of emotional harm resulting from particular intimate relations will 
make these relations of vulnerability, at least absent injustice or arbitrariness. 
Our ruggedly individualist critic is therefore left with just one option to press 
the claim that committed relationships may render us vulnerable and thus non-
autonomous. This is the notion that, in some autonomy-undermining way, we do 
not freely enter into the varied obligations generated by deep relationships. It 
is, as the objection might run, as if I thought I was becoming a primary school 
teacher but have instead been manoeuvred into a job teaching at secondary 
school – or, more to the point, as if I leapt into either job without any idea what 
obligations might be involved, and am now bound by duties and risks I could not 
have been expected to foresee. 
To draw again on Wallace’s paper, the duties of relationships do not simply fall 
upon us wholesale when we pass some specific checkpoint; “it is partly up to 
individuals to determine for themselves the exact contours of the obligations 
they fall under in so far as they participate with each other in relationships of 
love” (op. cit., p189). If my partner has explained to me that they deem it vital 
for me to x, then either I can reject x – with whatever consequences that might 
entail – or I can accept the obligation to x. Now, of course, if the consequences 
of my rejecting x include being, say, savagely beaten or publically humiliated, 
                                                          
23 The corollary of Whitman’s famous “do I contradict myself? Very well then, I contradict 
myself; I am large, and contain multitudes”, after all, is that contradictory multitudes 
sometimes escalate to conflicting multitudes; and no-one enjoys being caught in the middle 
of a running street-fight. 
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then I am vulnerable – but I am vulnerable precisely because of an injustice that 
should not be present in a loving relationship.  
By analogy, if I am told “teaching y is now a requirement of teaching here; do it 
or teach elsewhere”, it is significantly less plausible to hold that I stand in 
relations of vulnerability in the workplace than if I am told “teach y or we’ll 
break your legs”.24 The parallel extends still further: there is no realistic way to 
guarantee that I won’t come into work and be assaulted by an enraged 
student/colleague/administrator, but the relations I stand in are (supposed to be) 
hostile to that sort of thing, so that such an attack would be a deviation from, 
and guarded against by, the labour relations I stand in. To put it very briefly: I 
cannot be sure that no-one is going to bean me with a brick when I walk into the 
office, but I am non-vulnerable if I can be sure that such an action would be 
seen as unacceptable and entirely inconsistent with the employment relations I 
stand in, and that I will be supported in attempting to fend off and/or seek 
restitution from my attacker.  
We can now shift our focus back to intimate relationships, with the following 
articulation: standing in special obligations to another does not make us 
vulnerable, all possibility of emotional pain and limitation of self-direction 
accounted for, unless these obligations have simply been imposed by fiat – and it 
seems very odd to say that someone could genuinely love (as opposed to be 
obsessed with, etc.) someone upon whom they shovel arbitrary or unjust 
obligations. Similarly, it is possible that someone I am in a deep relationship 
with will act badly: betray my trust, attempt to manipulate or emotionally 
blackmail me, etc. But, first, this is to act immorally and in breach of “duties of 
love” in any case, so we are not vulnerable because we’re in a loving 
relationship, but because we’re in a dysfunctional relationship, or just in a 
relationship which is experiencing more or less temporary malfunction. Second, 
the other person(s) is/are in no position to force my acquiescence to continued 
interference of this kind unless I am already vulnerable.  
                                                          
24 Though by no means entirely implausible, depending on the wider context of the first 
directive – if there are no other jobs and unemployment results in material harm, for 
example, then there is much less to distinguish between the two commands in terms of 
domination. 
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In order to draw out this second point, return to the example of someone who 
jumps me with a brick in the office. For all that it will be deeply unpleasant, I 
am not vulnerable in the relevant sense because, as it were, they only get one 
shot at me; I don’t have to plan my work life around evading their continued 
assault, and there is no institutional reason why anyone else should take over 
where they left off. I am under no compunction, in other words, to choose 
between self-direction and welfare. Similarly, the person who acts badly and 
causes me emotional damage is not in a position to do it again unless I allow 
them to – and whilst it’s obviously possible that I allow them to because of some 
psychological hold they have over me, this sort of malevolent interference 
means I’m already non-autonomous or less autonomous – and so the structural, 
“built-in” possibility of unjust or arbitrary interference does not exist here.25  
To recap my argument: the mere fact that relationships may cause us pain does 
not render us (relevantly) vulnerable, because – given the kinds of creatures that 
humans are – we are at risk of pain or suffering in indefinitely many activities. It 
is true that intimate relationships make us particularly easy targets for 
emotional suffering, but without that risk we would not get the valued relations, 
just as we cannot (currently, at least) get the valued experience of mountain-
climbing without the potential risk of a fatal accident. Further, that we have 
new and interesting obligations as a result of intimate relationships is not 
enough for these relationships to be counted as interfering arbitrarily or unjustly 
with our self-direction, for just the same reasons that any kind of obligation-
generating relationship need not be interpreted as constitutive of heteronomy – 
autarchy and autonomy are not equivalent. 
Finally, that someone could cause us suffering or pain in an arbitrary or unjust 
way is not the same thing as our being structurally vulnerable to this injustice 
(unless there are independent relations which, for example, leave us defenceless 
against abusive partners); apart from the observation that an abusive 
relationship is of a different kind than a loving relationship, we can add that the 
                                                          
25 The other obvious problem is one where I am forced to stay in a relationship not because of 
psychological but material coercion – where I am in the situation experienced by abused 
partners who literally have nowhere to go, or where leaving the relationship would be social 
suicide, and so on. Here, again, the problem is not confined to the relationship, but involves 
the other relations I stand in; the fact that the depicted society will fail to defend me, or will 
enable abuse, is already enough to fail the non-vulnerability requirement. 
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potential to be hurt by another is not simply equivalent to that other being in a 
position of domination. To put it in slightly sloganeering terms, it is impossible to 
be sure that no-one will ever try to hurt me, but possible to be fairly sure that 
they won’t get to try it twice. 
So much, then, for the objection that non-vulnerability requires an unpleasantly 
a- or anti-social account of intimate relationships. We can be vulnerable in, and 
dominated as a result of, inter-personal relationships, but the requirements of 
(non-dysfunctional) intimacy are not in themselves hostile to autonomy.  What 
makes us less powerful and authoritative over our lives is not simply that we 
might experience harm as a result of particular relations, and certainly not that 
these relations might result in some of our desires being frustrated: it is that the 
social structures we are embedded in make us systematically vulnerable to 
arbitrary interference with our lives. Since a non-dysfunctional intimate 
relationship (like a non-dysfunctional relationship of any sort) ought by 
definition to involve standing in social relations which do not make us 
problematically vulnerable, the relational account of autonomy can thus evade 
the apparent problem in a way which is entirely consistent with what it says 
about domination in other areas of life. To be non-vulnerable is not to be the 
mountain man, but to stand within certain social relations, which may very well 
include as constituents of our autonomy intimate relations and their attendant 
obligations. 
1.3. Non-domination (2) – Recognition respect. 
Even if we can cast non-vulnerability in such a way as to prevent intimate 
relationships compromising autonomy, however, the problem alluded to in 
Section 1.1 remains – it is all very well to show that one can be autonomous by 
standing in such-and-such supportive relations, but without showing that the 
tyrant or feudal lord is not the most autonomous just because the least 
vulnerable (and thus least dominated or likely to be dominated), my account will 
end up looking like a desire-satisfaction theory with some additional 
handwaving, and be vulnerable to much the same problems. In this section, I 
provide the second condition for non-domination, one that blocks off the 
problem of might making right whilst also meeting the authority requirement for 
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standing in autonomy-constitutive relations: recognition respect. 
In addition to non-vulnerability, non-domination is partly constituted by what 
Darwall (2006) calls “recognition respect”: one’s social status and respect being 
based on the recognition of one’s agency, rather than of some perceived 
excellence. The latter, Darwall argues (pp122-126), is “appraisal respect”, a 
form of respect we must earn and which applies to excellence or merit, while 
the object of the former is dignity or – crucially – authority, and must be 
presumed or simply granted on the basis of different qualities from appraisal 
respect.26 That this recognition respect forms the motivational basis for our 
standing in secure relations of power and authority is a crucial point, and so I 
now turn to an examination of recognition respect as a property of non-
dominating relations. 
There are, firstly, no immediately intuitively obvious cases where I can somehow 
fail at agency in the same way I can fail at some “excellence”. I may, for 
example, make a hideously ill-advised decision about whether to go to the bar or 
to go home, but this is patently still an act in the relevant sense; I did not, 
contra some of the more implausible interpretations of Kant, somehow cease to 
be metaphysically free when I settled upon having another round.27 To grant 
someone recognition respect as an agent is not something we base on an 
assessment of their ‘success’ at agency. Instead, recognition respect directly 
regulates the authority (and, to some extent, power) we grant to others; when 
we offer someone recognition respect, we acknowledge their authority. For an 
agent to be authoritative over their lives in the sense required for them to be 
autonomous on my account, they must therefore have recognition respect: if we 
do not recognise someone as an agent, and hence do not recognise the prima 
facie authority this grants them to determine the course of their lives, then they 
do not meet the Strong Authority Condition referred to in the previous chapter. 
It might be objected here that there is clearly still an evaluative aspect to 
recognition respect: unless we are to adopt some intuitionist approach whereby I 
                                                          
26 I use Darwall’s terms for convenience’s sake. 
27 Or, to put it more modestly and forestall determinist objections, I did not cease to be 
compelled to act as if I were metaphysically free. 
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“just know” to offer this respect to the appropriate candidates, there must be 
some feature or cluster of features which is motivating the decision to regard 
Jones the Neighbour as an authority, but not Jonas the Neighbour’s Dog.28 29 
It is true that recognising someone as an agent requires some amount of 
evaluation – plausibly, any kind of recognition requires evaluation of the object 
of recognition – but this is not the same as that recognition respect being, itself, 
an evaluative trait. That is to say, the kind of evaluation we undertake to 
determine that someone has a trait that demands recognition respect is not 
simply equivalent to judging that the trait is present to such-and-such a degree, 
whereas the objects of appraisal respect can be evaluated both in terms of their 
‘mere’ presence or absence and in terms of the extent of that presence. 
To give an example, say that you grant me appraisal respect as a philosopher to 
the extent that I meet particular conditions. If I meet 30% of these conditions, 
you might grant me 30% respect (to use a weirdly mathematical abstraction). 
Perhaps, for example, I don’t always affirm the consequent, but often do so; 
this lessens my appraisal respect just insofar as I do it. But I cannot only 
sometimes be an agent, or only sometimes have basic human needs. If you make 
the evaluation that I am an agent, then the respect demanded admits of no 
apportioning according to “how much” of an agent I am. 
To pursue the point further, consider the difference between agents and what 
we might call mere actors; beings such as songbirds, mice, tuna, and so on. 
There is clearly some level of consciousness or awareness here. Such beings 
respond to stimuli and, as best as we can tell, have experiences, and there is 
obviously something driving the mouse to prefer peanut butter over cheese. But 
the mouse does not suffer when there is only cheese, and has no awareness that 
some malign force has been replacing all the peanut butter with cheese in an 
attempt to make a philosophical point. We could plausibly say that it might be 
wiser, or in the actor’s best interests, for us not to interfere with their goings-
on, but it would seem strange to cast this as our interfering with their self-
                                                          
28 In fact, we plausibly should be motivated to regard Jonas the Neighbour’s Dog as some kind of 
authority, but the knotty question of non-human and non-sapient animal agency is one I must 
simply leave aside. 
29 Carter discusses this problem of evaluation in his paper on equality and respect – see Carter 
(2011), pp540-543. 
145 
 
determination – to slightly alter my claim above, how can there be self-
determination without a self? 
An agent, on the other hand, must have some idea of themselves as 
(conceptually) distinct from and able to influence the world around them. Unlike 
actors, agents can make choices rather than simply respond to stimuli; whether 
or not these choices are authentic, well-thought-out or whatever else, they are 
still the result of a decision-making process (that many or most non-human 
animals do not seem to possess). It might, thus, be more helpful to reconsider 
the notions of pseudo- or proto-agents sometimes used to characterise human 
children’s capacity for choice, and instead think of agency as something that can 
be applied across a greater or lesser (more or less complex, more or less 
considered, etc.) range rather than something that comes in greater or lesser 
degrees. Rather than there being many kinds of agency – primate agency, child 
human agency, adult human agency – determined by conceptual sophistication, I 
suggest agency as a determinable with many possible determinates; one can 
either be an agent or not, but what one is an agent about may vary wildly.30 
There will undoubtedly be hard cases here with regards to, for example, persons 
with particularly severe kinds of brain damage, but it should be remembered 
that there are already preconditions for autonomy (say, instrumental rationality) 
which they may not meet. Whether or not someone possesses the various 
autonomy competencies is not simply equivalent to whether or not they are an 
agent, and recognition respect simply requires the latter; we cannot be 
autonomous without recognition respect, but we do not demand recognition 
respect on the basis of our autonomy.31 To put it another way: to be 
heteronomous because of the relations one stands in is a different thing to being 
heteronomous because of some psychological state or incapability, but the 
former agent is not thus more morally considerable nor more deserving of 
recognition respect than the latter.  
                                                          
30 I owe the idea of casting agency as a determinable with many determinates, or multi-tracking 
disposition, to a discussion with Umut Baysan and John Donaldson at the University of 
Glasgow. 
31 In fact, it seems to me that we cannot demand recognition respect on this basis – how could 
we be autonomous if autonomy required recognition, but we were owed such respect in 
virtue of our autonomy? 
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To summarise: there are fairly broad (and, as I have given them, very sketchy) 
evaluative properties that we might use to determine agency. Once this 
determination is made, however, the form of respect demanded – recognition 
respect – gives prescriptions on how we may act and what sort of reasons we 
must consider, rather than how we should evaluate the property.  
Recognition respect is thus required for non-dominating relations because a non-
dominating relation must hold the relevant agent to be authoritative over 
themselves and recognition respect forms part of agency’s normative demands; 
as such, it allows the relation to satisfy the authority condition of autonomy.32 In 
practical terms, recognition respect probably makes demands of the power 
conditions as well, but whether or not this is so might well be dependent on who 
or what it is that purports to be doing the recognising. It seems odd to say that I 
grant recognition respect to someone whose attempts to self-direct I 
consistently arbitrarily or unjustly frustrate, but it also seems that I could give 
an agent recognition respect while being unable to affect their power over their 
lives in any way.33 
The idea of recognition respect as playing a normative or prescriptive role leads 
to the second important point on the matter. Whereas appraising someone as an 
excellent crab diver (that is, granting them appraisal respect as a crab diver) 
gives no guidance on how to do anything except appraise them as an excellent 
crab diver, recognising someone as an agent is intimately bound up with treating 
them a certain way. Namely, recognising someone as an agent requires that we 
take their desiring something to be a prima facie authoritative reason for them 
to pursue that thing; that is to say, while I can consistently give someone 
                                                          
32 Or perhaps satisfies the relational component of the authority condition. 
33 This suggests a further, more complex problem (posed by Oshana): what is the minimum 
power threshold required for recognition respect, and why isn’t meeting this threshold 
enough for non-domination? I think the most I can do here is to suggest that the ‘minimal 
social security’ I referred to on p126 gives a rough guideline for the powers we must have in 
order for it to be plausible that we are recognised: if I am denied food, shelter, healthcare, or 
am at constant risk of violence, then I am not being recognised as an agent. Similarly, if my 
wanting to do something is seen as giving no good reasons for me to do it, it seems odd to say 
that my agency is recognised and respected. This is a necessity, not sufficiency condition (as 
is suggested by the discussion elsewhere in this chapter); I can have enough food and not be 
looking over my shoulder for bandits and still not be fully or properly recognised. Perhaps, for 
example, someone agrees that my wanting to be a teacher is a good reason for me to do it, 
but denies that this gives anyone else any reason not to interfere – and so it is possible to 
meet this minimum threshold without thereby being non-dominated.  
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appraisal respect as a philosopher while also denying that they have any 
principled rights to self-determination, I cannot grant them recognition respect 
and deny them these rights. 
This may seem in tension with what I have just said about the possibility of hard 
cases – surely, the objection comes, we can respect an agent but also think that, 
on the basis of some descriptive fact (or, more cynically, some ‘descriptive’ 
‘fact’), they should not self-direct, or not self-direct in such-and-such an arena 
of action? 
Here again it is useful to consider the agency-autonomy relation. One cannot be 
autonomous without being an agent; it is nonsensical to speak of someone 
determining their own way of living if there is no “their” in the first place. But 
one can be an agent without autonomy – apart from children or many non-human 
animals, there are clearly many autonomy-competent agents who are 
nonetheless not autonomous. To recognise someone as an agent is to grant them 
authority and presume their rights to autonomy given certain psychological 
requirements; to be autonomous is to be a competent agent who stands in the 
appropriate relations. Thus, denying that an agent in principle has rights of self-
determination is simply incoherent. 
Still, the critic has a move to make here. There does not as yet seem to be 
anything preventing the would-be dominator from performing the argumentative 
equivalent of the regretful shrug and claiming something like “yes, in principle 
the agent should self-direct, but what about this most disadvantageous feature 
which in practice prevents them from doing so, or justifies interference?”. Here, 
the dominator’s claim would be that the agent’s prima facie authority is 
recognised but over-ridden by other factors: thanks to poverty, or gender, or 
ethnicity, or sexuality, or whichever characteristic is seized upon, the agent is 
ultimately not to be regarded as authoritative over the direction of their lives. 
There are innumerable historical examples of just such a tactic being deployed 
to deny autonomy – indeed, basic welfare – to groups so characterised. Without 
successfully countering it, my theory is irrelevant or worse, providing support for 
oppression. 
148 
 
One pragmatic response can be made here: as a point of fact, these kind of 
moves are probably if not overwhelmingly going to be based on palpably false 
premises or fallacious or bad-faith reasoning. It was manifestly not the case, for 
example, that the stolen generations of Australian Aboriginal children were 
taken from their parents because of some good-faith, well-reasoned but 
mistaken assessment about those parents’ competence to self-direct, or the 
children’s competence regarding their own wishes. It was done, and knowably 
done, to destroy community identity and to further secure the dominance of 
white Australians. My theory, then, does not have to make any special moves to 
defend against problems of this sort precisely because the problems arise after 
the point of departure from my theory. One pretty obviously cannot interfere 
with self-direction for the purpose of buttressing racist and colonialist power 
structures without thereby failing to grant the agent recognition respect, since 
apart from anything else displaying racism towards someone is clearly not to 
accord them recognition respect.34 
Still and all, some theoretical response is required – we might not be able to 
make any account rogue-proof, but we are certainly obliged to make it rogue-
unfriendly. Evaluations about an agent’s autonomy competency may legitimately 
affect how we respect their agency, but they may not legitimise our acting in a 
way inconsistent with their actual competence. How this actual competence 
should be determined is a question that would require a separate paper – or 
many papers – to answer fully, but some fairly general thoughts can be put 
forward, all of which suggest that requiring recognition respect as part of an 
autonomous life does not imply an ableist or overly strenuous account of 
autonomy. 
First, and uncontroversially, we ought to err on the side of caution: someone’s 
making a decision that seems odd or even ‘crazy’ cannot be grounds to think 
they are incapable of self-direction, although repeated out-of-character or 
                                                          
34 Again, it is worth noting: individuals can display racism (e.g. by using ethnic slurs), but 
structures can do so also – by, for example, being insensitive to (or contributing to) social 
conditions that result in some group or groups being disadvantaged in some particular way. 
The idea of structural racism is of course an old one; I bring it up to emphasise the point that 
whether the individual, group or structure is thought of as acting primarily in the private or 
the public arena, the failures of recognition respect occur in precisely the same ways. 
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wildly inconsistent behaviour of some kinds might be a sign that something is 
psychologically (or, given the plausible thought that many kinds of putative 
mental illnesses are the predictable results of or coping mechanisms for 
structural/social conditions, structurally) amiss. To give a blunt example: if I shit 
on the floor of my house for erotic pleasure then you have no grounds to 
interfere, no matter how odd it seems to you, but if I shit on the floor to ward 
off the demons I think live under the carpet, there are probably grounds for 
investigation – although even then it is not obvious that I am incapable of self-
direction. As with many aspects of self-direction, there are likely to be times 
when it seems absurd to us that any autonomous agent would want to x or y and 
we are nevertheless bound to let them x or y; the possibility of a non-
autonomous act being treated as autonomous is in some circumstances far less 
worrisome than the reverse.35 
If someone is, for whatever reason, not capable of choosing between three 
options, then it is not overbearing for an appropriate stand-in to choose for 
them. Indeed, it is plausibly part of a non-dominating society that I may have 
friends or others who can be trusted to act on my behalf in the event of 
incapacity. If I am recognised as an agent, I have standing rights for my interests 
to be considered in a way that clearly isn’t true of a rock or a car; that I might 
temporarily or permanently be incapable of furthering or protecting these 
interests myself in no way changes this. The evident possibility of hard cases, 
and of bad faith assessments, cannot be taken as evidence against this claim; 
people will deny the obtaining of all kinds of relevant factors (or claim the 
relevance of irrelevant factors) if it suits them, and it does not seem unduly 
pessimistic to say that no quantity of paper sacrificed to demonstrating their 
lack of philosophical justification will prevent this from happening. 
Secondly, we should consider that individual judgements of incompetence are 
only going to become damaging when we are already vulnerable – I have no 
reason to care that Colonel Blimp regards my kink as a sign of madness unless 
                                                          
35 The issue of adaptive preferences is particularly pressing in political philosophy generally and 
leftist politics specifically because of the false consciousness problem – “if you want to x, 
then that’s proof enough that your reflective capacities have been malignly influenced by so-
and-so!”. I addressed some of these issues in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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Colonel Blimp has the power to non-trivially interfere with my self-direction. A 
society or set of institutions organised so that its members stand in autonomy-
constitutive relations – that is, non-vulnerable and instantiating recognition 
respect – must be a society that is not prone to casually interfering with self-
direction. 
It should be clear now that while there is a psychological aspect to recognition 
respect (at least in terms of individuals), it is still a fundamentally relational 
matter. If, to give a historical example, there is putative institutional/legal 
respect for agents – as with the British government’s attitudes to the “Windrush 
generation” of Caribbean migrants to the UK – but the same agents face violence 
or hostility if they attempt to claim the rights associated with this respect, then 
it is simply not the case that they are being granted recognition respect.36  To 
use a familiar concept: purely formal recognition respect is no respect at all. 
However, a situation whereby one has all the psychological indicators of 
recognition respect – the community doesn’t hold racist, sexist, homophobic, 
etc. attitudes – will probably be a situation where formal or institutional rights 
are upheld also. Again, this is primarily a sociological or psychological point in 
the sense that particular attitudes will probably produce particular social 
structures, but it does seem incoherent that a group of people could both hold 
attitudes of genuine respect towards me as an agent and also believe that I 
should be denied associated rights. 
To recap this section’s key argument, then: recognition respect, as opposed to 
appraisal respect, is owed to an agent just in virtue of their being an agent, and 
requires that certain rights (such as self-determination) be presumed. Although 
this respect does not act as an all-things-considered trump card on all occasions 
                                                          
36 To give a brief illustration: assuming (very unsafely) that having a good chance of putting a 
representative in Parliament, or becoming one, makes one more politically autonomous, the 
structural and institutional racism of the 1950s UK militated against African and Caribbean 
Britons being elected, plausibly making these agents less autonomous. There was no formal 
bar against persons of colour being elected, but the kinds of attitude encapsulated by the 
1964 Tory election campaign for Smethwick, which ran with the infamous strapline “if you 
want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour”, were endemic. Whether or not one is legally 
barred from running for parliament, the public propagation (and at best institutional 
endorsement by toleration) of racist hate speech by a powerful faction within that parliament 
renders the prospect of winning a slim one, and the prospect of running a potentially life-
threatening one. To be in a position whereby attempting to access rights of respect risks 
predictable, because structurally endemic, violence is clearly not to be respected.  
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– you do not deny me recognition respect if you ask me to take my briefcase off 
your foot – it does provide prima facie authority to the decisions of any agent, 
an authority that requires good reasons before it can be over-ridden.  
There are both psychological and formal or structural requirements for such 
respect to be instantiated, but it is difficult to cleanly separate these 
requirements from each other. This, I would argue, is a feature rather than a 
bug. It would be odd if not incoherent to imagine a world where one is granted 
psychological but not formal respect, and history shows that formal respect 
alone cannot make up relations that instantiate recognition respect.37 
We can now connect recognition respect to the power and authority conditions 
in the following way. The relations of recognition respect, requiring as they do 
that I do not face undue difficulty in self-directing, make me more powerful over 
my life. If the neighbours do not hold the kind of attitudes that will cause them 
to throw rocks at me (or approve of rocks being thrown at me) while I garden, 
and the state or governing institution presumes and protects my right to garden 
just because, as an agent, I ought to be able to garden I want to, then I am more 
powerful than in the reverse situation. 
The way in which recognition respect fulfils the authority condition should 
hopefully be fairly clear, since it is more or less built in. If we are regarded as 
prima facie authoritative because of our agency, as recognition respect requires, 
then we must be regarded as (at least prima facie) authoritative over our lives. 
What is probably the more interesting feature of recognition respect in terms of 
authority is that this respect – and as such, our authoritative status – is itself 
instantiated relationally and in large part non-psychologically. I am authoritative 
not just insofar as my neighbour thinks I’m an appropriate source of values, but 
also insofar as any changes of heart they might have do not change my 
authoritative standing in the wider community. If, to emphasise the point, I can 
be regarded as an inappropriate source of values on the basis of one person’s 
say-so, then it is surely odd to assert that I was truly authoritative to begin with 
                                                          
37 As it happens, the only circumstance I can think of where “psychological but no institutional” 
respect isn’t incoherent is one where social attitudes have outpaced legal change; even there 
the fact that the legal system can lag behind in such a fashion plausibly points to some 
shortfall in psychological respect, but it at least seems within the bounds of possibility. 
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– rather, it seems that I was coat-tailing on another’s authority, or that I had 
false or pseudo-authority.38 
Taken together, the non-vulnerability and recognition respect conditions of non-
dominating relations ensure that we are powerful and authoritative over our 
lives in the way required for autonomy: we are structurally supported and 
protected against arbitrary or unjust interference, and supported not for any 
unstable or inappropriate reasons like privilege or influence, but simply in virtue 
of our being agents. Note that the relations of non-domination should be 
understood as constituting autonomy insofar as they constitute primarily 
programmatic autonomy. To dust off the lumberjack example used in the last 
chapter, non-domination does not consist in our being able to chop down any 
tree we feel like, but in being able to be a lumberjack at all. Social relations 
which constitute our being powerful and authoritative over our lives need not 
(indeed, surely could not) allow us to do anything we want at any given time, 
but they must allow us to pursue our values and life plans insofar as those values 
are consistent with maximal equal autonomy.39 
Notably, the recognition respect requirement goes some of the way towards 
blocking the objection that non-domination could be attained just by being the 
dominator. Even if such an agent is not currently vulnerable – perhaps, for 
example, because of their political or economic position – this non-vulnerability 
is based on morally irrelevant features rather than recognition respect, and so 
they ultimately fail the non-domination condition and are less than maximally 
autonomous. The recognition respect requirement thus militates towards what I 
shall call maximal equal autonomy-constituting relations: even if we meet the 
power conditions for non-domination, if we meet these conditions because we 
stand in relations of privilege then ultimately we fail the authority condition. We 
are not respected in virtue of being recognised as agents, but excused from 
                                                          
38 This thought, that what appears to be recognition respect may in fact not be depending upon 
what its real basis turns out to be, will be returned to in the final chapter. 
39 This, again, shouldn’t imply that only relations which allow us to pursue suitably ‘weighty’ or 
‘serious’ life plans constitute autonomy. Although it seems relatively unlikely that anyone 
would have as their central life goal the collecting of (for example) biscuit tins, if they did, 
then their programmatic autonomy would be constituted by their standing in relations which 
allow them – effectively, not just formally – to collect biscuit tins. It would not, though, be 
harmed by inability to obtain a particular biscuit tin, in the same way that the lumberjack’s 
autonomy is not limited by being unable to cut down a particular tree. 
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challenge in virtue of being privileged, and this just puts us in the position of 
prison trusties or favoured servants – enjoying the ride all the way up until the 
point where the screws are investigated or the boss goes bankrupt and we are 
thrown under the bus.40  
This in turn suggests that theories of institutional legitimacy which seek 
justification in autonomy need not concern themselves with being “value-
neutral” – being autonomous is not just a matter of deciding on things in a 
particular way and being able to carry those plans out, and so autonomy-minded 
justifications are not forced to accept that, for example, exploitative economic 
practices could be legitimised on the basis that a majority of people 
authentically voted for them (or, conversely, that a losing minority would have 
its autonomy reduced by being prevented from exploiting other agents).  
This has obvious import for any account of political obligation or authority we 
might try to develop; before moving into that part of my thesis, however, it is 
worth drawing out another feature of my theory which has similarly weighty 
implications. 
2. Structures, Relations and Why the Personal is Still Political 
There is a final implication to be drawn from the account of autonomy I have 
given in this and the previous chapter, and one that should serve to link the 
account with my broader aim of identifying the requirements which institutions 
must meet in order to be both authoritative and autonomy-respecting or 
constitutive. The implication is that the relational account of autonomy has no 
room for a sharp conceptual split between ‘personal’ and ‘political’ autonomy. 
                                                          
40 We can conceive of this as their still standing in dominating relations – as it happens they are 
(at the moment) the beneficiaries of such relations, but because their position cannot be 
based on consistent moral respect, they are essentially only autonomous only insofar as they 
meet some morally arbitrary set of criteria. But, of course, this is the position that the slave 
in Pettit’s example occupies, and we do not want to say that they are autonomous. Indeed, 
pushing it up to the top of the hierarchy, we can see that the politician, aristo or mob boss 
whose privilege is maintained by entrenched injustice still stand in such relations, for their 
self-direction is protected via violent exercise of power, not mutual recognition respect; the 
difference is a matter of degree, albeit great degree, not of kind. Our sympathy is not 
required, and this is again not to say that they are worse-off than folk who are both 
vulnerable and not granted recognition respect, but the point that non-vulnerability must 
itself not be based on arbitrary features, and must reflexively include an equality condition, 
is worth emphasising. 
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So far, the requirement that autonomy-constitutive relations include recognition 
respect and non-vulnerability has included no specification of how these 
features have come about – as alluded to in the discussion of labour relations, it 
seems that I am protected against economic domination if I have a powerful 
trade union or if I stand in community relations such that friends and 
acquaintances will defend me against attempts at exploitation. But – 
traditionally, at least – trades union activity is in the political or public sphere, 
while having strong relationships with friends is counted as a matter of personal 
or private preference.41 This distinction cannot solely be a procedural matter, 
either. I am perhaps more able to rely on an institution specifically designed to 
protect me against exploitation than on friends who may or may not be 
efficacious, but that itself is unsatisfactory as an explanation of a distinction 
between personal and political autonomy given that my trade union may be less 
effective than a suitably protective and motivated group of friends.  
Similarly, the way we interact with our friends and relatives is often thought of 
as being not a matter for political philosophy (or a matter only to the extent 
that we point at a vague area and say “not our problem!”). This, the thought 
seems to go, is the moral philosopher’s realm and we ought not to get our 
political mud all over the floor if at all possible. But treating, say, a trans agent 
hurtfully on the basis of their identity is not merely immoral, it is an action that 
(tries) to define the status and the conditions of people of a certain identity 
within society. That is, surely, an archetypally political matter. 
I argue that the personal-political split is a confused one which ought not to be 
replicated in our conception of autonomy: someone can satisfy what we might 
think of as formal conditions for political autonomy (no legislative bar to 
engagement/voting/etc.) and yet still be politically heteronomous. As I shall 
suggest, the best way to explain this apparent inconsistency is by pointing to 
exactly those kinds of relations which are taken to be important to – or, on my 
view, constitutive of – ‘personal’ rather than ‘political’ autonomy.  
                                                          
41 Again, Otsuka (2001) defends the personal/political split; see also Raz (op. cit.), and Oshana 
(op. cit., p102) for the claim that an agent can be politically autonomous without being 
personally autonomous (and vice-versa).  
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There are, in essence, two interlocking claims which make up my argument 
against the personal-political division.  
First, if we understand political autonomy as being limited to interactions with 
or powers against particular formal or legal institutions, we will be unable to 
satisfactorily explain why agents like the angel in the house are not able to 
effectively engage with political institutions. We will also be unable to explain 
to explain how agents may have extensive powers to effect political change 
despite being formally disempowered or disenfranchised. In other words, the 
account of political autonomy as holding formal rights or being able to access 
certain decision-making procedures casts the net both too widely and too 
narrowly in terms of capturing the character of ‘political’ autonomy.  
The second claim is that the power and authority over our lives required to be 
personally autonomous must include the same kinds of power and authority (or 
power and authority over the same kinds of areas) that are taken to be crucial to 
political autonomy: the personal and the political are thus different emphases 
on the same concept, not two different concepts with a shared foundation. 
In this section, the task is therefore to give plausible accounts of the kinds of 
relation that are picked out by “personal” and “political”; identify the features 
that are supposedly doing the individuating; and argue that in fact we can find 
putatively distinctive political features of personal relations (and vice versa) to 
such an extent that the terms are really only useful to indicate very general 
areas of public discourse. On the picture which emerges my personal life is 
personal insofar as it is on the whole none of your business, but the reasons that 
it is (on the whole) none of your business are overtly politicised, and insofar as 
my personal life intersects with many others, it is, at least potentially, very 
much your business.42 Political autonomy thus entails personal autonomy, and 
vice versa. This is a conclusion which is important in providing both a plausible 
account of autonomy and plausible autonomy justifications for political authority. 
 
                                                          
42 As Williams notes, “To say that “the personal is political” is to say only that private life is 
implicated in networks of power, leaving open the question of under what circumstances it is 
appropriate for government to intervene” (2001, p94). I would perhaps use “community” 
rather than “government”, but the point stands. 
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2.1 The Personal and the Political 
The distinction between the personal and the political in terms of autonomy is 
usually characterised in something like the following way: personal autonomy is 
a matter of doing what one wants (within certain limits), of being free and able 
to settle on the direction of one’s life and work towards the values and goals 
that one has. Political autonomy, on the other hand, is seen to be the holding of 
certain rights against one’s government and/or fellow citizens, specifically with 
regards to involvement in (or being involved by) coercive institutions.43 We can 
be politically autonomous without being personally autonomous – so the agent 
who is not self-directed, or whose desires are inauthentic (etc.) can still be 
politically autonomous insofar as, say, they have certain legal rights or 
protections with regards to voting, taxation, and so on – and by the same token 
we may be personally autonomous without being politically autonomous: a 
standard example would be the disenfranchised agent who happens to be so far 
off the grid that they are entirely free to pursue their self-conception.44 
Both forms or realms of autonomy are taken to have at least some shared 
foundations – in both cases, we hold prima facie rights against interference/of 
assistance just by virtue of being agents – but the one is not usually explicable 
by reference to the other. Although we might claim that at least some measure 
of political autonomy is necessary for personal autonomy, the reverse claim is 
far less common. The existence of that hoary chestnut, the benevolent dictator, 
is a marker of the belief that personal autonomy is (at least potentially) 
achievable under conditions of fairly extensive political repression.45 
The divide is not merely one of emphasis, either – at least, in the standard 
liberal narrative – for as Lee says, “The idea of a limited government is 
                                                          
43 Wolff (1998) defines political autonomy using this criterion. 
44 Note that in the latter case, they’re only personally autonomous if autonomy doesn’t require 
things like access to public healthcare, education, or indeed the ballot box, which should 
provide an early indication that the distinction is built on sand. 
45 Of course, there are some cases where, even on the standard view, political heteronomy is 
inconsistent with personal autonomy: if part of my self-conception is “non-trivially engaged 
with the institutions that affect much of my life”, then being prevented from so engaging will 
be counted as making me less personally autonomous. But this is a contingent, not 
conceptual, link from the personal to the political – I’m only less personally autonomous 
because, as it happens, my personal autonomy is partly reliant on my political status, and (at 
least on non-relational models) if I didn’t care about political status I would be autonomous 
without any change in that status. 
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predicated on the assumption that it is both possible and desirable to keep 
politics out of the private sphere”; if there is no sharp conceptual divide 
between personal and political then it would be misguided to suggest that 
politics had no business in the home (or that familial relations were an 
inappropriate subject of social or institutional oversight).46 
Perhaps because of its status as a presupposition of many theories, it is difficult 
to find a recent account of the personal-political division that gives necessary or 
sufficient conditions for something’s being personal or political. Instead of a 
straight counterexample to such putative conditions, I will instead consider a 
case illustrating what I take to be the core notions of the personal or private 
sphere.  
Imagine an agent deciding where to go for dinner tonight. Here, they are 
(personally) autonomous insofar as they stand in relations such that they can go 
to a range of friends’ houses or restaurants, they are competent instrumental 
reasoners, will not be bullied into picking one kind of food over another, etc. 
They are, albeit in a fairly minimal way, powerful and authoritative with regards 
to their self-direction. What, though, are the properties that make this a 
specifically personal autonomy? Three possible contenders present themselves: 
intention or goal, decision-making process, and scope. 
Taking the intention approach will give us something like the following line of 
argument. Political action (and therefore political autonomy) is concerned with 
a particular set of intentions or aims, specifically those to do with the broader 
society one lives in. While this encompasses our desires to some extent – we 
have desires exactly about the nature of our society – the relation is only one-
way; that I have some plan does not make my carrying that plan out a political 
action unless the plan is aimed at special kind of goal or good. Here, picking a 
place to eat tonight is a personal action because it is silent about social goods or 
institutional organisation; one cannot read off a political statement from a claim 
about what kind of food I’d like for dinner.47 
                                                          
46 Lee (2007, p164). 
47 The obvious objection here, of course, is that deciding what to eat – insofar as it may be a 
decision about the value of non-human life – is a political decision even on the standard 
model. I agree entirely, but let us pretend for the sake of argument that this angle is 
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Putting the emphasis on decision-making, meanwhile, provides a different 
account. Here, the thought is that realms of action might be divided up (at least 
partly) by what kind of reasoning or evaluative procedure we use to settle on a 
particular course, and – more pertinently – what kind of procedure we ought to 
use. Thus, while I can answer the question “where should I eat” with reference 
only to my own tastes and preferences, questions like “what sort of businesses 
ought to be allowed/supported/banned/etc.?” must include input from others, 
and input of a specific (if broad) type – that is, input through something like a 
democratic ballot or consultation. 
Lastly, making the argument that personal and political action are individuated 
through the scope of the action results in a story whereby matters of personal 
autonomy are limited in scope to oneself and one’s friends/family, while 
political activity ranges, potentially, across national and global institutions. 
There is some overlap with the intention account here, but they are not 
equivalent. For example, perhaps I want sole use of some patch of nearby land, 
without a care in the world for any social or institutional implications. While I do 
not aim at any obviously political course of action here, the scope of such an 
outcome (affecting as it does any members of the community who might have 
claims on that land) move it out of the personal, and into the political domain.48 
When I muse on where to eat, though, there is a very narrow realm of action to 
choose within; perhaps one person or group has to sit at a different table or go 
to a different restaurant, but this is not the same thing as changing the 
ownership of means of production (or recreation) as in the field example. 
2.2 The Personal is (Still) Political 
We thus have three ways of explaining the intuition that decisions about dinner 
are personal rather than political. However, I now argue that none of these ways 
give us any distinctive criteria for what is political about (for example) a 
decision on whether or not to take strike action. That is: there are no sharp 
conceptual differences in intention, decision-making processes or scope between 
                                                                                                                                                                                
irrelevant (or imagine that I am deciding between solely vegetarian or carnivorous eateries in 
this scenario). 
48 Alford and Hibbing, to give an example, seem to have the scope distinction in mind when they 
claim that “political temperament [as opposed to “interpersonal” temperament] deals with 
the structure and organisation of large-scale social life” (2007, p197). 
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the two cases, and we should conclude that ‘personal’ and ‘political’ at most 
mark out areas where certain different types of interference (or coercion) may 
or may not be permissible. 
Take the aforementioned example of deciding whether to strike. What 
conceptual distinctions can we draw between this and the restaurant decision in 
terms of intention or goal? Obviously the immediate intention is different (in the 
way that the immediate intentions of all distinguishable actions are different), 
but this doesn’t do any useful work: the interesting question is whether the 
important features of the intentions are different – whether replacing “where 
should I go for dinner?” with “should I cross that picket line?” requires radically 
changing the kinds of reasons which bear on the answer – and it seems to me 
that they aren’t. When I decide where I want to go for dinner, I am making a 
claim about how I want my life to go (albeit briefly), about what is important to 
me and what kinds of actions best fit with my ideals or principles.  
We can say exactly the same thing about striking: I want my life to go better, so 
I strike for better pay (working conditions, etc.); I claim that labour power is 
important to me, or that sufficient time with my family is important to me, so I 
strike; I have ideals of fair working conditions, or collective action, or economic 
justice, which are inconsistent with crossing a picket line, so I strike. Here, 
someone could object that this is inconsistent with what I entertained earlier 
about the idea that deciding where to go for dinner is a personal rather than 
political decision. The mere fact that both dinner and striking involve plans, 
reflect my goals, etc., cannot be enough to put them both in the same category. 
This is true, but it misses important facts about the extent to which both plans 
presume and require certain background conditions. When I decide that I want 
to go to place A rather than place B for dinner, I am making a decision which is 
affected by (and in turn affects) the social relations I find myself in. If, for 
example, A is more expensive than B, but I prefer it because it is known to pay 
its staff better, then I am making a decision about self-interest versus social 
values – just as I may personally lose out as a result of strike action and still 
decide to strike. Contra the earlier claim, we can read off political ideals from 
dinner decisions – it is just a bit more involved than reading off such ideals from 
decisions about whether or not to go on strike. 
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This won’t, however, put the objection to rest. The interlocutor could still 
assert that, absent the kind of self-conscious moralising which I seem to be 
engaged in, the dinner decision does not reflect political views – I just want to 
have something tasty to eat, and damn all other considerations. 
My response is simple: I just deny that such a thought would be apolitical. Take 
the strike contrast case again, but change the thought process so that I am solely 
concerned with my own immediate benefit, and stipulate that in this instance I 
will lose out by going on strike (whether through lost pay, being marked down as 
a troublemaker by management, etc.). Pretty obviously, I will not strike – I just 
want to earn a wage, and damn all other considerations. There are many ways 
we might describe this agent: selfish, short-sighted, and so on. But would we say 
that they have acted apolitically? Plausibly, no, because the presuppositions of 
their decision are manifestly concerned with questions of solidarity, the role of 
self-interest in economic relations, and so on. We cannot simply divorce “what 
matters to me” from “what matters to others”, nor from how it affects others: 
denying that the decision to scab is a political one already presumes a sharp 
division between the personal and the political, and presumes that something 
must involve a vote, or a parliamentary body, or what have you, in order to be 
political.  
To put it another way, this objection presumes that there are such things as 
purely self-regarding actions, and this simply isn’t so for any action taken in a 
social context.49 If we follow it to its logical conclusion, the criticism also seems 
to imply that actions and decisions which involve others – such as “where should 
my family go for dinner?” – would be political just in virtue of not being self-
regarding, which I take it that nobody wants to endorse regardless of their views 
on the personal/political distinction (or the possibility of solely self-regarding 
actions).  
                                                          
49 Two qualifications should be made here. First, as I have implied, there is conceptual space for 
self-regarding actions – if I am the last agent on Earth, or trapped on a desert island with no 
hope of rescue, then plausibly questions like “should I sleep under this or that tree?” really 
are solely self-regarding. Most of us, however, are not in such a position. Second, what we 
might think of as mental actions (including affective responses as well as propositional 
attitudes, etc.) might well be self-regarding; but this is orthogonal to the problem and hence 
a question I need not be concerned with. 
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To the second possibility, then. The claim here is that dinner decisions are 
personal, and strike decisions political, because of the kinds of procedure we 
undertake to make them or because of the kinds of reasons that are inputs to 
our decision-making process. Thus dinner decisions are personal because the 
correct method of determining where I want to eat is simply to ask myself where 
I want to eat. Again, though, this line of criticism rests on dubious 
presuppositions. If we imagine that the question of strike action is to be put to a 
collective, then there obviously are procedural differences – but if we put the 
question of dinner to a collective, we (ought to) follow a different procedure 
than if the question was solely answerable by us. If, on the other hand, the 
question remains “ought I to go on strike?”, then we cannot claim that the 
eventual decision will or will not be political depending on whether I canvassed 
other people’s opinions.  
One factor which might cloud our reasoning here is that oftentimes, the 
procedural requirements for making some political decision will include (say) 
voting or some other method of collective input, and this makes it appear as if 
anything which doesn’t have such requirements must therefore be apolitical. We 
should be careful not to put the cart before the horse here: procedural 
requirements are set by the nature of the decisions being made, rather than 
such requirements being definitional of what kind of decision it is. When I 
consider whether I ought to go on strike, then I am making a one-person political 
decision. When a collective considers whether it ought to require its members to 
go on strike, then it is making a collective political decision, and must use 
procedures appropriate to collective decision-making. But the reasons which 
motivate this (for example, considerations of equal input) remain the same 
across both cases; all that changes is the particular procedure those reasons 
motivate us to adopt. 
To sum up my response to the claim that personal and political are individuated 
by the kinds of decision-making procedures we adopt: there are probably reasons 
to think that individual and collective actions (or decisions) should have 
different procedural requirements for legitimacy, but believing that this split 
maps onto personal and political only follows from an implausible presumption 
that an individual’s decision is personal and a collective decision is political. We 
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ought to take a vote on where we collectively go for dinner for the same kinds of 
reasons that we ought to take a vote on whether we collectively strike, namely 
that our autonomy is plausibly compromised by having no opportunity to affect 
and determine collective decisions. The relational structures are parallel, 
although not identical. By the same token, while my individual decision on some 
matter – whether it be dinner or striking – ought not to be a matter for general 
debate because deciding what I think is a key precondition of being autonomous, 
this motivation gives no distinction between ‘personal’ and ‘political’ decisions. 
Finally, there is the third possibility: the personal and the political can be 
distinguished by the scope of the action or intended outcome. This criterion 
would account for why procedural distinctions arise after the definition rather 
than forming it: actions with broader scopes require a broader spectrum of 
inputs. So when I decide on my dinner, there is no need for a vote because the 
scope of the decision is very limited (its effects range only across myself and 
whatever cafes or restaurants I am considering), while when we deliberate on 
whether to strike we do need a vote because the scope of the action 
encompasses many other individuals, groups, and institutions. This does suggest 
a rule of thumb for distinguishing between those decisions which are primarily 
individual and those which are primarily collective. When I decide where to eat, 
I make very limited relational changes if I make any at all, but strike action 
might (at least in theory) change a much wider array of social and economic 
relations. But note that such a rule makes no distinctions of kind, only of degree; 
the reason to elicit a wider range of input for ‘political’ decisions is because the 
scope ranges more widely, not because political decisions fall within a unique 
category which invariably demands collective decisions. 
I have argued here that conceiving of autonomy relationally suggests that there 
is no principled distinction between the personal and the political: my being 
able to choose between two restaurants is not just indicative of but also 
dependent on a whole host of factors which are typically characterised as 
‘political’, such as the economic relations we stand in and our practical ability 
to self-direct according to our own principles. Similarly, deciding whether or not 
to take part in strike action involves or may involve considering the effect that it 
will have on my family, or on my relationships with friends – the political 
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decision is also a personal one both because of the factors relevant to the 
decision and because the decision may alter the personal relationships that we 
have. Neither intention nor procedural requirements can separate out the 
personal from the political, and different scopes of decision or action do not 
require a difference in kind between the two putative types of autonomy. 
I do not claim that only the relational account implies the conclusion that the 
personal is political (such a claim would plainly be ignorant of history, apart 
from anything else), but I do claim that conceiving of autonomy as a matter 
primarily of our relational standing entails that any alterations to that standing 
must be of the same broad category, the category of “decisions or actions which 
alter the relations we stand in”. We cannot be personally autonomous and 
politically heteronomous, nor vice-versa; only personally-politically autonomous 
to a greater or lesser extent and perhaps unevenly across different areas of our 
lives. 
2.3 An Objection to Collapsing the Personal/Political Distinction 
Before concluding the chapter, there is one further objection to address. Rather 
than take issue with any of my critiques of putative distinctions, this objection 
claims that collapsing the distinction opens up our lives to unpalatable levels of 
oversight and interference from others. The problem can be summarised like this: 
if everything I do is political, then why is it not a matter for public discussion 
who I sleep with, or make friends with, or have nothing to do with?  
A response to this objection is already discernible within what I have written so 
far, but it would be helpful to make it explicit. There is no a priori reason why 
matters like intimate relationships should not be the focus of public discussion, 
but there are strong autonomy-minded reasons to think that this kind of social 
setup would be unfavourable. Remember that we are concerned with autonomy 
as a matter of being embedded in social relations which are consistent with 
maximal equal autonomy. When we consider actions which would change those 
relations for a large number of people, we should (at least) get the input of 
those people, since we are non-trivially affecting their self-direction – though we 
may still think, for reasons given in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, that 
their self-direction can be over-ridden. They get oversight and input, in short, 
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because to do otherwise would be to deprive them of powers which are required 
for maximal equal autonomy. But if we give a public assembly powers to 
interfere with my intimate or romantic life, what have they gained – how do 
these powers allow them to more effectively self-direct in a fashion consistent 
with others having maximal equal autonomy? They have gained nothing, and I – 
by dint of being unable to significantly determine how my life goes in this 
respect – have lost considerably. This does not mean that there can be no 
general norms or social rules governing relationships in the abstract: the 
impermissibility of sexual violence does not prevent me from self-directing in a 
way consistent with others’ maximal equal autonomy, but a general norm that 
nobody could go out for a drink with anybody else without a quorum would 
prevent me from directing in such a fashion. 
Another way of looking at it can be illuminated with this analogy: there are good 
autonomy-minded reasons for a community not to permit the trading of certain 
products – let us say teabags which are produced by slave labour – because their 
exchange would result in the endorsement and, if they’re sold, financial reward 
of practices incompatible with maximal equal autonomy. But there are, ceteris 
paribus, no good reasons for my tea preferences to undergo the same level of 
scrutiny because we would get nothing and lose much; practices of letting 
people choose their own teabags from within a morally acceptable range are, 
surely, more conducive to maximal equal autonomy than everybody’s having to 
have their breakfast drink okayed by a committee. 
We have, then, a claim that the maximisation of (programmatic) autonomy 
provides its own set of rules with regards to others’ being able to scrutinise and 
interfere with my life. If the scope of some decision or action ranges widely, it is 
very likely that autonomy gives us a reason to take the decision a certain way 
and on the basis of certain inputs – for example, by taking a vote on the action 
from any relevant agents. If the scope is very limited, we have a reason to take 
the decision a different way and on the basis of different inputs – so that my 
decisions over whether to eat here or there, which in total form a not-
insignificant part of being able to decide how my life goes, ought to be taken 
with reference to where I want to eat and very little else. But this doesn’t make 
the former decision political and the latter personal; it means just that one is 
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apt for collective oversight (in the way usually associated with the ‘political’) 
and the other is not. When I decide to prefer a Celtic pub over a Rangers pub, 
that is a political decision; it is also a personal decision about where I want to 
spend the next couple of hours of free time.50 The personal really is (still) 
political, and the political is personal; for this reason, I will refer hereafter to 
personal-political autonomy rather than distinguishing between two concepts.  
 
Conclusions 
I have argued in this chapter that autonomy-constitutive relations, in order to 
make us powerful and authoritative over our lives, must make us non-vulnerable 
to arbitrary interference with those lives, and must be based on recognition 
respect. That is, we must have a prima facie right to do what we want with our 
lives (ultimately conditional on our doing so being compatible with maximal 
equal autonomy), and this right must be based on the acknowledgement of our 
status as an agent deserving of recognition respect.  
If we are constantly vulnerable to interference with our lives, then we are not 
powerful over them, for being powerful over one’s life must mean something 
more than its direction not currently being interfered with (this also means that 
effective rather than merely formal power is required for autonomy). Similarly, 
being able to self-direct because it pleases somebody else to allow us, or 
happens to align with their own goals, is not to be authoritative over one’s life. 
If my being a teacher is solely permitted (or encouraged) because it furthers 
somebody else’s aims, rather than because my status as an agent gives me the 
right to pursue being a teacher, then the direction of my life is not explicable by 
reference to respect for me as an agent and hence I am not authoritative over 
how my life goes. 
                                                          
50 As in the example of tea produced by slave labour given previously, if it was to transpire that 
the reason I preferred some Celtic pub was because it was a racist establishment and only 
served whites then we would have autonomy-based reasons not to let the pub exist in the 
first place (or to address the relations which allowed such a pub to exist and survive, and so 
on); notice that this isn’t the same thing as saying that my decision to go there or not ought 
in principle to be overseen by some committee of public morality. 
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Finally, I have argued that there is no meaningful normative distinction to be 
found between those relations which make us ‘personally’ autonomous and those 
which make us ‘politically’ autonomous. They both, ultimately, concern our 
ability to direct our lives and change our material conditions in accordance with 
our values and self-conceptions, and the only plausible difference is one of 
scope (and thus one of degree rather than kind). This does not, I’ve claimed, 
make us vulnerable to oppressive levels of interference in our lives because the 
same considerations of autonomy which collapse the personal/political 
distinction mean that some regions of programmatic autonomy – such as those 
concerning our intimate lives and our everyday preferences – are best served by 
individual rather than collective decision-making. 
In the next chapter, I return at last to the problem which opened this thesis: 
reconciling an account of autonomy which (though social) values self-direction, 
with an account of authority which must include the ability to over-ride at least 
some self-direction and, on my view, will sometimes do so on the basis of 
autonomy’s value. With the relational conception of autonomy now in hand, I 
argue that a notion of authority as functioning to promote and defend maximal 
equal autonomy can solve the problem of political obligation. 
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5. 
Authority (I) 
 
Introduction 
After concluding the first half of this thesis, we have an account of autonomy 
which starts from the claim that autonomy is a matter of being powerful and 
authoritative over our lives. This status of power and authority, I have claimed, 
is largely constituted by standing in particular relations, and has conceptual 
limits set by the nature of our demands for recognition. By this I mean that 
valuing autonomy, rather than just valuing the satisfaction of our desires, 
requires that we value autonomy for others just as much as for ourselves. Even if 
I authentically desire a life where I go about setting fire to people, for example, 
I cannot justify it on the basis of autonomy because such an attempt would be 
internally inconsistent with a commitment to autonomy: valuing relations which 
make agents powerful and authoritative over their lives is not compatible with 
valuing relations which allow folk to be set alight at another’s whims. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: to “turn the ship” from defending an account 
of autonomy towards constructing an anarchist account of political authority, 
and to indicate as clearly as possible the problems of voluntariness and 
universality this course change will encounter.1 Having explained the problems 
here, the next chapter will (attempt to!) solve them. 
First, I will recap the theory of autonomy defended in the first half of this 
thesis, rehearsing a couple of paradigm cases and emphasising the external 
requirements for autonomy, and sketch the problems they seem to pose to 
political authority. Then, I lay out desiderata for our theory of authority; I 
suggest three conditions for this autonomy-motivated concept of authority, and 
go into more detail about what the conditions require and why they are 
required. Finally, I consider two conceptions of political authority, the Razian 
                                                          
1 Here, and everywhere else in this chapter, I use “political” in the thin sense of being 
appropriate for collective decision-making or to do with collective co-ordination, rather than 
to suggest something conceptually divorced from the personal or the private.  
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“service conception” and Klosko’s authority based on obligations of fairness; I 
claim that although neither conception will do the job required by our concept 
of political authority, there are useful features in both and the reasons for 
rejecting each conception provide further signposts for what our eventual 
account of political authority should look like. 
One note before continuing: there are two separate concepts which are picked 
out by “authority”, and it is important not to confuse them. On the one hand, 
there is the authority over oneself which is a foundational component of 
autonomy: the normative claim that I am best placed to decide for myself what I 
want to do, and that my wanting to do something is a prima facie reason for 
doing it. This is the authority that I have been concerned with in my chapters on 
autonomy. 
On the other hand, there is authority as a characteristic of power structures; 
something which plays a role in the interaction of autonomous agents within 
social structures. It is something like the right to provide and have heeded some 
reason for an authoritative (in the autonomous sense) agent to do something 
which they have decided for themselves not to do, or vice-versa. The two kinds 
of authority are thus in principle compatible at least if we understand them 
correctly: something’s being authoritative over me in the second sense need not 
make me non-authoritative in the first sense. The problem is not that the 
existence of external authorities makes me non-authoritative (over myself) by 
definition, in other words, but how to structure and justify these authorities in a 
way that recognises and is consistent with our caring about agents’ authority 
over themselves in the first place. 
 
1. Autonomy Recapped, and the Problem of Authority 
The autonomous agent, I have argued, is authoritative and powerful over her 
own life: able, albeit within certain limits, to decide the course of her life and 
have this decision respected and supported in virtue of institutional respect for 
her agency (i.e. recognition respect). 
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These power and authority requirements are satisfied in two distinct ways: 
psychologically or internally as preconditions for autonomy, and relationally or 
externally as constituents of autonomy.2 I may, for example, stand in social 
relations that would enable or facilitate my power over my life, but be 
incapable of practical reasoning. Conversely, it is also easy to imagine an 
autonomy-competent agent who stands in relations that deny their power and 
authority. It will probably be helpful to provide some cases of these contrasting 
failures. 
The first type of autonomy failure can be illustrated with the following example. 
Take some ‘average’ adult of a rigorous democracy, who stands in relations such 
that they would be supported in their plan of (e.g.) becoming a teacher, and 
who would be supported in virtue of it being their goal. That is, they are 
acknowledged as an appropriate source of values with regards to what they want 
to do with their life, and empowered to pursue those values through access and 
opportunity to take up training courses, material support during periods of 
unpaid training, and so on. Ceteris paribus, they are authoritative and fairly 
powerful over their lives.  
But now let us add that all else is not equal: the agent also suffers from mental 
ill-health which has the effect (among others) of making them psychologically 
incapable or barely capable of actually following through on their plan. We thus 
have a situation where (by hypothesis) they value being a teacher; where this 
valuing is reason enough for institutions to support their pursuit of becoming a 
teacher; but they cannot exercise the powers to engage in that pursuit.3 They 
                                                          
2 Friedman describes these preconditions as competencies, and draws the distinction 
“between, on the one hand, conditions that constitute the autonomy of choices and actions, 
and, on the other hand, conditions that are causally necessary for the realisation of 
autonomous choices and actions” (2003, pp11-13). Friedman holds something like a 
procedurally-independent desire-satisfaction account with relational elements, hence the talk 
of choices constituting autonomy and external factors as merely effective on the realisation 
of that autonomy: the parallel in my account would be the preconditions for autonomy and 
the constitution of autonomy, but they occupy roughly the same conceptual space. The 
distinction can also be thought of with this analogy. In order for me to be able to play 
football, I have to meet certain requirements: some capacity for forward planning, minimal 
bodily co-ordination and so on. If these requirements are met, I stand ready to play football – 
but it is the running about, kicking a football, sliding through opposing players etc. that 
actually constitute the playing of football. As with football, so with autonomy. 
3 I have discussed the possibility of some psychological problems directly undermining one’s 
authority in Chapter 4, and will not return to it here; I stipulate just that in this case, the 
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are thus less autonomous not by dint of external oppression or interference, but 
through failing the preconditions for autonomy: the race is not rigged, but they 
have not made it to the starting line. 
The second kind of autonomy failure, and the kind my thesis so far has been 
most concerned with, is illustrated by simply reversing some of the previous 
example’s claims. As before, the agent values becoming a teacher. Now, 
however, they are in a psychological state that presents no barriers to their 
pursuing this value, but they stand in relations that make them powerless to 
pursue it, or they would be supported in the pursuit only for reasons other than 
their valuing it. Examples of this kind of heteronomy would include folk who are 
(whether formally or substantively) prevented from training to be a teacher, or 
who are supported during their training only because and insofar as they are 
shaping the educational narrative in accordance with the wishes of the powerful. 
Here, we can imagine that the agent is at the starting line, eyes locked on the 
finish – and as soon as the gun goes off they are tackled to the ground. Although 
there are, as discussed, plenty of cases where external conditions can lead to an 
agent’s eventually failing autonomy preconditions, it can never be the case that 
an agent stands in autonomy-hostile relations whilst also being autonomous, 
whereas an agent may stand in autonomy-constitutive relations while failing the 
precondition requirements. 
To re-emphasise the point: I have argued that the relational components of 
autonomy can both affect the meeting of preconditions and (if they instead 
constitute heteronomy) make those preconditions indeterminate of whether an 
agent actually is autonomous; the relational constituents, rather than the 
preconditions, should therefore regarded as the primary concern for autonomy-
minded political philosophers. 
As I have argued in the preceding chapters, this account captures many of our 
intuitive and theoretical platitudes about autonomy. That there are some 
                                                                                                                                                                                
problems are primarily action- rather than assessment-undermining – I know what I want to 
do, I just cannot motivate myself to do it (or to figure out how to go about doing it, etc.). 
Severe depression seems to me to be an example, although obviously not an “all and only” 
type example, of how mental ill-health may undermine the prerequisites for autonomy. 
171 
 
occasions when we can be told what to do (or what not to do) without this 
constituting heteronomy is thus unsurprising in at least one way. To recall the 
example that opened this chapter, the account will claim that I cannot kick my 
heels and bawl “repression!” if I’m hauled off a passer-by and the lighter 
forcibly removed from me as I attempt to pursue my deeply-held goal of setting 
fire to unsuspecting pedestrians. This claims gels neatly with our thoughts about 
the role of autonomy within moral as well as political philosophy: we cannot, on 
the basis of commitment to autonomy, demand exceptions for ourselves.4  
The flat-footed example above is not, however, the only instance of what we 
might think of as blameless denial of self-direction. Indeed, it is plausibly the 
least problematic instance. According to the schema I have laid out over the 
preceding chapters, the only reason we might think otherwise is through a 
misconception of autonomy or a failure to fully work through the implications of 
some act or other. If, in other words, I am prevented from carrying out an 
autonomy-hostile act, or my attempt to justify some act by reference to 
autonomy is unsuccessful, then the mere restriction of action is no threat to 
autonomy under the relational account I have put forward. Autonomy properly 
construed is not simply autarchy, and to reduce options or restrict actions is thus 
not necessarily autonomy-hostile. This much, at least, we can defend against the 
mountain man’s demands for autonomy-as-autarchy.  
The more serious problem arises when we attempt to reconcile this picture of 
autonomy with another of this thesis’ goals. I aim to provide an account of 
political authority that takes due heed of autonomy without collapsing into 
conceptually sleek but practically useless total voluntarism; a voluntarism 
whereby I can be obliged – and perhaps coerced – to do (or refrain from) only 
those things that I have explicitly contracted or agreed to do (or refrain from). 
Under this picture, there can be no institutional obligation to give aid to the 
                                                          
4 As I have argued in Chapters 3 and 4, commitment to autonomy “but just for me” is 
ultimately self-defeating. Not (or not just) in a Kantian way, but in a material consequences 
sense: if I want folks’ autonomy-constituting relations to be vulnerable to the whims of a 
would-be oppressor, then I either already stand in, or am committed to standing in, relations 
that make my autonomy a matter of luck. That is, if I am (more) autonomous because I 
occupy a position of privilege, then my autonomy is dependent on this arbitrary privilege 
rather than on my being respected as an agent – consequently, I am still vulnerable and thus 
not maximally autonomous.  
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person who collapses outside my front door, nor – unless I have agreed to be part 
of it – any obligation to contribute to a public health service.  
And this, of course, is exactly what the mountain man asserts: only through his 
explicit consent can he be placed under (or, perhaps, can he place himself 
under) political obligation. To borrow from Simmons’ (1979) summary of the 
problem, my account of autonomy gets us the voluntariness desired for political 
obligation, but looks as if it will have great trouble with universality. If everyone 
has to agree, then there will always be some folk who we have no claim over; 
but if we’re willing to coerce non-volunteers, then why profess to value consent 
as a marker of self-direction? 
Now, if I were putting forward some free market libertarian political theory, this 
would be a selling-point (as it were). Only freely-accepted contracts or promises 
allow external coercion; so much the better, says Nozick (1974) and, although he 
seems understandably reluctant to acknowledge it, Wolff (1998) probably ought 
to agree. However, political anarchism has a historical – and in my view correct – 
hostility towards hyper-individualised theories of obligation that sits ill with 
accepting that any authoritative command is a limitation on autonomy or 
freedom. I explore this problem in more detail in the next chapter, but in short, 
the worry is that “against all authority” is ultimately somewhat unilluminating 
for anyone who cares seriously about how an anarchist society might look.  
In addition to the problem of reconciling voluntarism with the ambition of 
universal political obligation, there is the question of what any putative 
authority might be entitled to enforce. Often, we take the view that person A 
may legitimately demand that B stop doing something, but may not intervene to 
force the cessation. For example, it seems reasonable to ask the person behind 
me on the bus to turn their music down, and if we not implausibly assume that 
blasting unsociably loud music on public transport is a (very minor) wrong then I 
am in some sense making an authoritative demand; nevertheless, forcibly 
turning off or confiscating their phone would not be permissible.5 Either there 
                                                          
5 An interesting example of precisely this situation can be seen in Star Trek IV: The Voyage 
Home, when Spock uses the Vulcan nerve pinch to render a stereo-toting punk unconscious – 
he is then applauded by a busful of passengers who are apparently fine with what is 
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can be the possibility of ‘empty’ authority - “you ought not do that, but I ought 
not stop you” - or, more plausibly, different kinds or extents of authority justify 
different kinds or extent of coercive acts. 
This is a somewhat separate issue, insofar as “what justifies authority?” and 
“what does authority (or being authoritative) justify?” clearly admit of different 
answers, and arguably different types of answers, but it seems very likely that 
our answer to the question of how we should think of authority will shape what, 
if any, coercion that authority may legitimately employ. To return to the bus 
example, my authority as a citizen or fellow traveller may not extend to 
confiscating possessions – but perhaps my authority as a busconductor (or 
whatever) does. Thus, one way of sharpening what we might mean by political 
authority is by examining what kinds of action are consistent with the 
conceptual shape and basis of that authority. 
 
2. Desiderata for an Account of Authority 
So much for autonomy. If, as I have argued, the correct conception of the 
autonomous agent is of an agent who is powerful and authoritative over her life 
(where these features are partly internal but primarily externally constituted by 
social relations), then we have half the puzzle of political institutions solved – 
we know at least one value that these institutions should promote (evince, 
respect, etc.), and we know roughly the kinds of relations that would tend to be 
constitutive of or hostile to this value. 
This still, however, leaves a significant challenge to tackle. In order for any 
institution or group of institutions to actually go about promoting this value, 
then we must know what powers they may use to this end. Otherwise, we have a 
target but no rules or guidelines on how to attain it. By analogy, if we were to 
tell someone that football exists to promote the scoring of goals, and tell them 
to play football, and nothing else, we could not be surprised if they picked up 
the ball, hacked down opponents and so forth. Understanding why we value 
                                                                                                                                                                                
effectively assault, so long as the victim is kind of obnoxious.  
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autonomy (football, etc.) gives us some hints as to what may or may not be 
carried out in its name, but a political philosophy with pretensions to practical 
usage must do more than gesture at the likely shape of the institutions it is 
concerned with. There are thus two questions to answer in order to lay out some 
rules for authoritative institutions: in what realms do we want them to be 
authoritative, and for what reason? 
I take these questions in reverse order. The desiderata, or what we want 
authorities to be authoritative over, must surely follow from the reasons we 
need a concept of authority in the first place. 
2.1 Implications of the Functional Analysis 
Recall that in Chapter 2, I argued for a functional analysis of authority: the 
content of the concept is given by what purpose we want that concept to play 
(rather than being a pre-existing concept with clear necessity and sufficiency 
conditions which we must fit into our theory). There, I suggested that the 
functional analysis allowed us to explain why it was required for an authority to 
have the right to command (and be obeyed), and what would justify such a right 
in the context of political institutions, more easily than the conceptual analysis.  
So much for why we should perform a functional analysis of authority. The 
question remaining is what we would lack in the political state of nature, to 
borrow Lane’s phrase again – that is, what we would lack if we had no concept 
of political authority.6 It certainly seems that communication, co-operation and 
the like would be possible, so the task now is to give an autonomy-minded 
explanation of why we would need to create the concept. 
To put the issue in the starkest terms possible: what reason do we have for 
surrendering or exchanging our autarchy to an institution which may make and 
enforce decisions we disagree with? This is not the worry that anything save 
unrestricted choice is heteronomy – my argument doesn’t imply the conclusion 
that having obligations of care to a loved one makes us less autonomous, as I 
have shown – but rather that we seem to be rendering ourselves vulnerable to 
                                                          
6   See Lane (1999). 
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commands that have a justificatory shape alarmingly similar to “because I said 
so”. Arbitrary interference with one’s life is heteronomy-constitutive, after all: 
being under the thumb of somebody (or some body) such that the course of your 
life is determined at their say-so seems a paradigm case of heteronomy.7 So what 
makes institutional obligation non-arbitrary? What function does authority play 
here which justifies authoritative institutions having coercive power? 
The Hobbesian answer to this is straightforward: the obligation is arbitrary in the 
sense that there’s no particular reason for person or body X rather than Y to 
issue commands, but we have good reasons to obey it anyway because the point, 
the function, of an authority is to resolve co-ordination problems.8 Since, on the 
Hobbesian view, making co-ordination possible is both the necessity and 
sufficiency test for authority, anything which does do that – in Hobbes’ case and 
given his view of human psychology, this ability is a direct function of bigness of 
stick – is thus authoritative and can command us more or less as it pleases. 
Perhaps because of the notoriously unappealing methods which Hobbes proposed 
as tools of proper authority, it is easy to miss the relatively modest and beguiling 
view of its function that he offers; it is not difficult to spin a much more benign 
interpretation which leaves us with exactly the same problem. 
We might, for example, think that humans generally tend towards the 
Kropotkinian rather than the Hobbesian caricature, and still think that informal 
bonds between agents and communities will (just as a result of complexity, 
human frailty, etc. etc.) be insufficient for the just and progressive resolution of 
resource disputes.9 In other words, it seems entirely coherent to believe that, a) 
Humans are ineliminably social rather than atomised beings, b) We usually tend 
towards co-operation rather than competition, and c) The function of 
government/authoritative institutions is simply to facilitate co-operation.  
Despite starting from an almost diametrically opposite position from that of 
Hobbes, by c) we have ended up giving exactly the same purpose – and thus 
                                                          
7 Here I once more draw on Pettit’s (1997) useful account of domination as vulnerability to 
arbitrary interference. 
8 See Hobbes (1651), particularly Chapter xVII. 
9 See, in particular, Kropotkin (1972). 
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sufficiency criterion – for authority. Perhaps something about a) or b) might 
motivate us to introduce limitations on how authorities may ‘facilitate’ co-
operation, but it is certainly worth noting that Rousseau’s legislating general will 
has at its disposal very similar powers to Hobbes’ sovereign. 
It does seem plausible that part of the purpose of political institutions is to 
resolve otherwise intractable co-ordination problems. If we are deadlocked over 
the choice of “x or y?” and there are no moral considerations in play, it seems 
obvious that a body with the ability to decree “x!” will allow greater progress 
just by virtue of being something to move matters along. A community of 
individuals genuinely committed to maximal equal autonomy, but irreconcilably 
split about how best to achieve it – even in micro-level cases such as the use of 
some patch of land – is presumably not going to make much actual headway on 
creating autonomy-constitutive relations, after all. Hanrahan & Antony (2005, 
p63) make the point that: 
Sometimes decisions must be made in the absence of a rationally sufficient 
reason to do one thing rather than another. And sometimes, even when an 
optimal solution exists, the cost of finding it can be prohibitive. In such 
circumstances, the best decision is the decision that gets made. Consider, for 
example, the hell of visiting BlockBuster to choose a movie with your partner. 
After a while, almost any film seems better than spending another minute in 
the video store. (This is the only reason that Gigli has ever been rented.)  
In other words, sometimes authorities must go for A rather than B for no 
particularly good reason (although I presume that there are good reasons to do A 
or B in the first place). This being so, we want the decision about A to be binding 
– it is, as previously mentioned, unsatisfactory for our purposes if the institution 
selects A, but we shrug our shoulders and carry on B-ing. Notice that an account 
of moral authority cannot do the job here: if it is equally morally permissible to 
A or B, then we can do either. Crucially, someone trying to make us A rather than 
B would be in the wrong – when our actions are morally underdetermined, any 
action not already ruled out is permissible according to purely moral 
considerations. So political authorities must be able to do something more than 
just assert and enforce (even correct) moral claims.  
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There is a further qualification to be made with regards to seeing political 
authority solely or primarily as a method of resolving co-ordination problems: 
there are obvious cases where expediency triumphs even when, intuitively, it 
ought not to. If the only role of political authority is to move resources about 
and resolve disputes in the most efficient manner possible, then it doesn’t 
matter much why we think that’s its only role. Whether King Solomon believed 
that both plaintiffs deserved to suffer the loss of a child, or that neither would 
possibly countenance the death of an infant for their own desires, he still 
threatened to bisect a child. If that kind of swift resolution is the sole purpose of 
a political authority, it’s difficult to dispute the wisdom and, more importantly, 
authority of Solomon. Clearly, though, this is not what we want of authority: I 
have already claimed that the task is to find an autonomy-minded justification 
for authority, or a conception of authority that is compatible with my account of 
autonomy, and the picture of authority we get from Solomon fails to perform 
that function. 
For the reasons given in the preceding discussion, we should conclude that 
although resolving co-ordination and resource distribution problems is part of 
what we desire an authority to do – because without co-ordinating and co-
operating it will be nigh impossible to create the kind of social relations that are 
constituents of autonomy – this cannot be all that we want it to do. 
So what, if not (solely) for dealing with co-ordination issues, does authority do – 
why should we bother with it? 
Primarily, I argue, authorities act as markers and promoters of values; we want 
authoritative institutions to issue rules or decisions that serve some political 
end. So an egalitarian will identify some institution as authoritative because it 
issues directives that instantiate and/or promote the value(s) of equality; a 
market-libertarian authority enacts policies consistent with the ideals of 
minarchism and is thus authoritative; and so on. Note that this implies not just 
different justificatory strategies, but different realms of authority, depending on 
the sought-after values: the liberal-democratic separation of public and private, 
for example, fits much more neatly with market-libertarian than egalitarian 
roles for authority. This is hardly a ground-breaking point, but it is nevertheless 
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worth emphasising the extent to which substantive judgements suffuse allegedly 
uncontroversial or conventional political presuppositions. 
In the case I present, because we are (by hypothesis) committed to relations 
that constitute maximal equal autonomy for agents, the purpose of authority is 
to defend or promote these kind of relations. Since we have established that 
autonomy is not best conceived of as something most easily attained in isolation, 
then it follows that this authority must extend further than the individual in 
order to properly perform its task. 
Rather, the authority or authoritative command should stand as something like a 
marker of decisions, institutional policies etc. that will promote or defend 
autonomy-constituting relations. Since we are, by argument (see earlier 
chapters) committed to maximal equal autonomy if we care about autonomy at 
all, then we want some action-guiding principles; thus, the political authority 
must be able to say “do this, because it is most autonomy-promoting policy to 
follow”. 
So a political/institutional authority, whatever it may in fact look like, must 
provide us with good reasons to think that its policies are consistent with 
maximal equal autonomy on the basis of recognition respect. 
2.2 Desiderata for Political Authority 
The previous passage suggests that – in my case, at least – the purpose of 
authority is to give us autonomy-minded reasons to act, reasons that are 
consistent with our being coerced into obedience. Here I am mostly concerned 
with why or how being authoritative in such-and-such a regard is helpful for 
being able to promote or instantiate autonomy-constitutive relations.  
In this section, then, I suggest three desiderata for a theory of institutional 
authority, and explore what makes them desirable. These desiderata are, in 
order:  
1. The putative authority must be able to generate (morally) binding 
obligations. 
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2. These obligations don’t stand independently of the institution (for 
example, “don’t murder” isn’t a politically authoritative claim, it’s a 
morally authoritative claim that often gets made by political institutions 
but would still stand regardless of whether any institution asserts it). 
3. The justification of and process of enforcing obligations must be 
consistent with the theory of autonomy I have suggested so far. 
1. Binding Obligations 
The first requirement is reasonably straightforward and, I think, intuitive: 
political authority must be able to issue binding obligations. That is to say, when 
some institution tells me to x, it should not be a suggestion, or merely an 
interesting report on their policy, but an imperative to which disobedience is (at 
least prima facie) morally wrong. There are, I think, two major motivations 
underlying this desideratum. 
The first motivation is conceptual. Without a moral upshot to its claims, any 
institution seems more like a descriptive ‘advisory board’, and as such inapt for 
the task of administering or enforcing rules. Consider some equivalent to the 
General Medical Council, which tells us that eating such-and-such a food, or 
drinking so much per day, is bad for us. This surely falls victim to a version of the 
famous Open Question argument, in that it does not seem particularly odd or 
inappropriate for someone to say “Fine, x is bad for me, but why ought I not to 
x?” (perhaps we should say “why, all things considered, ought I not to x?”).10 
Similarly, I have no reason to disbelieve that Pluto does not meet the criteria for 
planetary status met by Earth, Mars etc.; nor that paper burns at 451 degrees 
Fahrenheit, but there is equally no convincing reason for me not to go around 
saying “Pluto is a planet”, “Paper burns at 440 degrees”, and so on.  
Without falling back to the Weberian idea (2004) that authority is a matter of 
being the only one acknowledged as a proper wielder of the state’s big stick, we 
surely cannot say that a putatively authoritative body with no moral claim on 
obedience (rather than, at this stage, the means to enforce it) is doing the work 
                                                          
10 See Moore (1993) for the original form of this argument. 
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we require of a political institution. To emphasise the point, political authority 
ought to give us an imperative that is in some sense conclusive – they say 
“jump”, and we do wrong if the question is “why?” rather than “how high?”. A 
political authority cannot generate solely prudential reasons, not least because 
there are always non-absurd cases where prudential reasons fly in the face of 
the imperative.11 
The second motivation takes the conceptual thought in a slightly more practical 
direction. For any institution to promote or defend relations that are 
constitutive of autonomy (or indeed heteronomy) it must have some power. 
Quite what form this power takes we can leave open for now, but it seems 
correct to say that while an institutional authority may prove ineffectual in 
enforcing moral obligations, it must at the very least be able to try, if it is to be 
even in theory able to create or protect autonomy-constituting relations.  
A bit more needs to be said about how institutions may or may not generate 
obligations in this way. It will not be enough just for some institution to assert 
itself as the traffic management body, collect members, and then start issuing 
orders: I can call myself a football expert, and perhaps even find some credulous 
acolytes who will accept my decisions, but that doesn’t mean I get to pick the 
Scotland team. There has to be some link between my authority and how I came 
to have that authority; or, to put it another way, the obligation (demand, 
directive, etc.) has to be comprehensible in light of the institution. 
Perhaps, if we assume that my reckonings about the best XI available to Scotland 
are correct, I have some limited epistemic authority. But this gives me no 
institutional authority, and no remit to call up players: unlike the national 
team’s management, nobody wants (or expects) me to pick the team. When the 
manager issues a summons, they do generate a (weak) obligation, and do it in 
virtue of their institutional role – a player who isn’t called up ought not to turn 
up anyway on the basis that they, even correctly, think they’d be better than 
one of the actually selected players. The flipside of this is that the manager is 
                                                          
11 Here’s an obvious case: there are prudential reasons for me to drive within the speed limit, 
mostly to do with my safety. If that is the only sort of reason for me to do so, then there is no 
principle stopping me from mounting a crowded pavement if I’m being chased by an 
(automotive) axe-murderer. 
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assumed to be making their picks according to reasons consistent with their 
holding the position. If this is not the case – if, for example, some player is 
repeatedly capped because of their personal relationship with a coach – then the 
manager’s authority is accordingly called into question. In short, then, the kind 
of institutional obligations that can be generated by the Scottish Football 
Association (in this case) are both justified and constrained by the purpose of 
the institution.  
This is a fairly familiar account of one aspect of political obligation (see for 
example Hanrahan & Antony op. cit., Klosko 2005, Mokrosinska 2012, Raz 1986), 
and in order to make progress in understanding whether some institution 
actually is authoritative according to the conceptual description given here we 
will have to know how the institution is set up, whether its procedures are 
consistent with its purpose, and so on. This task can be left until later. For now, 
we should say that a political authority may generate obligations in virtue of its 
institutional structure if 
i) That structure is consistent with its purpose, however this is cashed out; it 
would be difficult to see why anyone should pay attention to national call-ups if 
the selection process was handled by a random assortment of folk uninterested 
in football.12 
ii) The obligation would not apply (or be comprehensible) were it not for some 
quality or qualities of the institution – again, the SFA composed of passers-by 
seems apt to fail here. 
iii) The obligation’s issue meets whatever internal or procedural requirements 
delimit the institution’s purpose. Return again to the football example. If we 
had a selection committee composed of seasoned ex-pros, scouts and coaches, 
all aiming to pick the best team possible, and one member performed some fait 
accompli with regards to announcing the squad, then the announcement should 
not be regarded as authoritative or even being generated by the SFA. Despite 
satisfying the first two criteria in virtue of the SFA’s structure being (by 
                                                          
12 Although not impossible by any means: perhaps we are more concerned that the team should 
be truly representative rather than (notionally) determined by skill levels, in which case a 
Buggins’ turn system of selection would seem much less bemusing. 
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stipulation) consistent with its purpose, and the squad being comprehensible in 
light of the institution’s purpose, the rogue announcement is not an institutional 
obligation because it has not passed the relevant procedures, whatever they 
might be. 
This subsection has shown that the conceptual requirement for putative 
authorities to generate obligations by virtue of their institutional structure 
implies further justification and constraint requirements. For political 
authorities, we must be able to understand their structure in light of their 
function to promote autonomy; their ability to issue obligations must cohere 
with that structure and function; and the directives that they actually issue must 
pass whatever procedural constraints are placed on an autonomy-promoting 
institution. 
2. Institutionally-Generated Obligations 
The desideratum, to recapitulate, is that obligations generated by the authority 
get their force from something about the institution itself: they are not just 
institutional assertions of free-standing moral requirements. To use a well-worn 
example: the reason that I ought not (ceteris paribus) to murder people is 
because it is wrong, not because there are laws against it. When (e.g.) the 
British state tells me not to murder, I comply rather than obey: I act in 
accordance with the law, but not because of the law. That is to say, the 
authoritative nature of the command “do not murder” has nothing to do with 
the issuer, and everything to do with the content. 
If there is to be an institutional political authority, however, it seems that it 
should have something aside from (although perhaps not ‘over and above’) 
purely derivative moral force of this sort. The reason for this is simple: much of 
the work of co-ordinating groups of people will involve resolving blameless 
disagreement rather than Manichean conflict. There is, laying aside conceptions 
of justice and retribution for a moment, no manifest need for any body to 
adjudicate that murder is wrong; but there is a manifest need for some method 
of arbitrating between competing proposals (over, for example, some shared 
space). Unless we are to adopt a kind of optimistically but narrowly technocratic 
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or perfectionist model whereby there is one and only one best use for any space 
or resource – and a group of people who can reliably identify it – then any 
decision regarding these proposals will not be able to coat-tail on the moral 
status of the proposals themselves. 
But we still, on pain of falling into the individualist trap discussed earlier, want 
the eventual decision to bind us in a stronger way than the advice of a friendly 
expert. It should not, under normal circumstances, be morally permissible for 
the relevant institution to rule “out of x or y, x” and yet for me to continue y-
ing. 
The worry, to briefly sketch it here, is that even obligations that are in form the 
result of institutional declarations – such as traffic laws in the UK – may get their 
force from free-standing moral reasons. There is no independent moral reason 
for anyone to drive on the left (or right), the thought goes, but given the 
convention of driving on the left, to drive on the right is to inflict inconvenience, 
or more likely risk, on others in a way that is ruled out by everyday moral rules.  
If it turns out that this is true of any purportedly institutional obligation, then I 
will have to give up the strong form of the second desideratum. Even in that 
eventuality, however, note that we will still have a reason to do that rather than 
this on the basis of institutional say-so – albeit that the reason will be an indirect 
one resembling “the institution says do that (and there are moral reasons to 
endorse the institution’s instructions)”. In this case, whether or not an 
institutional directive was morally binding would be more dependent on whether 
following the directive was the best (or best available) way of pursuing other 
goals. 
Perhaps, then, there is no clear distinction between how an institution might go 
about generating obligations, and how those obligations come to be morally 
binding; a thought which is supported by the following example.  
Imagine that we are members of some friendly association that holds a monthly 
dinner in one or other of its members’ homes. Everybody puts in a certain fixed 
sum to cover the dinner, which always falls on the first Sunday of a month. Now, 
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the obligation to pay in such-and-such an amount by this particular date is 
institutional in form: not only are the specifics determined by the institution, 
but the obligation would not even exist absent the council of diners (or whatever 
we wish to call them). Is there any moral dimension to the obligation? Plausibly 
so: whether we argue from fairness, from benefits received, or any of the 
possible contenders, it seems that there is at least a prima facie wrong I commit 
(whether or not I have explicitly consented) if I take the money and don’t cook, 
or turn up at other dinners without paying my subs.13 If I wasn’t a member, then 
the obligation wouldn’t apply at all; if I kept being the one selected to cook then, 
plausibly, the obligation weakens or again falls away. Crucially, it does so not 
because of any free-standing moral reasons or obligations – that is, it’s not 
obviously wrong for others to expect me to cook once a month – but because the 
institution, such as it is, is supposed to produce directives consistent with the 
presumed aim of giving everyone a turn to cook and turns to simply enjoy the 
food.  
The institution’s being able to produce binding obligations, in other words, is 
closely correlated with the institution’s making appropriate demands. In the 
dinner case, only those directives relevant to performing the institution’s 
function of monthly meals will be apt for authority; in the traffic case, the 
candidates for authoritative status will be all and only directives relevant to 
affirming a convention regarding which side of the road to drive on. More 
generally, whether or not some putative obligation is indeed binding will often 
be a substantive matter of whether the obligation will (or is likely to) serve the 
institution’s purpose, and whether the decision-making procedure which 
produced the directive is appropriate for that purpose. 
3. Coherence with Autonomy 
The last requirement is again a simple one: if we create an account of political 
authority which is plainly inconsistent with the account of autonomy I have given 
– “an institution is authoritative iff it does god’s work”, and so on – then one of 
the two has to go. Either the kind of institution formed would fail in promoting 
                                                          
13 I discuss Klosko’s fairness argument (which coincidentally also involves a gathering of 
gourmands) and Nozick’s objection to obligations from benefits received, later in the chapter.  
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and protecting autonomy, or the conception of autonomy I have given is vitiated 
by requiring a hyper-voluntarist view of social institutions. This is an external 
failure, in that neither concept need cause any problems by itself but only 
generates inconsistency when placed with the other (we might also think of this 
as a higher-order requirement).  
This requirement is the most difficult to describe in abstract rather than 
substantive terms. However, by considering the desiderata, we should at least be 
able to see what role the requirement plays (instead of seeing how exactly the 
requirement may be met). 
Perhaps, in my schema, it serves as a high-level conceptual constraint; we 
cannot know whether some putatively autonomy-promoting institution does 
generate obligations of the correct sort without substantive investigation, but 
we can know that any obligations it issues which are inconsistent with autonomy 
flatly fail to be authoritative. There does, however, seem to be one aspect of 
authoritative directives which only this requirement heeds: namely, their 
implementation. It is clearly possible for some directive to pass through 1 and 2 
while failing 3 by dint of what would be required to enforce it: if we take the 
inoffensive “drive on the left” obligation, it would still be possible for such a 
directive to be non-authoritative if the punishment for breaking it were 
something like familicide.  
One further thing to be said at this point is that we can understand “consistency 
with autonomy” in at least two ways. The first is that the directive 
straightforwardly increases or does not reduce the number (or efficacy, or range) 
of autonomy-constituting relations that agents stand in. The second is that it 
makes some relations unavailable in exchange for creating other, more 
numerous (more effective, wider-ranging) autonomy-constituting relations.  
The first interpretation requires that, in essence, every directive must leave 
untouched all autonomy-constitutive relations it does not improve in order to be 
authoritative. This is exceptionally demanding, but the more serious problem 
comes when we consider that such a move leaves us engaging in a kind of false 
consciousness defence when apparently valuable relations are changed or 
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removed. That is to say, if there is some decision which (for example) requires 
that 20% of one’s garden space is used for vegetables rather than decorative 
flowers, then it seems reasonable to say that something of value has been lost 
for the person who can no longer solely grow their preferred roses. The decision 
may still be legitimate and entirely justifiable by reference to autonomy, but it 
still seems that the rose-grower experiences some disvalue. If we are committed 
to the first interpretation, then we must be committed to the claim that the 
growing of roses just ceased to be valuable self-direction when the directive was 
issued (or that it was never valuable in the first place); to believe otherwise is a 
form of false consciousness. Akin to the Rousseauian line on dissenters from the 
General Will, or the orthodox Marxist characterisation of anti-communist 
proletarians, the agent has mistakenly or as a result of manipulation come to 
hold a belief which is against their own interests.14 In this case, the gardener is 
simply wrong about rose-growing being a valuable part of their life. This doesn’t 
seem like an absolutely insurmountable problem, despite its initial unpalatability 
(especially since I’m committed to something awfully like a false consciousness 
response with regards to, say, folk who take autonomy to be instantiated simply 
by unrestricted choice), but it is certainly a theoretical burden. 
On the second interpretation, we need take on no such burden: sometimes 
institutional directives will, in fact, deprive us of autonomy-constitutive 
relations. If the directive creates or is likely to create more such relations, then 
the command is still authoritative. We have committed to maximising equal 
autonomy, and this may sometimes involve curtailing unobjectionable (perhaps 
even valuable) self-direction; it is a trade-off, but so long as the balance tips 
towards more rather than less autonomy, it is a trade we are obliged to accept. 
This second account of how to reconcile autonomy-justified authority with 
limitations of self-direction is, again, fairly common in the literature: our 
familiar stalking-horse Raz  clearly holds such a view (op. cit., pp410-412), and 
Oshana’s observation that “if we distinguish global autonomy from local 
autonomy [or as I would have it, programmatic from episodic], it may be that 
                                                          
14 See Rousseau (1968) for the former and, among others, Gramsci (1971) and Eyerman (1981) 
for overviews of the latter. 
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global autonomy is one of those values for which local autonomy or personal 
liberty can be sacrificed” (2006, p120) strongly implies it. 
This, I think, is about the limit of what we can say about the third requirement 
without getting into the nitty-gritty of what sort of things actually are or are not 
consistent with autonomy. Although there will obviously be some proposals that 
are obviously conceptually incompatible with maximal equal autonomy – fascist 
directives, racist or sexist proposals, etc. – it seems likely that many or most 
disputes about whether or not a given policy will actually be consistent with 
autonomy will be resolved on the basis of empirical and contingent factors. That 
is, whether a proposal like “everyone should spend an hour a week x-ing” is 
actually consistent with autonomy will be dependent not only on what x is, but 
on the context the proposal is made in and the penalties (if any) for non-
compliance. If x is something like “planting potatoes”, it might be consistent 
with autonomy in a society short on food, or indeed a society which preferred 
localised food production where possible. But it could equally be inconsistent if 
the punishment for disobedience was death, or if many members of the society 
lived in places where growing potatoes was impossible: since, in the latter case, 
it would effectively be an injunction to do something which limited folks’ self-
direction in a way which – as it happens – instantiated and promoted no 
autonomy-constituting relations, and hence would not be consistent with 
maximal equal autonomy. The question of what broad sorts of substantive 
policies are likely to meet this third requirement is one that I return to in the 
next chapter. 
 
3. Some Competing Conceptions 
We now have the desiderata which a concept of authority must possess in order 
to play the role required of it. Before putting forward my account in the next 
chapter, considering other apparently promising conceptions of political 
authority will allow us to make headway on what is required for an account to 
fulfil the three requirements for a concept of authority. 
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In this section I examine and criticise two particular conceptions of political 
authority: Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis (NJT hereafter) and Klosko’s 
argument for political obligation rooted in fairness. Neither account, I argue, 
can satisfy all three conditions for a political authority’s being legitimate, 
although both contain useful and broadly plausible claims about authority. In 
particular, Raz’s notion of dependence – that the reasons we have to obey an 
authority should be in some way dependent on reasons we are already 
committed to taking as reasons for action – and Klosko’s argument from fairness 
both speak to the autonomy-promoting function of authority that I have argued 
for thus far. 
3.1 Raz and the NJT 
One immediately helpful aspect of Raz’s account is that he adopts a “normative-
explanatory account of the core notion of authority” (op. cit., p65) which is 
roughly the same as what I have called the functional analysis: he takes the 
concept of authority to be one which we shape and deploy for a particular 
purpose and in particular contexts, rather than having an antecedent and fixed 
meaning which we access through careful conceptual analysis.  
The first step of Raz’s argument involves identifying a crucial feature of 
authority: if we take a putative authority’s command as merely advice or 
suggestion, then the command is not authoritative. If institution A really is 
authoritative, then their telling me to do or not do something is a reason to act 
(refrain from acting) that simply over-rides any judgements I might make about 
the action. In Raz’s terminology, legitimate authorities give us pre-emptory or 
exclusionary reasons, reasons which should stop our reflection about whether or 
not to act at the point where the authority issues its command. An institutional 
command “is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what 
to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them” (p46). 
If authoritative commands are – as they plausibly seem to be – pre-emptive in 
this sense, and if Raz can show how such commands can come to exist, then we 
have two out of three features required by the concept of authority. A reason 
that replaces or over-rides other reasons for action, and does so specifically 
because it is provided by (or perhaps is constituted by) an authoritative 
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command, is clearly an institutionally-generated reason. Not only would the 
reason not exist absent the institution, but the reasons that should motivate us 
to act would be entirely different absent the institution.15 Equally clearly, a 
directive that pre-empts other reasons is at least of the form of a morally-
binding obligation. The mere fact of some reason for action being exclusionary 
does not automatically make it a moral obligation. Consider the authority of a 
referee in sport: we shouldn’t retreat ten yards for a free-kick iff we think the 
referee’s decision is correct, but neither would we think that under normal 
circumstances disobeying the ref was a moral failure. Nonetheless, it does seem 
that if we take there to be some underlying moral reason to act in accordance 
with the institution’s directives then we must also take the exclusionary reasons 
it provides to have moral force. 
Leaving aside for a moment the question of consistency with autonomy, the task 
for Raz would thus be to give us an argument to think that political authorities 
can provide exclusionary reasons of this kind. To do this, he offers two theses: 
the Dependence Thesis and the NJT. Since the latter is reliant on the former, I 
will deal with the Dependence Thesis first. 
The Dependence Thesis, as described by Raz, claims that:  
All authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already 
independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their 
action in the circumstances covered by the directive (p47) 
In other words, an authority cannot just drop out of the firmament and start 
ordering me about because I happen to fall within its claimed territory; I have 
reason to obey the authority (or the institution is genuinely authoritative) only if 
I am already committed to some principle or course of action which the 
authority and its directives are concerned with. To give an example, directives 
about which side of the road we drive on may be authoritative because they are 
based on reasons – ease of transport, public safety, etc. – which already apply to 
                                                          
15 To be clear: if an institution says “Don’t murder” authoritatively, then it isn’t the case that 
my previous reasons not to murder just cease to exist; rather, I never get to the stage where 
it is appropriate to reflect on them. It is in this sense that I take Raz’s account to mean that 
the reasons that should motivate us are different under the institution, a sense supported by 
his comment that “the difference is not in the presence of an additional reason for action, 
but in the existence of a pre-emptive reason” (op. cit., p60). 
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us or, in my terminology, because we are committed to a safe society (for 
example). Given that these reasons already apply to me, and given that 
conventions about road usage are obviously relevant to public safety 
considerations, a directive which says “drive on the left” satisfies the 
Dependence Thesis. 
The Dependence Thesis goes some way to explaining why, for example, some 
church’s imagined claim “parking on double-yellow lines displeases God” seems 
to fail at being an authoritative directive. Firstly, there is no independent reason 
for me to care about what pleases or displeases god; secondly (and relatedly), 
whether or not something pleases god is not relevant to my deciding whether or 
not I should risk parking on double-yellows. The directive gives me no action-
guiding principle because it is not based on any reasons that apply to me. Note 
that, if we were to assume that pleasing god was a reason which independently 
applied to us – in the same way that moral reasons are taken to – then the 
Dependence Thesis would suggest that such a directive could be authoritative.  
It is worth being clear that the Dependence Thesis gives us a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for authority. We can easily imagine a situation where 
somebody gives me relevant advice or suggestions without this constituting an 
authoritative command. If my friend tells me that such-and-such chocolate bar is 
produced by a more than usually evil company (and thus I shouldn’t buy it) as I 
consider my options in the newsagent, then they are offering me a relevant 
consideration on the basis of reasons that I am committed to, in this case 
reasons involving not supporting especially obnoxious businesses. But this 
manifestly does not put my friend in the position of being a political authority 
over me. If they have any authority, it is the moral authority attached to making 
correct moral claims, but we have already established that such authority is not 
the point of contention here.  
Rather, if a putative authority issues a directive based on reasons that don’t 
apply to the relevant agents, and/or if the directive includes no relevant action-
guiding imperatives, then we can disregard it even if the authority is set up in 
such a fashion as to generally provide appropriate directives. 
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Two worries arise here, the first exegetical and the second conceptual. The 
exegetical worry is that I have simply misrepresented Raz: he explicitly denies 
that authorities have to get it right on every occasion, that “authoritative 
determinations are binding only if they correctly reflect the reasons on which 
they depend” (p48). How can this be squared with my claim above about when 
we can write off directives as non-authoritative? 
Curiously, explaining the exegetical worry goes some way to addressing the 
conceptual worry, which is about how we can know when authorities fail to issue 
authoritative directives and how our exercise of such knowledge coheres with 
the Pre-emption Thesis. Although Raz indeed denies that an authority’s being 
mistaken necessarily makes it illegitimate, he argues that some kinds of 
mistakes have just this effect. This invites the conceptual worry, which he puts 
in the following way: “[if] the directives [of a putative authority] are binding 
only if they do not deviate much from right reason and as we should act on them 
only if they are binding, we always have to go back to fundamentals” (pp61-62). 
In short, if we cannot know whether or not an institution has made a mistake of 
the sort that justifies disobedience without considering the issue on its own 
merits, then the Pre-emption Thesis no longer applies, and authorities cannot 
play the role that we want them to. 
Raz’s response is to attempt to draw a distinction between “great” and “clear” 
mistakes, with the parallel of bungling a long process of addition. In the first 
instance, we might be out by many thousands without the mistake being 
detectable except by painstaking recalculation – a great, but by hypothesis, not 
clear mistake. A clear mistake, conversely, would be something like an answer 
which included a decimal point despite only integers being added: anyone with 
basic mathematical competence would instantly see that something was wrong 
without having to run the whole calculation. We can, Raz implies (ibid), only 
challenge authoritative directives when they have made a clear mistake, and 
unless we think that the majority of mistakes are clear (or that it is difficult to 
distinguish between a clear and great mistake) then we need not worry that the 
Pre-emption Thesis is ineffectual in practical terms.  
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We may or may not think that this is a satisfactory distinction, and even if it is 
we’ll need a fairly detailed picture of what a clear mistake would be for the 
autonomy-promoting authority that my thesis seeks to define; but that is a 
matter for the next subsection. 
So far, then, we have established two of Raz’s key theses. The Pre-emption 
Thesis says that legitimate authorities give us pre-emptory (or exclusionary) 
reasons for action, reasons which supersede our normal processes of evaluating 
what to do in particular situations. The Dependence Thesis stipulates that these 
exclusionary reasons must ultimately be taken to apply to agents because they 
are based on independent reasons which already apply to those agents – that is, 
authoritative directives should be dependent on principles (values, 
reasons/reasons for action, etc.) which are relevant to me, and should provide 
action-guiding advice consistent with my following those principles in this 
situation. 
Taken together (although it should be noted that this is not how Raz’s dialectic 
proceeds), the Dependence and Pre-emption Theses suggest a more general 
claim about authority, the well-known Normal Justification Thesis. This states 
that, to quote: 
the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with 
reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if 
he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding 
and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which 
apply to him directly (p54) 
The NJT implies both the Dependence and Pre-emption Theses, although only 
weakly in the latter case. If it is in general true that authorities can only 
demand that I act for (authority-independent) reasons which already apply to me, 
and there are plausible motivations for thinking that some of these reasons are 
best served by my not analysing each putatively authoritative directive, then we 
can (as Raz does) extend this claim to the stronger pre-emption claim that if I 
am committed to some value, then being told what to do by some body which 
reliably serves that value should simply shortcut my usual evaluations. Again, a 
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football analogy might help: if I am a centre-back committed to helping my team 
win, and my goalkeeper is generally better-placed to arrange the central 
defenders in a way likely to prevent the opposition scoring, then the goalie’s 
shouting at me to mark so-and-so or cover such-and-such part of the box should 
be enough to make me mark or cover the relevant targets. I act in some sense 
inconsistently with my stated commitments if I deliberate on the goalie’s 
command rather than following it; so too, says the Pre-emption Thesis, with 
legitimate political authority.  
So much for exegesis. To put this in terms of how the NJT matches up to my 
proposed desiderata for political authority, the three questions to ask of it are: 
1. Does it explain how institutional directives are (or may be) morally 
binding? 
2. Does it explain how these directives get their bindingness from the 
institution itself (rather than being independently binding directives that 
the institution simply parrots)? 
3. Is it consistent with the relational conception of autonomy that I have 
defended earlier in the thesis?  
In the next subsection, I argue that the answers are, respectively, yes, yes, and 
no. 
3.2 The NJT and the Three Desiderata 
We have already seen that authorities which are legitimate according to the NJT 
should be able to answer the first two questions above in the affirmative: the 
directives of legitimate authorities are morally binding insofar as they command 
on the ultimate basis of (normative) reasons which we ourselves are or should be 
motivated by. For example: Institution A, a traffic management committee, tells 
me not to park on double-yellow lines, and if I have good reasons to believe that 
institution’s directives generally promote or defend autonomy-constituting 
relations then I am morally bound to obey. 
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The requirement that this obligation be dependent on the institution (rather 
than the institution happening to issue orders which run parallel to independent 
moral requirements) is also met by an authority which satisfies the legitimacy 
conditions of the NJT. In addition to the thought that directives of convention 
definitely do take their particular form from the institution, the reason that we 
have to obey an institution is not solely reducible to (though it is ultimately 
dependent on) the reasons to promote autonomy that we already have. There 
will be background requirements of constitution, process and the like which 
mean that we have not just directives the form of which are institution 
dependent, but directives which would not, even if identical in form, be 
authoritative when issued by another institution. That is to say, even if 
Institution B (a religious body to be contrasted with A) issues a command which 
as it happens would be the best way to promote autonomy, it is not an 
authoritative directive; in Razian terms, we have no reason to think that our 
reasons are best served by obeying B, nor should we take B’s pronouncements to 
pre-empt our own evaluation of the matter. 
So far, so good – the ways in which institutions can promote autonomy, or how 
we come to have reasons to believe that they do, will have to be cashed out and 
are likely to be very different from the Razian statist view, but as a conception 
of authority which is consistent with the demands of the functional analysis the 
NJT seems promising. 
However, the question of whether the proposed conception of authority can 
accommodate (or be accommodated by) my account of autonomy prevents us 
from simply adopting the NJT wholesale and giving it an anarchist hat, for it 
does not seem to me that maximal equal autonomy is consistent with the really 
very rigid and hierarchical implications of the Pre-emption Thesis as Raz gives it. 
On the Razian model, it seems as if the only instance of ‘clear’ mistakes – those 
mistakes which do allow us to reflect on and reject the purported authority of 
an institutional directive – are those which he terms jurisdictional mistakes (p62). 
That is, it’s only when the authority tries to direct our behaviour in a realm over 
which it has no proper remit that we can reject the command on the basis of our 
own judgement (or, indeed, apply ourselves to any serious scrutiny of the 
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command in the first place). Leaving aside for a moment the question of 
whether it is really as clear and easy to detect jurisdictional mistakes as Raz 
suggests, the thesis carries the implication that our own reasons would be best 
served by following the directives of an institution which consistently failed – 
indeed, failed greatly – to reflect them, just so long as that institution refrained 
from making any jurisdictional mistakes. 
Recall that for an agent to be autonomous, on my conception, it is necessary 
(although not sufficient) for her to be non-dominated; which is to say that she 
must stand in relations such that any arbitrary or unjust attempt to interfere 
with how her life goes will be defended against, and that this defence must be 
grounded in recognition respect of her as an agent. One of the features of 
recognition respect is at least prima facie willingness to grant that the agent is 
an appropriate source of values and can make moral judgements. We may, of 
course, over-rule the agent if they are acting immorally, and perhaps in certain 
circumstances if they are acting unknowingly against their own interests, but the 
presumption of agential primacy is a fairly strong one. In short, we tend to think 
that the only time it is permissible to interfere with or coerce the agent is when 
they are acting inconsistently with the equal autonomy of others. 
This on its own is not an obvious defeater of the NJT. If we take the plausible 
stipulation that following an NJT-legitimated authority would tend to promote 
maximal equal autonomy, then someone’s rejecting an institutional directive 
would be grounds for some measure of interference, so (at the risk of repeating 
myself) having one’s self-direction restricted is not necessarily inconsistent with 
autonomy.  
The problem is instead that having one’s self-direction interfered with, or 
standing in relations such that it may be interfered with, by an authority acting 
on neither moral nor ‘dependent’ reasons (that is, in pursuit of reasons which 
apply to the agent) looks very much like being dominated. Indeed, on Raz’s view 
even to try and evaluate some directive from an NJT-legitimated authority, let 
alone reject it, under one’s own steam is to fail in a duty of obedience. Let us 
take an example where we specify  “the factors about which the authority was 
wrong, and which are not jurisdictional factors” (p62), and where the Pre-
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emption Thesis would tell us that we are nonetheless obliged to obey without 
engaging in evaluation.  
The case is one where the authority is, on the whole, generally reliable as an 
autonomy-promoting institution; by and large, we are likely to better comply 
with reasons which apply to us by complying with the directives of the 
institution. In this instance, however, the institution issues a greatly mistaken 
directive that says some proportion of public land must be turned over to 
growing quinoa (instead of what it was growing before). The reasoning is that 
quinoa will be more effective at feeding the citizens of this region than the 
alternative, thus freeing up labour time for other tasks or for relaxation – and so, 
the thought goes, promoting a state of affairs which is likely to bring about 
greater equal autonomy. Let us add, also, that the institution is either wholly 
concerned with co-ordinating regional crop rotation, or that this sort of thing 
properly falls under its aegis. 
The reasoning is plausible (we stipulate), but as it happens wrong: replacing the 
current crop with quinoa would be far less efficient, resulting either in extra 
work or, in the worst case, widespread food shortages. Although the reasoning is 
wrong, it is not wrong in any immediately clear way – there is no stage of the 
calculations where the committee have thrown in “number of days since my 
birthday” or anything similarly arbitrary as a variable – and, as we have specified, 
the committee makes no jurisdictional mistake. In Razian terms, it is a great but 
not a clear error, and so it seems that we are obliged to obey the directive. Even 
those rascals who do apply their own judgement, and realise that the 
calculations are disastrously wrong, are under the same obligation.  
But look at the structure of what is happening here: even though the agent who 
refuses to farm quinoa is not doing anything contrary to maximal equal 
autonomy, and even though they have good (indeed, correct) reasons to justify 
or account for their behaviour, the Razian model suggests that they be coerced 
in the name of autonomy. There is no appeal to one’s own reasons; the agent 
cannot cop to a prima facie breach of duty but point out that their actions are 
ultimately justified, because they are not supposed to judge for themselves 
(“clear” mistakes aside) when the prima facie obligation ceases to hold. In other 
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words, the explanation for their behaviour, if they were to follow the directive, 
would have no room for their own reasons – they stand in relations such that 
their lives can be interfered with without reference to the agent’s values. Again, 
this looks like domination, and that means that the Pre-emption Thesis fails the 
requirement that conceptions of authority be consistent with the foregoing 
account of autonomy. 
There is an obvious Razian objection to field here before moving to suggest a 
weaker variant of the Pre-emption Thesis. The objection runs as follows: to 
claim that coercing the dissident farmer in the quinoa case is not defensible by 
reference to autonomy is to beg the question against the NJT, or at the very 
least to overlook a crucial fact about it. Raz is clear that the reason we are 
obliged to obey even those directives which are greatly mistaken is because 
without the Pre-emption Thesis, no institution can perform the co-ordinating 
role required to fulfil part or all of its function.16 Thus, the motivation behind 
over-ruling the recalcitrant pastoralist is an autonomy-minded one – if everyone 
adopts an attitude of non-compliance towards directives they disagree with, the 
institution will be ineffective in its goal of promoting and defending maximal 
equal autonomy – and, consequently, one that is based in the agent’s own 
reasons. 
It would be disingenuous to suggest that the problem here is the possibility of 
being over-ruled against one’s firmly-held (in good faith, after rational 
reflection, and so on) principles. As I have made clear elsewhere in the thesis, 
my account will forbid the earnest, authentic right-libertarian’s attempt to 
remove themselves from collective obligations, and will even do so on the basis 
that what they think about autonomy is substantively incorrect. My objection to 
Raz cannot, therefore, be an anti-perfectionist one. Equally, the Razian thought 
that an authority which has no pre-emptive force is no authority whatsoever 
seems largely correct – so I cannot object to the mere over-ruling either. 
                                                          
16 I have argued that resolving ‘mere’ co-ordination problems is not the only purpose of 
authorities, but it will be simplest if we take co-ordination to be the sole desideratum for the 
sake of this example. We might in any case think that sometimes the resolution of co-
ordination problems will be (as it happens) the sole requirement for some policy’s having an 
autonomy-promoting impact. 
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Rather, the problem is that the Pre-emption Thesis as given reduces the 
justification for political obligation down to one we might be given by a 
particularly unimaginative parent; we ought to obey the law because it’s the law, 
and we ought to obey a putatively authoritative institution because it’s a 
putatively authoritative institution. Just as “because it’s the law” is a directive 
which, insofar as it has any power whatsoever, is reduced to empty 
authoritarianism the moment that law obliges us to do something immoral (or 
refrain from acting morally), the notion that we should obey an institution 
because of autonomy, even when the institution is knowably acting in a fashion 
which is hostile to autonomy, renders the whole business of searching for 
plausible justification moot.17 To draw the point out, the quinoa example 
provides at least two reasons to think that the Pre-emption Thesis as given won’t 
work for my purposes.  
First, the agent’s values involve (by hypothesis) the authority actually serving 
the goal of maximal equal autonomy, and when the institution fails to do this, it 
fails to reflect the agent’s reasons. In other words, it is not enough for the 
institution to follow the right kinds of procedures; it must also reach the right 
outcome in order to be authoritative. Admittedly, in many cases, following the 
correct procedures will give the right outcome - for example, if we ask the 
appropriate people about how best to use some patch of land for recreation, 
record their responses accurately, and act in accordance with those responses, 
that strikes me as the outcome likely to produce maximal equal autonomy. But 
this is not the case in the example under consideration, and it is also not the 
case here that compliance will end up being more autonomy-conducive than 
non-compliance.  
Second, the problem is not just that the authority gets the wrong outcome; 
indeed, the more pressing issue is to do with the relationship between agent and 
                                                          
17 Someone sympathetic to Raz might respond, as Ben Colburn has suggested in discussion, by 
modifying the boundaries of what it is to be a clear mistake so that any policy incompatible 
with maximal equal autonomy is guilty of making a clear mistake (just as a jurisdictionally-
illegitimate policy would be). This response would certainly enable them to evade my charge 
as given above, but does not make the NJT overall more appealing for my purposes; since, as 
I have suggested, our right to disobey cannot be limited solely to instances of clear mistakes. 
If an authority makes a great mistake, we should be able to challenge it on the basis that it is 
no longer serving the goal of maximal equal autonomy, not just on the basis that it is clearly 
no longer serving that goal.  
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authority on Raz’s model. We have stipulated that the institution is wrong, and 
that the agent knows they are wrong – in other words, that the authority is not 
best serving autonomy by its directive. But this is not, for Raz, enough to justify 
the agent’s refusing to comply, or to undermine the institution’s authority. This 
means that not only does the authority fail to reflect our values with regards to 
the specific quinoa directive, it also fails to reflect our values with regards to 
how authorities should be directed – it gets the wrong result and we cannot (or 
ought not) challenge its decision. The institution interferes with our lives in a 
way that does not serve our values, and we’re required to obey it anyway; this 
looks to me exactly like domination.  
We’d be as well, if we buy the Pre-emption Thesis as-is, taking a Hobbesian line 
that any political authority is an improvement (autonomy-wise) over a world 
without authority; it would at least have the virtue of honesty. 
Even if we think that such a line is correct, it is clearly inconsistent with the 
anarchist motivations of my thesis. I have already indicated that one fail-state 
for the thesis would be the conclusion that a Nozickian or Stirnerian 
individualism is entailed by philosophical anarchism; my ship is sunk if it 
transpires that a rejection of state authority must also involve an appeal to the 
primacy of individual autarchy and hence that there can be no legitimate 
political obligations which we have not explicitly consented to. But the 
conclusion that we ought to obey institutions (and that institutions may 
legitimately coerce us) regardless of considerations of autonomy is surely 
another equally unappealing fail-state. It’s difficult to imagine a more 
comprehensive betrayal of the anarchist intuition than the one which leads to 
“my committee, right or wrong”, and an account of authority which forbids us 
from critically examining the directives of a putative authority looks prone to 
embracing exactly this kind of dogmatism. 
This doesn’t, though, exhaust the Razian’s options in responding to my criticism. 
In the same way as the previous objection suggested that I had overlooked the 
authority’s purpose – that, in effect, I was assuming that it was coercing people 
just for the sheer hell of it and then charging it with unjustified coercion when it 
was in fact engaging in coercion in order to promote autonomy – this objection 
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would accuse me of mischaracterising our relationship with the putatively 
authoritative institution. I have already characterised the institution as one 
which has previously been fairly reliable (and known to be reliable) in terms of 
introducing autonomy-promoting policies, and Raz has already claimed that 
“trust in the authority is trust that the authority is likely to discharge its duties 
properly” (p55). In light of this, we must surely then think that there are reasons 
to trust the authority. It is not as if this institution suddenly appears, delivers a 
(mistaken) demand about farming and then expects obedience. We have, by 
stipulation, lots of historical reasons to think that following this institution’s 
policies is in general good for maximal equal autonomy. In other words, the 
interlocutor can object, we have a vast array of reasons to obey the putative 
authority, even if we know that on this occasion its policy is incorrect, and talk 
of “obeying the law because it’s the law” is (albeit not quite incorrect) by no 
means the whole picture. We ought to obey this law because it has been laid 
down by this institution, and said institution is on the whole an autonomy-
promoter: it may, indeed, be non-ideal, but it’s not a blind-faith commitment. 
There is something to this, but it will not do the job that the critic wants. If I 
have good reasons to trust an authority, and no (or weak) reasons to doubt it in 
this particular case, then it does seem as if I ought to obey a policy even if I am 
sceptical of it. But in the quinoa case, to re-flog the horse, we have an 
indefeasible reason to think that the institution will not discharge its duties 
properly – namely, that we know for a fact that its policy is mistaken and will 
not have the effect of promoting autonomy – and so the benefit of the doubt 
that the institution has accrued over the years simply doesn’t come into play. If I 
correctly inform you ninety-nine times that a bay window is open and you can 
run through unimpeded, then you have good reasons to take it on trust when I 
tell you the same thing on the hundredth occasion. But those reasons are 
defeasible: if you can see your reflection as you approach what I assert is empty 
space, then you’d have to be a blessed innocent or a bloody fool to keep running, 
and this is ultimately what the Razian version of the Pre-emption Thesis seems 
to me to demand.18 
                                                          
18 It will do no good to claim that we should still obey the policy because (say) widespread 
dissent will undermine the institution: if the institution is generally on the ball, then the 
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This, of course, leaves me with the task of explaining how pre-emption ‘fits in’; 
a task which must largely be left until the next subsection. We can, however, 
note at this point that something like the Pre-emption Thesis seems to work as a 
constraint on baseless or bad faith rejections: that is, unless an agent can give 
some plausible account of why they take a putatively authoritative directive to 
be wrong, they must take themselves to be pre-empted. Intuitively, there is a 
difference between “I think your command is mistaken because x” and “I don’t 
wanna!”, and it seems that, at the very least, the latter rejection fails to give 
any meaningful reason for rejecting authoritative pre-emption. If we cannot give 
some account of why rejecting a particular directive seems likely to result in our 
better complying with our own reasons then it is difficult to see what reason we 
have for disobeying the directive.  
3.3 Authority and Obligations from Fairness 
I have argued in the previous subsection that the NJT cannot play the role 
required of political authority because the Pre-emption Thesis is incompatible 
with the relational view of autonomy (and so the NJT is inconsistent with an 
autonomy-motivated conception of authority). Ultimately, the Pre-emption 
Thesis tells us that we should obey putatively authoritative institutions just 
because of their putative authority, even if we have excellent reasons to think 
that their authority is absent or critically undermined in some cases. Although, 
as suggested, the Pre-emption Thesis might account for why we dismiss bad-faith 
refusals of institutional directives – if you have no reason to think the authority 
is wrong, it’s not clear why you should take it to be wrong – it does not give a 
motivation for why we should obey such institutions. That is, while we can point 
out that mere suspicion or disinclination is a bad objection to some directive, we 
cannot motivate the recalcitrant agent by appealing to autonomy. By stipulation, 
after all, they’re not convinced that the directive can be justified in such a 
fashion, and it’s both easy and plausible to imagine a less apparently-truculent 
sceptic than the baseless foot-stamper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
occasional spate of justified refusal ought not to destroy it, and if it’s persistently making 
mistakes then – as suggested in responding to the previous objection – suggesting that we 
ought not to undermine it doesn’t seem attractive unless we want to call the game a bogey 
and join Hobbes in his bunker. 
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Take some directive which will impose a noticeable, albeit mild, burden on all 
members of the community, and which has met whatever procedural standards 
are required of it. There would likely still be those who are unconvinced: 
perhaps there has been a high-profile mistake recently, or there is a great deal 
of division in public opinion about whether the directive is truly optimal, such 
that our hypothetical agent can be described as blamelessly ignorant or 
indecisive. In such cases, we might want to appeal to a principle which demands 
compliance because, recalling Antony and Hanrahan’s “Gigli problem”, some 
decision has to be made and non-compliance with the decision will result in the 
decision being effectively unmade. A return to the initial deadlock would thus 
loom, and the benefits of an authoritative institution would be lost (at least in 
this case). When everyone else has, or a majority of others have, willingly 
accepted the burden in order to maintain this public good, it seems unjust that a 
resistant minority, even a sincere one, can reject the obligation. We would, in 
other words, be arguing for obligation not on the basis of asserted authority, but 
on grounds of fairness.  
There is of course a tradition of liberal political philosophers making arguments 
from fairness or fair play, perhaps most importantly Hart (1955), Klosko (1987, 
1994) and, although he does not think that principles of fairness alone can 
generate political obligations, Rawls (1964, 1971). In this subsection, I focus 
mainly on Klosko’s development of the principle.19 
First, “suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social 
cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only be obtained if everyone, 
or nearly everyone, cooperates” (Rawls 1964, p9). The principle of fairness in 
such a scheme is characterised by Klosko’s claim that for some agent A, “if 
others are willing to co-operate and the benefits in question are provided, A is 
also obligated to co-operate” (1987, p354). This seems intuitively plausible: I 
ought not to sit about while others pick apples and then gorge myself on the 
results, to give a very basic example.  
An immediately obvious worry affects this formulation, however. If I have no 
desire to eat apples, or at least no desire strong enough to motivate me to 
                                                          
19 For a useful overview of Hart’s and Rawls’ arguments from fairness, see Simmons (1979). 
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action, then it’s not obvious why I should take part in the tree-climbing, even if I 
consequently eat an apple (and thus receive the benefits). I would, after all, 
have been just as happy without the apple; it is not that I’ve waited to pounce 
and begone with my ill-gotten fruity gains, but that I am so minimally interested 
in eating apples that I will only pursue the goal if it involves next to no effort. 
This is not something that we generally regard as untoward behaviour in 
everyday life: variations on “if you’re going to the shop, I’ll have an X, but I 
can’t be bothered getting one myself” are both common and unobjectionable, so 
it can’t simply be that receipt of benefits simpliciter makes one obligated under 
a principle of fairness (I do not engage with arguments about receipt versus 
acceptance of benefits here, for reasons explained at the end of this subsection). 
We might, incidentally, think that a similar worry applies to the dinner club 
example I sketched earlier in the chapter: imagine that, instead of being a 
member of the club, I am the partner or friend of a member, and consistently 
get delicious leftovers. Clearly I have benefited, but this can’t mean that I’m 
under any obligation to cook or give anyone money, and when we consider that 
(unlike the dinner club) political communities are very often not the kind of 
thing one can simply opt out of, the worry that the principle as given obligates 
too many people only intensifies. 
For precisely this reason – and indeed, in the context of considering precisely 
this kind of example – Klosko distinguishes between excludable and non-
excludable goods. As we might guess, it is possible or straightforward to provide 
the former to some and not others, and either impossible or deeply inconvenient 
(or difficult, expensive, and so on) to provide the latter to some but not others. 
The goods of the diner’s club are fairly clearly excludable goods: if I am not a 
member of the club then, absent the kind of partner/friend links mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, I will not receive the goods. Co-operation in the pursuit 
of excludable goods gives us a pretty simple principle of fairness; if I join a 
group with the aim of pursuing some excludable good, then I ought to share the 
burdens or be excluded from the good. As Klosko puts it, “in cases of this sort 
individuals incur obligations only when they actively seek to attain benefits 
provided by co-operative schemes” (ibid.). This characterisation explains both 
why I ought to do my share if I am actively seeking benefits, and why being a 
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lucky bystander – getting the surplus apples, or leftover meals – does not make 
me obligated in such a way. 
Public goods, Klosko argues persuasively, are non-excludable goods: we cannot 
provide, say, reasonably clean air to citizens A-Y, but withhold it from Z (who 
lives in the same community). Equally importantly, public goods require that a 
great many people co-operate effectively in order to exist in accessible form at 
all. Clean air, extensive public transport, and free healthcare all require a fairly 
high degree of co-ordination and co-operation in order to be made available, 
and it is also noticeable that trying to exclude people from the last two results 
in their immediately becoming more difficult to access for anyone. Imagine that 
there was a surcharge for non-citizen users of healthcare; we would then have 
to institute systems of identification, rules about residency, and so on and so 
forth. The principle of fairness, then, requires us to participate in (for example) 
co-operative labour to administer and supply public healthcare because, i) Such 
a system is dependent on universal or near-universal co-operation to function, 
and 2) Excluding non-compliers from healthcare provision would be prohibitively 
costly (broadly understood). 
This will still not do for the purposes of generating political obligation, for the 
resister still lurks off-stage. Why, they will demand, are we assuming that public 
healthcare is of benefit to them? After all, the interlocutor continues, they know 
a very fine doctor who will act as their GP at negligible cost, less than would be 
required of them by the public provision, and so they are neither motivated nor 
inclined to comply with our demand. 
Klosko’s response is to invoke presumptive (or presumptively beneficial) goods: 
goods “necessary for a minimally acceptable life” (1987, p355). Access to public 
healthcare is a very plausible instance of a presumptive good (whereas we can 
easily imagine a minimally acceptable life without private healthcare). Agents 
may thus be compelled by the principle of fairness to contribute to the upkeep 
of such a good regardless of whether they desire it.  
This may seem a little counter-intuitive at first, since it seems that fairness 
requires contributions from someone who may receive no benefits. An analogy 
may make the thought clearer and more attractive. Imagine that I have some 
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rare genetic kink which means that I can tolerate much lower temperatures than 
any other member of my community, to the point where conditions that would 
be fatal to my cohabitants merely cause me discomfort. A scheme which 
provided survival gear for everyone would thus be of no benefit to me personally, 
but according to Klosko’s characterisation of presumptive goods, the principle of 
fairness still requires that I contribute to the scheme: a minimally acceptable 
life surely requires that we don’t freeze to death (or regularly suffer frostbite, 
etc.), and goods which enable us to avoid freezing must therefore be 
presumptively beneficial even if they are as it happens not beneficial to some 
particular agent.20  
There is one other complication to be addressed before assessing whether 
Klosko’s account can do the job we want of a conception of political authority: 
the distinction between acceptance and ‘mere receipt’ of benefits. As I 
suggested above, there are well-known arguments to the effect that the latter 
cannot generate political obligation; and that the former amounts to an 
obligation from consent rather than fairness. I argue that given Klosko’s notion 
of presumptive goods, we can (as he, in fact, does) sidestep questions of 
acceptance versus benefit. Although this move may produce a problem for 
Klosko, it need not trouble my account (for reasons which become apparent in 
section 3.4). 
This argument can be traced to a famous example from Nozick (1974). As Nozick 
gives it (p93), the citizens of your community use a PA system for telling jokes 
and stories, singing songs, and so forth, rather like a particularly local radio 
station. There is a rota which assigns each person a day when they are in charge 
of the PA; when it comes to your assigned day, the question is whether your 
having enjoyed the jokes and songs (for you have) means that you are now 
obliged to take over and begin spinning tales for the community. Nozick, not 
implausibly, argues that you cannot be; your mere receipt of the benefits is not 
enough to generate an obligation for you to discharge. If you have agreed to 
                                                          
20 The analogy also seems to work well as a parallel for the actual motivation behind progressive 
and redistributive taxation – a giant mansion is not part of a minimally acceptable life, but 
some secure home is, and so possession of the former does not exclude us from fairness-based 
obligations to pay some (arbitrarily restricted) tax which funds public-sector housing. 
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take part in the scheme, then you plausibly are obliged – but only because you 
have consented, and not because of fairness. 
As Simmons (1979) and Klosko (1987) both argued, however, much of the force 
of Nozick’s argument rests on the nature of the goods provided. Simmons 
provides a different example, and one which seems to foreshadow Klosko’s 
account of presumptive goods. Instead of a PA system, Simmons suggests, 
imagine a well which must be dug because the community’s water supply has 
become irrevocably tainted (op. cit., pp325-326). Jones votes against the public 
provision and maintenance of this well, and refuses to take part in its upkeep – 
he does, however, surreptitiously draw water from it. Simmons’ point is that he 
has thereby accepted benefits and generated, contra Nozick, an obligation from 
fairness and not consent, but we can make a different observation. Clean water 
is a plausible public good, and Jones is thus obliged on grounds of fair play, not 
consent, regardless of whether or not he actually does draw water from the well 
(perhaps he could get clean bottled water shipped in, or something of that kind). 
Simmons later argues against Klosko’s principle being fairness-based because of 
this, but that can be left for the next subsection: for my purposes, the point is 
that where presumptive goods are concerned, we need not worry overmuch 
about whether we accept or merely receive those goods. 
3.4 The Principle of Fairness and the Three Desiderata 
Although Klosko’s argument for a principle of fairness as given in the previous 
subsection is strictly concerned with political obligation of a certain sort – 
specifically, obligations to contribute to institutions – it is not difficult to widen 
the scope of the obligation.21 If it is unfair to refrain from an action which would 
contribute to public goods then absent some counter-argument it must also be 
unfair to not refrain from an action which would be damaging to public goods. 
While political obligation resulting from principles of fairness is most easily 
understood as implying some claim like “it would be unfair not to contribute to 
this scheme, and so there will be some rule enforcing contribution on members”, 
there is no reason not to understand it as also entailing the simpler and broader 
“it would be unfair not to comply with rules which produce presumptive public 
                                                          
21 As Klosko notes (1987, p356). 
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goods”. That is, if principles of fairness require rules enforcement, then 
principles of fairness must be able to give reasons to obey those rules in the first 
place – and being able to generate reasons for obedience is exactly what we 
want political institutions to do. With that in mind, we return to the three 
questions. 
1. Does it explain how institutional directives are (or may be) morally binding?  
2. Does it explain how these directives get their bindingness from the institution 
itself (rather than being independently binding directives that the institution 
simply parrots)?  
3. Is it consistent with the relational conception of autonomy that I have 
defended earlier in the thesis?  
My contention is that an account based on principles of fairness is well-placed to 
give an affirmative answer to questions 1 and 3, but that the bindingness of 
fairness obligations need not be reliably founded in the institutions; to use a 
standard example, fairness probably requires that I obey the dictator who issues 
a directive for citizens to contribute to emergency relief, but this doesn’t make 
the dictator (or, to keep our subjects consistent, dictatorial institution) 
authoritative. This is not to claim that no institution can create fairness 
obligations: imagine a variation on the traffic rules example where we’re all 
obliged to contribute to some system of public transport that wouldn’t exist 
absent the institution. As we saw in the examination of the NJT, the obligation 
doesn’t trivially ‘belong’ to the institution just because its particular form is 
dependent on the form of the directive, but because the institution gives us 
reasons for action which didn’t exist before. My criticism of fairness obligations 
as following from institutions is rather that such obligations can be generated by 
institutions which would clearly fail to be consistent with autonomy, and those 
directives cannot therefore be thought of as binding us in virtue of the 
institution. This being so, a straightforward account of authority as the right to 
demand fulfilment of institutional fairness obligations won’t cut it. I go into this 
in more detail shortly, but it would be as well to examine the responses to each 
question in order. 
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As with the NJT, it should be fairly easy to see how fairness explains the 
bindingness of an institutional directive. If an institution tells me to do 
something, and performing that action would be required by considerations of 
fairness, then I am morally obliged to do so; more modestly and pragmatically, if 
following an institutional directive seems likely to be the fairest way to 
distribute (or create, etc.) some good, then I have very strong pro tanto reasons 
to do as the institution tells me. 
On to the second question, that of whether the obligations’ bindingness is 
explicable by reference to the institution. At first pass, it seems that fairness-
based accounts should be able to make use of something similar to the NJT here 
– the institution gives us a new reason to perform some action, such as driving on 
the left or right of the road, which we just don’t have absent the directive 
and/or the institution. The problem is something like this: when a putative NJT-
claiming institution gives us a false directive (i.e. it doesn’t better reflect our 
reasons) then, contra Raz, we don’t have any reason to obey. This gives a pretty 
tight link between the institution and the bindingness of its obligation; if the 
institution isn’t of form X, the obligation of form (or for purpose) Y, and so on, 
then we don’t have any reasons to obey the directive. A putative fairness-
claiming institution, though, can give us reasons – think traffic examples – to 
obey which didn’t exist before, without those being reasons to obey the 
institution. That is, we might well have good fairness-based reasons to obey Nazi 
speed limits, but these reasons have got nothing to do with the structure of the 
institution: it is not set up to serve justice, and any directives it issues which do 
serve justice do so merely coincidentally. Analogously, a non-autonomy-minded 
institution which issues a directive that does (as it happens) serve the goal of 
equal maximal autonomy cannot be giving a directive which gets any of its 
binding force from the nature of the institution. As with the Nazi speed limits, 
although there might are autonomy-minded reasons to obey the directive, these 
reasons are entirely separate from the way the institution is set up; the directive 
cannot bind us in virtue of that institution, and the second desideratum is unmet.  
Is this a chimerical worry? After all, the Nazi state would clearly lack authority 
by dint of failing to respect autonomy (amidst all the other reasons that it would 
lack authority), so it’s not immediately clear that the possibility of institutions 
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giving directives which we have some reason to obey and some reason to disobey 
should rule out fairness. We might thus think that the third desideratum offers a 
way out here: as stipulated, a Nazi state is inconsistent with maximal equal 
autonomy, so the directive cannot be binding in any case. But the structure of 
this should, I think, worry us. Take a micro example: some powerful figure 
comes into my office and lays down a set of rules which will, if followed, result 
in a fairer distribution of whatever goods and burdens there are to distribute in 
an office. Let’s stipulate that they have no authority in the sense we’re 
concerned with – there is no institutional or procedural reason for me to obey 
them – but they have the power to coerce us into action, such that their 
directive will be generally followed and thus be effective. We have fairness-
based reasons, one of which is directly concerned with the nature of the 
directive, to obey this tea-room tyrant, but it seems very odd to say that they 
give us binding obligations in virtue of their institutional role (or the nature of 
our institution). As Simmons observes of Klosko’s principle, such a claim “would 
ground political obligation in quite non-democratic contexts” (1987, p270). It is 
not enough that some particular directives are disbarred from binding on 
grounds of their inconsistency with autonomy if the issuing institution could still 
generate political obligation in some contexts despite being anti-democratic 
(and hostile to autonomy). We wouldn’t think that our having institutional and 
fairness-based reasons to obey Nazi speed limits gave that state any authority, 
and so simply adopting Klosko’s principle of fairness is not on the cards for our 
conception of authority. 
It is in response to the third question that fairness accounts give us the piece of 
the puzzle which is absent in the NJT. While the Razian NJT and its Pre-emption 
Thesis demand what is effectively domination (as we stand vulnerable to 
arbitrary interference), a principle of fairness cannot require that we stand in 
relations hostile to fairness. It is not a simplistic sharing of any and all burdens, 
after all, but a principle of contributing towards presumptive goods. That is to 
say, fairness cannot give us political obligations to (for example) participate in 
unjust schemes, even if our participation would lessen the deleterious effects on 
others.22 As such, no fairness-motivated account of political obligation should, as 
                                                          
22 Although there might, just about plausibly, be moral obligations of this sort, and there will 
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the NJT does, command us to obey an unjust or mistaken directive. Something 
like Klosko’s argument from the principle of fairness can avoid making 
domination a function of obligation, and on this score is therefore consistent 
with the relational account I endorse. 
But the critic will likely still feel uneasy about this. We have stipulated that 
fairness cannot require domination, so our obligation to obey is no longer wholly 
divorced from the legitimacy and/or justice of the directive; but it seems now as 
if the obligation may be divorced from what we desire or judge to be right, and 
from what might be of benefit to us. Surely this should concern an autonomy-
motivated account of authority? 
There is a parallel between this question, and the challenge to the relational 
conception from procedurally-independent desire-satisfaction theorists discussed 
in Chapter 4. The response here follows a roughly similar line. Recall that when 
the PIDS advocate argues that preventing someone from satisfying a 
procedurally-independent desire to be enslaved is an infringement of their 
autonomy, the relational theorist counters that this is simply to misunderstand 
what autonomy requires. Autonomy on the relational conception demands not 
maximal desire satisfaction, but standing in equal maximally autonomy-
constitutive relations (where autonomy is understood as having power and 
authority over one’s life). The same applies to the other aspect of slave-holding 
relations: even if the enslaved agent authentically desires their enslavement, 
and having slaves is part of another agent’s deeply-held desires, preventing the 
latter from enslaving the former does not infringe either agent’s autonomy, 
because enslaving relations are simply inconsistent with maximal equal 
autonomy. In other words, “how can I be autonomous if you won’t let me do 
what I want?” is, at least potentially, a question which relies on a mistaken 
conflation of autarchy and autonomy. Similarly, “how can it be fair to make me 
contribute to something that doesn’t benefit me (or that I disagree with)?” is 
just to misunderstand what fairness requires.  
More excitingly still, what is required for fairness on my account can be given by 
the purpose of authority (that is, to promote and defend autonomy) – the good, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
certainly be (moral and political) obligations to dismantle the offending scheme. 
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or at least one good, to be distributed is that of autonomy-constitutive relations, 
and as previously discussed such relations must include an equality condition.23 
We are committed to something like a principle of fairness insofar as we are 
committed to autonomy, and we are committed to autonomy insofar as it is a 
presumptive good.24 
Before concluding this section, it is worth considering an objection from 
Simmons against Klosko’s fairness account, and showing that it will not 
undermine the forthcoming fairness-influenced account of political authority. In 
‘The Anarchist Position’, Simmons argues that Klosko’s move from fairness to 
indispensability does not work; he claims that duties to take part in the provision 
of presumptive goods “have nothing to do with fairness [emphasis Simmons’]; 
they rest on the moral importance of the goods provided (not on considerations 
of fair distribution)” (1987, p272). When we have strong reasons to obey some 
imperative that would provide – say – satisfactory healthcare to others, these 
reasons are given by the mere fact that healthcare is a (presumptive) good. 
There would, presumably, be fairness-based reasons to distribute healthcare as 
equally as possible, but Simmons seems correct in saying that what grounds any 
obligation to obey here is indeed the presumptive nature of the good and not – 
or at least not primarily – anything to do with fairness. In other words, when I 
am coerced into taking part in a system of public healthcare, the reason that I 
have to obey (and the reason that justifies my coercion) is that healthcare is a 
presumptive good, rather than that it is only fair for me to take part. 
Recall Simmons’ example of Jones and the well. I suggested in the last 
subsection that a Klosko-type argument could avoid questions of whether Jones 
                                                          
23 Recall the discussion in Chapter 4 of the instability of unequal power relations between 
agents: such relations cannot be justified by recognition respect, and valuing one’s own self-
direction must ultimately rest on demanding recognition respect for oneself. Since we cannot 
demand recognition respect for ourselves while denying it to others, unequal relations fail to 
meet the Strong Authority Condition and so cannot constitute part of a maximally autonomous 
life. 
24 In fact, we’re probably over-committed (although not in any pejorative sense) here: 
committed to equal maximal autonomy insofar as we value our own self-direction, committed 
to maximal equal autonomy insofar as we value agency, and committed to maximal equal 
autonomy because it is a presumptive good. Notice that the first two apply even if we were 
to take a sort of sufficientarian line on autonomy as a presumptive good and deny that 
maximal and/or equal autonomy was required by fairness (although I think that such a line 
would in any case be mistaken for the kinds of reasons suggested here and in previous 
chapters), so we have a multitude of good reasons to think that a principle of fairness or 
some close relative is implied by taking relational autonomy seriously. 
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had accepted benefits or not (or whether acceptance was consent or not, and so 
on) by arguing that clean water was a presumptive good, and that Jones was 
thus obliged to contribute to the well’s maintenance regardless of whether or 
not he actually drew water from it. If Simmons’ argument here is correct then, 
albeit that Jones’ obligation does not rest on acceptance or receipt, it doesn’t 
rest on fairness either: Jones is obliged to contribute because we have a moral 
obligation to help provide others with clean water, not (or not primarily) 
because his failure to take part in the scheme would be a breach of fair play. 
This may be a problem for Klosko. Note, however, that the picture of authority 
which has begun to take shape over the last few pages need not be vulnerable to 
such an objection, because although there is (to restate the point) something 
very like a built-in fairness condition with the maximal equal autonomy 
requirement, fairness is not the initial reason-giving consideration. Rather, that 
reason is our commitment to autonomy, and as autonomy is a presumptive good, 
that is a reason we may legitimately expect to apply to everyone. Thus, instead 
of saying that considerations of fairness demand that you take part in provision 
of these presumptive goods, we say that the character of these presumptive 
goods themselves give you reason to take part in systems of provision; and that 
the equality condition of one of these goods, namely autonomy, demands a fair 
distribution of presumptive goods. No further justificatory resources are 
therefore required. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the motivation for seeking a workable notion of 
political authority is, ultimately, autonomy. Without some kind of action-guiding 
and authoritative institution, we fall squarely into the voluntarist problem and 
end up with a collection of rugged individualists who may be autarchic, but are 
not autonomous. Given this motivation, I claim that we should adopt a 
functional analysis of authority as a promoter and defender of maximal equal 
autonomy. What it is for an institution to issue an authoritative command is for it 
to give some imperative which requires collective action (or refraining from 
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action) and would increase or secure our autonomy-constituting relations. 
Three desiderata have been identified: the putative authority must be able to 
generate (morally) binding obligations, which do not stand independently of the 
institution, and the justification of and process of enforcing obligations must be 
consistent with my theory of autonomy.  I have argued further that two 
promising conceptions of political authority, Raz’s service conception according 
to the NJT, and Klosko’s account of obligations from fairness, do not meet the 
conceptual requirements given in this chapter (although each account suggests 
plausible features which our eventual conception can adopt). 
The task for the next chapter is therefore to construct a conception that 
satisfies the success conditions they imply – a task that cannot, I will argue, be 
completed by any statist authority.
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6. 
Authority (II) 
Introduction 
The previous chapter gave three desiderata for a conception of authority: that it 
be able to produce morally binding rules, as a result of the authoritative 
institution’s nature, which are consistent with maximal equal autonomy. I have 
argued that neither Raz’s NJT-motivated ‘service’ conception of authority, nor 
Klosko’s argument for authority from fairness, will quite do the job.  
In this chapter, I put forward my preferred conception of authority. After 
explaining it and showing how it meets the desiderata given in the previous 
chapter, I pursue two further tasks: defending it against the problems for 
democratic authority given in the first chapter, and providing a sketch of how 
we might actually go about meeting the success conditions that the conception 
provides. 
1. The Autonomy-Justified Conception of Authority 
In this section, I outline and defend the autonomy-justified conception of 
authority, whereby institutions can claim authority when they meet two 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions:  
1) The Dependence Condition - Authorities act or effect action in ways 
which reflect our own reasons 
 2) The Equality Condition - Authorities act or effect action in ways which 
are consistent with maximal equal autonomy.  
In essence, this account borrows the normal justification and dependence theses 
from Raz and uses fairness (most particularly Klosko’s conception of fairness 
regarding presumptive goods) as a means of explaining why an institution may 
have authority over those who either deny that such reasons apply to them or 
that the reasons are reflected by the institution, without this explanation 
needing to characterise such agents as irrational or acting in bad faith. 
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It should be made clear that while much conceptual machinery has been 
borrowed from the various arguments from fairness, it is not strictly a fairness 
principle which does the work here; or at least, not fairness as an independent 
political principle. Instead, it is the reflexive equality condition of autonomy 
described in previous chapters. As I have argued (see footnote 4, p171), if we 
value autonomy then we’re conceptually committed to valuing the autonomy of 
others. This is not a Kantian argument insofar as it need not claim that there’s 
anything incoherent about valuing one’s own self-direction but nobody else’s 
(although I would tend to think that there is, the argument need not be 
rehearsed here). Rather, it is a sort of practical rationality requirement. If we 
are prepared to tolerate or promote only the self-direction of morally 
arbitrarily-defined subsets of agents, then we stand in a set of relations which 
have no principled reasons to prevent us being given the dirty end of the stick to 
hold, and so even self-interest provides a good reason to endorse maximal equal 
autonomy. This being so, I shall refer to the equality rather than fairness 
principle from now on, in order to signal that the condition is generated 
internally by considerations of (maximal equal) autonomy, rather than being a 
separate commitment as it is in the literature on fairness. 
1.1. The Components of Autonomy-Justified Authority and the Desiderata of 
Authority 
It may be useful to restate the purpose authority is supposed to serve before 
laying out how I take the autonomy-justified conception to best meet that 
purpose. I have claimed that in order to play the role of promoting and 
defending autonomy, there are three criteria or desiderata for the putative 
authority to meet: it must be able to generate (morally) binding obligations, 
which do not stand independently of the institution, and the justification and 
enforcement of obligations must be consistent with my theory of autonomy. 
Without the ability to create obligations, the authority is either empty or non-
existent; an authority which merely re-asserts free-standing moral obligations is 
of no use in resolving the kind of blameless disputes which occur within societies; 
and it should be fairly obvious that failure to respect autonomy is a disqualifying 
offence for any institution which is supposed to promote autonomy. 
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Autonomy-justified authority, as I will argue, has the conceptual features 
required to meet all three of these desiderata. By borrowing the Dependence 
Thesis’ requirement that authorities act or aim to act on reasons which apply to 
every agent, it can create moral (or morally binding) obligations to obey: if I am 
committed to autonomy, then I have at least a prima facie obligation to co-
operate with courses of action which will tend to increase or secure autonomy. 
Given that autonomy is a presumptive good, we need not be thrown by claims of 
apathy or active hostility towards it: just as somebody’s not valuing physical 
health may be authentic, rational and perhaps even good for them without this 
making it unjustified to coerce them into contributing towards a public health 
service, somebody’s (authentically, etc.) disvaluing of autonomy does not permit 
them to act in ways which are hostile to maximal equal autonomy.1 Importantly, 
it can also pronounce authoritatively on matters that autonomy is silent on, 
presuming that such matters exist.2 We can easily allow – probably, in fact, the 
majority of theorists will want to assert – that there are other presumptive goods 
than autonomy, and so long as the institution correctly reflects our reasons for 
action regarding these goods then it can still produce binding obligations about 
them. There will, of course, remain potential problems insofar as it seems 
possible on a pluralist view (or at least one which held that some values were or 
could be exclusive) that a policy may pass the dependency test but fail the third 
requirement, for compatibility with autonomy; but this is a general problem for 
pluralism, and it would be tedious to go into detail here. 
In regards to the second desideratum, the autonomy-justified conception is 
again successful: only through the creating and sustaining of certain kinds (or 
broad groups) of institutions can certain obligations be given binding force. This 
may be in the purely conventional sense, as with injunctions to drive on the left 
or right of the road, or it may be in the sense that some obligations are only 
appropriately created or enforced by particular bodies. In general, anyone may 
coerce anyone into not murdering, but it is inappropriate for the Scottish 
Football Association to set the rate of contributions to the NHS. We might also 
                                                          
1 See the discussion of presumptive goods and fairness in the preceding chapter for detailed 
discussion of this claim. 
2 As has been alluded to previously, this is something I remain agnostic on within the thesis, but 
it would be remiss not to at least acknowledge my sole focus on autonomy and sketch how 
the theory might fit within a pluralist schema. 
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suggest a third sense of generating obligations in virtue of institutional structure, 
where neither the convention nor the obligation to find and obey some 
convention applies prior to the authority’s policy. Imagine some co-operative 
public project which is only possible through the operation of a co-ordinating 
body. This is distinct from cases of pure convention: in those cases, there are 
strong moral reasons to obey some relevant convention even before the 
convention is created (that is, we all have independent reasons, based on 
prevention of harm, to drive on one or other sides of the road, and the 
convention specifies which side that should be), whereas here both the 
convention regarding x and the need for some convention regarding x arrive at 
the same time.3 Here again, the machinery of the NJT comes in handy. If the 
authority fails to (fairly) accurately reflect the reasons of its citizens, then it 
either fails to create an obligation at all – “on Tuesdays everyone must put jam 
in their socks”, presuming that jammy socks are not a valuable component of 
autonomy – or it creates an obligation that is at best independent of the 
institution itself – “don’t murder” as an injunction of the Nazi state. The 
equality principle can be seen lurking below the surface here: if a directive laid 
out by some putative authority fails to cohere with maximal equal autonomy, 
then it can’t be dependent on the institution, because the institution’s purpose 
is maximal equal autonomy. 
Finally, the third criterion of consistency with autonomy is guaranteed by the 
principles of dependence and equality.  A policy which fails to promote or 
defend autonomy is inconsistent with the reasons held by participants within its 
scope, and the reasons we have for valuing autonomy require that we value 
maximal equal autonomy.  
It will not have escaped anybody’s notice that thus far my argument for the 
autonomy-justified conception’s plausibility has consisted largely of assertions. 
Even if this all looks good, and we are prepared to buy my account of what an 
                                                          
3 Although it’s worth noting for conscientiousness’ sake, I don’t think this potential third type 
gives us any interesting new ways for the institution to make the obligation binding: it’s 
simply that the authority has generated an obligation which is dependent on the authority for 
its existence as well as its force. In any case, I might just be mistaken here – perhaps such 
cases are merely non-obvious examples of conventions, in which case the imperative does 
straightforwardly get its force from being the relevant particular iteration of a general moral 
requirement. 
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authority should do and how the autonomy-justified conception fits that account, 
there is still the question of what substantive features this implies. There is 
unlikely to be a detailed set of unique practical implications for each 
requirement of autonomy-justified authority. It is predictable and perfectly 
reasonable, for example, that similar procedural conditions must be met in 
order for our putative authority both to act or effect action in ways which 
reflect our own reasons, and to act or effect action in ways which are consistent 
with maximal equal autonomy. It would seem odd if a putative authority could 
require, say, direct democracy in virtue of the first but not in virtue of the 
second. However, for the sake, or at least hope, of clarity, I have split the 
upcoming discussion into subsections according to the two success conditions for 
autonomy-justified authority. This practical discussion will also bear on the 
conception’s theoretical justifications insofar as the ways in which autonomy-
justified authority may successfully be claimed will help to illustrate the 
different conceptual requirements of the Dependence and Equality Conditions. 
1.2. The Dependence Condition and Its Substantive Implications 
We have stipulated, on something very like Raz’s Dependence Thesis, that an 
institution may only claim authority if it acts in a way which reflects our own 
reasons, where these reasons include intersubjective reasons to pursue public or 
presumptive goods. What I call the Dependence Condition provides a necessary 
rather than sufficient condition on being authoritative in the relevant way. After 
all, I can demand that someone acts (or refrains from acting) in virtue of 
autonomy, which they are by hypothesis committed to taking as a reason, 
without this making me a political authority. It is worth noting that the 
requirement for authorities to reflect the reasons of their participants is not 
limited to reasons that they conceptually ‘must’ have, or what I’ve followed 
Klosko in calling presumptive goods. There’s no independent motivation (let’s 
assume) for any group to prefer cheese sandwiches over ginger nuts, but if the 
group does prefer cheese sandwiches, then the institution acts illegitimately if it 
prioritises the production of ginger nuts. For an authority to be able to satisfy 
the necessary condition of the Dependence Condition, it must reflect our reasons 
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regarding both presumptive goods and non-presumptive goods.4 The immediate 
task is then to explain how an authority can go about acting in such a way. 
In fact, there are two questions buried here. First, how can we create or shape 
an institution such that it is likely to do this; second, how can the institution 
actually carry out its task? 
It will be helpful here to recall what we have already said about autonomy and 
democracy in Chapter 1; in particular, the constitutive, respect and equality 
justifications which may be used to motivate an autonomy-minded theory of 
democracy. For an authority to act consistently with valuing autonomy, then it 
must meet these justifications. If it does not act consistently with valuing 
autonomy then it fails to reflect our reasons and falls foul of the dependence 
requirement, thus becoming non-authoritative. In short, an authority’s being 
able to satisfy the three justifications is partly dependent on the procedures 
which determine its institutional composition and which determine how it makes 
and enacts policy: direct democracy is a requirement of satisfying dependence.  
Being able to take part in collective self-determination is very plausibly a 
requirement of programmatic autonomy, else we are disempowered from making 
decisions that concern us and our values. We don’t have to be “successful” on 
every occasion – again, such a stipulation would fit only with a desire-
satisfaction account of autonomy – but we must not be structurally unable to 
influence the decision. Such an inability clearly renders us less powerful over the 
direction of our lives, and also signifies that we are not seen as authoritative 
over them. This, as previously argued, means that the absolute furthest towards 
representative democracy we may go is in the selection of delegates, not 
representatives, who vote according to the previous votes of the relevant group 
                                                          
4 In many cases, as suggested later, our reasons regarding non-presumptive goods might just be 
“we have reasons not to turn to public institutions for the distribution or production of non-
presumptive goods”, and so the institution best reflects our reasons by making no policies 
regarding sandwiches or biscuits. However, I don’t think this applies in all cases – it seems 
appropriate to at least consider whether, for example, it would be legitimate to coerce 
participation in a system which distributes a variety of non-presumptive goods – and there will 
also be instances of presumptive but unspecified goods where institutions must reflect the 
actual reasons of their citizens. If we assume that playing football and swimming are both 
subtypes of a general health and/or leisure presumptive good, and can only provide one of 
the activities at a particular time, then the question of what form the presumptive good 
should take should surely be answered by reference to what the citizens in fact think. 
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(that is: Citizen’s Committee A votes to accept or reject various proposals; 
Delegate A goes off to the national assembly and votes exactly the same way). 
For a collective decision of any kind to constitute part of our self-direction, we 
must have a meaningful input in that decision. Selecting one or other charlatan 
to go and make decisions on our behalf, particularly when we have no method to 
then influence what decisions they make, does not seem like meaningful input. 
It’s worth noting that, again, a representative democracy with a strict recall 
system (where the recall is initiated by voters rather than following a top-down 
dismissal or ejection of a representative) would thus be better placed to claim 
autonomy-justified authority than a representative democracy of the British 
‘elective dictatorship’ variety. This is consistent with what has already been said 
about relational autonomy being a scalar rather than binary feature of our lives.  
The respect requirement – that we be treated as independent sources of value in 
virtue of recognition respect of our agency – seems less militantly in favour of 
direct democracy. It is not immediately obvious that we fail to regard somebody 
as an independent source of value if they select some other agent to act as their 
mouthpiece or representative. But look again. When the ability to influence 
decisions which affect our programmatic autonomy is removed from our hands, 
even if we give it up (authentically, rationally, etc.), then we are so much less 
powerful over our lives.5 It is inconsistent with our being respected as an 
independent source of value that we not have the powers appropriate to such a 
source of value; if the Right Honourable Member and myself are equally 
respected in virtue of our agency, it seems odd that there a structural inequality 
which gives that member and denies me power to effect sweeping changes to 
mine and others’ lives. 
Finally, what about the earlier stipulation that any autonomy justification for a 
particular system of government must be able to call on equality – that is, that 
we can only justify (say) democracy through autonomy if democracy produces or 
affirms the basic equality of agents? Once more, direct democracy is indicated: 
                                                          
5 A word on the authority condition here: resisting the temptation to opine, in paternalistic 
Rousseauian fashion, that people who want to give up authority over their lives aren’t to be 
trusted with that authority, we can instead say that whatever might motivate such a decision 
is largely irrelevant: whatever the reasons behind my waiving a right to (for example) decide 
what colour to paint my house, I am still no longer the authority on how my house is to look. 
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under any system of representation looser than strict delegation, the 
representative clearly has more power to effect change than do their 
representees. I do not mean that representatives are more empowered in the 
faintly trivial sense that I am more empowered to mark essays than my students 
are, but that such representatives stand in different power relations relevant to 
their programmatic autonomy: MPs, MSPs and so on are structurally able to 
effect broad social change in a way that is not true of the average citizen.6 Such 
relational imbalance does not exist in a delegate system, where the delegate’s 
doing things that have not already been approved is directly contrary to their 
political role (though again, there are comparatively better or worse options in 
between, such as locally-triggered recall elections within a representative 
democracy). Note that the equality requirement is, on its own, pretty much 
silent on whether we should make everyone as powerful as possible, or as 
powerless as possible, over each other’s lives – it’s only when we plug in a 
particular account of autonomy that we can, to call on the broader context of 
my thesis, decide whether equality demands anarchist communism or right-
libertarianism. 
The role of the Dependence Condition within autonomy-justified authority is 
twofold. By asserting that autonomy is a presumptive good, it rules out certain 
types of organising institution (and background social conditions). And by 
requiring that authoritative institutions in general reflect the reasons of their 
citizens, it demands certain types of decision-making procedure as well as 
certain kinds of background conditions: our reasons are not well-reflected by an 
oligarchy, even laying aside the presumptive good of autonomy, because an 
oligarchy is not the kind of institution which is concerned with reflecting the 
reasons of all its citizens. Neither is a putatively democratic system within a 
racist and sexist social context; the enforcement of majority racism does not 
                                                          
6 Of course, citizens can and do effect change despite this power imbalance – a thought which 
motivates the anarchist idea of direct rather than political action – but the point stands that 
it is significantly easier for a member of the political elite to make changes than it is for the 
average citizen, and that this is unjust because (in part) it suggests differing levels of 
recognition respect. Taking this to its logical conclusion, we come to the thought that 
political elites in general are unjust, which seems correct: the trick is therefore to find a 
form of social organisation which either replaces political with direct action, or makes 
political action an effectively egalitarian form of engagement. I’m inclined to think that not 
too much rests on which of these we pick, since the distinction between political and direct 
action becomes much less clear in a non-statist society. 
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serve the purpose of producing policies which will tend to reflect the reasons of 
those citizens.7 Even formal equality and a lack of overtly oppressive legislation 
does not equate to equality of the sort required for democratic procedures to 
meet the Dependence Condition: if one is a member of an oppressed group in 
such a society then one is structurally less able to influence public decisions, 
command respect in virtue of one’s agency etc., because formal or legislative 
structures are clearly not the sum or the greater part of social structures. 
However, the Dependence Condition does allow for slips or mistakes. If some 
institution really does, on the whole, produce policies which citizens would 
pursue their own reasons better by following than by disobedience, then we 
have a good justification for thinking that any given policy will be of this nature 
and obeying it. That’s true even if there have, in the past, been policies which 
failed to reflect our reasons. So long as we don’t have any grounds to think that 
a particular policy will fail to do so, then its having been produced by direct 
democratic voting under conditions of fairly strict equality should be a good 
signifier that it will not fail. 
1.3. The Equality Condition and Its Substantive Implications 
This condition stipulates that institutions may only claim authority (demand 
obedience, and so on) when they generally enact policies consistent with 
maximal equal autonomy. When they do act in such a fashion, we are obliged to 
obey because of conceptual commitments associated with valuing autonomy. 
Like the Dependence Thesis, the Equality Condition does service at both ‘ends’ 
of the authority relation: in order to demand obedience, institutions must meet 
that condition, but once it has been met we are obliged to obey in virtue of our 
own commitments. The Equality Condition also provides the sufficiency 
condition missing from the Dependence Thesis; it is necessary that an institution 
reflect the reasons of its citizens in order to demand obedience, and it is 
necessary and jointly sufficient for obligation that a policy would in fact tend to 
produce maximal equal autonomy. 
                                                          
7 In particular: which reflect the reasons, including presumptive goods, which those citizens 
have. As has been argued elsewhere, lots of people endorsing an autonomy-hostile policy does 
not make it any less autonomy-hostile. 
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What implications does this condition have for how we might practicably go 
about putting the autonomy-justified conception into action? Most obviously, it 
reinforces the previous claims that material equality is a key precondition of 
institutions being able to claim authority for voting-endorsed policies. In other 
words, unless and until we live in a radically egalitarian society, something 
having been voted for does not imply a kind of social consensus which satisfies 
the constitutive, respect and equality requirements necessary for democratic 
processes to be justified on the grounds of autonomy. 
A nagging thought needs to be dealt with here. We do not, to tender a 
remarkably obvious claim, live in an egalitarian world. If the only way for 
institutions to attain any authority is to exist in a revolutionary utopia, then 
even for a work of political philosophy my thesis is patently irrelevant. 
Fortunately, the Equality Condition gives us an explanation as to how institutions 
may claim obedience even within hierarchical and capitalist systems, for it is 
surely possible for institutions to suggest policies that will tend towards maximal 
equal autonomy even if they start from imperfect positions.  
There is an interesting and relevant actual world case here: the recent law 
changes which expand the scope of marriage as an institution beyond 
heterosexual couples. We might – as Stonewall memorably if briefly did – deny 
that trying to co-opt a greater range of people into participating in marriage is 
of any benefit to those agents’ autonomy, because marriage is itself a 
fundamentally possessive and anachronistic practice, or because the move 
effectively tried to assimilate LGBTQ agents into a heteronormative narrative, 
and so on. On the other hand, we might think that there are material benefits to 
socially-recognised relationship practices which have historically been denied to 
some oppressed groups, or that challenging and reshaping relationship practices 
including marriage is required for equality, etc. Depending on what one thinks 
about epistemic access, the capacity of reformism to stifle radical change, and 
any number of other concerns, one will naturally be more convinced by one than 
the other of the positions on equal marriage; but note that one’s reasons to obey 
or not obey will be based on what tends towards maximal equal autonomy in 
non-ideal circumstances, not on what would be consistent with such autonomy 
given ideal preconditions. 
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So: how do we know whether the proposals for equal marriage tend towards 
maximal equal autonomy? The most obvious answer is the best; we listen to the 
people whose lives are most affected, and organise around those groups which 
seem most trustworthy or best serve their role of achieving justice. In other 
words, questions about what actions we should take, whether as LGBTQ agents, 
allies, or good citizens, are most likely to be answered authoritatively by 
democratically organised activist or self-advocacy groups. And here we can ask 
whether the Equality Condition (in this case) is satisfied by asking whether some 
directive is consistent with constitutive, equal and respect-grounded autonomy. 
Could marriage form a constitutive part of somebody’s living life according to 
deeply-held principles? Clearly so. Would marriage being broadened in such a 
fashion be consistent with equal social relations for others? Again, yes – although 
in the case under consideration, it is only consistent with rather than entailing 
others’ having such relations, and worries about the inegalitarianism of marriage 
as an institution remain. Finally, is equal marriage consistent with having 
recognition respect for an agent? The answer should be yes again; regardless of 
what we think about the value of some practice, there can be no attempt to 
sanction or forbid the practice on the basis of differential recognition respect – 
either everyone should, or nobody should, be able to marry.8 
The three kinds of justification sought for autonomy-motivated reasons suggest 
that we can very plausibly hold an authority to be valuing autonomy if it 
endorses equal marriage. The relevant question in terms of the Equality 
Condition is thus the following: will we be more likely to “act or effect action in 
ways which are consistent with maximal equal autonomy” if we are for, or 
against, working towards (or endorsing) equal marriage as state/legal 
recognition of a slightly broader set of relationships? This is again a substantive 
question; we cannot, from our armchair, decide which of two putative 
authorities with competing and exclusive answers is more persuasive. Neither is 
a more complex answer out of the question, where we believe both that 
marriage is an autonomy-hostile sham which should be dispensed with and that 
it is non-trivially worse for folks’ autonomy if, in some contexts, they are 
                                                          
8 See Chambers and Wedgwood in Brake (ed., 2016) for more on the value or disvalue of 
marriage and equal marriage. 
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prevented from pursuing courses of action which would be sub-optimal or 
inconceivable in ideal conditions.9 
Given that we are not in fact deciding whether to create a relationship practice 
ex nihilio under conditions of social equality, but whether to (incompletely and 
somewhat arbitrarily) alter existing institutional recognition of relationships 
under conditions of social inequality, the autonomy-justified conception will say 
that if extending marriage recognition is better than not doing so, we ought to 
extend it. The equality condition requires that institutions act in a way which 
preserves or tends towards maximal equal autonomous relations: if we have a 
case where doing nothing preserves existing inequalities, then it seems plausible 
to say that even imperfect policies which tend more towards equality are 
authoritative insofar as they don’t shut down or distract from better alternatives. 
We would have no reason to listen to anyone who wanted to bring marriage 
about in our revolutionary utopia, and there are conditions where everyone’s 
autonomy is straightforwardly best served by tossing marriage on the bonfire of 
other institutions bequeathed by god and government, but in our current actual 
world it seems likely that it would be both unhelpful and wrong to defy equal 
marriage legislation, or to work against its introduction. “Don’t vote, organise” 
is a tactical principle, not merely an ideological condemnation, and to deny that 
any reformist change can bring an improvement (even if only relatively and 
temporarily) is callow and dogmatic. 
To put it another way, institutions that cannot claim general political authority 
may nonetheless be authoritative in certain contexts or within certain scopes – 
and this seems about right. There is no particular reason to think that obeying a 
demand from the Anarchist Federation not to eat biscuits in bed will tend 
towards instantiating or defending maximal equal autonomy, but there plausibly 
is an obligation to abide by a previously agreed-upon plan for what AF members 
will do during some or other direct action. At heart, our reasons to obey 
                                                          
9 Here’s another example: the kinds of employment and economic relations presupposed by 
reformist trades unions are inconsistent with maximal equal autonomy, and often union 
managers work against the interests of their members anyway. But we still have autonomy-
minded reasons which make union directives (about, for example, industrial action) 
authoritative – although not exclusive of organising action outwith reformist structures – iff 
we have reasons to think that following such directives will tend to produce more equal 
autonomy-constitutive relations. 
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authorities must be derived from reasons we have to secure and further 
autonomy. If we have reasons to think that some institution’s directives are, or 
suggest, the best option open at the current time, then that institution is 
authoritative and can claim political obligation from us. 
 
2. Relational Autonomy and the Problems of Democracy 
In considering the mountain man problem, I rehearsed at the start of this thesis 
several familiar criticisms given against autonomy-minded justifications for 
democracy. They were, very briefly, that:  
1. Autonomy motivations for democracy do not survive instances of frustrated 
self-direction – if I value democracy as a means of instantiating self-direction of 
a particular kind, the valuing must stop when my self-direction is unsuccessful. 
Conversely, I will end up endorsing anti-democratic principles to get my own 
way. 
2. Democracy appears to endorse autonomy-hostile and even immoral acts and 
policies if they garner sufficient votes – if I value democracy because it 
instantiates or allows for autonomy, for example, I must seemingly endorse a 
majority decision which was based on authentically-held racist beliefs. 
3. The existence of persistent minorities (that is, some unspecified group who 
for whatever reason always or generally end up being on the losing or 
unendorsed side of any vote) is inconsistent with autonomy-minded justifications 
for democracy; if I value autonomy, I cannot approve of any decision-making 
procedure which systematically deprives folk of their self-direction (or renders 
their participation in collective decision-making procedures moot). 
The total effect of these criticisms, I suggested, was to render autonomy and 
democracy incompatible – it appeared that we should either ditch autonomy, or 
democratic authority. Now armed with the relational account of autonomy, and 
with a sketch of authority as the institutional framework which is required in 
order to provide maximal equal autonomy, I re-examine the problems and make 
three claims: 
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1. The standard formulation of such problems is (implicitly or explicitly) based 
on a notion of autonomy/self-direction (and thus voting, in this context) as not 
much more than desire-satisfaction. 
2. It is impossible to resolve the problems caused by this desire-satisfaction 
analysis with solutions which are themselves desire-satisfaction driven. We 
cannot, for example, avoid problems of democratically-frustrated desires by 
arguing for a satisfied separate or second-order desire that our desires be 
achieved in such-and-such a manner. 
3. A more plausible explanation for cases where we experience autonomy loss is 
that our social-relational status has changed and we have lost particular powers 
or our authoritative status. With a relational analysis in hand, some of the 
paradoxes of democracy can be addressed. 
After laying out the competing analyses, I address each problem in turn, first 
outlining how the standard (and unsatisfactory) responses to them are rooted in 
a desire-satisfaction analysis of both voting and autonomy itself and then 
explaining how the relational view allows us to avoid many of these pitfalls. In 
the process, I propose the beginnings of a view of autonomy-justified authority’s 
success conditions – that is, how the conception of authority given in the 
preceding section can be satisfied through democratic procedures.  
I argue that under the relational analysis, correctly-constituted democratic 
procedures will (or at least should) produce outcomes which provide the 
constitution, respect and equality justifications for autonomy-motivated policies 
necessary in order to meet the Dependence and Equality Conditions for an 
institution’s being politically authoritative. There may be the conceptual and 
practical possibility of a directive claiming one or two of the autonomy 
justifications but failing one of the authority conditions; but any proposal which 
correctly claims all three justifications must be capable of satisfying the two 
conditions. This is not to say that providing all justifications is sufficient for 
claiming political authority, as will be shown, but instead that a genuinely 
authoritative directive will always be consistent with autonomy. 
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Recap: Voting, Desire Satisfaction, and Relational Autonomy 
The desire-satisfaction picture of voting is a relatively straightforward and 
intuitively plausible one: we vote in order to try and fulfil desires, goals or 
preferences we hold. In this picture, voting is essentially just a tool to get what 
we want. It is worth noting that merely having our desires frustrated in this way 
is not self-evidently an autonomy loss – for voting and losing to affect our 
autonomy, rather than merely restricting our available choices, something like a 
desire-satisfaction account of autonomy must also be at work. Indeed, without 
this underlying presupposition, the idea of voting as desire-satisfaction is 
relatively inert. What, a critic could enquire, is so damned important about 
fulfilling our desires?  
If we think of autonomy as consisting in achieving our desires (or, more usually, 
fulfilling desires which have been formed under particular conditions or through 
particular kinds of reflective procedures), however, the connection between 
voting and autonomy is clearer.10 Given material scarcity and reasonable 
disagreement between agents, some form of democracy offers the best chance 
of maximising our autonomy. There are a number of ways of cashing this out. It 
might, for example, be taken to mean that a rational agent would prefer 
democracy over any other option because it offers the lowest chance of their 
desires being consistently frustrated, or it could be a return to the maximisation 
justification.11 However, all of these interpretations look to be operating in 
tandem with what Elster (1997) calls social choice theory: the idea that voting is 
something like a purchase mechanism for policies. Importantly, social choice 
theories suggest not only that people vote in order to ‘purchase’ their preferred 
outcomes, but that the measure of success of a voting system is how well it 
aggregates desires – that is, decision-making procedures are fit for purpose 
insofar as they accurately track voters’ preferences, weigh deeper versus 
shallower preferences, and so forth.12 
                                                          
10 For a more detailed account of what I dub procedurally-independent desire-satisfaction 
autonomy, see Chapter 3, and Colburn (2010). 
11 See Harrison (op. cit.) for more on the different ways we might understand democracy as 
being a maximising or “best-worst” approach to individual autonomy, and the problems with 
these ways. 
12 Elster, op. cit. 
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On such an account, then, the value of voting for autonomy must be either be 
linked to its efficiency at satisfying desires, or there must be some feature of 
the voting method itself which meets procedural preferences we are all assumed 
to have. The problem cases thus far have all closed off one or both of these 
options, leaving us with the conclusion that democracy is neither necessarily nor 
contingently the best option for autonomy. 
The relational account produces a different analysis. On this view, although we 
still vote in order to achieve our goals, the effect voting has is not solely 
determined by whether or not our desires are fulfilled, and the decision-making 
procedure which results in the most satisfied preferences (or the weightiest 
preferences being satisfied, etc.) is not necessarily the best one in terms of 
autonomy.  
Rather, the extent to which our autonomy is protected or promoted (or 
abnegated) by a vote is determined by the relational changes the vote brings 
about. To give an example, imagine that a vote is taken on whether or not to 
run a bypass through my back garden, and I vote in favour of it because I like 
watching cars go fast. For the desire-satisfaction account, my autonomy is thus 
increased unless I turn out to have other desires (about noise and air pollution, 
for example) which are frustrated by the bypass. The relational analysis suggests 
that how I feel about the matter is orthogonal to its impact on my autonomy.  
Presume for the sake of argument that this new road will negatively impact my 
social relations: for example, by resulting in the closure of bus services that 
allow me to get to and from work easily (thus making it more difficult for me to 
self-direct). Then, by voting for the bypass I have actually taken part in limiting 
my own autonomy despite the fact that I have satisfied my desires. 
This gives us the beginnings of how the autonomy-justified conception of 
authority, which aims at maximal equal (relational) autonomy, can be given 
plausible satisfaction conditions. Where the desire approach is committed to 
claiming that I am more autonomous insofar as I have more desires fulfilled, and 
less autonomous insofar as I have more desires frustrated, social-relational 
theories can argue that while autonomy losses and desire frustration may often 
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go hand-in-hand, they are not simply equivalent.13 With this thought in hand, I 
now set about the task of re-evaluating the problems of autonomy and 
democracy.  
2.1. Relational Autonomy and Democratic Authority: Frustrated Self-Direction 
Consider the earlier case of disagreement over the choice of pub, where we take 
an informal ballot over whether to go to the Bourgeois Conceit or the Dive Bar, 
and my preferred option loses out to the massed votes of my friends. On the 
face of it, this looks like a straightforward (if very minor) autonomy loss, 
perfectly explicable by the desire-satisfaction account. I had a desire, namely to 
go to the Dive Bar, and it has been frustrated; assuming that it wasn’t a wanton 
desire – that is, assuming that it coheres with my self-conception and the like, 
rather than being an inexplicable and unjustifiable urge – then my self-direction 
has been limited. 
Similarly, in the Trident case – where I vote against the renewal of Trident and 
lose – the desire-satisfaction theorist may feel themselves to be on safe ground. 
I had a deeply-held desire regarding nuclear weapons, and this desire was 
frustrated. Surely relational autonomy cannot remove the rabbit from the hat 
and show that this is somehow irrelevant to my autonomy? 
No: the relational analysis gives the same result in the Trident case, but the 
method by which the result is arrived at offers a far simpler and more intuitive 
way of rejecting the claim that having to go to a disfavoured pub constitutes a 
similar failure to instantiate or respect autonomy.  
The relations that bound and make up my self-direction in the Trident case are 
suboptimal in terms of their autonomy constitution: that is, the possibility of 
nuclear war or accidental irradiation puts my (and, indeed, every other relevant 
agent’s) ability to self-direct under threat. This is true however those relations 
have come about, whether through dictatorial imposition or majority vote. If the 
                                                          
13 Of course, in some cases, the two are intertwined closely enough to make it difficult to 
separate the impact – if I have a desire to stand in a particular set of (autonomy-friendly, for 
the sake of argument) relations, and this desire is frustrated, a relatively natural way to think 
of it is that the frustration of my desire limits my autonomy. Indeed, this is the case, but 
perhaps misleadingly so: it is only the case thanks to the changes that frustrate my desire 
being exactly those changes which limit my autonomy. They do not, however, limit my 
autonomy just because they frustrate my desire. 
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current vote ends up endorsing nuclear disarmament, then those relations are 
changed for me as well as for everybody else – everybody’s autonomy improves, 
and entailed by that is an improvement in my autonomous status. On the other 
hand, a decision to renew Trident threatens my autonomy in the same way that 
it threatens everybody else’s, regardless of how they voted for it. In short, the 
loss of autonomy in the Trident case hinges on the fact that I am powerless to 
self-direct in a way which is consistent with equal maximal autonomy for others; 
the relations I stand in are not the relations that allow such direction to occur 
(or, they are not the relations that would constitute such self-direction).14 Now, 
it is likely that the manner in which the decision is taken does have some impact 
on autonomy. Decisions being taken without reference to affected agents, as in 
the dictatorial imposition of a nuclear arsenal, are not a mark of an autonomy-
friendly society. It therefore seems plausible to say that I am slightly better off 
just for being able to vote on these sorts of things, but the mere fact that I have 
voted on some decision doesn’t mean that the outcome becomes any more 
autonomy-constituting. If we think that self-direction is prima facie important, 
we should be wary of those things which seem likely to limit our realm of 
morally permissible self-direction; the atomic sword of Damocles is one such 
thing, and when we fail to remove it, it is that failure, not the frustration of my 
desire to remove it, which makes us less autonomous.15 
 Drawing on the argument that relations are important because they constitute 
part of our successful self-direction, and the observation that lots of choices are 
fairly inert with regards to this, the relational analysis suggests that the pub 
example changes no important relations for the worse if it even really changes 
any relations. 
Firstly, it is not clear what if any relations have been malignly affected by the 
lost pub vote: I retain my previous power to go to any pub I wish to, and in 
                                                          
14 It is important to note that whether or not the frustration of some deeply-held element of 
self-conception constitutes a loss or limitation of autonomy is ultimately a question that must 
be answered substantively rather than formally, as I have argued elsewhere in the thesis. 
15 Someone might object that in fact a nuclear deterrent secures our realm of self-direction by 
protecting it against invasion, etc. It must be said that I find this argument unconvincing in 
the extreme, but we can make the same point without encountering the objection by 
reversing the example – imagine instead that the eco-warrior loony left have forced unilateral 
disarmament against my opposition, and that this will weaken the protection of my realm of 
self-direction. Again, it’s the material change, rather than the frustration of the associated 
desires, which impacts my autonomy. 
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addition, I have acquired a new power – I may now go and socialise with my 
friends. The (temporary) power I have to go to the pub with my friends is 
constituted in large part by our (unanimous) acceptance of the more general 
shared wish to go out together. Whether or not I end up standing in a second 
new relation where I have the power to meet my friends at the pub of my choice, 
I’ve still gained this first power of meeting my friends at any pub; and 
throughout, I retain the only relevant standing I had before the vote was taken. 
To sum up, the outcome of the vote results in my gaining either one or two new 
powers, and regardless of what that outcome is, I don’t lose any powers at all – 
so it’s difficult to see, if we’re engaging in a simple totting-up of relations, how 
my autonomy can fail to increase; it certainly doesn’t decrease. 
This explanation, however is vulnerable to the same triviality objection as the 
desire-satisfaction analysis insofar as it suggests that, assuming I lose the vote, 
my autonomy is still less-than-satisfactory: I might not be any worse off than I 
was, but I’m worse off than I could be, and so, as it were, some autonomy has 
gone missing somewhere along the line.16 This is an odd conclusion; we are apt 
to think of autonomy as a matter of being able to pursue deep commitments 
(although we need not be consciously “deeply committed” to them), and crying 
foul when we can’t go to our favourite pub, buy our favourite fizzy juice or the 
like just doesn’t seem appropriate.  
As such, the second option for the relational account is likely to prove stronger. 
What’s going on in the pub case, I argue, just isn’t a matter of programmatic 
autonomy – that is, of being powerful and authoritative over the direction of our 
lives. Programmatic autonomy concerns choosing jobs or careers, where we live, 
forming and expressing our social and (overtly) political attitudes; the realm of 
episodic autonomy covers whether to cross the street now or in ten feet, have 
this or that sandwich for lunch, and so on. 
This explains the distinction between being unable to go to my preferred pub 
and being powerless to prevent nuclear proliferation, or being forbidden from 
free assembly. In order for us to be able to meaningfully programmatically self-
                                                          
16 The triviality objection owes its name and its relational application to Gareth Young, who 
raised the point in response to a draft paper presented at Glasgow University in February 
2013. 
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direct, we must have fairly extensive, stable control over our lives: although 
there are exceptions (such as, say, a temporary ban on going to a public square 
because it’s prone to bursting into flames), it nevertheless seems generally true 
that repression of action in the public sphere simply prevents some of the 
relations required for this, such as being able to stand in defence of or 
opposition to some programmatic principles without this decision risking one’s 
life or livelihood.  
While we may still take this stand under oppressive conditions and thus commit 
to authentic courses of action, part of what it is to be (maximally) autonomous 
is to relate to others and our community such that authentic courses of action 
compatible with equal autonomous relations do not carry an unduly high cost. In 
the pub case, whatever the outcome of the vote there is no change to those 
relations which concern authentic programmatic self-direction: my episodic 
autonomy has maybe taken a hit, but the ability to pursue courses of action 
which further or are consistent with my self-conception remains unaffected, and 
so does my programmatic autonomy.  
2.2 Frustrated Self-Direction, the Three Justifications and Autonomy-Justified 
Authority 
In the pub case above, the proposed directive (“let’s go to the Bourgeois 
Conceit”) seems to provide all three autonomy justifications. It part-constitutes 
my programmatic autonomy, it is consistent with my being granted recognition 
respect as an agent, and it is consistent with all others being able to stand in the 
same or equivalent social relations.  
Crucially, however, it is not the kind of decision which can generate institutional 
obligation, or even be appropriately institutionalised: meeting the three 
autonomy justifications is necessary, but not sufficient for political authority. 
Remember that the Dependence Condition requires that a political authority 
reflects our own reasons for action. In the pub case, the reasons that we have 
for taking an informal vote are to do with deciding relatively quickly what to do 
with our evening – reasons which are fairly obviously not best served by putting 
the question to the vote at the next meeting of the community executive 
committee. If we were, for whatever reason, to make the decision in that 
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fashion, then whatever the committee decided would still fail to be politically 
authoritative because the kind of decision being made simply isn’t apt for 
committee oversight: our interests in autonomy are not best served by having 
(potentially coercive) directives of this sort being put up for general discussion.  
In the pub example, I am not politically obliged, but it has nothing to do with 
the frustration of my self-direction and everything to do with the nature of the 
decision. 
If the group discussion was instead a community vote on allowing or prohibiting 
pubs or pub-like institutions, then the decision would (or would fail to) be 
authoritative dependent, in part, on whether or not this kind of decision is best 
made by democratic vote. Plausibly, it is best made in such a fashion; one 
motivation to think so is that questions about presumptive goods must include 
the widest possible range of respondents and must be fairly decisively settled. 
The requirements of the Dependence Condition can tell us when we’re obliged 
to obey institutions, but also when we should consult institutions and how much 
enforcement power those institutions should have. 
It is, in other words, constitutive of our programmatic autonomy that we can 
make decisions about where to go for drinks, lunch and so forth; but the specific 
outcomes of those decisions are not (in general) constituents of programmatic 
autonomy – therefore not presumptive goods – and therefore not capable, even if 
decided by putative political authorities, of generating political obligation. 
To be clear: what happens in a different case, where we vote on the use of 
common land for some exclusive option – football pitch versus pond – and my 
preferred option loses out? Here, it seems obvious that the decision ought to be 
authoritative in the sense that it meets the Dependence and Equality Conditions 
and is an appropriate candidate for institutional decision-making, but we will 
worry that the institution does not in fact reflect my own reasons. More 
accurately, though, the decision doesn’t reflect all of my own reasons. 
Specifically, it doesn’t reflect my reasons for certain non-presumptive goods 
(let’s say football), but it does reflect my reasons regarding presumptive goods: 
it is better for everyone’s autonomy, including mine, that decisions about the 
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use of common land attempt to provide the greatest amount of non-presumptive 
goods, here determined through voting.17  
The reasons that we have for putting certain questions, most especially those 
about presumptive goods, through an institutional decision-making procedure 
are the same reasons that we have for abiding by the decisions which result. At 
the same time, and to illustrate the constraints placed by the Dependence 
Condition, the extent to which we can be coerced with regards the football 
versus pond decision is relatively limited. Perhaps, for example, we cannot be 
obliged to contribute to the upkeep of the pond (unless we change our mind and 
make use of it) but can be legitimately coerced into refraining from dumping a 
harmless but inconvenient solidifying agent into the pond. The idea would be 
that we (at least by hypothesis) have strong reasons not to interfere in the 
provision of non-presumptive goods, but no similarly strong reasons to take part 
in their provision. The work here is all being done by reasons which we’ve 
already brought into play with the Dependence Condition: we don’t have to be 
committed to some non-presumptive good in order to have reasons to obey a 
suitable directive about it. 
Given this, the Dependence Condition means that the autonomy-justified 
authority does indeed generate morally binding obligations as a result of its 
institutional nature (unlike in the group pub decision case). Presuming that the 
proposal does not involve driving residents off the land, or threatening folk into 
voting one way or the other – in other words, presuming that its implementation 
is otherwise consistent with autonomy – then we have a legitimately 
authoritative political obligation. 
2.3 Relational Autonomy and Democratic Authority: Malevolent Self-Direction 
To recap, malevolent self-direction poses two significant problems for 
autonomy-based justifications of authority. First, malevolent self-direction 
appears to be inconsistent with the conceptual claim that autonomy is 
                                                          
17 The mixed justification problem need not be a problem here: we’re asking the question “how 
should we distribute these exclusive non-presumptive goods?”, not specifically “what would 
you personally prefer?”, and in this case we can be relaxed about whether the answers reflect 
self-interest or individuals’ principles regarding the distribution of two possible non-
presumptive goods. 
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necessarily respected and its equality condition met by democracy. Second, it 
also seems at odds with the contingent argument that our interests and self-
improvement are best served by democracy. 
Viewing the case from a desire-satisfaction standpoint generates an impasse: if 
we (dubiously) allow that fulfilling or allowing me to fulfil some malignant desire 
would express respect for my autonomy, the question arises of why my desire for, 
say, setting fire to cars is taken to be equally or more valuable as others’ desires 
not to be torched on their way to work. Again, the only option that seems open 
to the desire-satisfaction account is to argue that we must all have some 
particular desire or set of desires about the way our goals are fulfilled, and that 
the problem cases violate these. And again, it just ain’t necessarily so.  
A relational analysis, however, is able to more or less sidestep the problem by 
arguing that the kinds of proposals which would allow morally problematic 
courses of action would also make us vulnerable. If, to re-state the point, we 
should respect autonomy because of some value all agents possess which 
motivates respect, then changing the web of relations such that being an agent 
is not enough to command this respect marks a failure to heed normative 
importance of autonomy.  
A collective decision-making procedure cannot therefore legitimate autonomy-
hostile policies on the basis of respect for autonomy where autonomy is 
understood relationally: even if the policy is overtly hostile only to some entirely 
notional group, it alters social relations in a fashion inconsistent with the stated 
motivation for democracy.18 Imagine, for example, that an overwhelming 
majority of people in a community vote to limit receipt of social benefits to only 
those who were born in the community or whose parents were born in the 
community. If we draw the community broadly enough, so that it encompasses 
Earth, no existent agent is excluded – nevertheless, the kinds of capacities which 
are a precondition for autonomous status are, conceptually at least, 
independent of whether or not one’s parents were born on Earth. The collective 
decision, however, has instituted arbitrary restrictions; given that part of what 
                                                          
18 This option is not open to desire-satisfaction accounts because it is entirely possible to 
imagine someone who, knowing that the process which fulfils their desires will render them 
vulnerable, is prepared to take the risk anyway. 
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it is to respect autonomy is not to take irrelevant factors into consideration 
when making normative choices, neither the fact that the policy is majority-
approved, nor that nobody is immediately disadvantaged by it alters the 
conclusion that the new set of social relations are not justifiable by respect for 
autonomy.19  
When we apply this thinking to examples closer to home, the conclusion remains 
the same. Consider the ongoing crusade against (largely imaginary) benefit 
fraudsters, which purports to be at least partly motivated by increasing folks’ 
autonomy through some ill-defined idea of the autonomy-increasing properties 
of waged labour. By ensuring that only the worthy poor receive benefits, the 
rationale appears to run, those who might otherwise let their inherent laziness 
entice them onto the life of ease provided by £52 a week are motivated instead 
to find self-direction through employment. But if we consider the impact of 
these policies, which is to cast anyone who claims benefits as something 
between a pity case and a con artist, not to mention making it materially more 
difficult for hundreds of thousands of people to feed themselves, the claims are 
exposed as hollow (not, admittedly, a particularly difficult trick).20 Even in a 
possible world where an overwhelming majority of the voting public had directly 
voted for this proposal, the net relational effect – creating or altering relations 
which increase economic insecurity, inflict psychological damage, contribute to 
child malnutrition and so on – is clearly not one which respects maximal equal 
self-direction and diverse self-conception. Thus, although malevolent self-
direction in this case may fulfil deeply-held desires about (for example) the kind 
of society one wants to live in, it cannot be justified by reference to respect for 
autonomy.  
Precisely the same rationale applies with regard to the equality condition. A 
policy which changes some group or individual’s relations on the basis of 
irrelevant considerations, or considerations which should apply to everyone if 
anyone, is failing democracy’s function as a means of fairly resolving cases 
where different sets of relations interfere with each other. It cannot therefore 
                                                          
19 Of course, given that it does not alter any relations between existing citizens and society, the 
autonomy loss is somewhere between potential and very minor. Nevertheless, it is there. 
20 See, for example, Kay, Jordan & Baker (2012), and Beatty & Fothergill (2013). 
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be justified by reference to autonomy. Return to the single-community-Earth 
case: if some group of sapient aliens were to unexpectedly arrive on the planet, 
the policy of withholding benefits from extraterrestrials would constitute an 
unfair inequality in the democratic process. We cannot coherently justify 
democracy as a way of paying equal heed to agents’ autonomy, and at the same 
time defend democratically-approved policies which explicitly fail to do so by 
claiming that their majority mandate means they must be fulfilling the equality 
condition.  
Lastly, the failure of the contingent motivations in this case is explained by the 
relational approach as a structural matter. If malevolent self-direction is 
permitted with a democratic mandate, then the defence against domination that 
democracy is supposed to provide becomes very weak and we have no particular 
reason to prefer it to a moralistic autocracy or a war of all against all; similarly, 
it is unlikely that the relations we occupy in the “immoral democracy” case are 
more likely to bring about valuable traits than relations we could occupy in 
autocracies or even more hostile situations.21 
2.4 Malevolent Self-Direction, the Three Justifications and Autonomy-Justified 
Authority 
It should be fairly clear from the preceding paragraphs why proposals which 
amount to or enable malevolent self-direction will be unable to claim autonomy-
justified authority, but it can’t hurt to make sure. Imagine, as before, that some 
policy is put before our committee(s) which will have the effect of forcing 
unemployed agents to take part in public works projects (on pain of, say, being 
prevented from accessing some or other non-presumptive good).22 Such a policy 
will fail to provide any of the three autonomy-minded justifications for 
democratic authority; and its failure to do so entails a failure to meet either the 
Dependence or Equality Conditions. 
                                                          
21 The Kantian Gulag, for example, might well prove to be more conducive to valuable moral 
traits than a society where relations of respect are dependent upon some morally arbitrary 
feature or features. 
22 ‘Unemployed’ might be a slightly misleading term here, since I’m implicitly postulating a 
society where employment (understood as capitalistic, boss-gives-me-money-for-work 
relations) doesn’t really exist and so to be unemployed is just to have no time-consuming 
tasks just at the moment, but ‘agents of no fixed occupation’ is a bit of a mouthful. 
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Take the Dependence Condition first. Does the punitive proposal reflect our 
reasons for acting? No. There might be reasons to make everyone take part in 
public works projects (and indeed these reasons would include such proposals 
being decided upon through democratic voting rather than top-down directives). 
There might also be reasons for making a particular agent or group of agents 
perform some task just to keep them busy or to inculcate some attitude or other, 
such as making a child mow the lawn, or do the dishes, etc. 
It is possible, in other words, that actions or programmes of these sorts could be 
constituents of our autonomy under certain conditions. In the first case, where 
everyone is equally obliged, the proposals would also give us the equality and 
respect justifications for their putative authority (presuming that it is consistent 
with respecting someone as an agent to require their labour or assistance, which 
it seems to be, dependent on the reasons we give for so obliging them).  
But these reasons can’t give us any reason to put somebody else’s free time in 
the hands of an institution just on the basis that they don’t seem to be doing 
anything with it. The autonomy-minded reasons that I have for (hypothetically) 
making my child wash plates are not going to be reasons which suggest the 
decision should go to a public vote. Equally, the reasons we have for starting and 
contributing a public project will not stretch to forcing people to take part on 
morally arbitrary grounds like unemployment. The Dependence Condition, then, 
is not satisfied by the proposal under consideration: differential coercion of this 
kind is not constitutive of autonomy, is not consistent with equal autonomy, and 
does not grant agents recognition respect. It does not, consequently, give us any 
reason to believe that the institution is acting on reasons which reflect our own. 
The Equality Condition is silent on whether or not the proposal should be 
institutionalised in the first place, but gives an unambiguous answer as to its 
authority: making some folks do community service but not others is at least 
prima facie inconsistent with relations of maximal equal autonomy. If there 
were some satisfying explanation as to why this prima facie inconsistency is 
actually unobjectionable – if, say, we held that making everyone take part when 
they had free time was consistent with autonomy, and that all the proposal did 
was demand greater contributions from agents with more free time – then the 
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Equality Condition would be met. Again, this is a substantive question, but my 
suspicion is that such an explanation will not be forthcoming. To give one 
illustration, it seems likely that making people spend much of their free time 
working on public projects will severely limit their ability to self-direct in other 
realms in a way which means the proposal fails to produce equal maximally 
autonomous relations. Clearly, this is inconsistent with the equality justification 
for democratic authority. 
So the public works proposal given above cannot claim autonomy-justified 
authority despite its apparent fitness for democratic oversight, because either 
it’s inconsistent with our reasons regarding autonomy (the Dependence 
Condition), or it’s inconsistent with agents standing in relations of equal 
autonomy (the Equality Condition). Malevolent self-direction, whether in the 
form of setting kittens alight or forcing punitive labour on the unemployed, 
cannot be justified by autonomy and therefore cannot be justified by democratic 
majority. 
2.5 Relational Autonomy and Democratic Authority: Persistent Minorities 
The failure of the desire-satisfaction analysis is not so much in explaining the 
problem of persistent minorities as in resolving it. In a hypothetical society of a 
hundred people, where thirty are bound to lose any vote on a particular matter 
of importance to programmatic self-direction, it is fairly easy to describe the 
breakdown in terms of frustrated desires: not only is there some deeply-held 
goal which cannot be achieved now, but it cannot be achieved at all under the 
obtaining conditions. Further, it seems likely that folk do in fact have a negative 
desire of the sort “I do not want my desires to be irrelevant to collective 
decisions” which is being frustrated into the bargain.  
Plausible enough so far: democracy cannot instantiate or respect self-direction 
or our self-conception if fulfilling these conditions is a matter of satisfying 
desires and we are structurally blocked from doing so, and as suggested above, 
this structural exclusion also looks to violate the equality condition. But posing 
the problem is only half the task, and the desire-satisfaction analysis cannot 
provide an answer. 
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Just as in the previous cases, the only way for a desire theory to try and deflate 
the autonomy loss is by pointing to some higher-order desires regarding decision-
making procedures, and for the reasons provided previously, this strikes me as 
unsatisfactory. Indeed, with regards to persistent minorities our desires are if 
anything more likely to militate against a process which puts us in a 
disproportionately weak position because of prevailing social or political trends. 
The relational account is unable to explain away the autonomy loss by casting it 
in terms of changing relations – whether our hypothetical minority are thought of 
as having deep desires frustrated, or of being put in relations that do not 
instantiate programmatic autonomy, they are still patently not self-directed, 
and as such there is no relational magic wand to be waved at the problem. What 
can be done, however, is to relocate the problem by recalling why it is that we 
are supposed to value democracy. 
If democracy is to be justified by reference to autonomy then, at the risk of 
obviousness, it must be an appropriate kind of process and it must range across 
an appropriate realm – to put it in relational terms, it must (conceptually) 
instantiate and respect and (contingently) tend to produce maximal equal 
autonomous relations. That is to say, there are some kinds of proposals – again, 
arbitrary restriction of freedom of assembly is a useful example – which fail the 
conceptual and contingent tests regardless of how many votes they garner or 
how many desires they satisfy. Looking to autonomy to justify democracy cannot 
work if the sorts of proposals which the process purports to legitimate are 
inherently hostile to autonomy-constitutive relations. The problem in the case of 
persistent minorities is not so much that some group of people keep getting their 
desires frustrated, but that their minority status is enough to make their ability 
to programmatically self-direct vulnerable.  
This, incidentally, is why desire-satisfaction theorists cannot adopt something 
like the relocation approach and insist that democracy is only justified by 
autonomy if it respects programmatic self-direction. If the relevant 
programmatic desire was something like the setting up of a fascist state, or 
ethnic segregation, then the minority’s continuing frustration is no failure to 
respect or instantiate autonomous relations, but it is, clearly (just as was clear 
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in the Trident case), a denial of deeply-held desires. That is to say, being an 
active fascist might well form a subjectively-crucial part of someone’s self-
direction; without being embedded in a society which reflects and expresses this 
ideology, they are in a real sense not the person they would like to be. Denying 
them this opportunity need not count as an abrogation of autonomy on the 
relational account, for their desires are fundamentally incompatible with the 
normative basis of autonomy’s value and with the kinds of relations which are 
most evocative of this value. However, the desire-satisfaction theorist must say 
that so long as the relevant desires have been formed under conditions of 
procedural independence, the fascist is less autonomous in a democracy than in 
a fascist state. This looks to me like a very good reason to be sceptical of the 
desire-satisfaction account, and a correlatively good reason to endorse the 
relational analysis. 
2.6 Persistent Minorities, the Three Justifications and Autonomy-Justified 
Authority 
An institution which fails to provide to agents relations that partly constitute 
programmatic self-direction, on the basis that those agents are members of a 
minority group, will obviously fail to have autonomy-justified authority. If, for 
example, some organising body persistently enforces rules which prevent a group 
from wearing (or not wearing) certain clothes, or hairstyles, etc., then that body 
is failing both the Dependence and Equality Conditions. It is important to be 
clear, however, that it is not merely the fact that the institution has frustrated 
the agents’ self-direction which causes this failure of authority. Instead, there 
are two steps the institution takes which result in the failure. 
In the first instance, this kind of decision is not apt for general oversight; it is 
not the wearing or not of some item of clothing which constitutes our autonomy, 
but of standing in relations such that our sartorial choices – whatever their 
motivations – are our own business without strong countervailing reasons. We 
can imagine that racist or sexist slogans on T-shirts would be one of the 
exception cases, dependent perhaps on whether we think that folk have the 
right to be out in public without effectively having hate speech directed at them, 
243 
 
but that isn’t the crucial issue here.23 As we’ve given the example, there aren’t 
any of these possible countervailing reasons. It is simply that the institution has 
decided to raise the question of whether such-and-such an item of clothing is 
generally permissible. It therefore immediately, and obviously, fails the 
Dependence Condition: we don’t have any general reasons to put up this area of 
our lives for institutional approval.24 Room to decide for ourselves how we dress 
or wear our hair is a constituent of autonomy, and for obvious reasons granting 
someone recognition respect requires that we give them (at least prima facie, as 
mentioned before) this room. Policies like the one under discussion are thus 
doomed from the off, because how we dress is not something that should in 
general be determined by institutions – we have no reason to put the matter to a 
vote, let alone abide by the outcome. So, the Dependence Condition goes unmet 
here because any institutional directive about hair length fails to reflect our 
reasons – in fact, such a directive would be in direct opposition to what our 
reasons suggest about authoritative directives and institutions. 
The institution, then, ought not to be issuing directives on how people dress in 
the first place (excluding some fairly specific cases). Furthermore, and 
displaying some similarities with the example in Section 2.2, the institution 
certainly has no business placing agents under restrictions because of their 
membership of a minority group. Not only is the institution trying to coerce 
agents illegitimately, the coercion would be unjust even if it met the 
Dependence Condition; it is clearly false to say that a policy which had the 
effect of limiting agents’ self-direction on the basis of morally arbitrary factors 
is consistent with, or tends towards, maximal equal autonomy.  
                                                          
23 Notice that even in this case, we’d probably think that the institution cannot rule on what we 
wear at home – our reasons for particular endorsements or prohibitions differ across different 
cases, and the negotiation of interactions between agents in common spaces is sensitive to 
different reasons than the interactions between agents in private (in the natural language 
sense). 
24 In contrast, and continuing the thought in the preceding footnote, we have reasons to 
negotiate with, say, flatmates about this kind of decision. Negotiations of this sort can’t have 
the same sort of coercive power, however, because there will be context-sensitive reasons 
that don’t apply to general policies. For example, if two of my flatmates object to a T-shirt 
on grounds of personal taste (that is, they genuinely revile it, but it’s not offensive or 
oppressive), I have good reasons not to wear it around the flat. But they cannot force me not 
to, and they cannot prohibit me from wearing it out and about, because the sorts of reasons 
that apply in flatmate negotiations won’t (or won’t always) apply outwith that context, and 
don’t endorse coercion even within that context. 
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In sum, we have no reason to put up our choice of clothes as a matter for 
general oversight, so the policy fails the Dependence Condition for institutional 
authority. And even if we did have such a reason – such as the potential racist T-
shirt case – a policy which makes only some (morally) arbitrarily-defined group’s 
clothes choices a matter for general oversight would fail the Equality Condition. 
One further problem should be addressed here. As suggested in the previous 
subsection, my account will say that denying fascists the opportunity to endorse 
fascism at the ballot box is no limitation of their autonomy.25 How then can an 
institution claim autonomy-justified authority for a decision which non-trivially 
limits some group’s ability to effect social change, on the specific basis of that 
group’s features?  
Take the Dependence Condition first. When an institution refuses to put fascistic 
proposals to the vote, does it reflect our own reasons? Yes, and despite the 
apparent counter-intuitiveness of the claim, this includes at least some of the 
reasons fascists will have. Specifically, we all have reasons from the value of 
self-direction to endorse a decision-making process which will not render our 
programmatic self-direction vulnerable to arbitrary interference; since there is 
no iteration of fascistic thought which will not render us so vulnerable, we thus 
all have reasons to support a kind of ‘no platform redux’.26 Someone may 
authentically endorse fascist government, but as we have already seen that 
authentically endorsing some course of action does not equate to that course of 
action constituting autonomy, this is not an objection for my theory. An agent 
who denies that such a government would render them vulnerable, meanwhile, 
is simply incorrect. Power wielded for morally arbitrary reasons admits of no 
non-arbitrary restrictions: once you have pissed in the kettle, you cannot expect 
                                                          
25 Again, and just to be clear: I am not arguing that we should keep fascist proposals off the 
agenda but let the fascists organise in the streets. Here, as elsewhere in the thesis, I focus 
somewhat artificially on voting as one method by which we organise our society, but this 
simplicity-motivated focus should not be mistaken for an implicit claim that only through the 
ballot can we make legitimate policy and organisational decisions. 
26 ‘No platform’ being the anti-fascist principle that fascists ought not to be granted a platform 
for organisation – whether through spreading their views in public debates (which also serve 
to legitimise fascism as part of the political norm), holding demonstrations, and so on. It is 
important to note that no platforming is not the ‘censorship’ of fascist ideas, but the 
mobilisation against those ideas being put into action. See 
http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/ppapers/fascists.html (among others) for a fuller 
explanation of no platform in principle and practice. 
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your tea to taste the same. The anti-fascist policy under observation, then, is 
one that anyone with an interest in autonomy – which is all of us – has a good 
reason to defend that autonomy. Preventing fascists from coming into power is 
necessary to defend autonomy, and so an institution which gave fascists no 
platform would, at least in this instance, pass the Dependence Condition. 27 
The means by which such an institution would meet the Equality Condition are 
similarly straightforward. Is a policy of hostility towards fascists consistent with 
maximal equal autonomy? Yes – it is not arbitrary to treat agents and groups 
differently according to substantive differences in their outlook, dependent on 
what the effect of those substantive differences are. That someone is a fascist is 
not arbitrary in the way that their being white, or gay, or elderly, is, or even in 
the way that their being a meat-eater or a morally flawed individual would be 
arbitrary here: the things (or at least some of them) that they endorse and value 
as important are simply incompatible with others being equally as autonomous. 
It is not therefore a failure of equality to prevent them from bringing such 
inequality to pass. 
Close of Section 2 
I have argued in previous chapters that while desire-satisfaction theories can 
account for some of the problems of democracy, they cannot coherently solve 
these problems. There are also independent reasons to be suspicious of a pure 
desire-satisfaction analysis: the fulfilling of malevolent desires in particular 
                                                          
27 It might be thought that (as Robert Cowan has suggested) this reasoning implies that we 
should no platform not just fascists, but also liberals, socialists, and indeed anyone whose 
beliefs include a commitment to the state – after all, their values are (by hypothesis) 
inconsistent with equal maximal autonomy. There is more to this objection than can be 
satisfactorily dealt with here, but I think that there are two key differences between no 
platforming fascists and no platforming any statist. First, although statism is indeed hostile to 
maximal autonomy, the effect of shutting down all statist-friendly political debate rather 
than engaging with it is also inconsistent with autonomy – the cure is likely to be worse than 
the disease. Secondly, and as suggested in the last footnote, what makes the toleration of 
fascism particularly dangerous is that where liberals (for example) organise, they do not tend 
to bring with them physical attacks on oppressed minorities. Fascists, on the other hand, 
invariably do. It’s not ‘just’ that fascism as an ideology is especially inconsistent with 
autonomy; it’s that letting fascists organise and giving them the veneer of mainstream 
acceptance (thereby encouraging them further) is directly inconsistent with autonomy. Thus, 
although the basic theoretical incompatibility of fascism with autonomy provides an argument 
for why no platformism doesn’t fail the Dependence Condition, it is the specific nature of the 
fascist threat which gives us the “all things considered” justification for no platforming – 
here, the disease is worse than the cure.  
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looks capable of being waved through so long as the desires are procedurally 
independent.  
A relational approach, by contrast, can not only explain the apparent autonomy 
loss in the problem cases just as well if not better than the desire account, but 
also go some way to resolving the problems. The key matter for justifying 
democratic authority on a relational account of autonomy is the effect of voting 
on the social relations that we stand in (or the relations revealed by putting a 
matter to the vote in the first place), and an authority which meets the 
Dependence and Equality Conditions will not malignly affect relations which are 
constitutive of our programmatic autonomy. 
3. Some New Problems for Autonomy-Justified Authority 
I have argued so far that the relational analysis of autonomy and the autonomy-
justified conception of authority resolve the three familiar problems for 
democracy of frustrated self-direction, malevolent self-direction and persistent 
minorities. Conceiving of authority as a matter of institutions meeting the 
Dependence and Equality Conditions, and of autonomy as matter of relational 
standing rather than desire-satisfaction, allow us to show that the kinds of 
policies which would malignly affect our relational standing will not be made 
authoritative by democracy; but, still, that democratic endorsement of some 
policies do give us reasons to treat them as authoritative. In this respect, the 
autonomy-justified conception has done the job required of it. It can point to 
autonomy as an explanation for how properly-constituted direct democracy may 
generate political obligations, and evade the conclusion that respect for 
autonomy requires the abandonment of political authority. 
But it would be premature to put out the jelly and ice-cream yet. Before 
endorsing autonomy-justified authority, there are two worries specific to it 
which must be addressed: that it gives a problematically perfectionist view of 
authority via the Dependence Condition, and that the Equality Condition is 
redundant and therefore uninformative about authority. 
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3.1 The Dependence Condition and Perfectionism 
As is obvious, the account of autonomy that I’ve given in the thesis is broadly 
perfectionist insofar as it claims that there are substantive criteria for an 
agent’s being autonomous – so the voluntary, authentic (etc.) slave is not 
autonomous, while the agent whose authentic desires for submission to or 
governance by another are frustrated is autonomous despite themselves. 
Although perhaps less obviously so, the conception of authority given here is also 
a perfectionist one. Two proposals can have passed through exactly the same 
procedure, been approved in exactly the same way, and so on, and yet not be 
equivalently authoritative because of substantive differences in how they (fail to) 
reflect our reasons. 
This means that my account must deal with the following familiar objection: 
what is there to defend non-malevolent but apparently valueless self-direction 
against directives which aim to produce valuable self-direction through coercion? 
We can put it the other way around, too: if the Dependence Condition requires 
that authorities act to promote or defend autonomy-constitutive relations, then 
do we not end up with an account of political obligation which says that I may be 
coerced out of (e.g.) counting blades of grass and into evening classes? 
The particular nature of the problem as it applies to the Dependence Condition 
should be made clearer. When an institution claims authority on the basis that it 
acts on reasons which reflect my own (in other words, according to the 
Dependence Condition), these reasons include presumptive goods like autonomy. 
With a substantive account of autonomy, therefore, it seems possible that an 
institution can coerce me into doing something that I do not value or hold as 
part of my self-conception, on the basis that doing that thing will come to form 
part of my valued self-direction. But this just looks like exactly the kind of false 
consciousness, ‘forced to be free’ approach that we have already rejected. If it 
turns out that the autonomy-justified conception of authority commits us to this, 
then the conception is worthless after all and the mountain man is vindicated. 
Fortunately, a response is possible, and helpfully brings out the internal 
constraints which the Dependence Condition places on coercion. The response 
hinges on two points: the authority’s purpose is to promote and defend 
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autonomy-constitutive relations, not to force people to stand in them; and we 
have no reasons to give authorities the kind of intrusive powers that would be 
necessary to conduct this kind of objectionable perfectionism. 
Take the first part of the response. When an authority makes it so that, for 
example, it is feasible for agents to become teachers, or lumberjacks, or 
whatever, it is serving its purpose (at least in this case) because it is expanding 
the scope of our programmatic self-direction. We would not think that it had 
failed to be authoritative if, as it happened, nobody’s deeply-held values led 
them towards being a lumberjack – the institution reflects our reasons for 
attaining the presumptive good of autonomy insofar as it makes being a 
lumberjack possible, not insofar as it causes lots of people to be lumberjacks. 
While counting blades of grass is perhaps an implausible candidate to be central 
to an agent’s valued self-direction, insofar as it is possible then we also have 
reasons to think that its being permissible does form part of the presumptive 
goods authorities should assist in providing. To emphasise, it is not that we all 
have reasons to count blades of grass and therefore the authority should reflect 
these reasons, but that we have reasons for authorities not to interfere in our 
pursuit of self-conceptions and central values. It is thus a mistake to describe 
counting blades of grass as ‘valueless’ self-direction; it might be silly, or 
implausible, or what have you, but insofar as it forms part of somebody’s self-
direction and doesn’t interfere unjustly with anyone else’s, it is indeed valuable. 
It would be absurd to expect that the Dependence Condition requires authorities 
to reflect every single reason for action that every agent has; it rather requires 
that authorities act in ways which we all have reasons to endorse, and one such 
way, plausibly (and as argued in Sections 2.1 and 2.3) is to give us room to 
pursue esoteric or iconoclastic life plans. Now, it is possible that authorities will 
in fact be justified in prohibiting something harmless on the basis that there are 
other goods to be pursued: maybe our grass-counter is sitting in the middle of a 
popular football pitch. But here, of course, the prohibition (or rather, lack of 
priority) has nothing to do with making the grass-counting agent more 
autonomous and everything to do with co-ordinating public resources such that 
any given agent is likely to be more autonomous. It is not for the agent’s own 
good, except in the very broad sense that we all benefit from living in a society 
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which tends towards maximal equal autonomy – and in any case the authority 
still has a reason to try, if at all possible, to provide the grass-counter with a 
different patch of land to contemplate. 
The second part of the response is negative rather than positive. In addition to 
having reasons which entail that authorities provide space for unusual lives, we 
have strong reasons not to allow institutional or general oversight which would 
be likely to make morally permissible self-direction more difficult. Imagine the 
kind of institutional machinery required to coerce our luckless Stoic into evening 
classes – some group has to decide that his harmless self-direction is a proper 
matter for their oversight, then they have to force him to do something which is 
neither morally obligatory nor valuable to him (nor required for the instantiation 
and defence of equal maximal autonomy-constitutive relations) and, presumably, 
they must stand ready to punish him if he resists. This is not, I suggest, a setup 
which seems consistent with a society which values self-direction on the basis of 
respect for agency, and if we were to find ourselves in such a society we would 
all have strong reasons to destroy or radically alter the offending institution. In 
other words, considerations of autonomy motivate us strongly against giving 
institutions the ability to interfere with our self-direction unless that self-
direction is itself inconsistent with maximal equal autonomy. Incidentally, this 
will also limit the kind of coercion that we can employ if the grass-counting man 
does need to be removed from the football pitch – in fact, the permissible 
coercion is probably limited to exactly that removal and no more, although by 
the same token it’s permissible for the impatient players to remove him rather 
than waiting for some council officer equivalent.  
The Dependence Condition does therefore imply a substantive and broadly 
perfectionist rather than procedural and content-neutral account of authority, 
but not problematically so: it is met when directives reflect our reasons 
regarding presumptive goods, and hence will be sensitive to whether some 
proposal is in fact consistent with maximal equal autonomy, relationally 
conceived. The Dependence Condition does not legitimate coercion which forces 
us to pursue “more” autonomous lives, however; in part because this is a 
misconception of autonomy as being constituted by fulfilling lots of authentic 
desires rather than relational standing, but also because exactly those reasons 
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which justify political authority serve to set the scope of that authority. We just 
don’t have any reason to give an institution the authority to forbid us from or 
punish us for grass-counting, and so no institution attempting to claim such 
authority can meet the Dependence Condition. 
3.2 Is the Equality Condition Redundant? 
The other immediate worry for autonomy-justified authority is taxonomical or 
methodological. The Dependence Condition, as I have stated it, requires that 
legitimate authorities act on reasons which reflect our own, including 
presumptive goods. If one of these goods is autonomy, specifically the relational 
conception of autonomy given earlier in my thesis, then it may appear that the 
Equality Condition is redundant – authorities are already required to act in ways 
which reflect our interest in maximal equal autonomy, so what extra work is 
being done by the stipulation that authorities must act in ways consistent with 
equal autonomy? 
The first way to respond would be to accept that the Equality Condition is just 
one particular gloss of the Dependence Condition, in the same way that the 
Formulae of Humanity and Universal Law are supposedly two ways of cashing out 
the same Categorical Imperative. In this case, the objection is not so much that 
the Equality Condition is wrong but that it’s just unnecessary: all that is required 
to generate political obligation is that an institution meets the Dependence 
Condition. It might be helpful to draw out the Equality Condition as a particular 
implication or sub-condition, but ultimately political authority is just a matter of 
satisfying the Dependence Condition. This would, of course, be inconsistent with 
what I have already said, namely that the Equality Condition acts as a sufficiency 
condition in tandem with the Dependence Condition: if the Equality Condition is 
just a gloss, then it cannot provide different logical success criteria to the 
Dependence Condition. 
But this is not a very satisfactory answer. Apart from anything else, it risks 
circularity – the Equality Condition must be different because it plays a different 
role in legitimate authority, and it plays a different role because it is different 
(and it is different because it plays a different role, and round and round we go). 
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I must, then, show how it is that the Equality Condition gives us sufficiency 
conditions which are not provided by the Dependence Condition. My argument is 
that a directive’s meeting the Dependence Condition just shows that it could be 
authoritative; it is only when something meets both conditions that it is 
authoritative. There is a practical bent to the Equality Condition which allows it 
to play this role, as can be seen in the following example. 
Return again to the case of the agent who wants to sit and count blades of grass. 
As we have seen, there is no in-principle reason why this should fail the 
Dependence Thesis – it is consistent with relations of equal maximal autonomy 
that the agent should self-direct in such a fashion. As such, an institutional 
directive of the form “Park X is primarily for the counting of blades of grass, and 
that activity should be prioritised there” can plausibly meet the necessary 
conditions for authority. But this is – as in fact became obvious in the previous 
discussion – not enough to actually make the directive authoritative. Why? 
Because it may be that in the actual world, we do not have the available 
resources to enable everyone to self-direct in the (morally permissible) ways 
that they want to. Perhaps, as suggested in Section 3.1, a choice must be made 
between two activities which are both consistent in principle with maximal 
equal autonomy, and both exclusive (or more precisely, exclusive at place p and 
time t). The question then becomes one of whether there are differing costs of 
implementation, and which of the two activities is in practice more consistent 
with, and more likely to result in, a greater range of equal autonomous relations. 
That is, the issue which the Equality Condition considers is “which of policy A or 
policy B is the most likely, given pertinent empirical information, to serve the 
end of equal maximal autonomy?”. This will include considerations of 
implementation that may not be taken into account by the Dependence 
Condition because such considerations may apply solely in practice rather than 
in principle. It is plausible, for example, that a policy of not interfering at all 
with folks’ morally permissible self-direction would meet the Dependence 
Condition (indeed, it is a very attractive policy in principle) but would fail the 
Equality Condition because, in practice, the result of total non-interference 
would be the establishment or maintenance of informal power hierarchies which 
are in principle and in practice inconsistent with equal maximal autonomy.  
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Conversely, a policy which suggested strong perfectionism without a coercive 
bent – we try really hard to convince the grass-counter that he would be better 
served doing something else, but we don’t manipulate or force him into doing 
something else – would fail to be authoritative, even if it was not objectionable. 
This is precisely because any kind of obligation it came up with would be 
impossible in practice for the institution to enforce: an authoritative institution 
creating a policy with, by design, no associated coercive powers and hence no 
purpose to claiming political authority. It would, to rephrase the claim, be 
attempting to generate an obligation with no obligatory acts; and if it tried to 
make some acts obligatory, the purpose of the policy would be defeated 
(because the policy is supposed to be non-coercive).  
The Equality Condition is therefore not redundant because it completes our 
principle of legitimate political authority by telling us something about which 
the Dependence Condition remains silent: conflict between claims. It, first, 
allows us to individuate between two (in principle) equally permissible but 
exclusive proposals or directives. It also serves to account for the illegitimacy of 
policies that are (again) in principle permissible but would in practice, and for 
contingent reasons, be inconsistent with the stated purpose of the institution in 
question. We can think of the Dependence Condition as catching policies which 
institutions may never endorse and offering directives which could plausibly be 
authoritative, and the Equality Condition as telling us what institutional 
directives we must follow, as well as catching directives which some institutions 
may issue – but not this one in this place.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that an autonomy-justified conception of political 
authority is implied by the foregoing thoughts about the need for and purpose of 
any political authority. Under this conception, institutional directives are 
authoritative when they meet the Dependence Condition (when an authority 
may claim to “act or effect action in ways which reflect our own reasons (these 
reasons including autonomy as a presumptively-desired good)” and Equality 
Condition (when the institution will in fact “act or effect action in ways which 
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are consistent with maximal equal autonomy”). Further, I have argued that a 
direct democracy, under conditions of equality, is capable of meeting both these 
conditions and thus claiming legitimate authority. Some points should be 
clarified or re-asserted before moving to the final chapter. 
Firstly, some kinds of proposals are simply not appropriate subjects for 
legitimation by reference to autonomy; you cannot make a fundamentally 
autonomy-hostile policy into an autonomy-promoting one by covering it in ballot 
papers. Given that we are arguing from autonomy to democracy – given that 
democratic authority is justified by reference to how well it instantiates, 
respects and promotes autonomy – it is counter-productive to try and argue that 
a proposal which patently fails to instantiate, respect or promote autonomy can 
be made to do so just by having majority approval. The democratic process, 
then, must not be taken to magically legitimate autonomy-hostile proposals just 
by virtue of the fact that it is supposed to serve partly as a method of 
autonomous self-direction. 
Secondly, for voting to have a meaningful impact on our relations, there must be 
equality at more than the ballot box. If, for example, a community passes a law 
requiring that medical treatment be free at the point of use, it will not put me 
in a notably better position if there is no relatively easy and reliable way for me 
to access that treatment in the first place. The merely formal change, that I 
may now theoretically go to a doctor without taking my wallet, does not 
constitute enough of a change in my powers of self-direction to argue that the 
proposal has done much to increase my autonomy – for that to occur, it must be 
the case that there are other changes (to public transport, or expanding the 
healthcare system, for example) which mean that it is now in fact easier for me 
to seek medical care.28 To justify democracy through autonomy, then, we have 
to think of democracy fairly broadly as a whole set of social institutions, of 
which voting is one, but which also includes ideas of freedom of expression, 
freedom from inequality, and so on that are best served by a direct democratic 
decision-making process.29  
                                                          
28 The corollary of this is that, had my situation been different (had I lived right next to a 
hospital, for example) the change would have had a fairly dramatic impact on my autonomy.  
29 This being so, it invites the question of why I have more or less equated democracy with the 
254 
 
This all militates, as I have been muttering consistently throughout, towards a 
radically egalitarian and participatory view of political authority. It should be 
fairly obvious that such a view will be far more at home in the communist 
anarchist camp than as, say, a contemporary liberal account of authority. What I 
have not as yet done, however, is to make clear why I take it that the view is 
not just consistent with, but demands, an anarchistic organisation of society. In 
the next and final chapter, I recapitulate the argument that states can never 
grant us recognition respect in virtue of our agency, and offer a sketch of how 
an anarchistic society might be organised in light of what I have said about 
autonomy and authority.
                                                                                                                                                                                
narrow conception throughout this chapter. The answer is twofold: for pure simplicity’s sake, 
and also to draw out the point that autonomy-minded justifications for democracy must 
ultimately be concerned with more than formal or procedural matters. 
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7. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
1. The State of Play 
At the start of this thesis, I presented the problem of the mountain man: the 
individual who argues that a concern for autonomy is inconsistent with the 
existence of legitimate external authorities. The mountain man, I suggested, 
was a problem for autonomy theorists in general, but particularly for autonomy-
minded anarchists. Given that anarchists deny the legitimacy of states, and are 
historically unfriendly to institutional coercion of any sort, the net effect of the 
mountain man’s challenge seemed to be that anarchists must drop one of 
autonomy or authority – either the value of autonomy is not a good reason to 
reject state authority, or the value of autonomy is such that only an explicitly 
contractarian and voluntarist account of authority is plausible. This latter view, I 
argued, essentially amounts to accepting the mountain man’s claims, and given 
that communist anarchists repudiate the sort of Nozickian minarchism or free-
market libertarianism entailed by these claims, autonomy-minded anarchists 
now have a trilemma.  
First, accepting autonomy and authority but not anarchy suggests a familiar 
account of something like social democracy or left-liberal democracy: there can 
be legitimate states, and some directive’s being a law does provide a strong 
prima facie reason to obey it. It should not be difficult to see why this is 
unappealing from an anarchist perspective. 
The possibility of autonomy and no legitimate political authority must lead to 
individualist anarchism, which we have already rejected on the basis of its 
unattractive fetishisation of autarchy and self-sufficiency.  
Finally, we have the curious third option of authority and anarchy at the cost of 
autonomy.1 Given that one crucial goal of my thesis is to find a way of making 
                                                          
1 This last claim seems particularly odd, but is not completely inconsistent with the historical 
goals of anarchism: perhaps, in fact, communist anarchism is entailed by a concern for 
equality which rules out having autonomy as a primary value (some of the feminist critiques 
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autonomy and authority consistent with each other, this is less a plausible option 
for achieving that goal and more a way of explaining why it is impossible to do so. 
If, as the trilemma above suggests, the only means of reconciling autonomy and 
authority entails the legitimacy of states, then autonomy-minded anarchism is 
incoherent – and, again, autonomy has and continues to be a key value in much 
anarchist thought.2 The task has therefore been to show that autonomy and 
authority are compatible with each other, and that a legitimate non-voluntarist 
political authority is not inconsistent with communist anarchism.  
My response has involved three elements. First, I made a methodological claim 
that we do best to delimit the concepts of autonomy and authority functionally, 
according to the role the concepts play in our political discourse and practices. 
Second, I gave an argument to the effect that the most plausible way to 
conceive of autonomy is relationally, so that we understand autonomy as being 
in large part constituted by the social relations that we stand in. Third, I 
defended an account of authority as a means of promoting and defending 
particular values – in this case, authority as an institution which allows us to 
promote and defend autonomy-constituting relations. 
In Chapter 2, I argued for the functional analysis of autonomy and authority, 
borrowing the approach from Craig and Lane. I suggested that the concept of 
autonomy best captures the reasons we value and practice self-direction if we 
understand it to require that we be powerful and authoritative over our lives: 
the autonomous agent is competent to choose courses of action which reflect 
her values and principles, and her having chosen them is a prima facie reason for 
her to be empowered to carry these courses of action out. Such a concept 
evades the charges of unpalatable individualism and misdirected valorisation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of autonomy as a concept which were examined in Chapter 2 could also lead to a position 
much like this). I think the claim is mistaken, obviously, but it’s not a trivially false and thus 
uninteresting horn of the trilemma. 
2 See, for example, Franks & Wilson (2010), Kinna (2012) and McLaughlin (2007). For overviews 
of historical anarchist thought and theorists, see Guerin (2005) and Woodcock (1977), and for 
a strong argument against my claim that autonomy is (or ought to be) important for 
anarchism, see Bookchin (1995). For what it’s worth, Bookchin seems to me to be taking 
autonomy to be exactly the kind of individualistic self-sufficiency we have already rejected; 
his notion of freedom is much closer to the relational account of autonomy endorsed in this 
thesis. 
257 
 
self-sufficiency which have been levelled at those who appeal to autonomy, for 
there is no reason to think that power and authority over one’s life require 
complete freedom from obligations, or that one must be implausibly self-
creating or rational to be powerful and authoritative in the relevant ways. 
Regarding authority, I posed the question of what would be lacking in a ‘political 
state of nature’ (to use Lane’s framing) where we had no concept of authority. 
Primarily, I argued, the notion of political authority serves as a means of giving 
and justifying the normative claims of social institutions. To resolve co-
ordination problems, and – more positively – to generate social goods which 
would be unattainable without co-operation, we require some means to indicate 
institutions and policies which reliably fulfil these goals. Thus, the conception of 
authority, as well as its success conditions, will be substantively informed: what 
it is to be an authority is different across different political theories, so that a 
liberal capitalist will require a different conception of authority from a socialist 
or a monarchist. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I argued for a social-relational account of autonomy which 
draws heavily from Oshana’s and explored some of its implications.3 The social-
relational view of autonomy holds that an agent must meet certain psychological 
preconditions, or what Friedman called competencies, such as a sense of self 
and an ability to make and follow through on plans. Meeting these preconditions 
does not, however, mean that the agent is autonomous: autonomy is a matter of 
standing in certain social relations which make one powerful and authoritative 
over one’s life.  
The notion of autonomy as relationally constituted, rather than merely being 
causally affected by social relations, is crucial: if an agent stands in (to use the 
standard example) relations of slavery, then she lacks power and authority over 
her life regardless of whether she authentically endorses such relations. If we 
are to understand autonomy as something which is valuable because it evinces 
respect for the idea of being able to shape how one’s life goes, then we cannot 
say that the agent who is unable to perform such shaping is autonomous – even if 
this inability is something that they endorse. Conversely, being relationally 
                                                          
3 See Oshana (2006). 
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positioned such that you are powerful and authoritative means that you are 
autonomous, even if you’d rather not be. As in Oshana’s example of the ‘would-
be surrendered woman’, the relational account suggests – correctly – that the 
autonomous agent can be unhappy with their life and can even be resistant to 
being powerful over it. But autonomy is not a matter of getting everything you 
want, or of being entirely content with how your life is going: it is a matter of 
being positioned such that your wanting to do something is – again, prima facie – 
a reason to do it. Relations which constitute our being powerful and 
authoritative over our lives are those of non-domination: power is not to be 
understood as relentless desire-satisfaction or mastery of the universe, but as 
relational standing such that we are not vulnerable to arbitrary interference in 
our lives. We are authoritative, meanwhile, insofar as this relational standing is 
the result of our being granted recognition respect as agents – the external 
recognition, rather than internal belief, that our being an agent and wanting to 
x is a prima facie reason for us to x and for others to help us to x.  
There are two implications of the relational thesis which are especially worth 
noting. The first is that this account of autonomy comes with an equality 
condition ‘built in’, for if you value autonomy you are required to value 
everybody else’s autonomy equally. Although this can be interpreted in a 
vaguely Kantian fashion as meaning that you reason inconsistently if you value 
your own autonomy but nobody else’s (an interpretation which, as it happens, 
strikes me as correct), that is not the interpretation which generates the 
equality condition here. Rather, we are committed to what I have called 
maximal equal autonomy – the set of relations which grant each agent as much 
power over their lives as is consistent with other agents having the same amount 
of power over their lives – because determining agents’ relational standing 
according to morally arbitrary distinctions is, ultimately, always a mug’s game. 
Even if I think that my self-direction is important and everyone else can go hang, 
it is irrational for me to support social relations which enable or deny powers of 
self-direction in an inegalitarian fashion; even if I am (as it happens) situated 
such that I am not immediately threatened by such inegalitarian relations, this is 
more or less a matter of luck, and we do not want our autonomy to rest on being 
lucky. In other words, this account of autonomy does not need a separate 
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account for why everyone should be granted the same ‘space’ for autonomy as 
ourselves: my account builds in an equality condition insofar as we are 
committed to equal maximal autonomy if we value autonomy at all (for nakedly 
self-interested reasons, if for no others), and need not reach for other 
arguments about, say, justice. The second implication, which I explored 
particularly in Chapter 4, is that the personal is political. That is to say, there 
are no principled distinctions which can be drawn between paradigm cases of 
‘personal’ and ‘political’: on the relational account, changes which make an 
agent more (or less) powerful and authoritative over their life have the same 
effect regardless of whether they are the result of direct democracy, dictatorial 
fiat, or informal power hierarchies. 
In Chapter 5, I returned to the problem of constructing a concept of political 
authority which is consistent with its being justified through considerations of 
autonomy. According to the functional analysis adopted in Chapter 2, the role of 
political authority is to enable or facilitate the production of co-operative goods 
as well as resolve co-ordination problems. What these goods are will, as 
suggested, be dependent on one’s pre-existing political convictions; for the 
purpose of the thesis, I argued that we want political authority primarily to 
promote and defend relations of maximal equal autonomy. I left aside the 
pluralist question: on my view, goods like security and shelter will be required 
for autonomy in any case, and the conception of autonomy in play entails that 
authorities should also serve justice and equality as necessary parts of promoting 
autonomy. Pluralists about value are thus to some extent accommodated anyhow, 
but given that my functional analysis of authority suggests a strongly substantive 
account of authority (in that my account will say that an authority’s legitimacy 
is in large part to do with getting the “right” result rather than simply following 
the correct procedures), it should be no surprise nor weakness that an explicitly 
autonomy-focussed concept of authority may not serve as an equally good 
concept of authority for other values.  
Political authority being delimited by its ability to produce maximal equal 
autonomy gives us three desiderata for the concept: (1) political authorities 
must be able to produce morally binding obligations, (2) which are binding at 
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least in part as a result of the authority’s institutional structure, and (3) these 
obligations must themselves be consistent with maximal equal autonomy.  
These three desiderata, I argued in Chapter 6, are best met by what I called the 
autonomy-justified conception of authority. On this view, an institution is 
authoritative (or a directive it issues is authoritative) and thus generates 
political obligation if it meets two conditions. The Dependence Condition 
requires that the institution act or effect action in ways which reflect our 
reasons, including autonomy as a presumptive good: no institution may thus 
claim authority, however it is constructed and however many people vote for its 
proposals, if those proposals are autonomy-hostile. Similarly, authorities may 
not coerce us with regards to non-presumptive goods or reasons which we do not 
in fact have – the proposals must either reflect actual shared reasons, or reasons 
to pursue presumptive goods, in order to be authoritative. The Equality 
Condition, meanwhile, stipulates that institutions and proposals must act or 
effect action in ways which tend towards maximal equal autonomy. This 
condition serves to filter potential directives which would be friendly towards 
autonomy in theory but hostile in practice, and to help us select between 
exclusive autonomy-friendly proposals. If two proposals would both be consistent 
with agents being powerful and authoritative over their lives, but under 
conditions of moderate scarcity one of them is less accessible than another, or 
would require disproportionate resource allocation, then the Equality Condition 
tells us to prefer the most accessible (or least expensive, etc.) proposal. These 
conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for authority and 
political obligation: an institution which meets both conditions can legitimately 
issue coercive directives, and legitimately justify this coercion on the basis of 
autonomy. 
 
2. Autonomy-Justified Authority, the State, and Anarchy 
There is now a coherent and unified picture of how autonomy and authority 
interact, and how the latter must operate in order to be justified by the former. 
I will finish by explicitly laying out why this picture strongly implies both 
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philosophical and political anarchism, without crudely lumping together all 
states as an indistinguishable and equivalent mass of ‘bad’. First, I show that the 
account of autonomy I have given requires relational standing and recognition 
respect which it is impossible to attain in (or at least because of) the state. Then, 
I move from this claim to the argument that states cannot therefore claim 
autonomy-justified authority: there may potentially be institutions within the 
state which can, but the basic assumption that we have any prima facie duties 
to obey the law in virtue of the state being a legitimate political authority is 
incorrect. 
2.1 Relational Autonomy and the State 
Recall that, on my view of autonomy and authority, we are not maximally 
autonomous if we lack respect in virtue of our agency; and if institutions do not 
grant and defend recognition respect to their participants, then they lack 
authority. This gives us a very straightforward and, I think, fairly convincing 
reason to think that states are inconsistent with agents being maximally 
autonomous: they do never, and can never, respect agents qua agents.  
At the absolute utmost, states grant respect to agents as state citizens, and 
often not even that. In order to be permitted to stand in a position of even basic 
respect within the various social-relational structures of, for example, the UK, 
one must be a British citizen (or one must be a very wealthy foreign citizen). 
Being an agent is not enough for one’s wishes to have prima facie normative 
force under these conditions; if an agent is an asylum seeker or so-called illegal 
immigrant, then their wishes are not granted even secondary importance by the 
British government. Let us be clear about this: reflexively disregarding (as 
opposed to denying after consideration) somebody’s desires is bad enough even 
if those desires concern cake, choice of film, or favoured seat. But refusing to 
take somebody’s need for safety or security as a fact of the first importance is 
essentially to regard their life as unimportant. Sometimes, perhaps, it might 
transpire that these needs are already met, or that greater needs must be met 
first, but you cannot claim to recognise and respect an agent qua agent if their 
request for vital assistance doesn’t stop you in your tracks. States, when they 
are concerned with agents at all, require a passport – or a skin – of the right 
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colour before they recognise that those agents’ wishes might have some 
normative weights. My having been born in such-and-such a place is not a 
relevant factor in whether or not I need to eat and keep a roof over my head; 
but if I and a non-national go to the dole office, it is not agency nor need but 
citizenship which will determine who gets social security.4  
These are, crucially, not contingent unpleasantnesses or mistakes in the 
functioning of a well-ordered society; these are conceptual necessities of the 
statist hierarchy.5 Any society which held the principle of recognition respect 
dear would not tolerate arbitrary divisions based on map lines, historical 
accident and injustice or superficial sexual characteristics. State organisation 
requires that there be those excluded from recognition, however, because 
without the power to exclude agents it is plausibly not a state. Weber’s 
definition of the state as a “human community which successfully claims the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (2004, p33) has 
maintained its usefulness for a reason, after all. Here’s an example: if nation-
states cannot treat agents differently in virtue of, say, different nationalities, 
then no state has the right to eject or arrest non-citizens just because they are 
non-citizens. But this means that their claim to sole legitimate use of force 
within a territory is unsuccessful: they do not, in fact, have the right (let alone 
sole right) to use force within a given territory if they cannot eject people from 
it. This is why the common response that (some) states are bad, but (no) states 
need to be will not fly. States must base their limited recognition of agents on 
morally arbitrary factors like place of birth; indeed, they are required to do so 
                                                          
4 An inequality which the government are doing their best to erase via the simple expedient of 
making sure nobody gets any social security, but there we are. 
5  It could be objected here that I’m deploying a concept-first analysis of the state for no good 
reason – why, the interlocutor can inquire, not just adopt another functional analysis such 
that there is no such conceptual necessity? This objection overlaps to some extent with the 
“state by any other name” criticism I consider later in the chapter, but is worth addressing 
here as well. Briefly, my response is this: neither the concepts of autonomy nor authority that 
I have used are made unrecognisable through being arrived at by functional analysis – 
autonomy is still to do with self-direction, and authority is still to do with legitimate 
coercion. But if we arrive at a concept of the state (as something like “the legitimate 
organising authority of some area or community”, I take it) which features no powers of 
exclusion or sole legitimate use of force, I think we have given a concept which no longer 
bears any relation to its usual understanding. This doesn’t, as it happens, strike me as a 
knock-down problem – as I suggest later on, if you want to call my picture of the anarchist 
society a state you’re free to do so – but it does invite the question of why we should use that 
term rather than any other.  
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on pain of losing their main claim to statehood. And, to reiterate the point, if 
you deny somebody the things they need for survival or flourishing because of 
morally arbitrary factors, you cannot pretend to be granting them recognition 
respect as an agent. 
The state is therefore incapable of providing one key requirement of being non-
dominated and thus autonomous, namely recognition respect in virtue of agency. 
As I now recapitulate, non-vulnerability is also necessarily absent from the 
relations citizens find themselves in under statist organisations. 
As I argued in Chapters 3 and 4, in order for us to be non-dominated, we must 
stand in relations which are hostile to arbitrary interference in our lives. If I am 
embedded in relations which mean that some person or group can decide how 
my life goes without reference to my own values, or the requirements of equal 
maximal autonomy, then I am vulnerable and hence dominated. The question is 
thus whether state organisation is compatible with relations of non-vulnerability, 
and the answer is that it is not. 
To give a particularly relevant example: the institution of the police must, if it is 
to serve its primary function of maintaining the state and its laws, be in a 
position of domination over citizens. If we genuinely had protection against 
arbitrary interference in our lives, then the police could not be used as a 
method to suppress political and economic opposition. But this is, in fact, how 
the police are used: the threat or reality of police interference in one’s life is a 
common and well commented upon tactic used to intimidate and silence 
challengers to particular policies or governments in general, and without the 
police having the ability to dominate citizens this tactic would not be effective.6  
It’s worth being clear about how this follows from what I’ve said about relational 
autonomy and the state: to focus narrowly on one aspect, agents A and B do not 
dominate each other so long as violence towards each other is equally forbidden 
(or sanctioned). That is, if the response to A clubbing B without provocation 
                                                          
6 It will not go unnoticed that this analysis both explains and has depressing implications 
regarding the currently high-profile murders of young black men by police in the United 
States (and, indeed, the British police’s murders of Mark Duggan, Paul Tomlinson, Sheku 
Bayou and many others) and the probability of any effective change being made by 
governments. 
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would be the same as the response to B clubbing A without provocation, neither 
are in this respect dominant over the other. This means, of course, that A 
cannot prevent B from organising strikes which threaten a particular economic 
orthodoxy by beating them up and being free to do it again – and A is thus 
powerless to maintain the state’s sole claim on legitimate violence. A is, in short, 
not a very useful police officer from the state’s perspective. It will not do, 
either, to claim that since we elect representatives we have any meaningful 
ability to change this state of affairs through reform. As I have argued 
consistently throughout the thesis, one of the features of a hierarchical political 
and economic system is that the non-elite are significantly less powerful to 
change policy than the elite even if there is some formal equality: we thus face 
a situation where the legislative tools to render the police non-dominating are 
kept out of our hands, in large part thanks to the ability of police to arbitrarily 
interfere (or threaten to interfere) with our lives.7  
Though there are plausible reasons for some kind of peace-keeping group in an 
anarchist society – appealing as, for example, Kropotkin’s (1972) faith in 
humanity’s basically benign nature is, it strikes me as unreliable and probably 
unjustified – such a group would look very different from the institution which 
exists first and foremost to protect the powerful and the current order of 
things.8  
The relational account of autonomy thus entails the incompatibility of the state 
and maximal autonomy in at least two key ways. First, states do not and cannot 
grant recognition respect in virtue of our agency. Most obviously, the existence 
of closed borders show that, at most, states are prepared to grant limited 
recognition respect only to their citizens or non-citizens who pass a suitably 
stringent test. Second, there are some kinds of power structures entailed by 
                                                          
7 Of course, people can and do effect change through direct action and other means which do 
not involve taking the parliamentary path. The point is thus not that a suitably reformed 
parliamentary system would solve these problems, but that no parliamentary system can 
solve these problems and the police are key players in making direct action as difficult and 
dispiriting as possible. The game is rigged, in other words, and the machinery of the state is 
firmly behind making it the only game in town. 
8 I specify “first and foremost” because the police clearly do play a role of protecting citizens, 
at least at some junctures. But this doesn’t give us any reason to think that’s their primary 
role, and nor does the fact that many or most of us would call the cops if we saw a gang 
beating up some victim: by analogy, I’d rather call Batman than let the Joker poison Gotham 
City, but given the option I’d rather be shot of them both. 
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what states are, and these structures are inconsistent with our being non-
vulnerable: a society structured such that there is a set of institutions which 
citizens are dominated by is not a society consistent with maximal equal 
autonomy, and this is how state societies are and must be structured. Just as 
you don’t get rich in an egalitarian society precisely because you don’t get poor, 
and racism plays no functional role when white skin gives you no unfair 
advantage, a society structured for maximal autonomy would not and could not 
co-exist with an institution which exercised domination over members of that 
society. The police are one such institution, but so are states themselves: the 
former are simply one particular manifestation of the latter’s dominance.  
This is not, of course, to regurgitate the leftist fallacy that come the revolution, 
everything will be fine; you cannot just topple the superstructure and assume 
that the base will change, to borrow (or perhaps expropriate) the Marxist notion. 
Equally, it is possible, as I have indicated throughout this thesis, for some states 
to be better than others – there are obvious reasons to prefer liberal social 
democracy to a Victorian laissez-faire state, and to prefer either to Nazi 
Germany. Autonomy is a matter of the social relations that we actually find 
ourselves in, and those relations can be more or less constitutive of autonomy 
depending on what defines and controls the nature and interaction of those 
relations. Ultimately, though, if we desire a society where everyone stands in 
relations of power and authority over their lives, without domination of others, 
then we cannot be statists; and we ought, I think, to desire that society. 
2.2 Autonomy-Justified Authority and the State 
If we accept these arguments, then there is one trivially obvious reason why 
states may not claim autonomy-justified authority. Since maximal equal 
autonomy is inconsistent with statism, and a requirement of the autonomy-
justified conception is that authorities claiming it act in ways consistent with 
maximal equal autonomy, states cannot claim autonomy-justified authority. It is 
still worth taking a moment to explore whether states can act to promote 
autonomy and in ways consistent with equal autonomy: I have already claimed 
that we can have autonomy-minded reasons to think of some state directives as 
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being authoritative, after all, and this apparent contradiction requires 
explanation. 
I argue that while we do have reasons to obey or participate in at least some 
state directives, and that at least some of these reasons are given to us as a 
result of valuing autonomy, they do not amount to making the state 
authoritative (in the autonomy-justified sense). That is, we have autonomy-
minded reasons to obey some of the state’s laws, but no reasons which would 
line up with the state having autonomy-justified authority – there is something 
like political obligation which is given to us in virtue of our political goals, not in 
virtue of the putative authority being constituted such that it meets the 
Dependence and Equality Conditions. Thus, either the state cannot claim 
autonomy-justified authority but some of its constituent institutions can – which 
is in fact consistent with what I have already said about autonomy-justified 
authority – or we have fairly weak prima facie obligations to obey the state 
which are not actually political obligations (as in the case where we have an 
obligation to obey Nazi speed limits without this being a political obligation 
generated by the state). These options are not, I think, exclusive. 
Take one example from the previous chapter, the introduction of equal marriage 
in the UK. I said there that, pace arguments about the institution of marriage, 
we seem likely to have equality-minded obligations to obey and work within laws 
extending the marriage franchise. The Equality Condition, I claimed, plausibly 
was met by a directive which so extended marriage, if we presumed that “more 
equality within the state” was better for autonomy than “less equality within 
the state”, and that a directive legislating equal marriage would in fact make 
citizens more equal. Unless we are to believe that any state sanctioning (or 
expansion) is inconsistent with folks being more autonomous than before, then 
more equality within the state being better for autonomy, and the extension of 
marriage making folks more equal, seem like reasonable presuppositions.  
Now, there are plausible worries about the way the decision has been taken in 
regards to the Equality Condition, in particular worries related to representative 
democracy. Even if we have the right result (in terms of the Equality Condition), 
it’s been arrived at through a decision-making process which systematically 
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disempowers agents who aren’t members of the economic or political boss class. 
Without dismissing such worries, though, I think we can still argue that they 
don’t entail an inability to meet the Equality Condition. Since every state 
decision will have this feature of limited democratic legitimacy, it is not a 
question of the democratic shortfall requiring disobedience rather than 
compliance with this particular law, but of whether maximal equal autonomy is 
better served by compliance or disobedience. In this case, however, note that 
nothing about this qualified meeting of the Equality Condition suggests that we 
are obliged to obey the law and do nothing else. We are not, in other words, 
obliged to obey the law and refrain from trying to abolish marriage (or the state) 
entirely; we are merely obliged not to take up a contrarian position of 
disobeying any and all laws because they are the directives of a fundamentally 
undemocratic state. 
So far, we either have a very tentative satisfaction of the Equality Condition, or 
simply a reason given by autonomy’s internal equality requirement, which 
demands obedience to equal marriage laws. Given what I have said about the 
autonomy-justified conception previously, something’s meeting the Equality 
Condition suggests that it should meet the Dependence Condition as well. If the 
proposal will in fact tend towards maximal equal autonomy, it seems likely 
(though not logically entailed) that it reflects the autonomy-minded reasons we 
have for obedience to authorities in the first place. Interestingly, though, that 
does not seem to be the case in respect of equal marriage laws. For example, 
our presumptive reasons regarding autonomy do not suggest that our cultural 
and relationship practices ought to be determined by representative democracy, 
and it is unlikely that every citizen actually has a non-presumptive reason to 
favour equal marriage.  
We might, nonetheless, think that there is a move to be made which roughly 
parallels our reasons to think the Equality Condition still applies in non-ideal 
circumstances. We have no autonomy-minded reasons to bring about the state 
and its sanctioning of relationships, the argument runs, but given that we have 
both the state and state-sanctioned relationships, we have autonomy-minded 
reasons to expand the latter as broadly as possible. Given that autonomy is a 
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presumptive good, it is therefore not required for every citizen to have non-
presumptive reasons to favour equal marriage, and the Dependence Condition is 
satisfied. As with the Equality Condition, any obligation as a result of this is very 
limited – we ought to obey the law, but have no requirement to then try and 
maintain the legal system.9 
Now, though, there is an anarchist objection to field. After all this huffing and 
puffing, have I not ended up with an account of authority and anarchy which in 
the final analysis is pretty much indistinguishable from some kind of woolly 
reformism? If states can generate political obligation in virtue of being not quite 
so bad as they might be, then the Hobbesian or pseudo-Hobbesian claim that it is 
vital to maintain the state – because the alternative is worse – seems to follow 
along pretty closely behind. 
I can reject this argument for two reasons. First, our obligations to obey “better 
than the current alternatives” laws are, as I have suggested, not obligations to 
obey them and then stop fighting for a better society. Certainly, we should be 
wary of having our organisational energies diverted into reformism; but nothing 
about the suggestion that we ought to obey equal marriage laws implies that we 
have to either aim to bring such laws about, or employ those tactics endorsed by 
liberal democracy to do so. Indeed, many laws which we can think of as better 
than nothing or better than the current alternatives – working time directives, 
employment rights, social security – have been brought about as the result of a 
government running scared in the face of direct action with much more 
fundamental goals than reform. That the laws exist doesn’t mean that the work 
is done, but it seems plausible to say that we ought not to seek to overturn them 
just to prove how much more radical than thou we are or that we cannot be 
bought off with reformist sops.  
Second, it still does not seem that we do have a general obligation to obey the 
state: if equal marriage laws, to stay with the same example, do in fact meet 
                                                          
9 Although this does, rightly, suggest that autonomy-motivated anarchism cannot just aim at 
removing the state. If we object to letting the state have the power to privilege some 
relationships over others, we are committed to changing society such that legal recognition is 
not required to ameliorate other oppressive structures, not just paring the powers of the 
state. The state is a particularly obvious and formal-institutional example of an unjust power 
hierarchy, but it is not the only one. 
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the Dependence and Equality Conditions, it won’t be the case that every law 
does and thus generates obligations. If there is some challenge to equal marriage, 
for example, and a law is passed repealing the decision, then ceteris paribus 
there is no obligation to obey it. Under conditions of background inequality and 
democratic shortfall, in other words, some policy having been made an 
institutional directive is no reason at all to think that it generates obligations. If 
two directives pass exactly the same procedural requirements but have different 
authoritative status, then they are not getting their authority from the 
legislating institution but from external considerations (about autonomy, justice, 
etc.). To say that we might have some obligations to obey some laws, in short, is 
in no way to accept that the state’s creation of a law gives us even a prima facie 
reason to obey it. 
The answer to the question of whether states can claim autonomy-justified 
authority, then, is a negative but a complex one. States cannot claim autonomy-
justified authority, but it is possible that some of their participant institutions 
can, iff it makes sense to think of those institutions as claiming political 
authority at all. It is also possible that states cannot claim autonomy-justified 
authority but may still issue directives which we are obliged to obey thanks to 
independent moral reasons.  
It’s conceivable, for example, that some hypothetical allotment committee set 
up by local government might be able to claim the autonomy justification 
despite being part of the machinery of the state, so that it can issue (very 
limited) authoritative demands. Equally, although we have good reasons to do 
what, for example, firefighters and paramedics tell us, it seems odd to say that 
they are members of institutions which have political authority – rather, they 
make morally obligatory demands which, as it happens, are co-extensive in this 
instance with the demands made by the state. In either case, that we have 
reasons to comply with some state institutions does not entail that the state has 
autonomy-justified authority. 
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2.3 Autonomy-Justified Authority and Anarchy 
The objection above, that my account of authority ends up committing us to a 
liberal reformism in effect if not in theory, has a corollary which is worth 
addressing in its own right. The corollary is this: even if I’m correct that 
autonomy-justified authority does not explicitly require statism or reformism, 
any institution which can legitimately claim it will end up looking very like or in 
effect being a state. The “state by any other name” objection is familiar, but I 
rehearse it here for the sake of clarity.10 
The criticism runs as follows. On my account, there is some institution (or more 
likely group of institutions) which can legitimately tell us what to do in some 
contexts. Further, these institutions do have powers of coercion – what powers 
exactly cannot be reasoned out a priori, but they must include the power and 
right to restrain and constrain folk under some circumstances, and to 
expropriate certain resources. If they don’t have these powers then they cannot 
serve the role of defending and promoting relations of maximal equal autonomy, 
and so fail to be effective authorities. But powers of legitimate coercion over 
non-consenting individuals are surely, as Weber (op. cit.) suggests, the hallmark 
of the state. Now, perhaps the state implied by my account is a very different 
state to the ones we are familiar with – it is radically egalitarian, directly 
democratic, and very decentralised – but it is a state nonetheless. And an 
anarchism which includes a theory of the legitimate state is a very odd 
anarchism indeed. 
One possible response here is just to dismiss the objection as a taxonomical 
quibble, and I don’t think this response is entirely without merit. The anarchist 
objection to the state, after all, is not an objection to the idea that others may 
have legitimate authority over us, nor an objection to the existence of 
organising bodies.11 If somebody wants to insist that any kind of organisational 
                                                          
10 See, for example, Miller’s (1984) critical overview of anarchist thought. 
11 See, e.g., Malatesta for both an endorsement and a rejection of my historical claim here. On 
the one hand, he makes it clear that persistent non-compliers should be ejected from free 
associations: “these malcontents cannot fairly demand that the wishes of many others should 
be sacrificed for their sake” (1965, p29). This looks like a pretty clear endorsement of the 
idea that there can be organising bodies with legitimate rights to use force at least so far as 
necessary to exclude agents. On the other hand, he speaks in Anarchy of not using 
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network or set of institutions which can legitimately make demands is a state, it 
is tempting to shrug and let them have at it. But there is, I think, a key 
distinction between the state and the kinds of organisation that I argue can be 
legitimately authoritative, and a distinction which makes the taxonomical 
response redundant.  
The distinction between anarchistic autonomy-justified authorities and the 
authority of states is that autonomy-justified authorities need claim neither sole 
nor general rights of coercion, while states claim both. Here is one example: the 
co-operative which oversees food production and distribution in my region 
determines that some area of fallow land should be turned over to growing 
something or other. We vote on it and approve the proposal – and check with 
other organising bodies to make sure that there are no competing proposals 
which don’t involve food – but some die-hard grass-counter takes to making a 
nuisance of themselves so that planting can’t begin. The committee will, I take 
it, endorse coercion to prevent this from happening, and will (by hypothesis) be 
justified in doing so. But there is nothing saying that forcibly removing the 
dissenter from the field has to be done by some agricultural compliance team, or 
that the removal must be cleared with them first. Similarly, there is no 
implication that the decision legitimates any coercion beyond removing the 
dissenter; the committee does not and cannot claim the right to, for example, 
exclude the dissenter from the distribution of resources as punishment.  
Contrast this with state coercion: if a parallel decision is made, and the grass-
counter again obstructs the carrying out of that decision, then the coercion is 
justified solely by reference to the authority of the state. There is a superficial 
similarity with the anarchist example – in both cases, a decision results in 
legitimate coercion – but when the food co-op’s decision justifies coercion, it is 
the fact that the decision is in the interests of maximal equal autonomy which 
justifies the coercion. That they have made the decision is or should be a good 
                                                                                                                                                                                
“expressions such as ‘abolition of the state’....substituting for it the clearer and more 
concrete term ‘abolition of government” (p14), and of anarchy as “society without 
government” (p15) where more commonly anarchists speak of society without rulers. I tend 
to think that from what he says elsewhere in Anarchy and his other works that he is in fact 
using “government” to refer to a representative or hierarchical system of rulership, rather 
than simply an institution for co-ordinating and producing public goods, but the reader may 
disagree. 
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sign that the proposal does indeed defend or promote autonomous relations, but 
it is not the case that coercion is justified simply because the committee has 
made the decision. Our right to coerce non-compliers in this case is suggested by, 
not dependent upon, the committee decision; when the state sanctions coercion, 
any rights to coerce are solely derivative from their being sanctioned by the 
state. A group of people who removed the agent from the land without state 
approval might very well find themselves up on charges.  
So, states claim sole right of coercion where autonomy-justified authorities do 
not; they also claim general rights of coercion where autonomy-justified 
authorities do not. State coercion of the grass-counter will not be limited to 
their removal from this particular piece of land. Non-compliance with a 
particular state directive results in a general forfeiture of rights against coercion. 
The obvious instance would be when, in our example, the state decides to 
imprison the dissenter and justifies this very broad coercion by reference to its 
own authority. That is to say, having claimed the right to coerce the individual 
just by dint of that individual’s disobedience of the law, the state then claims 
the right to coerce and punish them in ways which are unconnected with and do 
not further the original proposal. The coercion is a general punishment for 
lawbreaking, not a means to ensure the efficacy of the food production directive. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In Section 2, I reran some anarchist arguments against the state and police in 
the context of my accounts of autonomy and authority, and argued that an 
anarchist society with autonomy-justified authorities was neither self-
contradictory nor a state by another name. What I have not done is give any 
concrete account of how we are to move from our hierarchical, statist society to 
the anarchism of social-relational autonomy I have advocated in the thesis. 
Partly this is down to constraints of space, but mostly it’s because I have no 
exhaustively worked-out revolutionary how-to guide. 
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Still, I think some rough suggestions are implied by the preceding theoretical 
fandango. First, the anarchist core principle of bottom-up organisation is 
reaffirmed by the account of autonomy as relationally constituted and requiring 
non-domination. A government policy or reform which (say) increases social 
security may very well make folk better off than they were before, but the 
structure of the reform – proceeding from party lines or calculations of political 
expediency, and imposed by a dominating body – is still analogous to 
slaveholders deciding to make their slaves more comfortable in order to get 
more work out of them or stave off a revolt. When we organise directly, 
however, shutting down factories, resisting evictions, and so on, we are (albeit 
incompletely and perhaps temporarily) making ourselves less vulnerable to 
interference from those dominating agents by restructuring the relations 
ourselves in a way which is both consistent with, and required for, greater equal 
autonomy for agents. 
Second, I have shown that the charge of hyper-individualism against anarchism, 
in particular autonomy-motivated anarchism, does not stick. The argument 
which does this, however – the argument that relational autonomy requires 
relations of equal autonomy – entails that we have obligations of solidarity and 
support which are far from limited to resisting the state. The state sanctions and 
enforces racism, misogyny, homophobia, inequality; but so too do non-state 
organisations. When we reject the police as a means of fighting fascism and 
racism, we must do it ourselves, organising directly against fascist and racist 
groups and working to eradicate hierarchies of privilege and power. If autonomy-
minded anarchism is to be consistent with a social rather than individualist 
outlook, in other words, it must consist of more than anti-statism. 
Third, and relatedly, to engage with fundamentally and fatally flawed 
institutions is not to be a bad anarchist, or a dupe of the state – at least, not 
necessarily. My membership of a reformist trade union is indeed predicated on 
the existence of capitalism; reformist trades unions essentially exist to mediate 
the relationship between boss and worker, and that is not a relationship which 
exists in an egalitarian and anarchist society. But it is still a tool – a limited, 
ultimately unreliable tool – to make things a little bit better. We do badly as 
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anarchists if we rely on union bureaucracy and government mediation to bring 
about a better society, but I think we also do badly to insist on doctrinal purity 
over material improvements in our relational standing. Reform at the cost of 
revolution would not be worth fighting for; but it is very rare that we actually 
find ourselves faced with such a dichotomy, and it does nobody any favours to 
dismiss concrete victories as mere chimerae. You can’t, to quote Howard Zinn 
(and a thousand lefty think-pieces), be neutral on a moving train, and the folk 
fighting for higher wages or better healthcare are not our class enemies just in 
virtue of their statism. 
Ultimately, and perhaps appropriately, my thesis’ novelty lies more in the way it 
explains the relation between autonomy, authority and anarchy than in any 
particular definition or description of the concepts. If we value self-direction 
and inter-personal relationships, we ought to adopt relational autonomy; if we 
are relationalists about autonomy, then we ought to be anarchists; and if we are 
social rather than individualist anarchists, then we ought to have some working 
concept of political authority. This extended and tortuous formulation is not, I 
admit, anywhere near as catchy as “I am not free until everybody around me is 
free” – but it amounts to saying the same thing.
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